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SUMMARY 
The  present  study  traces  the  political  history  of  Na  Fianna 
Eireann,  the  Irish  Republican  youth  organisation,  from  its  founda- 
tion  in  1909  to  the  replacement  of  the  Official  body  in  1976.  In 
addition  to  the  main  narrative  several  of  the  appendices  provide 
accounts  of  organisations  related  to  Fianna,  including  its 
Provisional  off-shoot  which  bears  the  same  name  and  survives  to  the 
present  day. 
The  study  is  based  on  a  variety  of  first-hand  sources,  including 
publications  and  internal  documents  of  Fianna  and  the  Republican 
movement,  written  statements,  official  records,  contemporary  news- 
papers  and  extensive  interview  material.  The  wider  political  back- 
ground  is  adumbrated  by  reference  to  recognised  primary  and 
secondary  sources. 
Founded  as  a  National  Boy  Scout  body  to  rival  the  Baden-Powell 
movement,  Fianna  was  soon  transformed  into  a  military  organisation 
and  as  such  participated  during  the  decade  1913-23  in  events  that 
shaped  the  course  of  Irish  history.  Its  members  figured  notably  in 
the  founding  of  the  Irish  Volunteers,  the  preparations  for  the 
Rising  of  1916,  Easter  Week  itself,  and  the  Anglo-Irish  and  Civil 
Wars  that  followed  it.  After  the  latter  it  reverted  to  the  role  of 
non-participating  cadet  force  and  gradually  declined  in  size  and 
importance  as  the  intransigent  Republican  movement  of  which  it  was 
a  part  became  reduced  to  the  status  of  irritant  in  the  Irish  politi- 
cal  arena.  Not  until  the  outbreak  of  the  most  recent  Troubles  in 
1969  did  it  again  play  a  significant  part  in  events  of  national 
moment. 
The  study  attempts  to  reflect  these  fluctuations  in  its  for- 
tunes  and  concerns  over  the  years,  and  while  devoting  considerable viii 
space  to  its  activities  and  the  events  in  which  its  members  parti- 
cipated  seeks  also  to  explain  its  inner  development.  Thus  the 
author  has  inserted  within  the  chronological  narrative  analyses  of 
the  ideological  and  organisational  context  of  its  foundation,  its 
later  structural  changes,  its  development  in  relation  to  the  adult 
movement  and  the  effects  upon  it  of  radical  changes  in  the  movement 
after  1962. 
Fianna's  relationship  with  successive  adult  Separatist  and 
Republican  organisations  in  fact  represents  the  most  recurrent 
theme  of  the  study,  appropriately  so  in  that  they  largely  determined 
its  character,  development  and  final  demise.  Its  position  vis-ä- 
vis  the  Irish  Republican  Brotherhood  (1911-22)  and  the  Volunteers 
(1913-22),  its  standing  within  the  national  army  under  the 
Republican  Däils  (1919-22),  its  association  with  the  I.  R.  A.  over 
half  a  century  following  the  Civil  War,  its  own  attempts  to  change 
in  response  to  the  metamorphosis  of  Republicanism  in  the  1960s  and 
its  reaction  to  the  Provisional-Official  split  of  1969-70  are  all 
treated  in  some  detail.  These  sections  of  the  study  are  of  central 
ýr  relevance  to  the  political  history  or  Fianna,  but  in  addition  it  is 
hoped  that  they  may  shed  some  fresh  light  on  the  history  of 
-Republicanism  in  general  and  offer  points  of  comparison  with  other 
political  youth  organisations. ix 
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Note: 
Accents  may.  be  included  or  omitted  over  capital  letters  in  Irish. 
Their  inclusion  or  omission  in  the  present  text  follows  the  usage 
of  the  original  sources  quoted. 
Irish  spelling  has  been  modernised  and  standardised  since  the 
foundation  of  Fianna.  In  the  present  text  both  old  and  new 
spellings  are  used,  according  to  the  usage  of  the  sources  quoted, 
except  in  the  case  of  words  (such  as  'slua'  for  example)  which 
occur  throughout  the  narrative;  these  have  been  given  the  modern 
standard  spelling. xiv 
A  NOTE  ON  NOMENCLATURE 
For  the  sake  of  consistency  the  present  study  follows  the  nor- 
mal  word  usage  of  the  documentary  and  interview  sources  upon  which 
it  is  based.  Thus,  for  instance,  adult  Republicanism  is  commonly 
referred  to  as  'the  senior  movement',  and  Northern  Ireland  as  'the 
Six  Counties'  or  'the  North';  the  city  of  Derry  is  given  its  his- 
torical  not  its  British  name;  and  the  term  'the  Army'  applies  not 
to  the  British  or  Southern  Government  forces  but  to  the  I.  R.  A. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
THE  STRUCTURE  AND  PURPOSE  OF  THE  STUDY 
The  study  that  follows  is  the  first  attempt  to  present  an 
extended  political  history  of  Fianna  Eireann 
l, 
the  Irish  National 
Scouts.  The  fortunes  of  Fianna,  as  of  the  Republican  movement  of 
which  it  was  a  part,  fluctuated  considerably  during  the  seventy 
years  of  its  existence  and  its  history  falls  into  a  number  of 
fairly  distinct  phases.  These  are  marked  by  chapter  divisions  in 
the  present  study. 
During  the  first  four  years  from  its  foundation  in  1909,  the 
infant  organisation  struggled  to  establish  and  define  itself 
(chapter  1). 
With  the  founding  of  the  Irish  Volunteers  in  autumn  1913 
Fianna's  role  changed  radically  through  its  close  association  with 
the  new  adult  army,  in  which  many  of  its  officers  held  dual  member- 
ship.  In  1915  it  adopted  a  military  structure  appropriate  to  its 
increasingly  military  role  (chapter  3). 
The  majority  of  its  Dublin  officers  and  seniors  were  mobilised 
for  the  Rising  of  Easter  week  1916,  in  which  they  fought  alongside 
the  Volunteers  and  the  Citizen  Army.  Juniors  were  excluded  from 
the  action,  but  a  number  found  their  way  into  the  insurgent  posts 
during  the  week.  Fiannai  were  among  those  executed  and  interned 
after  the  surrender  (chapter  4). 
In  the  five  years  that  followed  the  Rising  Fianna  expanded  as 
Republicanism  came  to  be  the  dominant  political  force  in  Ireland. 
At  the  same  time  its  association  with  the  Volunteers  was  progres- 
sively  formalised  until  with  the  establishment  of  Dail  Eireann  in 
1919  it  was  incorporated  into  the  'Army  of  the  Republic'  as  an 
autonomous  section,  under  the  Ministry  of  Defence.  As  such  its 2 
members  fought  in  the  Anglo-Irish  War  and  continued  to  train  after 
the  Truce  of  July  1921  (chapter  5). 
The  Däil's  ratification  of  the  Treaty  with  Britain  in  January 
1922  split  both  the  political  movement  and  the  Republican  Army, 
decimated  Fianna,  and  brought  on  a  Civil  War  in  which  the  evapor- 
ating  remnant  of  the  youth  organisation  fought  on  the  side  of  the 
Republic  to  the  point  of  virtual  extinction  (chapter  6). 
Rebuilding  after  the  defeat  of  1923  Fianna  relinquished  its 
formal  association  with  the  I.  R.  A.  and  its  directly  military  role, 
reverting  to  independent  status  as  a  scouting  organisation  within 
the  Republican  movement.  From  this  date  its  Northern  section 
developed  a  quite  distinct  character  from  its  counterpart  in  the 
Free  State,  in  consequence  of  its  different  needs  and  its  illegal 
status  under  the  Stormont  government.  The  adult  movement's  re- 
surgence  from  1927  and  its  diminution  after  1934  were  reflected  in 
a  rise  and  decline  in  the  membership  of  the  youth  organisation, 
which  was  in  addition  now  forced  to  compete  for  recruits  with  the 
newly  formed  Catholic  Boy  Scouts  of  Ireland.  Fianna  did  not 
participate  in  the  I.  R.  A.  's  1940  bombing  campaign  in  England  with 
which  the  period  ends  (chapter  7). 
Between  1940  and  1945,  which  mark  the  nadir  of  Republican  for- 
tunes,  Fianna  barely  maintained  the  thread  of  existence.  After  a 
decade  of  partial  recovery,  dominated  by  controversy  as  to  Fianna's 
standing  with  the  movement,  the  I.  R.  A.  opened  its  Border  campaign 
in  1956,  in  which  a  number  of  Fianna  officers  took  part.  The 
public's  initial  enthusiasm  for  the  campaign,  which  brought  a  brief 
upsurge  of  recruitment  to  Fianna,  was  already  on  the  wane  in  its 
silver  jubilee  year  of  1959  and  had  evaporated  long  before  the 
ceasefire  in  1962  (chapter  8). 3 
The  failure  of  the  campaign  prompted  the  Republican  leadership 
to  initiate  radical  changes  in  the  movement,  the  effects  of  which 
were  beginning  to  be  felt  in  Fianna  when  violence  erupted  in  the 
North  in  1969.  Fianna's  military  involvement,  in  Belfast  particu- 
larly,  greatly  enhanced  its  membership  and  importance  there  and  so 
further  widened  the  gulf  between  the  organisation  North  and  South 
(chapter  9). 
The  crisis  also  precipitated  the  Official-Provisional  split  in 
the  adult  movement  in  1970  in  which,  after  a  year  of  neutrality, 
Fianna  took  the  Official  side.  But  the  split  had  further  reduced 
an  organisation  already  ailing  in  the  South.  The  Official  move- 
ment,  which  was  now  emphasising  political  action  and  had  called  a 
ceasefire  in  summer  1972,  concluded  that  Fianna  in  its  present  form 
was  dysfunctional  to  its  aims  -  ineffective  in  the  South  and  in- 
corrigibly  military  in  the  North  (chapter  10). 
Between  1973  and  1975  the  possibility  of  its  radical  re- 
organisation  was  investigated  and,  despite  strong  support  for  such 
a  course  in  Belfast,  finally  rejected.  In  1975  the  movement  voted 
to  establish  a  new  political  youth  movement  to  replace  it,  a 
decision  implemented  the  following  year  (chapter  11). 
During  Fianna's  year  of  neutrality  its  Provisional  members, 
unable  to  gain  a  majority  on  the  executive,  established  a  separate 
organisation  of  the  same  name  within  the  Provisional  movement.  As 
an  offshoot  of  the  constituted  body,  and  thus  not  a  direct  descend- 
ant  of  the  organisation  founded  in  1909,  Provisional  Fianna's 
subsequent  history  is  not  included  in  the  main  text  of  the  present 
study.  However,  as  an  organisation  that  has  outlived  its  Official 
rival  and  played  a  part  in  the  military  campaign  of  the  Provisionals 
for  the  past  decade  it  is  made  the  subject  of  a  major  appendix. 4 
Other  appendices  present  accounts  of  the  boys'  organisation 
Fianna  Eireann  founded  in  Belfast  in  1902,  which  provided  a  name  for 
the  1909  body  and  to  some  extent  influenced  its  form;  the  Irish  Citi- 
zen  Army  Scouts  (1914-1916)  largely  modelled  on  Fianna;  Fianna's  own 
sporadic  attempts  to  set  up  branches  outside  Ireland;  and  Pensions 
Acts  relevant  to  Fianna  passed  by  the  Free  State  Government. 
Although  the  basic  structure  of  the  study  is  chronological  it 
was  not  the  author's  intention  to  write  an  account  complete  in 
every  detail,  nor  would  this  have  been  possible  in  a  narrative  of 
thesis  length  spanning  seven  decades.  As  the  political  history  of 
a  youth  organisation  the  study  has  certain  thematic  aims,  and  it 
was  these  that  determined  the  choice  of  emphasis  and  omission. 
It  attempts,  firstly,  to  place  Fianna  as  an  organisational  type 
at-its  foundation  in  the  context  of  contemporary  youth  organisations, 
and  to  locate  such  structural  changes  as  it  underwent  later; 
secondly,  to  place  its  genesis  and  subsequent  development  in  the 
context  of  contemporary  political  events;  and  thirdly,  to  explore 
its  ongoing  relationship  with  the  Republican  movement  and  the  in- 
fluence  of  the  latter  upon  it  (for  though  Fianna  influenced  and  was 
influenced  by  the  wider  political  developments  in  Ireland  the  pro- 
cess  was  usually  indirect:  as  a  youth  wing  its  first  and  most  im- 
mediate  'context'  was  the  parent  movement  itself). 
In  the  course  of  his  enquiry  the  author  came  to  recognise 
these  themes  as  keys  to  an  understanding  of  Fianna's  history.  In 
structuring  the  thesis  they  have  been  woven  into  the  chronological 
presentation  that  subserves  them.  Thus  Fianna  is  defined  as  an 
organisational  type  and  placed  in  the  contexts  of  early  twentieth 
century  youth  movements  and  of  contemporary  political  events  in 
chapter  2.  The  far-reaching  organisational  changes  made  in  1915 5 
and  reversed  ten  years  later  are  analysed  in  chapters  3  and  7  res- 
pectively.  The  wider  political  context  within  which  Fianna  devel- 
oped  forms  a  recurrent  theme  through  the  study.  Fianna's  relation- 
ship  with  the  adult  movement  is  explored  in  a  number  of  chapter 
sections  -  its  domination  by  the  Irish  Republican  Brotherhood  in 
chapters  1,3  and  6;  its  early  association  with  the  Volunteers  in 
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chapter  3;  its  absorption  into  the  Army  of  the  Republic  (1919-21), 
in  chapter  5;  the  temporary  severing  of  its  association  with  the 
Dail  and  Army  in  spring  1922  in  chapter  5;  its  relationship  with 
the  I.  R.  A.  in  later  years  in  chapters  7,9  and  10.  The  changes 
initiated  within  the  adult  movement  in  the  1960s,  with  the  problems 
of  relationship,  role  and  identity  that  these  posed  for  the  youth 
wing,  are  analysed  in  chapters  9  and  10,  and  their  solution  traced 
in  chapter  11.  Finally,  the  Conclusion  attempts  an  overall 
assessment  of  the  subject  based  on  the  foregoing  themes. 
It  should  be  clear  from  the  historical  overview  of  Fianna  pre- 
sented  above  that  its  history  broadly  corresponds  to  distinct  periods 
in  the  history  of  the  Republican  movement  as  a  whole.  It  was  indeed 
a  crucial  characteristic-of  it,  and  one  that  set  limits  on  its  poten- 
tial,  that  it  was  never  able  to  develop  independently  of  the  parent 
movement  and  as  such  can  only  be  understood  in  reference  to  it. 
The  fact  that  the  present  study  is  the  first  extended  politi- 
cal  history  of  Fianna  is  the  main  and  (the  author  believes)  suf- 
ficient  justification  for  compiling  it.  But,  as  it  has  been 
illuminated  throughout  by  reference  to  the  senior  movement,  so  it 
is  hoped  that  it  occasionally  throws  some  new  light  upon  the  for- 
tunes  and  processes  of  that  movement  which  may  be  of  benefit  to 
those  who  study  Republicanism.  And  in  addition,  as  a  case  study 
it  may  perhaps  offer  some  useful  points  of  comparison  to  the  student 6 
of  political  youth  organisations  in  general. 
In  view  of  the  close  association  between  Fianna  and  the  adult 
movement  it  is  of  relevance  to  the  present  study  that,  in  one 
important  sense,  the  history  of  Republicanism  between  1909  and  the 
1970s  falls  naturally  into  two  parts,  between  which  the  years 
1922-23  form  a  watershed. 
In  its  pre-1922  era  the  movement  was  in  ascendant.  Though  its 
adherents  remained  few  in  number  before  the  1916  Rising,  at  which 
date  its  influence  appeared  to  be  insignificant  and  its  goals  quite 
unrealistic,  it  can  be  seen  with  hindsight  to  have  grasped  the  init- 
iative  and  directed  the  course  of  events  even  in  this  period  of  ob- 
scurity.  Before  the  end  of  the  era  it  commanded  the  support  of  the 
great  majority  of  Irish  people  outside  the  North-East  and  its  aim 
of  establishing  an  independent  Republic  seemed  not  beyond  its  reach. 
Its  post-1923  era  was  one  of  decline  and  initiative  lost. 
Abandoning  political  processes  for  the  argument  of  force  alone,  the 
movement  was  soon  by-passed  by  developments  in  Ireland  that  it  some- 
times  influenced  but  from  which  it  itself  gained  no  lasting  benefit. 
Further  reduced  by  division  in  its  own  ranks,  within  fifteen  years 
it  had  become  an  isolated,  extremist  minority,  an  irritant  on  the 
periphery  of  Irish  political  affairs.  And  so  it  remained,  rejected 
and  almost  forgotten  by  the  mass  of  the  people  except  when  its 
military  campaigns  brought  it  briefly  into  the  public  eye. 
It  is  true  that  from  the  1960s  Republicans  sought  to  reverse 
its  historical  decline  and  isolation  by  developing  an  open,  politi- 
cal  movement,  and  that  since  1970  the  Official  movement  has  taken 
this  aim  further  with  a  measure  of  success,  while  during  the  same 
period  the  Provisionals  have  sustained  a  campaign  that  in  strictly 
military  terms  has  been  more  successful  than  any  since  1921. 7 
The  verdict  of  history  may  therefore  yet  show  the  last  two  decades 
to  have  marked  a  turning  point  for  Republicanism  and  the  beginning 
of  a  new  era  in  its  history.  To  date,  however,  despite  their 
respective  successes,  the  Officials  and  the  Provisionals  remain 
minor  movements. 
As  a  mirror  of  adult  Republicanism,  Fianna  shared  its  early 
historical  importance  and  its  later  decline.  And  in  addition  it 
suffered  a  diminution  of  its  own  standing  within  the  movement  after 
the  Civil  War,  since  by  relinquishing  its  association  with  the  Army 
it  was  left  without  any  defined  status  or  demonstrably  essential 
role.  For  most  of  its  subsequent  history  it  remained  thus,  and 
the  changes  of  the  1960s  -  whatever  benefit  they  brought  to  the 
movement  as  a  whole  -  only  hastened  its  decline  and  made  its  end 
inevitable. 
The  duality  of  Fianna's  history  has  certain  implications  as 
regards  the  author's  treatment  of  his  subject.  In  particular,  it 
has  implications  regarding  the  source  material  available  to  him. 
THE  SOURCE  MATERIAL2 
As  might  be  expected,  there  exists  a  considerable  body  of 
written  evidence,  primary  and  secondary,  for  the  early  years,  and 
a  paucity  for  the  post-Civil  War  era.  In  the  latter  case, 
secondary  source  material  is  virtually  non-existent,  and  such  first- 
hand  references  as  are  available  are  almost  entirely  confined  to 
publications  and  internal  documents  of  the  Republican  movement  it- 
self.  The  imbalance  is  aptly  reflected  in  the  brief  history  of 
the  organisation  in  Fianna's  own  1964  Handbook3,  in  which  the  years 
1909-23  comprise  five-sixths  of  the  narrative  and  the  following 
four  decades  only  one  sixth. 
Among  published  primary  source  material  available  to  the 
researcher  the  accounts  written  by  Countess  Markievicz4,  Bulmer 8 
Hobson5  and  Liam  Mellows6  are  particularly  revealing  for  the 
1909-16  period,  as  the  work  of  Fianna's  co-founders  and  first 
national  organiser  respectively.  A  number  of  published  reminis- 
cences  of  the  Rising  include  references  to  the  participation  of 
Fianna  juniors  or  of  Fianna  seniors  serving  with  the  Volunteers. 
To  these  should  be  added  the  pamphlet  The  Fianna  Heroes  of  19167 
produced  by  the  Republican  women's  organisation  Cumann  na  mBan, 
which  largely  comprises  brief  biographies  of  those  members  who 
died  in  the  Rising.  Several  of  the  series  of  Fighting  Stories 
published  by  the  Kerryman  contain  first-hand  accounts  of  local 
Fianna  battalions  or  of  personnel,  those  for  Kerry  and  Limerick 
providing  fairly  detailed  records  of  the  part  played  by  the  youth 
organisation  in  the  Anglo-Irish  war  in  their  areas.  The  Dublin 
Brigade  Review9  produced  by  the  Old  I.  R.  A.  includes  a  chapter 
devoted  to  Fianna  containing  details  of  its  role  and  organisation 
in  the  capital  up  to  1921.  Briefer  first-hand  references  for 
this  period  are  to  be  found  in  the  published  historical  works  of 
Republican  activists,  accounts  written  for  the  press  by  former 
members,  and  in  the  Prison  Letters  of  Countess  Markievicz10. 
Almost  certainly,  much  valuable  manuscript  material  concerning 
Fianna  is  contained  within  the  corpus  of  statements  written  for  the 
Bureau  of  Military  History-by  persons  who  participated  in  the  in- 
dependence  struggle,  a  number  of  whom  held  dual  membership  in 
Fianna  and  the  Volunteers.  Unfortunately,  these  statements  remain 
meantime  in  the  Bureau's  archives  and  are  not  available  to 
researchers.  The  author  nevertheless  acquired  and  has  used  copies 
of  seven  of  them  particularly  germane  to  Fianna. 
Of  the  private  manuscript  collections  to  which  the  study 
refers,  the  Bulmer  Hobson  papers,  Barney  Mellows  collection  and  the 
Mrs.  Sidney  Czira  papers  in  the  National  Library  of  Ireland,  and 9 
the  collection  of  Eamon  Martin  (part  of  which  is  in  private  posses- 
sion)  are  especially  valuable  for  the  statements  and  correspondence 
they  contain.  The  first-named  includes  the  minute  book  of 
Hobson's  1902  Belfast  Fianna  whose  history  is  outlined  in  Appendix 
II.  The  National  Library  also  holds  the  prison  letters  of  George 
Plunkett  to  his  family. 
The  papers  of  Richard  Mulcahy,  I.  R.  A.  Chief-of-Staff  during  the 
period  that  Fianna  operated  under  the  Republican  Ministry  of 
Defence,  contain  vital  correspondence  with  Fianna  G.  H.  Q.  staff, 
local  Army  Brigade  reports  pertaining  to  Fianna,  and  a  crucial 
statement  on  the  position  of  the  youth  organisation  immediately 
after  the  Truce.  The  Mulcahy  papers  are  a  holding  of  the  National 
University,  as  are  the  collected  papers  of  Ernie  O'Malley  which  in- 
clude  brief  but  important  references  to  Fianna  between  the  Treaty 
and  the  Civil  War. 
The  archives  of  the  National  Museum  of  Ireland  contain  a 
bequest  by  Sean  Saunders  comprising  Fianna  G.  H.  Q.  correspondence 
and  internal  reports  which  throw  light  on  the  organisation's  standing 
in  spring  1922  and  its  reaction  to  the  split  in  the  movement  that 
followed  the  Treaty,  particularly  as  this  affected  its  relationship 
to  the  I.  R.  A.  and  the  Dail.  This  material  is  especially  useful  in 
view  of  the  scarcity  of  documentary  evidence  concerning  Fianna  for 
this  critical  phase  of  Irish  history. 
Surprisingly,  the  holdings  of  the  Kilmainham  Jail  Historical 
Museum  include  almost  nothing  of  relevance  to  the  present  study. 
From  the  founding  of  the  Irish  Volunteers  in  1913  to  the  with- 
drawal  of  British  troops  from  Ireland  in  1922  Fianna  regularly  came 
under  surveillance  by  British  Government  Intelligence,  particularly 
on  the  eve  of  the  Rising  and  during  the  Anglo-Irish  war,  as  witness 
references  in  Royal  Irish  Constabulary  County  Inspectors'  reports 10 
1915-16  and  1919-2111,  police  evidence  given  to  the  Royal  Commission 
on  the  Rebellion  (1916)12,  the  Castle's  collection  of  Documents 
Relative  to  the  Sinn  Fein  Movement13,  and  1921  issues  of  its  Weekly 
Summary.  The  activities  of  Fianna  personnel  were  also  on  occasion 
made  the  subject  of  questions  in  the  British  parliament,  and  thus 
receive  mention  in  the  pages  of  Hansard. 
Following  the  Free  State  government's  Military  Service  Pensions 
Act  of  1934  committees  were  established  to  compile  details  of  the 
service  of  Volunteers  during  the  independence  struggle  and  so  assess 
their  merit  for  state  pensions.  None  of  the  information  gathered 
has  been  made  available  to  the  public  to  date.  One  of  the  commit- 
tees  was  appointed  specifically  to  investigate  Fianna  service14. 
The  author  has  made  extensive  use  of  copies  of  its  notes  and  corres- 
pondence  and  its  compilations  for  G.  H.  Q.  staff  and  Dublin  city  and 
county  organisation  and  personnel  between  1909-23. 
Such  documentary  material  as  exists  for  the  post-Civil  War  era 
includes  notes  in  the  O'Malley  papers  of  meetings  held  for  the  re- 
construction  of  Fianna  after  the  ceasefire  of  1923,  and  references 
to  the  youth  organisation  in  Department  of  Justice  reports  compiled 
preparatory  to  the  Cosgrave  government's  anti-Republican  legislation 
of  193115.  The  author  has  been  able  to  obtain  little  internal 
written  documentation  for  the  following  three  decades  apart  from  an 
extended  memoir  covering  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  1940 
Bombing  campaign  written  by  Fianna's  national  organiser  of  that 
period 
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Very  probably,  few  records  remain.  In  the  im- 
poverished  youth  wing  of  a  hand-to-mouth  movement,  lacking  perma- 
nent  office  facilities  and  under  regular  surveillance,  communica- 
tion  was  more  often  by  the  spoken  than  the  written  word,  and  where 
the  latter  was  unavoidable  documents  were  quickly  destroyed. 11 
For  the  years  1960-76  a  considerable  body  of  material  is  con- 
tained  in  the  Fianna  file  at  the  offices  of  Sinn  Fein  the  Workers' 
Party  in  Dublin,  including  A.  G.  M.  agendas,  correspondence,  monthly 
slua  returns,  newsletters,  G.  H.  Q.  orders  and  Court  martial  details. 
The  file  is  fortunately  most  complete  for  the  years  1968-71,  which 
cover  Fianna's  expansion  from  1969  and  the  position  it  adopted  dur- 
ing  1970  concerning  the  split  in  the  adult  movement.  In  addition 
it  includes  thorough  documentation  of  the  debate  within  the 
Official  movement  between  1973-75  concerning  Fianna's  possible  re- 
construction  or  replacement. 
Separatist  and  Republican  newspapers,  journals,  bulletins  and 
other  publications,  including  several  series  produced  nationally  and 
locally  by  Fianna  itself,  provide  unbroken  coverage  of  the  youth 
organisation  from  its  foundation,  with  the  exception  of  the  years 
1940-48.  The  movement's  publications  have  always  served  as 
vehicles  for  internal  and  external  propaganda  and  for  this  reason 
statements  printed  in  them  sometimes  err  on  the  side  of  optimism: 
numbers  may  be  exaggerated  and  plans  or  hopes  described  as  accom- 
plished  facts.  Nor  in  the  case  of  Fianna  has  exaggeration  been 
propagandist  alone,  but  also  occasionally  the  result  of  internal 
deception.  It  has  been  not  unknown,  for  instance,  for  branches  to 
be  set  up  temporarily  prior  to  A.  G.  M.  s  for  the  sake  of  voting 
power,  while  the  secrecy  necessary  to  the  organisation  in  the  North 
has  on  occasion  been  used  to  similar  advantage. 
Republican  newspapers  nevertheless  provide  very  extensive 
coverage  of  Fianna  and  have  been  used  throughout  the  study.  For 
the  'middle  years',  particularly,  Fianna  notes  in  An  Phoblacht 
(published  from  1925  and  through  the  1930s)  and  The  United  Irishman 
(from  1948)  compensate  the  sparseness  of  other  written  material. 12 
The  study  also  refers  to  national  and  local  newspaper  sources  where 
these  throw  light  on  Fianna  activities  or  the  political  events  sur- 
rounding  them. 
Interview  material  represents  a  major  part  of  the  evidence 
collected  by  the  author.  In  all  sixty-nine  persons  were  inter- 
viewed  and  a  number  of  others  made  briefer  verbal  statements.  In 
addition,  use  has  been  made  of  interview  notes  in  the  case  of  two 
early  members  now  deceased.  Interviewees'  accounts  span  the  entire 
history  of  Fianna  and  every  critical  point  of  its  development,  in 
which  many  of  them  played  strategic  parts.  Most  of  those  inter- 
viewed  were  themselves  members  of  the  organisation;  in  these  cases 
the  name  list  given  at  the  conclusion  of  the  thesis  (pp.  433  ff. 
below)  normally  only  states  their  dates  of  membership  and  the  ranks 
they  attained,  but  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  most  graduated 
into  the  senior  movement  and  a  number  to  leadership  positions  in  it, 
where  they  maintained  an  interest  in  and  influence  upon  the  youth 
wing. 
Others  interviewed  include  relatives  and  close  associates  of 
deceased  Fianna  leaders,  those  senior  Republicans  centrally  res- 
ponsible  for  the  changes  in  the  movement  from  the  1960s  and  for 
disbanding  Fianna  ten  years  later,  the  founder-leaders  of  the  youth 
movement  that  replaced  it,  prominent  members  of  Provisional  Fianna, 
of  Republican  girls'  organisations  and  of  the  two  main  non- 
political  Scout  associations  in  Ireland,  and  the  sole  surviving  mem- 
ber  of  the  Irish  Citizen  Army  Scouts. 
A  certain  urban  bias  may  be  levelled  against  the  author's 
interview  sources,  a  dominance  of  Dublin,  Belfast  and  Cork  that 
reflects  but  somewhat  exaggerates  the  importance  of  these  areas 
during  much  of  Fianna's  history.  In  addition,  such  material 13 
carries  the  problem  of  reliability,  particularly  in  view  of  the  re- 
current  divisions  in  the  Republican  movement  over  the  years  and  the 
bitterness  that  has  often  followed  them.  It  was  therefore  desir- 
able  to  hear  both  sides  in  order  to  form  a  balanced  account  of 
controversial  matters  such  as  the  disputes  over  control  of  Fianna 
between  its  own  leadership  and  the  I.  R.  A.,  the  events  that  followed 
the  establishment  of  the  Provisionals  in  1970  or  those  that  led  to 
the  disbanding  of  Fianna. 
Such  limitations,  however,  were  more  than  compensated  by  the 
conceptual  depth  and  articulateness  of  almost  all  interviewees, 
their  thorough  familiarity  with  the  organisation  and  the  real  issues 
confronting  it,  and  their  objectivity  which  contrasted  notably  with 
the  sentimentality  of  some  written  sources.  In  addition,  they 
accorded  the  author  an  impressive,  not  to  say  at  times  a  disarming 
frankness,  barely  veiling  with  the  standard  euphemisms  of  the  move- 
ment  matters  sometimes  well  beyond  the  law.  I  remain  conscious  of 
my  obligations  to  the  living  and  have  left  some  things  unsaid  and 
given  to  others  a  mask  of  anonymity.  Interviewees  from  Northern 
Ireland  -  where  Fianna  was  always  illegal  -  have  also  been  protec- 
ted,  those  still  resident  in  the  North  being  identified  in  the  text 
only  by  their  initials. 
Interview  material  is  used  throughout  the  study.  But  whereas 
in  the  earlier  chapters  oral  evidence  supports  the  written  material 
the  reverse  is  the  case  for  the  later  era:  there  interviews,  with 
newspapers,  provide  the  main  evidence,  supplemented  by  such  written 
documentation  as  is  available.  Newspapers  and  interviews  comple- 
ment  each  other  at  many  points  in  the  study.  For  while  the  first 
provide  the  detail,  sequence  and  chronological  accuracy  often  lack- 
ing  in  oral  accounts,  interviewees  were  often  able  to  modify  the 14 
tactical  optimism  to  which  newspaper  statements  are  prone. 
To  have  leaned  heavily  upon  oral  evidence  requires  no  apology: 
indeed  one  might  argue  its  particular  aptness  given  the  size  of 
Fianna,  its  local  traditions  and  the  importance  of  individuals  with- 
in  it.  Verbal  communication  has  in  fact  always  had  a  special  place 
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in  the  Republican  movement,  as  indeed  in  Irish  politics  as  a  whole. 
Though  secondary  sources  have  been  appropriately  used  to  fill 
out  the  political  background  of  the  narrative,  surprisingly  few  make 
reference  to  Fianna  itself,  presumably  because  even  in  its  pre-Truce 
period  it  was  considered  an  auxiliary  of  the  Volunteers.  Such 
references  as  do  occur  are  often  cursory  and  apparently  unsubstan- 
tiated  and,  even  in  the  case  of  respected  academic  historians,  not 
always  immune  from  basic  error 
18. 
Such  strictures,  however,  can- 
not  be  applied  to  four  secondary  source  works  that  provide  a  sub- 
stantial  and  valuable  introduction  to  the  subject.  I  refer  to  Van 
Voris's  biography  of  Constance  de  Markievicz19,  Greaves's  life  of 
Liam  Mellows20  ,  the  biography  of  Eoin  MacNeill  edited  by  Martin  and 
Byrne21,  and  Fitzpatrick's  account  of  Politics  and  Irish  Life  in 
22 
County  Clare  during  the  Anglo-Irish  war.  Though  not  centrally 
concerned  with  Fianna  their  references  to  the  organisation  are  al- 
most  always  accurate  and  based  firmly  on  first-hand  sources. 
Statements  and  accounts  of  Fianna  produced  by  the  Republican 
movement,  it  should  be.  added,  have  often  themselves  been  second- 
hand  and  even  direct  reprints  or  near-verbatim  repetitions  of 
earlier  second-hand  publications.  More  than  one  has  been  guilty 
of  absurd  inaccuracy23.  In  others  lore  commonly  takes  the  place 
of  accurate  statement  and  assertions  are  repeated  whose  veracity 
has  gone  unquestioned  -  the  assertion  that  Fianna  'trained  the  men 
who  fought  in  1916,24,  for  example,  or  that  Heuston  and  Colbert 15 
were  mere  boys  at  the  time  of  their  execution  after  Easter  Week25. 
In  addition,  such  accounts  are  at  times  vitiated  by  the  partial- 
ity  which  has  often  coloured  Republican  source  material  in  general, 
a  product  of  its  particular  conviction  reinforced  by  its  isolation. 
Accounts  of  its  own  heroic  years  written  in  later  decline,  es- 
pecially,  are  often  marked  by  a  simplistic  location  of  good  and  evil 
which  puts  them  closer  to  myth  or  hagiography  than  history.  In  the 
case  of  Fianna's  own  publications  this  quality  is  magnified  by  their 
need  to  provide  a  simplified  narrative  for  young  readers.  It  is 
revealed,  for  example  in  their  partial  elevation  of  Markievicz  and 
Mellows  as-exemplars  of  the  Fianna  ideal  by  emphasising  their  separa- 
tism  but  rarely  their  socialism,  or  again  in  their  virtual  erasure 
of  Bulmer  Hobson  from  his  rightful  place  as  co-founder  of  Fianna, 
as  being  persona  non  grata  to  Republicans. 
In,  sum,  there  exists  an  abundance  of  scattered  primary  source 
material  for  Fianna's  pre-1922  era,  as  well  as  a  number  of  secondary 
source  references,  the  latter  usually  cursory  and  sometimes  in- 
accurate.  Although  the  author  has  gathered  a  considerable  body  of 
hitherto  unrecorded  evidence  for  this  period  the  narrative  in  the 
main  comprises  a  collation  of  existing  primary  source  material. 
The  emphasis  is  on  the  actions  of  public  moment  in  which  Fianna 
participated,  as  well  as  on  the  organisation's  own  development. 
For  the  later  era,  documentation  other  than  that  of  the 
Republican  movement  itself  is  virtually  non-existent.  The  narra- 
tive  is  therefore  very  largely  original,  and  in  placing  somewhat 
greater  emphasis  upon  Fianna's  internal  processes  accurately  re- 
flects  the  concerns  of  the  organisation  it  describes. 
Despite  the  unevenness  of  the  source  material  and  the  fluctua- 
tion  of  Fianna's  significance  and  role  over  time,  the  subject 16 
nevertheless  has  an  essential  unity.  To  its  own  members  the 
Republican  movement  never  changed  (until  recent  years  at  least),  and 
even  in  its  most  reduced  state  remained  the  uncompromised  remnant  of 
the  pre-Treaty  body.  Continuity  was  always  its  crucial  validation. 
And  in  Fianna's  case  this  was  so  a  fortiori,  since  it  not  only  shared 
in  the  Republican  tradition  but  forged  and  preserved  its  own  unique 
tradition,  expressed  in  the  'Fianna  ideal'  and  Code.  It  is  this 
inner  conviction  above  all  that  gives  thematic  unity  to  the  present 
study. 17 
NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 
1.  For  the  meanings  of  Irish  words  see  the  Glossary  of  Irish  Terms 
Used  in  the  Text,  pp.  x-xiii  above,  which  includes  translations 
in  all  cases  except  those  of  bilingual  titles. 
2.  For  a  complete  list  of  Sources  referred  to  in  the  text  of  the 
study  see  pp.  422-43  below. 
3.  Iris-Leabhair  na  bhFiann,  The  Fianna  Handbook,  3rd  revised  ed. 
(Dublin,  1964). 
4.  Markievicz,  C.  'How  the  Fianna  was  started',  in  Nödlaig  na 
bhFiann,  The  Fianna  Christmas  (Dublin,  1914);  also 
Markievicz,  C.  'A  few  memories',  nos.  ii  and  iii,  in  Eire 11 
the  Irish  Nation,  9-16/6/1923. 
5.  Hobson,  B.  'The  I.  R.  B.  and  the  Fianna'  and  'Gun-running  at 
Howth  and  Kilcoole,  July-August,  1914',  in  Martin,  F.  X.  (ed.  ) 
The  Irish  Volunteers  1913-15  (Dublin,  1963).  These  accounts, 
with  some  changes,  comprise  chaps.  2  and  7  in  Hobson,  B. 
Ireland  Yesterday  and  Tomorrow  (Tralee,  1968). 
6.  'The  Irish  Boy  Scouts'  by  An  Irish  Volunteer  Officer,  series 
in  The  Gaelic  American,  14/4/1917-4/8/1917. 
7.  The  Fianna  Heroes  of  1916,  Cumann  na  mBan  (Dublin,  1931). 
8.  Kerry's  Fighting  Story  1916-21  (Tralee,  n.  d.  );  Dublin's 
Fighting  Story  1916-21,  told  by  the  men  who  made  it  (Tralee, 
n.  d.  );  MacCarthy,  J.  M.  (ed.  )  Limerick's  Fighting  Story 
(Tralee,  n.  d.  ). 
9.  Iris  Drong  Ätha  Cliath,  Dublin  Brigade  Review,  National 
Association  of  the  Old  I.  R.  A.  (Dublin,  1939). 
10.  Roper,  E.  (ed.  )  The  Prison  Letters  of  Countess  Markievicz 
(London,  1934). 
11.  Inspector  General's  Reports  no.  15,1908-20,  C.  O.  904/99, 
State  Paper  Office,  Dublin. 
12.  The  Royal  Commission  on  the  Rebellion  in  Ireland,  Minutes  of 
evidence  and  Appendix  of  documents,  Cd.  8311,  (London,  H.  M.  S.  O., 
1916). 
13.  Documents  Relative  to  the  Sinn  Fein  Movement,  Cmd.  1108, 
(London,  H.  M.  S.  O.,  1921). 
14.  For  details  of  pensions  awarded  to  Fianna  veterans  for  war 
service  between)  916  and  1923,  and  for  the  conditions  of 
eligibility,  see  Appendix  V. 
15.  See  especially  Department  of  Justice  Reports  of  4/4/1930  and 
31/8/1931,  its  Memorandum  regarding  the  activities  of  certain 
organisations  (September  1931),  and  the  C.  S.  Branch  account 
of  Organisations  inimical  to  the  State  (16/10/1931);  State 
Paper  Office,  Dublin. 18 
16.  Atkinson,  J.  Statement,  typewritten,  110  pp. 
17.  Cf.  Chubb,  B.  The  Government  and  Politics  of  Ireland  (London, 
1971),  espec.  pp.  217  and  308. 
18.  For  example,  the  assertions  that  boys  flocked  in  their  hundreds 
to  join  Fianna  from  the  outset  -  Macardle,  D.  The  Irish 
Republic  (London,  1937;  London,  1968  ed.  ),  p.  64;  that  Countess 
Markievicz  supported  Fianna's  reorganisation  of  1915  - 
Levenson,  S.  James  Connolly,  a  biography  (London,  1977),  p.  275; 
or  that  Fianna  was  transformed  from  an  innocuous  boy  scout 
movement  into  a  militant  organisation  under  the  Countess  - 
Edwards,  R.  Dudley  Patrick  Pearse  -  The  Triumph  of  Failure 
(London,  1977),  p.  213. 
19.  Van  Voris,  J.  Constance  de  Markievicz,  In  the  cause  of  Ireland 
(Amherst  Massachusetts,  1967). 
20.  Greaves,  C.  D.  Liam  Mellows  and  the  Irish  Revolution  (London, 
1971). 
21.  Martin,  F.  X.  and  Byrne,  F.  J.  (eds.  )  The  Scholar  Revolutionary, 
Eoin  MacNeill,  1867-1945,  and.  the  making  of  the  new  Ireland 
(Shannon,  1973). 
22.  Fitzpatrick,  D.  Politics  and  Irish  Life  1918-21  (Dublin,  1977). 
23.  For  example,  Ni  Eireamhoin  E.  Two  Great  Irishwomen  (Dublin, 
1971)  p.  54,  claims  that  Countess  Markievicz  founded  Fianna  with 
the  help  of  Jim  Larkin.  The  Trade  Union  leader  later  helped 
the  organisation  with  premises  but  had  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  its  foundation.  The  Countess  did  not  meet  him  until 
1910  -  cf.  'Larkin,  the  Fianna  and  the  King's  visit',  in  Eire 
the  Irish  Nation,  16/6/1923. 
24.  Wolfe  Tone  Annual,  1933,  p.  23-  'Na  Fianna  Eireann'  by  'Sean 
Fhear'. 
25.  'A  foolish  enterprise',  Fianna,  May  1936,  p.  118. 19 
Chapter  1.  FOUNDATION  AND  EARLY  YEARS  (1909-13) 
PREPARATION  AND  FOUNDATION 
The  background  circumstances  that  led  to  the  foundation  of 
Fianna  Eireann  have  been  recorded  in  some  detail  by  Countess 
Markievicz  in  an  article  first  published  in  1914  in  the  organisa- 
tion's  own  Christmas  magazine  Nodlaig  na  bhFiannl.  In  March  of 
1909  she  had  read  a  report  in  the  Irish  Times  of  a  review  of  Baden- 
Powell  Scouts  by  the  Lord  Lieutenant  at  Clontarf:  "Somehow  the  idea 
of  those  young  Irish  lads  haunted  me,  "  she  recalled.  Baden-Powell's 
movement,  though  only  two  years  in  existence  at  this  date,  already 
numbered  a  quarter  of  a  million  members  within  the  Empire.  It  had 
2 
gained  a  footing  in  Ireland  and  built  up  a  small  nucleus  in  Dublin3, 
though  its  strength  was  greatly  overestimated  by  the  nationalist 
press  which  reported  it  as  having  recruited  two  thousand  boys  "of 
all  classes  and  denominations"  in  the  capital  alone4.  The  Countess 
recognised  its  effectiveness  in  fostering  loyalty  to  the  British 
flag  and,  believing  that  its  methods  might  be  used  with  comparable 
success  in  the  cause  of  separatism,  made  up  her  mind  to  found  a 
nationalist  Boy  Scout  movement. 
During  the  late  spring  she  promoted  her  idea  privately  as  well 
as  through  the  press5  and  at  public  meetings  of  Sinn  Fein,  but  with 
disappointing  results,  receiving  "very  little  response  and  less 
offers  of  help".  Nonetheless,  she  was  developing  her  ideas  through 
discussion,  especially  with  Helena  Molony  her  friend  from  Inighnidhe 
na  hEireann,  Dr.  Patrick  MacCartan  and  Sean  McGarry,  who  became  "a 
sort  of  informal  committee,  talking  and  planning  and  dreaming  of  our 
organisation  that  was  to  be".  With  McGarry  she  visited  William 
O'Neill,  the  head  teacher  at  St.  Andrew's  National  School  in  South 20 
Great  Brunswick  Street,  who  chose  eight  pupils  for  her  whom  she  in- 
vited  to  form  a  nationalist  scout  troop.  Apparently,  half  of  them 
responded  to  her  appeal 
6 
and  with  this  nucleus  she  founded  the  Red 
Branch  Knights7.  They  were  the  immediate  precursors  of  Fianna. 
Organised  "on  the  same  lines  as  the  English  scouts"  and  with  a 
similar  programme,  the  troop  resembled  also  the  brigades  of  the  day 
in  its  use  of  military  drill8.  Meetings  were  held  at  weekends 
through  the  summer  at  the  house  in  Sandyford  that  the  Countess  had 
acquired  as  a  studio,  Helena  Molony  organising  refreshments  and  the 
Countess  herself  training  the  boys9.  The  venture  was  marked  by 
the  enthusiasm  and  the  complete  ignorance  of  the  adults.  "None  of 
us  elders  understood  boys  in  the  least,  and  no-one  knew  anything 
about  the  subjects  we  set  out  to  teach.  "  The  first  camp  typified 
the  organisation  as  a  whole:  the  tents,  pitched  in  the  dark  on  a 
hill-side  near  Three  Rock  Mountain,  were  washed  out  on  the  second 
day,  yet  the  boys  managed  to  stay  for  a  third.  The  camp  convinced 
Madame  that  scouting  could  succeed  with  Irish  boys  if  adapted  to 
organisational  methods  more  familiar  to  them;  it  also  demonstrated 
amply  that  enthusiasm  alone  was  no  basis  for  success. 
It  was  her  meeting  with  Bulmer  Hobson  at  the  home  of  Helena 
Molony's  brother  in  August  that  led  directly  to  the  founding  of 
Fianna10,  She  put  her  plan  to  Hobson  because  of  his  previous 
experience  in  running  boys'  organisations.  and  his  understanding  of 
boys.  No  doubt  at  forty-one  she  felt  that  he,  a  twenty-six  year 
old,  would  be  closer  to  boys  in  sympathy.  He  told  her  about  an 
organisation,  Fianna  Eireann,  that  he  had  founded  in  Belfast  in  1902 
as  a  boys'  hurling  league,  which  had  subsequently  developed  to  in- 
clude  Irish  language,  history  and  drama,  and  had  later  been  re- 
organised  briefly  as  a  brigade.  (For  an  account  of  the  1902  Fianna 
see  Appendix  II).  They  agreed  to  start  a  scouting  organisation  in 21 
Dublin  together,  though  their  recollections  differ  somewhat  as  to 
the  proposed  role  that  each  would  take  in  itll.  According  to  the 
Countess  she  "asked  him  to  come  along  and  help";  Hobson's  version  is 
12 
that  "she  suggested  we  should  start  again  in  Dublin",  implying  an 
equal  partnership  and  a  rather  close  connection  between  the  new 
organisation  and  his  earlier  venture.  The  decision  to  go  ahead 
was  taken  when  she  offered  to  cover  the  rental  of  premises,  and  with- 
in  a  few  days  she  became  the  tenant  of  a  small  hall  at  34  Lower  Camden 
Street,  formerly  the  home  of  the  National  Theatre  Society13 
A  public  meeting  was  arranged  for  Monday,  16  August  in  the 
hall,  to  form  -  as  the  press  announced  -a  "National  Boys'  Brigade" 
to  be  run  on  "National  non-party  lines"  and  managed  by  the  boys 
themselves  Over  one  hundred  boys  attended,  Hobson  taking  the 
14 
chair  and  the  Countess  recording  the  minutes.  The  meeting  marks 
the  inauguration  of  Na  Fianna.  Hobson  was  elected  President  of  the 
new  organisation.  Despite  initial  objections  to  the  admission  of 
females  the  Countess  was  elected  Vice-President  jointly  with  Patrick 
Walsh.  Joseph  Robinson,  now  twenty-two  and  a  veteran  of  the  1902 
Fianna  in  Belfast,  shared  the  duties  of  Secretary  with  Jimmy  Dundon, 
and  Padraig  0  Riain  was  appointed  Treasurer.  The  committee  in- 
cluded  Sein  McGarry,  Helena  Molony  and  Con  Colbert15,  while  other 
foundation  members  that  night  later  to  play  a  prominent  part  in  the 
movement  included  Eamon  Martin,  Paddy  Ward 
16 
and  Michael  Lonergan17, 
EARLY  GROWTH 
Fianna's  first  three  years  were  ones  of  growth  not  always 
steady  and  by  no  means  spectacular.  The  Lower  Camden  Street  branch 
of  Sinn  Fein  at  once  disclaimed  association  with  the  new  body 
18 
and 
the  party  as  a  whole  "gently  but  firmly  turned  down"  the  idea  of  an 
19 
organisation  that  aimed  to  prepare  boys  militarily.  And  within 22 
Dublin  society,  the  Countess  has  recalled,  "we  got  surprisingly 
little  support  from  the  young  men,  and  the  public  for  the  most  part 
laughed  at  us"20.  Nonetheless,  recruiting  was  undertaken  at  once, 
at  first  by  the  boys  taking  turns  to  stand  outside  the  hall  holding 
aloft  a  large  flag21,  and  later  by  visiting  local  schools22.  With- 
in  six  weeks  Hobson  was  able  to  establish  a  second  branch  in 
Drumcondra23  which  was  given  the  name  An  Dara"Slua.  The  original 
branch  was  henceforth  known  as  An  Chead  Slua,  a  title  that  would 
come  to  simply  more  than  merely  chronological  precedence  since  it 
would  provide  most  of  the  organisation's  officers  in  Dublin  in  the 
early  years24.  In  October  a  slua  was  opened  in.  Waterford25,  and  a 
third  branch  was  set  up  in  the  capital  in  the  new  year,  associated 
with  the  North  Dock  district  Sinn  Fein.  Known  as  Slua  Emmet,  it 
26 
met  at  the  Transport  Union's  premises  in  Beresford  Place  and  was 
trained  by  Paul  Gregan.  Three  further  branches  were  established 
27 
in  Dublin  during  the  summer  of  191028,  the  two  in  Sandwith  Street 
and  John  Street  proving  to  be  lasting  ventures29.  In  the  meantime 
Joseph  Robinson  had  moved  to  the  west  of  Scotland  where  he  success- 
fully  organised  a  troop  in  Glasgow,  taking  the  office  of  o/c  him- 
self30  .  This  was  the  first  of  a  number  of  attempts  over  the  years 
to  establish  the  organisation  abroad,  (see  Appendix  I,  'Fianna  out- 
with  Ireland').  So  it  was  that  when  Fianna's  first  Ard  Fheis  was 
held  in  the  autumn  the  national  secretary  could  report  seven 
sluaite  in  existence,  with  memberships  ranging  from  twenty  to  sixty 
boys  And  before  the  end  of  the  year  the  first  small  country 
31 
town  branch,  at  Clonmel32,  and  the  first  branch  in  Belfast,  were 
opened. 
Hobson  had  returned  to  Belfast  in  the  autumn  of  1909,  and  his 
arrival  prompted  attempts  to  establish  the  movement  there.  It 
appears  that  he  did  succeed  in  forming  a  slua,  whose  members  in- 23 
cluded  several  of  his  1902  boys33,  but  it  collapsed  after  a  few 
months.  It  was  restarted  in  the  October  of  1910  on  the  decision 
of  the  Belfast  I.  R.  B.  and  run  by  four  members  of  the  circle34. 
After  renting  several  premises  the  branch  acquired  huts  in  the  Sog 
Meadows,  Willowbank,  at  the  top  of  the  Falls  Road,  lending  them  in 
later  years  to  Cumann  na  mBan  and  the  Volunteers35.  By  Christmas 
membership  had  grown  sufficiently  to  necessitate  a  second  slua,  the 
two  now  taking  the  names  Clanna  Ruaidhri  and  Willie  Nelson36,  and 
within  a  year  or  so  there  were  over  one  hundred  boys  in  four  city 
branches,  all  situated  in  the  Falls  Road  area  of  the  town.  This 
represented  the  ceiling  for  potential  growth.  In  a  city  whose 
nationalist  areas  were  dominated  by  Joe  Devlin's  party,  recruitment 
would  be  severely  curtailed  after  the  Redmond-MacNeill  split  of  1914 
when  the  organisation  would  again  be  reduced  to  a  single  slua37 
Meantime,  in  the  spring  of  1911  a  branch  for  girls  was  opened  in  the 
town,  the  first  in  Ireland,  and  named  after  Betsy  Gray.  It  had 
twenty-five  members.  Annie  O'Boyle  was  made  o/c38,  Ina  Connolly 
secretary  and  her  sister  Nora  'captain'39,  (see  further,  pp.  44  ff.  ) 
At  Fianna's  second  Ard  Fheis,  held  in  August  1911,  it  was 
reported  that  three  new  sluaite  had  been  opened  in  Dublin  during 
the  year  past,  as  well  as  branches  in  Limerick,  Dundalk  and  Listo- 
wel,  and  that  plans  were  in  hand  to  organise  Newry  and  Cork40, 
A  slua  was  indeed  founded  in  Cork  the  following  October,  after 
a  visit  to  the  city  by  the  Countess41  .  Its  first  headquarters 
were  at  Dun  na  nGaedheal  in  Queen  Street,  at  the  time  the  chief 
meeting  place  for  nationalists  in  Cork42.  Later  the  boys  borrowed 
the  premises  of  the  I.  T.  G.  W.  U.  and  of  the  Volunteers,  first  in 
Fisher  Street  and  from  1915  in  Sheares  Street  where  they  had  the 
use  of  the  ground  floor  and  rifle  range43.  The  slug  was  guided  by 
a  committee  of  adults  chaired  by  Cork's  leading  Republican  Tomas 24 
MacCurtain.  Its  first  o/c  was  Walter  Furlong,  succeeded  a  year 
later  by  Christie  Monahan,  who  was  himself  replaced  by  Liam 
O'Callaghan  upon  the  foundation  of  the  Volunteers44.  By  now  the 
branch  numbered  close  to  forty  boys,  including  a  number  recruited 
from  the  Baden-Powell  scouts.  In  the  meantime  growth  in  the  city 
had  been  more  than  matched  by  progress  in  the  county,  with  sluaite 
opened  in  Blarney,  Kinsale45  and  Fermoy46  by  autumn  1912.  By  vir- 
tue  of  supporting  three  branches  the  Cork  area  became  the  third  in 
Ireland  to  be  accorded  the  status  of  a  District47,  one  which  would 
prove  itself  in  succeeding  decades  perhaps  the  strongest  centre  of 
the  organisation  outside  Dublin  and  Belfast. 
The  establishment  of  Fianna  in  Limerick  city  and  its  prosperity 
there  in  the  early  years  are  to  be  attributed  in  large  part  to  two 
people,  the  veteran  Fenian  John  Daly  and  the  young  Sen  Heuston. 
Where  the  former  offered  inspiration,  guidance  and  financial  help, 
the  latter  undertook  the  week-to-week  organisation  of  the  slua. 
Heuston's  work  with  the  Railway  had  brought  him  to  Limerick  in  1908. 
He  played  a  prominent  part  in  founding  the  movement  there  in  the 
spring  of  1911  when  aged  seventeen48,  and  from  that  time  until  his 
return  to  Dublin  late  in  1913  he  led  the  boys'  training,  being  a 
fluent  Irish  speaker  and  a  student  of  national  history49.  His 
energy  and  enthusiasm  were  largely  responsible  for  the  progress  of 
the  slua,  which  by  the  end  of  1912  was  by  far  the  largest  in  Ireland 
with  250  members,  and  boasted  its  own  pipe  band50.  So  successful 
was  it,  indeed,  that  it  was  able  to  open  its  own  hall,  the  first 
owned  by  Fianna  in  the  whole  country,  purpose-built  with  the  help  of 
John  Daly  and  "some  Fenian  friends"  and  able  to  accommodate  several 
hundred  people.  Hobson  visited  Limerick  in  December  for  the 
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official  opening  of  the  premises  in  Little  Barrington  Street,  and 25 
his  report  back  to  Dublin  prompted  Tom  Clarke  to  congratulate  Daly 
on  Fianna's  achievements  in  the  city  -  "You  are  way  ahead  of  any- 
thing  else  in  Ireland,  "  he  wrote52.  The  hall,  which  was  constructed 
largely  of  wood,  was  afterwards  burnt  to  the  ground  by  the  Black  and 
Tans  in  the  late  autumn  of  192053, 
Reports  of  the  national  secretary  at  this  time  reveal  the  tenuous 
existence  of  some  branches.  Between  the  Ard  Fheiseanna  of  1911  and 
1912,  for  instance,  seven  new  sluaite  were  opened  and  three  others 
collapsed54.  It  is  salutory  to  reflect  that  the  problem  of 
ephemeral  branches  which  has  often  beset  the  organisation  since  was 
not  at  all-unknown  in  its  subsequently  idealised  heroic  age. 
"A  branch  would  start  up  spontaneously,  crowded  with  enthusiastic 
kids,  all  wanting  to  start  fighting  at  once;  and  then  they  would 
gradually  disappear  one  by  one  to  more  exciting  pastimes  when  they 
found  that  they  were  not  to  go  out  and  fight  the  English  the  next 
week,  "  wrote  the  Countess  in  an  unpublished  memoir  recalling  those 
early  years55.  That  the  problem  was  not  confined  to  the  rural 
areas  is  indicated  by  year-to-year  variations  within  Dublin  sluaite, 
as  for  example  between  the  accounts  given  by  Liam  Mellows  for  1911 
and  those  published  for  the  following  year,  which  show  the  demise, 
rebirth  and  re-naming  of  several  sluaite,  movement  of  premises  and 
some  redistribution  of  branch  leadership56. 
Mellows  himself  later  commented  bitterly  that  Fianna  was  "too 
strong"  for  most  so-called  nationalists  at  the  time;  "something  with 
less  milk  and  more  water  suited  their  palates,  but  the  boys  would 
not  deviate".  It  took  the  Rising  and  its  aftermath  to  change  the 
public  attitude  to  the  movement,  as  he  noted  with  irony  -  "today 
(1917)  all  such  are  separatists,  extremists  and  Sinn  Feiners:  nothing 
is  'too  strong'  for  them  now"57.  Support  was  largely  confined  to 26 
members  of  the  Gaelic  League  and  a  few  of  the  "young  bicycle  riding 
curates"  who  had  come  under  the  League's  influence  at  Maynooth. 
The  clergy  otherwise  were  usually  unsympathetic.  The  I.  R.  B.  afforded 
the  young  organisation  vital  publicity  between  1910  and  1914  through 
the  pages  of  its  paper  Irish-Freedom,  as  well  as  giving  occasional 
financial  aid58.  Among  individual  patrons,  both  Mellows  and  Hobson 
attest  to  the  generosity  of  Roger  Casement,  for  which  there  is  also 
documentary  evidence  in  Casement's  own  correspondence 
59. 
But  such 
cases  represented  exceptions:  overall,  Fianna  struggled  against  the 
tide  of  public  apathy  in  its  early  years. 
Thus  the  leadership  on  occasion  found  it  necessary  to  take  a 
personal  hand  in  the  establishment  of  new  sluaite,  in  order  to  raise 
local  morale  and  lay  solid  foundations.  When  the  Enniscorthy  slua 
was  opened  in  the  summer  of  1912,  for  instance,  Hobson,  0  Riain  and 
Percy  Reynolds  visited  the.  area  to  supervise  the  organisation, 
camping  on  nearby  Vinegar  Hill60.  '  Nevertheless  Fianna  was  at  last 
becoming  a  genuinely  national  organisation,  and  the  Ard  Fheis  in 
September  looked  back  on  twelve  months'  endeavour  during  which 
branches  had  been  founded  as  far  afield  as  Donegal  town,  Wexford 
and  Rathkeale  County  Limerick61,  When  that  same  month  Sean 
MacDiarmada  attended  the  annual  convention  of.  Clann  na  Gael  as 
I.  R.  B.  delegate  he  estimated  Fianna's  membership  at  1000,  an  obvious 
approximation  in  contrast  to  his  precise  figures  for  the  Brotherhood 
itself,  but  one  that  was  probably  no  great  exaggeration62. 
FORM  AND  STRUCTURE  IN  THE  FIRST  YEARS 
Fianna's  constitution  was  drawn  up  almost  immediately  after  its 
inauguration  and  ratified  at  its  first  Ard  Fheis.  The  object  of 
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the  organisation  was  defined  as  being  "to  re-establish  the  indepen- 
dence  of  Ireland"64.  Beyond  this  remarkably  bold  definition  no 27 
more  specific  statement  of  the  proposed  form  of  independence  was 
offered:  Fianna  was  to  be  nationalist  but  independent  of  all  politi- 
cal  parties.  Its  Means  were  stated  to  be  "the  training  of  the 
youth  of  Ireland,  mentally  and  physically,  '  to  achieve  this  object  by 
teaching  scouting  and  military  exercises,  Irish  history  and  the  Irish 
language".  Members  were  required  to  make  a  declaration  -  "I  promise 
to  work  for  the  Independence  of  Ireland,  never  to  join  England's 
armed  forces,  and  to  obey  my  superior  officers".  The  unexpected 
reference  to  the  British  Army  should  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the 
objectives  of  contemporary  British  uniformed  youth  organisations, 
the  huge  numbers  of  Irishmen  then  serving  in  the  Crown  forces,  and 
the  anti-enlistment  campaign  in  which  Fianna  participated  prominently 
in  1912-13.  As  published  the  declaration  took  the  form  of  a 
promise,  but  it  appears  that  in  some  sluaite  an  oath  was  taken:  the 
point  is  more  than  merely  academic,  given  the  historical  implications 
concerning  oathbound  societies  in  Ireland  and  Fianna's  later  integra- 
tion  with  the  I.  R.  A. 
65. 
In  whatever  form,  the  declaration  was  made 
after  a  probationary  period  of  three  weeks  and  the  passing  of  the 
preliminary  test. 
The  constitution  gave  specific  instructions  regarding  uniform 
and  emblems,  details  of  which  were  at  first  disseminated  via  the 
nationalist  press.  It  allowed  a  uniform  of  either  green  kilt  and 
green  knitted  jersey  with  blue  collar  and  cuffs,  or  knee  pants  and 
olive  double-breasted  shirt  with  brass  buttons,  in  either  case  of 
Irish  manufacture  and  worn  with  a  slouch  hat.  The  kilt  uniform  was 
the  original  version,  conceived  by  the  founders  as  an  adaptation  of 
ancient  Gaelic  dress  for  modern  scouting,  but  it  proved  an  embarrass- 
ment  to  the  boys66.  An  Chead  Slua  members  continued  to  wear  it,  but 
some  branches  improvised  with  cotton  shirts  and  blue  shorts  until 28 
the  alternative  version  was  approved  at  the  1912  Ard  Fheis  and  at 
once  became  standard.  This  was  designed  by  the  o/c  of  Slua  Emmet, 
Michael  Lonergan,  on  the  pattern  of  the  U.  S.  Army67. 
The  Fianna  emblem  comprised  a  sunburst  in  gold  upon  a  green 
ground  bordered  with  white,  or  alternatively  a  sunburst  upon  a  blue 
ground  with  the  name  of  the  organisation  superimposed68.  The  full 
sunburst  on  the  badge  was  fifteen-pointed,  symbolising  the  twelve 
points  of  the  Fianna  Code  and  the  three  of  its  Motto69. 
From  the  outset  a  structure  had  been  established  in  which  overall 
legislative  authority  was  vested  in  the  Annual  General  Meeting,  and 
between  meetings  in.  an  elected  executive.  But  expansion  during 
the  first  two  years  necessitated  a  less  centralised  structure,  and 
the  A.  G.  M.  of  1911  ratified  the  following  organisational  pattern: 
Ard  Fheis  (A.  G.  M.  ) 
Ard  Choiste  (Executive),  elected  at  the  Ard  Fheis  and  to  include 
the  following  office  bearers  - 
President 
Vice-Presidents  (2) 
Honorary  Secretary 
Honorary  Assistant  Secretary 
Honorary  Treasurer 
Coisti  Ceanntair  (District  Councils) 
Sluaite  (Branches) 
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The  A.  G.  M.  of  1912  confirmed  this  existing  structure  in  general,  but 
added  a  number  of  specific  requirements71.  The  Ard  Choiste  was 
to  comprise  the  six  principal  office  bearers  and  six  others  to  be 
elected  by  ballot;  it  was  to  meet  every  quarter  and  be  responsible 
for  appointing  slua  o/cs.  Coisti  Ceanntair,  composed  of  the  o/c 
and  secretary  of  each  constituent  slua,  were  required  to  meet 
fortnightly  and  to  take  responsibility  for  appointing  local  officers 
and  arranging  scout  tests.  Their  establishment  was  dependent  upon 
the  existence  of  three  or  more  branches  within  the  region  they 29 
represented.  Sluaite,  whose  minimum  membership  was  eight  boys, 
were  to  be  divided  into  sections  of  eight  (seven  plus  a  section 
leader).  Ard  Fheiseanna  were  to  be  held  annually  or  at  the  request 
of  either  the  Ard  Choiste  or  one  third  of  the  branches.  Sluaite  of 
up  to  fifty  members  were  entitled  to  two  Ard  Fheis  delegates,  larger 
sluaite  to  one  further  delegate  per  fifty  additional  members,  and 
Coisti  Ceanntair  to  one  delegate. 
These  and  other  points  of  the  constitution  as  emended  in  1912 
were  retained  virtually  in  toto  until  the  Ard  Fheis  of  1915  when  the 
whole  organisational  structure  was  radically  altered  and  in  effect  a 
new  movement  created. 
ACTIVITIES 
Within  a  year  of  its  foundation  Fianna  could  claim  to  offer  mem- 
hers  a  range  of  activities  that  included  scouting,  drill,  physical 
culture,  boxing  and  wrestling,  single-sticks,  Irish  language  and 
history,  singing,  piping,  hurling  and  Gaelic  football72.  In  the 
first  of  these  it  followed  closely  the  programme  of  the  Baden-Powell 
Scouts  -  with.  camping,  knots,  first-aid,  signalling  and  swimming  - 
using  the  British  organisation's  handbook  as  its  training  manual73. 
The  boys  were  tested  for  proficiency  in  all  the  scouting  skills  as 
well  as  squad  drill,  Irish  and  history74. 
From  the  outset  'military'  training  formed  an  integral  element 
in  the  programme.  Drill  was  introduced  the  first  week,  and  two  of 
the  older  members,  Con  Colbert  and  Eamon  Martin,  were  detailed  as 
instructors,  imparting  whatever  information  they  could  glean  from 
British  Army  manuals75.  An  ex-British  soldier,  Seän  Kavanagh,  later 
assisted  with  instruction76.  Weekly  route  marches,  usually  held  on 
a  Sunday,  became  a  routine  practice  of  every  slua,  some  of  the  poorer 
boys  marching  barefoot  and  bleeding.  The  Dublin  branches  would  most 30 
often  make  for  Kilmashogue  Mountain,  Three  Rock  Mountain  or  the  Hell 
Fire  Club  at  Glendubh,  and  in  bad  weather  the  grounds  of  St.  Enda's 
where  every  facility  was  made  available  for  their  camps77.  With  a 
view  to  fostering  a  Gaelic  environment  at  slua  meetings  Colbert 
devised  drill  orders  in  Irish78 
Fianna  drilled  only  with  hurleys  or  dummy  rifles  in  the  first 
years.  Although  when  published  in  1914  its  first  Handbook  devoted 
over  twenty  pages  to  weaponry,  indicating  the  importance  attached  to 
this  aspect  of  training,  opportunity  for  practice  was  limited. 
Hobson  has  stated  that  "no  serious  effort  was  made  to  arm  the  Fianna" 
prior  to  the  founding  of  the  Irish  Volunteers  in  autumn  1913;  "side 
arms  -  i.  e.,  bayonets  -  were  common,  but  there  were  no  firearms"79. 
At  least  one  rural  slua  had  the  use  of  a  rifle  range,  however,  and 
a  number  of  older  Dublin  members  were  able  to  practice  shooting  under 
the  personal  guidance  of  the  Countess.  It  was  perhaps  to  these 
facilities  that  The  Irish  Volunteer  was  referring  when  it  claimed 
that  Fianna  officers  were  armed  at  this  time80.  The  Countess  was 
herself  an  excellent  shot  and  provided  the  arms  and  the  space  to 
practice  legally  and  safely,  at  first  at  her  country  cottage  at 
Sandyford  and,  during  1910  and  1911,  in  the  spacious  grounds  of  her 
home  at  Belcamp  Park81. 
Inter-slua  competitions  also  offered  an  opportunity  to  practice 
military  skills.  One  such  event  on  record  was  a  mock  attack  and 
defence  of  'a  citadel'  marked  off  in  a  field,  involving  some  seventy 
boys  from  three  Dublin  sluaite  and  lasting  the  whole  of  an  autumn 
afternoon  in  1910 
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Most  branches  r, 
and  in  Dublin  a  St. 
1910  in  association 
members  undertook  a 
eceived  at  least  elementary  training  in  First  Aid, 
Patrick's  Ambulance  Brigade  was  instituted  during 
with  An  Chead  Slua  at  Lower  Camden  Street.  Its 
specific  course  of  instruction  devised  by  a 31 
doctor,  which  may  later  have  formed  the  basis  for  the  Handbook  sec- 
tion  on  First  Aid83 
Among  cultural  activities  music  and  drama  were  prominent  in  the 
early  years,  especially  in  the  capital.  During  its  first  winter  An 
Chead  Slua  formed  a  choir84,  probably  following  rehearsals  for  a 
Christmas  concert.  Concerts  certainly  became  a  regular  feature  of 
the  movement  in  Dublin,  the  efforts  of  the  boys  being  supported  by 
items  from  girls  trained-by  the  Inighnidhe85 
Although  cultural  activities  formed  an  essential  part  of  the 
movement  in  theory,  their  practice  was  more  random  and  dependent 
upon  favourable  local  circumstances.  Cork  Fianna  were  always  piped 
in  public  at  this  time,  for  instance,  because  one  adult  piper  was 
interested  enough  to  instruct,  and  one  pupil  to  persevere86.  Simi- 
larly,  the  strength  of  drama  in  the  Dublin  organisation  was  due  to 
the  presence  of  the  Countess  and  Helena  Molony.  The  boys  actually 
became  involved  in  backstage  work  at  the  Abbey  Theatre  in  the  spring 
of  1910  because  the  Countess  was  acting  there  and  had  by  now  an  en- 
tourage  of  youngsters  who  followed  her  wherever  she  went.  She  had 
also  gathered  a  library  and  art  gallery  for  the  boys'  use87.  But 
generally,  despite  the  convictions  of  the  leaders,  it  was  easier  to 
find  adults  willing  to  instruct  and  boys  to  learn  physical  skills 
than  cultural.  By  the  autumn  of  1913  the  national  secretary 
admitted  that  Fianna  was  offering  "a  one-sided  training"  -  "the 
culture  of  the  body  has  monopolised  our  attention  whilst  the  culture 
of  the  mind  has,  to  a  very  large  extent,  been  overlooked,  "  he 
wrote88.  Already  learning  of  a  practical,  and  in  particular  a  mili- 
tary,  value  was  taking  precedence.  Music  was  considered  primarily 
in  terms  of  its  function  at  public  demonstrations  and  commemorations, 
in  which  members  were  already  participating  as  stewards  and  guards89. 
As  to  the  learning  of  Irish,  the  organisation  was  clearly  not  every- 32 
where  equipped  to  take  literally  its  own  Constitution,  in  which  the 
teaching  and  testing  of  the  language  were  compulsory. 
During  1912  and  1913  Fianna  assisted  the  adult  movement  in  its 
anti-enlistment  campaign.  The  work  chiefly  involved  postering  and 
the  disruption  of  recruitment  meetings  and  filmshows  arranged  by  the 
authorities90.  In  Dublin,  anti-recruitment  posters  were  prepared 
by  members  of  the  Inighnidhe  at  Countess  Markievicz's  home,  and  the 
Fianna  detailed  to  paste  them  to  walls  and  lamp  posts  by  night, 
touring  the  city  on  bicycles91.  The  posters  could  be  construed  as 
seditious  -  two  senior  Belfast  fiannai  were  in  fact  charged  with 
issuing  seditious  libel  for  postering  in  the  summer  of  191392  -  and 
in  work  of  such  doubtful  legality  boys  were  probably  safer,  and  cer- 
tainly  faster,  than  grown-ups.  Occasionally  they  postered  particu- 
lar  events,  such  as  the  visit  of  King  George  V  to  Dublin  in  1911. 
No  doubt  the  members  themselves  would  have  considered  their  en- 
counters  with  the  Baden-Powell  Scouts  as  among  their  most  notable 
slua  activities.  Fianna  had  been  founded  to  rival  the  British  move- 
ment,  and  by  1911  it  was  succeeding  well.  That  year  Baden-Powell 
appointed  Lord  Meath  Scout  Commissioner  for-Ireland  with  the  task  of 
developing  the  organisation  there93.  A  staunch  imperialist  and 
advocate  of  military  training  for  boys94,  Meath  began  a  recruiting 
drive  the  following  summer,  convening  a  meeting  "to  advance  the 
Scout  Movement  in  Ireland  amongst  all  classes  and  denominations"95 
The  meeting  elected  a  provisional  Committee  of  aristocrats  in  the 
hope  of  eventually  forming  a  Council  of  "Catholic  and  Protestant 
gentlemen  of  influence,  interested  in  the  Movement  and  representative 
of  Ireland".  The  council  was  never  formed,  but  the  organisation 
received  money,  patronage  and  military  facilities.  Rivalry  with 
Fianna  grew,  and  scraps  became  almost  weekly  events  which  the  res- 33 
pectable  B.  P.  boys  usually  lost.  Understandably,  therefore,  when 
the  Dublin  press  gave  favourable  coverage  to  a  camp  to  be  held  by 
the  British  organisation  for  publicity  purposes,  Fianna  intervened. 
Mellows  has  recounted  that  twelve  of  the  younger  members  unofficially 
wrecked  the  camp  of  the  advance  party  which  they  found  conveniently 
deserted,  adding  that  "this  killed  the  attempt  to  revive  the  English 
Boy  Scouts  in  Dublin"96.  His  conclusion  was  more  optimistic  than 
factual,  however.  In  reality,  the  Baden-Powell  movement  for  both 
boys  and  girls  continued  to  expand  quite  steadily  in  the  city,  albeit 
within  a  restricted  section  of  society,  with  the  approach  of  world 
97 
war 
THE  SPIRIT  OF  THE  EARLY  FIANNA 
The  accounts  of  contemporaries  reveal  not  only  the  scope  of 
Fianna  activities  but  also  the  spirit  in  which  they  were  undertaken. 
Above  all,  gaiety  and  intimacy  marked  these  early  years,  particularly 
in  Dublin.  One  contemporary  remembers  the  boys  "tearing  down  Union 
Jacks,  swarming  up  lamp-posts  to  paste  up  anti-recruiting  bills, 
ragging  Baden-Powell  Scouts,  and  playing  off  tricks  on  pompous 
British  officials",  and  attributes  their  spirit  to  the  mischievous, 
boyish  presence  of  the  Countess98. 
Certainly,  an  impromptu  gaiety  prevailed  at  Belcamp,  and  later 
at  Surrey  House,  which  from  the  time  of  its  purchase  in  the  autumn 
of  1911  became  a  second  home  to  many  a  young  fian.  It  was  against 
the  wishes  of  the  rest  of  the  adult  leadership  that  the  Countess 
allowed  the  boys  access  to  the  new  premises,  and  they  responded  by 
using  them  like  a  club  and  taking  possession  of  her  drawing  room 
every  night  of  the  week.  Fortunately,  her  husband  Casimir  was  as 
99 
free  and  informal  in  welcoming  visitors  as  she  was 
100. 
The  'Surrey 
clique'  were  made  to  feel  an  integral  and  natural  part  of  the 34 
Markievicz  household  -  when  important  visitors  called,  for  instance, 
they  were  always  included  in  the  introductions101.  Undoubtedly,  for 
these  youngsters  especially,  Madame  played  an  incalculable  part  in 
forging  that  closeness  that  characterised  the  early  Dublin  Fianna. 
But  other  factors  also  played  their  part.  The  organisation  was 
still  small  enough  to  be  close,  and  part  of  a  movement  that  prior  to 
the  Rising  was  itself  small  and  intimatel02.  The  very  apathy  and 
enmity  of  society  against  which  it  was  obliged  to  struggle  itself 
forged  a  comradeship,  according  to  the  Countess103.  In  addition, 
the  experience  of  democracy  and  the  responsibility  of  controlling 
their  own  slua  affairs  undoubtedly  exercised  a  profound  effect  upon 
the  members.  To  this  above  all  Liam  Mellows  attributed  the  "splen- 
did  spirit  of.  camaraderie"  within  the  movement,  which  as  a  result 
"was  rapidly  becoming  a  boys'  community,  the  embryo  of  the  Republic 
It  was,  "  he  added,  "remarkable  what  a  few  years  had  done  in 
forming  the  character  of  the  members.  No  longer  were  they  boys. 
They  felt  men,  if  not  in  years  then  in  strength  of  purpose'"104, 
Such  factors,  uniquely  present  in  the  first  years,  together 
created  the  spirit  of  the  early  Fianna.  It  would  never  be  quite 
rekindled  again.  It  is  true  that  from  the  mid-1920s  the  particu- 
lar  quality  of  size  and  the  closeness  of  the  Republican  'family' 
would  again  stamp  their  mark  upon  the  organisation.  On  the  other 
hand,  Fianna's  status  would  never  again  be  that  of  trail-blazer,  but 
merely  auxiliary;  the  Countess's  personal  influence  would  prove 
irreplaceable;  and  the  original  concept  of  a  boys'  republic  would 
never  be  fully  recreated,  since  Fianna  would  never  again  enjoy  the 
autonomy  within  the  Republican  movement  which  was  its  prerequisite 
and  which  was  indeed,  as  we  shall  see,  already  by  1913  being  eroded. 35 
THE  POSITION  IN  SPRING  1913 
A  census  conducted  by  the  organisation  early  in  1913  revealed 
that  membership  now  stood  at  over  2000105.  The  considerable  growth 
of  the  previous  six  months  reflected  on  the  one  hand  Fianna's  parti- 
cular  organisational  development  towards  a  stage  of  consolidation. 
But  principally  it  was  an  effect  of  the  wider  political  context  in 
the  autumn  and  spring  of  1912-13.  The  Home  Rule  Bill  dominated  all 
other  issues  at  the  time,  being  passed  in  the  Commons  but  rejected 
by  the  Lords  in  January  1913.  In  the  North,  disparate  groups  of 
loyalists  had  been  drilling  since  the  abolition  of  the  Lords'  power 
of  veto  irk  1911.  In  September  1912  over  471,000  people  in  one  day 
signed  the  Solemn  League  and  Covenant  pledging  to  use  "all  means 
which  might  be  found  necessary"  to  resist  Home  Rule.  The  following 
January  the  para-military  groups  combined  to  form  the  nucleus  of  a 
unified  and  disciplined  body,  the  Ulster  Volunteer  Force. 
Inevitably  these  events  provoked  reaction  in  the  South.  In  the 
long  term,  it  was  Eoin  Mac  Neill's  verdict  that  the  Easter  Rising  and 
subsequent  revolution  were  brought  about  "mainly  by  Carson"06.  But 
the  immediate  effect  in  the  winter  of  1912-13  was  to  spread  alarm 
among  the  people  -  thus  indirectly  preparing  them  to  embrace  Volunteer- 
ing  -  and  in  general  to  give  a  renewed  purpose  and  a  degree  of  public 
acceptability  to  militant  nationalist  organisations.  For  Fianna, 
therefore,  the  external  conditions  were  right  for  expansion  at  this 
time. 
Within  the  organisation,  however,  growth  was  restricted  by  the 
availability  of  officers  of  calibre  and  training.  For  whatever 
other  activities  were  valued  in  theory,  in  practice  it  was  drill 
and  allied  skills  that  attracted  boys  and  gave  week-to-week  cohesion 
to  the  sluaite.  But  as  yet  many  of  the  rural  branches  were  ill 
equipped  to  provide  adequate  instruction  in  drill,  skirmishing, 36 
first-aid,  etc. 
107, 
with  consequent  loss  of  morale  and  recruits. 
For  this  reason,  such  expansion  as  had  been  achieved  was  largely  con- 
fined  to  Dublin,  and  the  spring  census  revealed  that  country  sluaite 
accounted  for  only  one  seventh  of  the  total  membership. 
Moreover,  measures  aimed  at  creating  a  unified  and  disciplined 
organisation  had  as  yet  met  with  only  partial  success.  Structures 
had  been  developed,  certainly,  but  in  the  country  districts  particu- 
larly  these  were  sometimes  merely  paper  formulae  due  to  a  lack  of 
effective  co-ordination.  Not  only  did  rural  sluaite  feel  themselves 
remote  from  a  leadership  they  never  saw,  but  -  in  the  case  of  some  of 
those  founded  on  local  initiative  alone  -  it  was  questionable  whether 
they  were  in  fact  a  part  of  the  Fianna  organisation  at  all.  The 
same  political  climate  that  had  bred  Fianna  had  seen  the  rise  of 
other,  independent  and  often  highly  localised  nationalist  organisa- 
tions  for  boys,  whose  position  in  1913  was  ambiguous.  It.  was  with 
the  aim  of  gathering  them  within  the  aegis  of  Fianna  that  Hobson 
had  written  the  first  Manifesto  to  the  Boys  of  Ireland  the  previous 
year.  Yet  as  late  as  1915  Headquarters  would  claim  that  while  some 
"unattached  companies"  had  by  now  affiliated  many  others  had  not108. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  original 
standardised  tests  required  revision  and  the  inauguration  of  a  tests' 
committee  in  1913109,  and  that  uniform  and  equipment  remained  far 
from  standard  in  the  rural  areas  for  a  number  of  years  afterwards 
110 
Thus  in  the  spring  of  1913  Fianna  had  reached  a  position  where 
it  could  recognise  its  potential,  and  meantime  saw  its  immediate  needs 
as  being  to  build  and  consolidate  in  the  country  areas,  to  provide 
specialist  instruction,  and  to  forge  a  unified  and  standard  organisa- 
tion  nationwide. 37 
FIANNA'S  FIRST  NATIONAL  ORGANISER 
It  was  to  this  end  that  its  Ard  Choiste,  meeting  on  13  April, 
appointed  Liam  Mellows  as  the  movement's  first  paid  official,  to 
"act  in  the  dual  capacity  of  travelling  instructor  and  organiser't111. 
Padraig 
0 
Riain  formally  proposed  him  for  the  office,  but  in  fact 
the  matter  had  been  discussed  and  agreed  beforehand.  The  suggestion 
came  from  Mellows  himself.  Countess  Markievicz  recalled  later  that 
he  had  made  her  "the  amazing  statement  that  he  contemplated  going  on 
the  road  to  organise  the  Fianna,  that  he  had  a  bicycle  and  a  good 
new  coat,  and  that  once  he  got  clear  of  Dublin  it  would  be  cheap  work 
and  he  would  never  need  a  train"112.  Finance  had  up  to  now  been  the 
obstacle  to  appointing  a  full-time  official,  the  national  treasurer's 
most  recent  report  revealing  a  balance  of  only  £10  lls.  6d.  for  the 
whole  organisation113,  Mellows'  proposition  of  a  salary  of  lOs.  Od. 
per  week  without  expenses  made  an  appointment  possible. 
He  had  joined  An  Chead  Slua  in  1911  with  his  brothers  Barney  and 
Fred,  and  since  1912  had  been  Secretary  of  the  Dublin  District 
Council114.  He  was  now  promoted  to  Captain,  and  within  a  fortnight 
was  on  the  road.  More  than  usually  complete  details  of  his  work 
are  available  because  his  diary,  covering  the  first  month  of  his 
journeys,  was  printed  in  full  in  the  June  1913  issue  of  Irish  Free- 
dom.  The  entries  show  him  based  in  Wexford  but  travelling  as  far 
afield  as  Arklow,  Castlecomer  and  Cashel.  He  found  that  the  Water- 
ford  slua  and  Slua  Charles  Kickham  in  Clonmel  had  collapsed,  in  the 
latter  case  through  lack  of  a  meeting  place.  Here  and  elsewhere  he 
made  contacts  but  was  unable  to  obtain  firm  commitments  for  new 
sluaite.  In  Wexford  itself  he  instructed  the  boys  of  Slua  Father 
John  Murphy  in  drill,  bayonet  practice,  signalling  and  skirmishing 
with  great  success115. 38 
After  attending  the  annual  Bodenstown  commemoration,  where  the 
choice  of  Fianna  as  Guard  of  Honour  for  the  first  time  was  taken  as 
a  sign  of  its  growing  status  in  the  separatist  movement116,  he  con- 
tinued  his  work  further  north  and  west,  visiting  the  Dundalk, 
Limerick  and  Belfast  branches  and  strengthening  the  successful  Slua 
Leo  Cathasaigh  in  Athlone117.  The  local  Fianna  sports  took  him  in 
the  autumn  to  Tuam,  County  Galway,  where  the  branch  founded  in  1911 
was  in  the  charge  of  Liam  Langley118.  While  still  on  the  road  in 
November  he  was  recalled  to  the  capital  for  the  foundation  of  the 
Irish  Volunteers. 
In  assessing  his  contribution  to  Fianna  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  he  remained  national  organiser  for  only  seven  months,  and 
that-from  the  founding  of  the  Volunteers  he  resigned  from  the  Scouts. 
He  occasionally  trained  local  sluaite  up  to  the  time  of  the  Rising 
1191 
and  after  a  four  year  absence  in  America  was  again  briefly  associated 
with  the  Fianna  leadership  in  1921-22,  though  he  never  rejoined  the 
organisation120.  During  his  term  as  organiser  he  visited  over  half 
the  counties  of  Ireland,  as  Greaves  has  pointed  out121,  and  left  his 
mark  throughout  the  country.  His  efforts  certainly  contributed  to 
the  change  in  Fianna's  fortunes  with  which  they  coincided.  But  they 
do  not  amount  to  the  myth  that  developed  after  his  execution,  that  he 
transformed  the  organisation  single-handed.  "When  he  commenced  his 
task  ..,  he  found  indifference  almost  everywhere,  yet  within  a 
year  the  roads  of  Ireland  resounded  to  the  tramp  of  marching  feet" 
122. 
so  the  myth  was  expressed.  It  was  perpetuated  by  the  organisation 
itselfl23,  while  a  similar  if  more  modestly  phrased  judgment  has  been 
made  by  the  historians,  Macardle  among  them124.  Against  it  should  be 
set  Mellows'  own  assessment,  that  the  growth  of  Fianna  at  this  time 
was  as  much  the  cause  as  the  effect  of  his  appointment,  and  was  ex- 
plicable  in  the  context  of  current  political  developments  in  Ireland125, 39 
LEADERSHIP  CHANGES 
As  organiser  Mellows  took  his  place  in  a  national  leadership 
staff  that  had  changed  considerably  since  1909.  The  first  changes 
had  been  made  only  six  weeks  after  the  founding  of  the  movement,  at 
a  special  general  meeting  convened  to  elect  officials  on  a  perma- 
nent  basis126.  Hobson  had  been  confirmed  as  President,  with 
Padraig  0  Riain  and  the  Countess  being  newly  elected  to  the  offices 
of  joint  Secretary,  and  Colbert  now  sharing  the  post  of  Treasurer 
with  Joseph  Robinson. 
At  the  first  Ard  Fheis  the  following  August  Countess  Markievicz 
was  elected  to  the  presidency,  and  Hobson  to  the  office  of  joint 
Vice-President127.  The  reversal  of  titles  was  occasioned  by 
Hobson's  having  been  resident  in  Belfast  for  much  of  the  year  past, 
during  which.  time  Madame  had  presided  at  committee  meetings,  but  it 
also  reflected  her  outstanding  contribution  to  date.  The  presi- 
dency  was  a  'personal'  office  and  she  was  elected  to  it  by  virtue 
of  her  personal  influence  upon  the  boys.  In  addition,  her  seniority 
made  her  a  natural  choice.  She  herself  later  suggested  that  the 
election  was  a  demotion  of  Hobson  and  was  made  because  some  members 
"doubted"  him128,  but  the  assertion  is  vindictive  and  misleading 
and  does  less  than  justice  to  his  importance  and  standing  in 
Fianna. 
Madame  retained  the  presidency,  with  a  break  of  only  one  year, 
until  her  death.  Her  election  left  0  Riain  as  national  Secretary, 
a  task  he  undertook  with  energy  and  enterprise,  assisted  by  Michael 
Lonergan  and  from  1913  by  Alfie  White129.  Between  the  1911  Ard 
Fheis  and  that  of  1913  the  treasury  was  held  successively  by  Jimmy 
Gregan,  Pädraic  Mac  A'Bhaird  and  Frank  Reynolds130. 
Whereas  the  above  personnel  were  all  Dublin-based,  by  1913  the 
Ard  Choiste  as  a  whole  reflected  the  expansion  of  the  movement, 40 
including  as  it  did  members  from  Wexford,  Belfast,  Limerick  and 
Kerry131"  Apart  from  Markievicz,  Hobson  and 
0 
Riain  only  Con 
Colbert  remained  of  the  original  executive.  And  apart  from  the 
Countess  the  central  leadership  was  now  revealing  a  clear  and  signi- 
ficant  pattern,  one  which  indicated  the  growing  domination  of  the 
movement  by  men  of  sworn  obedience  to  the  Irish  Republican  Brother- 
hood 
132. 
FIANNA  AND  THE  I.  R.  B.  (i) 
At  the  time  of  the  foundation  of  Fianna  the  Brotherhood  had 
appeared  to  be  on  the  point  of  natural  extinction.  Dublin  Castle 
did  not  consider  it  to  pose  any  threat;  indeed,  successive  reports 
of  the  Under  Secretary  between  1905  and  1909  claimed  official 
intelligence  to  be  unaware  of  "a  particle  of  substantial  evidence 
to  show  that.  there  was  in  Ireland  any  secret  political  activity  of 
which  the  Government  need  have  the  smallest  apprehension" 
33. 
The 
organisation  which  had  once  enjoyed  a  membership  of  100,000134  had 
declined  to  perhaps  2000-by  the  turn  of  the  century,  by  which  time 
also  its  leaders  had  become  old  men  left  behind  by  political 
developments.  Shortly  before  1909,  however,  it  began  a  process  of 
rejuvenation,  a  change  of  fortune  that  Devoy  attributed  primarily 
to  the  return  of  Tom  Clarke  from  the  U.  S.  A. 
135, 
but  which  others 
ascribe  chiefly  to  the  influence  of  Hobson  and  Dennis  McCullough 
136 
As  an  oathbound  secret  society,  maintaining  not  only  external 
but  internal  secrecy  through  a  system  of  circles  and  secret  elec- 
tions137,  it  was  the  antithesis  of  an  open  mass  movement.  Its 
power  latterly  lay  in  infiltration  of  existing  bodies  and  the 
setting  up  of  front  organisations.  "It  had  members  everywhere, 
its  tentacles  went  into  everything,  it  maintained  a  footing  in  every 
organisation  and  movement  in  Ireland  which  could  be  supported  with- 41 
out  doing  violence  to  separatist  principles.  And  when  money  was 
needed  at  a  pinch  for  any  of  the  organisations  which  it  regarded 
as  key  organisations  ...  it  found  the  money.  Strange  and  tran- 
sient  committees  and  societies  were  constantly  cropping  up,  doing 
this  and  that  specific  national  work.  The  I.  R.  B.  formed  them. 
The  I.  R.  B.  ran  them.  The  I.  R.  B.  provided  the  money.  The  I.  R.  B. 
dissolved  them  when  their  work  was  done.  "  Thus  O'Hegarty. 
Significantly,  he  included  among  the  movements  considered  "key 
organisations"  -  along  with  the  Gaelic  League,  Sinn  Fein,  the 
G.  A.  A.  and  the  Volunteers  -  Na  Fianna  Eireann 
138. 
One  should  not  be  misled  by  'the  mythology  of  the  secret 
society'139  into  making  exaggerated  claims  for  the  Brotherhood. 
Maureen  Wall,  for  instance,  has  argued  that  its  practice  of  election 
and  communication  was  rather  different  from  its  theory,  and  its  in- 
filtration  and  control  of  other  organisations  less  thorough  than 
has  often  been  assumed 
140. 
Internal  secrecy  enabled  a  core  of 
individuals  to  make  decisions,  cut  corners  and  'apply'  the  consti- 
tution,  so  that  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  persons  or 
groups  within  the  I.  R.  B.,  rather  than  the  organisation  as  such, 
were  'behind  everything'  in  the  years  that  led  to  the  Rising. 
This  certainly  applied  in  the  case  of  Fianna.  No  doubt, 
Hobson  was  well  aware  of  the  possibilities  that  Fianna  could  offer 
the  I.  R.  B:  and  he  probably  discussed  them  with  Colbert  and 
6  Riain 
before  the  inaugural  meeting141.  But  Le  Roux  is  in  error  in 
asserting  that  Fianna  was  founded  "clearly  at  the  instigation  of 
the  I.  R.  B.  Supreme  Council,  who  had  got  the  idea  from  Bulmer  Hobson, 
and  which  appointed  Hobson  to  join  the  founders  of  the  Fianna  in 
order  to  keep  it  under  I.  R.  B.  control"142.  His  judgment  betrays 
a  lack  of  understanding  not  only  of  the  founding  role  of  Hobson  - 42 
and  Markievicz  -  but  also  of  how  the  I.  R.  B.  worked.  Hobson  him- 
self  has  stated  on  the  contrary  that  in  1909  he  was  an  ordinary 
rank-and-file  member  of  the  Brotherhood,  "but  that  body  took  no 
part  in  the  promotiön  of  Fianna  Eireann  and  was  not  consulted  re- 
143 
garding  it".  That  he  brought  his  young  colleagues  from  his 
Teeling  Circle  to  the  inaugural  meeting144  was  surely  a  natural  as 
much  as  a  conspiratorial  thing  to  do.  The  connections  subse- 
quently  developed  as  his  contacts  and  friendships  in  both  organisa- 
tions  gave  him  the  opportunity  to  introduce  more  I.  R.  B.  members 
into  Fianna.  Equally,  as  he  rose  in  the  ranks  of  the  Brotherhood, 
he  recruited  into  it  older  Fianna  boys  already  trained  and  scrutin- 
ised,  who  in  turn  observed  and  recruited  their  fellow  members145" 
When  Sean  Mac  Diarmada  delivered  his  I.  R.  B.  report  to  the  Con- 
vention  of  the  Clann  na  Gael  in  1912,  he  included  (as  we  saw)  an 
assessment  of  the  membership  of  Fianna:  the  significant  point  is 
that  he  bracketed  Fianna  -  and  only  Fianna  -  with  the  Brotherhood 
in  his  statement.  By  this  date  the  I.  R.  B.  was  already  taking  a 
serious  interest  in  the  youth  movement,  throwing  its  discreet  weight 
behind  it,  and  planning  a  specific  role  for  it.  By  now  it  had 
adopted  a  policy  of  domination.  In  the  same  year  Hobson  as  Dublin 
Head  Centre  created  an  I.  R.  B.  circle  of  Fianna  members,  which  took 
146 
the  name  of  the  John  Mitchel  Circle.  It  met  monthly  at  the 
Fianna  offices  at  D'Olier  Street,  Padraig  0  Riain  being  its  sec- 
retary  and  Con  Colbert  centre147.  Through  his  office  Colbert 
swore  in  new  recruits  among  promising  senior  fiannai.  Michael 
Lonergan  joined  in  1912,  and  in  Easter  of  the  same  year  Liam  Mellows 
was  sworn  in  an  Fianna's  camp  at  Ticknock  after  being  sounded  out  by 
Eamon  Martin  at  the  instruction  of  the  circle  Mellows  in  turn 
148 
invited  Garry  Holohan  to  join  during  a  weekend  camp  at  Hobson's 43 
cottage  at  Balroddery  often  used  by  circle  members;  he  was  sworn  in 
at  Fianna's  Aonach149.  Colbert  himself  introduced  four  of  the  St. 
Enda's  'dogs'  to  the  Brotherhood,  apparently  without  the  knowledge 
of  Pearse,  after  recruiting  during  drill  at  the  school.  They  were 
sworn  in  late  in  the  spring  of  1913150. 
The  John  Mitchel  Circle,  with  Hobson  as  'visitor',  met  before 
every  Fianna  Ard  Fheis  in  order  to  decide  policy  and  tactics  and  to 
fix  elections151  .  Its  influence  was  undoubtedly  behind  the  elec- 
tion  of  I.  R.  B.  men  to  all  important  local  and  national  leadership 
positions,  including  that  of  Liam  Mellows  as  National  Organiser. 
Mellows'  appointment  was  in  fact  a  dual  one,  his  main  though  secret 
work  being  that  of  itinerant  organiser  for  the  Brotherhood,  without 
whose  financial  support  he  could  not  have  travelled  the  country  for 
the  Fianna152, 
Control  at  the  hands  of  the  I.  R.  B.  had  a  profound  and  permanent 
effect  upon  the  youth  organisation.  In  the  first  place,  it  des- 
troyed  it  as  a  'Boys'  Republic'  as  originally  conceived.  Decisions 
were  no  longer  made  by  members  as  members,  leaders  were  elected  from 
without,  constitutional  autonomy  (though  claimed  now  and  in  later 
years)  had  become  a  myth.  From  this  time  Fianna  would  always  be 
dominated  and  often  manipulated  by  the  adult  movement,  initially  by 
the  I.  R.  B.  and  later  by  the  I.  R.  A.  The  fact  that  it  would 
occasionally  stand  up  to  the  adult  movement  -  or  more  often  enjoy 
a  certain  working  freedom  through  the  movement's  neglect  -  does  not 
alter  the  case.  Secondly,  domination  by  the  Brotherhood  changed 
the  emphasis  of  Fianna's  role.  Whereas  its  founders  saw  it  as  a 
way  of  life  and  an  upbringing  in  the  Republican  spirit,  the  I.  R.  B. 
viewed  it  more  pragmatically  and  urgently  as  a  training  ground  for 
cadres.  Both  points  of  conflict,  the  one  of  relationship  and  the 
other  of  role,  would  persist  as  strains  within  the  youth  organisa- 44 
tion,  Henceforth  Fianna  came  to  accept  the  status  of  auxiliary  or 
'youth  wing'.  The  adult  movement  became  its  raison  d'9tre  and 
would  mark  its  future  path,  demanding  that  it  be  a  military- 
oriented  organisation  and  denying  it  the  opportunity  to  develop  in 
its  own  right,  as  a  cultural  or  political  youth  movement  for  in- 
stance.  And  this  set  bounds  to  its  potential  for  growth  and 
effectiveness,  since  it  was  tied  to  the  fortunes  of  adult,  military 
Republicanism  both  in  ascendant  and  decline. 
FIANNA  FOR  GIRLS 
The  Betsy  Gray  Slua,  when  founded  in  Belfast  in  1911,  was 
announced  as  the  "First  Girls'  Coy"153,  but  the  anticipated  expan- 
sion  implied  in  the  description  was  never  effected,  though  the 
branch  itself  in  time  attained  a  parade  roll  of  sixty  and  a  member- 
ship  considerably  higher 
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The  slua  uniform  comprised  a  navy  skirt  and  a  green  linen 
blouse,  with  the  standard  slouch  hat.  Aged  between  fourteen  and 
eighteen  the  girls  were  older  than  the  boys,  but  they  shared  the 
same  premises,  took  the  same  oath  and  held  political  and  social 
activities  together.  Their  programme  was  almost  identical  -  Irish 
language  and  history,  camping,  route  marches,  field  drawings  and 
(after  the  foundation  of  the  Volunteers)  target  practice  using 
guns  loaned  from  the  boys'  sluaite.  The  glimpses  of  the  Belfast 
Fianna  given  in  Nora  Connolly's  Portrait  of  a  Rebel  Father, 
postering  the  Orange  Day  parade,  collecting  flowers  for  the  victims 
of  Bachelor's  Walk,  posting  up  anti-war  propaganda155,  are  of  an 
intimate  group  of  young  activists,  virtually  a  single  mixed-sex 
slua. 
From  1912  to  1914  Slua  Betsy  Gray  was  represented  at  the  Ard 
Fheiseanna  in  Dublin.  The  girls  and  boys  travelled  down  on  the 45 
coaster  S.  S.  Carrickfergus,  nearly  filling  it,  piping  and  dancing 
the  night  journey  away,  and  camping  at  Madame's  cottage  in  tents 
lent  by  the  Dublin  Fianna.  Since  girls'  sluaite  were  not  yet 
recognised  in  the  Constitution  the  presence-of  female  representa- 
tives  at  the  1912  meeting  prompted  a  debate  on  the  formal  admission 
of  girls  to  the  organisation.  The  matter  was  hotly  argued,  most 
of  those  opposed  to  admission  favouring  a  separate  girls'  organisa- 
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tion.  Nonetheless  a  Belfast  motion  was  carried  by  one  vote  to 
admit  girls  and  to  instruct  District  Councils  to  establish  female 
sluaite,  "these  to  be  affiliated  with  the  Ard  Choiste  and  governed 
by  it  until  such  time  as  they  were  strong  enough  to  govern  them- 
selves"157.  Van  Voris  has  credited  the  Countess  with  carrying  the 
resolution,  quoting  from  the  contemporary  Irish  Citizen  to  portray 
her  as  the  leader  of  an  ongoing  struggle  for  female  rights  in 
Fianna  at  the  time.  Her  argument  certainly  accords  with  Madame's 
active  interests  and  her  strategic  position  in  the  chair.  The 
further  suggestion,  that  the  I.  R.  B.  Fianna  circle  led  the  opposi- 
tion  to  girls,  would  be  harder  to  prove.  If  they  indeed  took  this 
position,  they  may  have  done  so  as  individuals  -  it  is  likely  that 
Hobson,  at  any  rate,  was  against  admitting  females158.  However, 
Van  Voris's  assertion  that  "the  resolution  was  never  enthusiastically 
put  into  effect,  and  there  were  never  more  than  a  few  girls  in  the 
Fianna"  misleads  by  understatement.  The  resolution  was  in  fact 
formally  quashed  the  following  month  by  the  barely  constitutional 
action  of  the  Ard  Choiste.  They  argued  that  because  some  branches 
had  not  attended  the  Ard  Fheis  the  decision  was  unrepresentative. 
They  claimed  that  if  implemented  it  would  "act  to  the  prejudice  of 
the  Fianna",  and  took  it  upon  themselves  to  hold  a  plebiscite  of 
all  sluaite  "as  to  whether  they  were  in  favour  of  giving  An  Ard 
Choiste  permission  to  change  back  the  constitution".  The 46 
announcement  was  certainly  tendentious,  promising  that  if  this 
point  of  the  constitution  was  revoked  an  independent  organisation 
for  girls  would  be  formed  "shortly"  and  that  the  leadership  would 
"do  their  utmost  to  assist  it"159.  In  the.  event  seventeen  sluaite 
replied  to  the  plebiscite,  twelve  voting  to  reverse  the  Ard  Fheis 
decision.  Belfast  alone  and  unanimously  stood  by  the  girls160. 
The  promised  organisation  was  finally  established  some  years 
later  as  Clann  na  nGaedheal,  and  the  very  infrequent  references  to 
"girls'  Fianna"  during  the  1919-22  period  appear  to  refer  to  this 
body.  Other  Republican  girls'  movements  were  formed  during  the 
1930s  and  1960s  but  no  attempt  was  made  to  re-introduce  girls  into 
Fianna  itself  for  over  half  a  century. 
The  Betsy  Gray  slua  continued  to  meet  until  the  spring  of 
1916161  when  it  appears  that  some  members  were  drafted  into  the 
Cumann  na  mBan162  Several  who  joined  the  Ambulance  Corps  section 
were  among  those  Belfast  women  who  made  their  way  to  Dublin  to  take 
part  in  the  Rising163 
It  was  perhaps  predictable  that  a  place  for  girls  in  Fianna 
would  be  denied  by  the  overall  membership  but  recognised  by  Belfast. 
The  Irish  national  movement  as  a  whole  at  this  time  allowed  women 
only  an  auxiliary  role  in  the  freedom  struggle:  it  is  significant 
that  Cumann  na  mBan  was  founded  separately  from  the  Volunteers,  and 
remained  separate.  Women  were  late  on  the  nationalist  scene;  they 
virtually  had  to  create  their  own  role,  and  that  role  was  always 
subsidiary,  as  some  bitterly  observed:  "Today  the  women  attached  to 
national  movements  are  there  chiefly  to  collect  funds  for  the  men 
to  spend" 
164. 
In  socialism,  not  nationalism,  could  be  found  an 
enlightened  view  of  the  female  political  role;  in  particular,  out- 
side  the  tiny  suffragette  movement,  it  was  to  be  found  in  militant 
Trade  Unionism.  But  in  Ireland  the  Trade  Union  Congress  was  only 47 
now  beginning  to  advance  beyond  a  moderate  reformism165.  Only  in 
Belfast,  with  its  'British'  industrial  economy,  had  a  radical  class 
consciousness  already  developed166.  In  that  city,  where  Larkin 
and  then  Connolly  had  organised  labour  and  which  had  been  awakened 
by  a  Lock-out  six  years  before  Dublin's,  support  for  the  Fianna 
girls  came  naturally  to  the  children  of  Connolly's  radical  circle 
of  socialist  republicans.  It  did  not  outlive  Connolly. 
AN  ATTEMPT  TO  ESTABLISH  A  POLITICAL  PARTY  FOR  YOUTH 
Under  the  same  influence  the  Belfast  Fianna  participated  in 
one  other  short-lived  but  unique  initiative  at  this  time,  the  forma- 
tion  of  a  Young  Republican  Party167  It  was  established  in 
October  1913  at  the  height  of  the  Dublin  Lock-out,  which  event 
(with  the  local  threat  of  Carsonism)  inspired  it168.  Members  were 
at  first  recruited  from  the  Gaelic  League,  the  Freedom  Club,  Fianna, 
and  local  working-class  organisations.  The  banner  was  tricoloured, 
an  orange  sunburst  on  a  green  ground  with  a  white  inscription. 
According  to  the  manifesto,  drawn  up  by  Cathal  O'Shannon,  the  party 
was  to  have  an  educational  and  propagandist  role  and  act  as  a  cadre 
for  youth.  The  members  visited  door-to-door  and  held  public 
meetings,  mainly  on  the  anti-Partition  issue.  It  is  significant 
that  the  Belfast  Fianna  should  attempt  to  develop  a  youth  party,  a 
discussion-action  group  to  publicise  young  opinion,  while  elsewhere 
the  organisation  was  becoming  increasingly  -  and  later  often 
exclusively  -  military.  As  we  shall  see  in  chapter  10,  Fianna 
would  take  up  this  role-concept  again  nearly  sixty  years  later, 
when  again  Belfast  would  give  the  lead. 48 
THE  POSITION  IN  AUTUMN  1913 
By  autumn  1913  Fianna  numbered  close  on  thirty  branches,  with 
a  combined  membership  well  into  four  figures,  and  could  consider 
itself  a  nationally  structured  and  controlled  organisation.  On 
the  other  hand  it  had  not  yet  attained  a  uniformity  of  practice 
and,  though  now  a  nation-wide  movement  it  was  by  no  means  geo- 
graphically  representative,  having  established  few  sluaite  in  the 
small  country  towns  and  almost  none  in  the  West.  It  had  not  yet 
achieved  the  ubiquity  and  status  which  would  make  it  a  generally 
accepted  part  of  Irish  society.  It  would  develop  towards  such  a 
position  after  the  Rising  and  especially  during  the  War  for  Inde- 
pendence,  in  association  with  the  I.  R.  A.  But  as  yet  something  of 
a  missionary  situation  obtained.  Here  and  there  particular  local 
circumstances  prompted  the  setting  up  of  sluaite,  as  at  Three  Rock 
Mountain,  where  local  people  were  inspired  by  the  bravery  of  Fianna 
boys  on  camp  during  a  drowning  tragedy169_  Otherwise,  outside 
the  large  cities,  their  foundation  and  fortunes  depended  perilously 
on  individual  leadership.  The  strong  areas  were  strong  because 
of  the  presence  of  energetic  individuals,  Sean  Sinnott  at  Wexford, 
Heuston  in  Limerick,  Eamon  Leahy  in  Listowel  for  example.  The 
organisation  had  not  the  momentum  to  carry  it  irrespective  of  per- 
sonnel.  Its  fragility  and  vulnerability  to  fluctuation  at  this 
stage  were.  characteristics  that  would  re-appear  in  the  1920s. 
Between  times  they  would  be  masked  by  Fianna's  relatively  heightened 
importance  in  Irish  political  life,  between  1918-21  in  particular, 
but  generally  during  the  decade  of  war  or  approaching  war  whose 
start  coincided  with  the  founding  of  the  Irish  Volunteers. 49 
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Chapter  2.  THE  CONTEXT  OF  FIANNA 
In  order  to  explain  the  kind  of  organisation  that  was  founded 
in  1909  it  is  necessary  to  place  in  the  context  of  the  time.  As 
an  organisation  for  boys  it  must  be  viewed  in  the  context  of  the 
contemporary  theory  and  practice  of  youth  organisations,  and  as  one 
serving  a  separatist  purpose  it  must  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the 
aims  and  values  of  separatist  Ireland.  The  two  contexts  partly 
determined  the  kind  of  organisation  that  it  would  be.  From  the 
first  it  took  both  form  and  ethic,  from  the  second  ethic  alone. 
Analysis  of  them  will  locate  their  spheres  of  influence  both  general 
and  specific.  At  the  same  time  it  will  reveal  the  origin  of  cer- 
tain  incompatibilities  inherent  in  Fianna  from  the  start,  hidden  at 
first  but  manifest  later,  which  offer  one  key  to  explaining  its  des- 
tiny. 
EARLY  TWENTIETH  CENTURY  YOUTH  ORGANISATIONS 
The  concept  of  organisations  exclusively  for  youth  is  to  be 
found  almost  no-where  in  the  Western  world  before  the  nineteenth 
century1,  and  is  a  product  of  the  industrialisation  of  society. 
In  some  European  countries  -  notably  Russia,  France  and 
Germany  -  the  movements  initiated  and  led  by  young  people  themselves 
were  dominant.  Probably  the  first  conscious  gathering  of  youth  was 
the  Wartburg  Festival  of  1817.  The  Burschenschaft,  founded  a  year 
later,  could  be  considered  the  first  formal  youth  organisation  and 
its  leader  Karl  Folien  the  prototype  of  student  leaders2.  Subse- 
quent  movements  were  essentially  intellectual  with  more  or  less 
consciously  held  and  articulated  ideologies.  Their  purpose  was 
protest,  against  the  rational,  bourgeois  and  -  as  industrialisation 61 
proceeded  apace  -  the  urban  origins  of  their  members.  It  ex- 
pressed  itself  diversely,  in  the  anti-rationalism  of  some  German 
movements,  the  terrorism  of  Young  Bosnia,  the  landschaftkultur  of 
the  Wandervogel,  and  the  political  identification  with  the  working- 
class  of  the  Russian  and  French  students3. 
In  the  latter  and  similar  cases  the  students  undertook  radical 
political  action  and  often  played  a  leading  part  in  effecting 
political  change.  From  such  movements,  as  they  broadened  their 
base  among  youth,  developed  the  political  youth  movements  proper. 
In  almost  every  case  they  were  established  by  young  people  them- 
selves  and  only  later  taken  over  by  the  parties  they  supported 
4 
they  usually  addressed  themselves  particularly  to  the  political 
problems  of  youth. 
The  political  youth  movement  as  a  type  was  already  known  at 
the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  and  might  have  provided  a 
model  for  Fianna.  But  in  fact  the  Irish  organisation  had  quite 
different  antecedents  and  belongs  historically  within  the  British 
tradition  of  youth  work  whose  typical  form  was  the  adult-initiated 
boys'  club. 
Such  clubs  were  also,  like  the  movements,  conceived  in  answer 
to  the  conditions  of  industrial,  urban  society5,  and  had  been  foun- 
ded  for  working-class  youth  by  men  of  privilege.  It  is  true  that 
the  Co-operative,  Trade  Union  and  other  workers'  self-help  move- 
ments  undertook  youth  work  in  late  nineteenth  century  Britain6, 
but  it  was  the  Public  Schools  and  Universities  that  largely  defined 
its  form  and  philosophy.  By  their  definition  it  was  'service',  an 
obligation  upon  the  leisured  class,  one  of  the  corporate  works  of 
mercy.  The  concept  was  in  essence  and  origin  religious,  not  poli- 
tical  :  it  extended  the  hand  of  friendship  across  the  gulf  of  class 
difference,  with  no  vision  of  eliminating  that  difference.  Through 62 
it  the  deprived  would  be  'rescued'  from  themselves. 
'Rescue'  accounts  for  the  fact  that  early  twentieth  century  youth 
work  was  addressed  largely  to  boys,  the  organisation  of  the  clubs 
determined  by  the  needs  and  interests  of  boys,  and  their  leaders 
guided  by  a  rough  psychology  of  boyhood.  Only  in  recent  decades 
have  girls  been  more  than  an  afterthought  in  the  British  tradition. 
'Rescue'  accounts  also  for  the  characteristically  moral  pur- 
pose  of  'improvement'  among  the  early  youth  workers7,  and  the 
emphasis  they  placed  on  physical  exercise  and  drill,  on  the  didactic 
and  overtly  educational,  and  on  esprit  de  corps.  Even  the  author- 
ity  structure  of  the  clubs,  by  offering  the  responsibilities  and 
relationships  of  house  and  prefect  systems8,  was  designed  to  edu- 
cate.  Clubs  were  in  fact  envisaged  as  a  compensatory  experience 
for  working-class  youth,  Public  School  surrogates. 
It  was  within  the  British  tradition  -  adult-led  and  -initiated, 
activity-oriented,  with  an  emphasis  upon  physical  and  mental  im- 
provement  and  the  role  of  club  life  in  character-building  -  that 
Fianna  was  founded.  Its  co-founder,  daughter  of  the  benevolent 
landlords  of  Lissadell,  was  in  the  same  social  relationship  to  her 
boys  as  were  the  founders  of  the  boys'  clubs,  and  came  to  political 
action  on  the  same  impulse  as  the  best  of  them  came  to  youth  work, 
"putting  aside  ease  and  station  and  taking  the  hard  way  of  service"9. 
Within  the  same  tradition,  also,  had  developed  the  Boy  Scouts  and 
Boys'  Brigades  which  afforded  specific  models  for  Fianna  in  1909. 
SCOUTING  FOR  BOYS 
Scouting  for  boys  may  be  formally  dated  from  July  1907  when 
Baden-Powell  held  his  experimental  camp  at  Brownsea.  As  a  skill 
and  a  way  of  life  scouting  had  attracted  public  attention  since  the 
appearance  of  his  Aids  to  Scouting  for  NCOs  and  Men  at  the  beginning 63 
of  the  century.  Its  possible  application  in  the  training  of  the 
young  had  been  recognised  among  others  by  William  Smith  at  whose 
suggestion  Baden-Powell  rewrote  his  book  as  Scouting  for  Boys10. 
This  work,  published  in  the  autumn  following  Brownsea,  caught  the 
imagination  of  youth  throughout  Britain  and  led  to  the  immediate 
and  spontaneous  appearance  of  scores  of  troops.  In  less  than  two 
years  -  that  is,  at  the  time  of  the  foundation  of  Fianna  -  Baden- 
Powell  was  able  to  assemble  11,000  scouts  at  a  rally  at  the  Crystal 
Palace 
ll. 
He  accepted  the  orientation  to  activity  of  the  Boys'  Clubs, 
their  explicit  Christianity  with  its  purpose  of  improving  the  young 
and  its  concept  of  fitness  of  body,  mind  and  soul,  and  from  them 
developed  his  original  philosophy  of  woodcraft.  He  extolled  the 
life  of  the  frontiersman  as  a  model  of  fitness,  strength,  skill, 
knowledge  and  endurance.  He  also  recognised,  as  did  the  Boys' 
Clubs  leaders,  the  relationship  between  social  learning  and  club 
structure,  and  accordingly  based  his  patrol  system  on  "a  boy's 
natural  desire  to  be  accepted  as  a  member  of  a  gang"12.  By  the 
innovation  of  the  Scout  Promise  he  satisfied  boys'  capacity  for 
commitment;  by  tests  and  insignia  he  satisfied  their  desire  for 
visible  success.  In  all  this  his  instinct  was  faultless.  The 
benefit  of  the  outdoor  life  to  minds  and  bodies  of  generations  of 
children  was  incontestable. 
More  arguable  were  elements  underlying  Baden-Powell's  con- 
cept.  Behind  the  rejection  of  urban  society  and  the  Public 
School  ethic  of  fortitude13  lay  a  philosophy  of  free  enterprise  - 
in  "life's  contest"  only  the  fit  prosper  and  "the  out-of-doors  man 
must  always  prove  the  better"14  :  Scouting  would  be  a  way  of 
training  for  winners.  Behind  the  idealised  relationship  of  leader 
and  boy,  as  knight  and  man-at-arms  who  stick  together  "through  thick 64 
and  thin"15,  lay  a  wider  assumption  of  the  scout's  political 
obedience  "to  everyone  who  is  above  him,  whether  his  officers  or 
his  employers"  according  to  his  allotted  place  in  a  society  whose 
structures  were  sacrosanct 
16. 
The  logic  of  Baden-Powell's  concept 
of  loyalty  was  his  assertion  of  the  classic  bourgeois  nationalist 
position  in  which  all  classes  in  a  nation  have  a  common  aim: 
"Remember,  "  he  urged,  "whether  rich  or  poor,  from  town  or  country, 
you  have  to  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder  for  your  country.  If  you 
are  divided  among  yourselves  you  are  doing  harm  to  your  country. 
You  must  sink  your  differences"17.  In  this  way  Scouting  served 
the  ends  of  capitalism  and  chauvinism,  and  -  on  the  eve  of  the 
European  war  -  of  imperialist  expansion. 
Baden-Powell's  was  also  a  sentimental  ideology.  He  extolled 
chivalrous  utopias  in  the  distant  past  and  on  the  edges  of  the  earth 
and  displayed  astonishing  ignorance  of  social  reality18.  Advo- 
cating  to  the  boys  of  Edwardian  Britain  the  luxury  of  seeking  out 
hardships  to  endure,  he  turned  his  back  on  the  here-and-now. 
Fianna  was  founded  in  conscious  imitation  of  the  Baden-Powell 
model,  and  it  is  significant  that  in  launching  the  organisation 
Countess  Markievicz  praised  every  aspect  of  the  British  body  except 
for  the  fact  of  its  being  "anti-  (Irish)  national"19.  Its  basic 
programme,  including  camp  life,  signalling,  first  aid,  swimming  and 
team  sports,  was  adopted  in  toto,  in  the  last  case  substituting 
Gaelic  for  'British'  games.  Its  insignia  and  three-fold  pro- 
ficiency  tests  were  imitated,  and  fiannai  were  encouraged  to  "learn 
from  the  enemy"  to  do  one  good  deed  a  day  for  Ireland20.  Its 
structure  of  troop  and  patrol  became  the  slua  and  squad. 
Fianna's  moral  code,  like  Baden-Powell's,  was  derived  from 
chivalry,  to  which  the  first  Handbook  of  1914  devoted  a  notable 
chapter  by  Roger  Casement.  The  twelve  points  of  its  Code  of  Honour 65 
echoed  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the  Scout  Law.  To  read  the  Fianna 
Handbook,  indeed,  is  to  walk  in  a  world  often  strikingly  similar  to 
Baden-Powell's;  its  very  phrasing  echoed  the  B.  P.  handbook,  particu- 
larly  in  its  references  to  the  type  of  boy  Fianna  sought  to 
"produce"  -  "trained  in  mind  and  body",  "thoughtful  and  manly  and 
independent",  "strong  and  self-reliant  and  self-respecting",  "never 
doing  anything  that  would  bring  discredit  ...  but  striving  with 
all  his  might  and  strength  and  energy  to  carry  out  the  promise",  a 
21 
"fit  citizen"  of  his  country.  Prior  to  1914  Fianna  used  Scouting 
for  Boys  as  its  training  manual 
22'and 
(whether  consciously  or  not) 
its  own  Handbook  was  directly  inspired  by  the  British  publication. 
BOYS'  BRIGADES 
Though  soon  to  be  known  as  the  National  Boy  Scouts  Fianna  had 
in  fact  been  founded  as  a  'National  Boys'  Brigade'23,  a  title  that 
indicates  the  influence  upon  it  of  William  Smith's  organisation  in 
particular  and  British  military  youth  movements  in  general. 
Smith  had  founded  the  Boys'  Brigade  in  Glasgow  in  1883  as  a 
means  of  fostering  interest  and  discipline  in  his  Sunday  school 
classes  by  grafting  onto  them  military  ranks,  uniform  and  drill. 
Himself  a  member  of  the  1st  Lanarkshire  Rifles,  he  took  the  concept 
not  only  from  the  British  Army  but  from  the  Cadet  forces  that  had 
come  into  existence  since  the  1860s.  The  latter  were  in  the  main 
Public  School  units  attached  to  local  Rifle  Volunteer  Battalions, 
and  would  in  time  be  incorporated  into  the  boys'  clubs  of  many  a 
Public  School  and  University  settlement24.  Smith  did  not  share 
their  frankly  imperialist  purpose.  But  in  that  he  sought  like 
them  to  instil  discipline,  responsibility  and  esprit  de  corps 
through  military  training,  he  stood  firmly  in  the  context  of  the 
Victorian-Edwardian  Public  School  military  mentality. 66 
His  undoubted  success  created  a  widespread  demand  for  drill  among 
young  people  and  a  proliferation  of  often  short-lived  Brigades25. 
Among  his  more  lasting  imitators  were  the  Anglican  Church  Lads' 
Brigade  and  the  Catholic  Boys'  Brigade.  The  latter  claimed  eight 
thousand  members  in  the  early  twentieth  century,  at  least  half  of 
them  in  Ireland26,  and  provided  a  local  model  for  Fianna. 
The  Brigades  gave  Fianna  its  military  structure  and  its  drill- 
based  programme.  The  B.  B.  's  enviable  record  of  attendance  and 
discipline  certainly  stood  as  a  model  for  the  insistence  upon  stand- 
ards  that  characterised  Fianna  from  the  beginning.  Most  important, 
the  Cadet  forces  gave  an  example,  and  a  certain  public  legitimacy, 
to  the  bearing  of  arms  by  minors. 
In  general,  Fianna  set  out  to  exercise  an  influence  in  Ireland 
comparable  to  that  exerted  upon  British  society  by  the  cadets  and 
Brigades  explicitly,  and  implicitly  by  the  Baden-Powell  Scouts.  It 
was  the  undoubted  aim  of  the  British  organisations  to  prepare  the 
young  generation  for  the  approaching  European  war27.  By  socialising 
young  minds  over  several  decades  they  successfully  influenced  public 
opinion  and  played  a  vital  part  in  instilling  the  patriotism  that 
allowed  the  British  government  to  recruit  successfully  and  conscript 
with  impunity.  Fianna  was  founded  as  an  antidote  to  their  propa- 
ganda  in  Ireland.  From  an  early.  date  it  became  an  explicit  part  of 
its  purpose  to  train  boys  in  military  skills  and  the  martial  spirit 
so  that  "when  Ireland  needed  soldiers  they  could  take  an  important 
place  in  the  firing  line"  in  a  war  for  independence28.  Pearse 
claimed  that  it  rekindled  the  military  spirit  in  the  nation  so  as  to 
make  possible  the  Irish  Volunteers29.  Before  and  after  the  Rising 
Fianna  was  part  of  the  separatist  armoury  that  cumulatively  eroded 
the  Irish  people's  loyalty  to  the  crown  and  its  faith  in  the  parlia- 
mentary  road  to  independence.  This  general  influence  was  perhaps 67 
its  greatest  political  contribution. 
EARLY  TWENTIETH  CENTURY  IRISH  SEPARATISM 
In  what  has  been  called  the  seed  time  of  revolution  in  Ireland 
30 
following  the  fall  of  Parnell  a  minority  rejected  the  aim  of  parlia- 
mentary  Home  Rule  for  a  more  complete  separation  from  Britain. 
Many  of  them  were  associated  with  the  Gaelic  League,  the  G.  A.  A., 
Sinn  Fein,  the  I.  R.  B.,  Socialist  Republicanism,  or  the  more-or-less 
conscious  group  of  writers  who  comprised  the  Literary  revival. 
These  "small  coteries"31  were  in  no  sense  unitary.  Some  stressed 
the  cultural,  some  the  political.  They  had  in  common  only  a  con- 
viction  of  Irish  separateness.  They  created  a  climate  but  not  a 
homogeneous  movement,  and  the  aims  and  methods  of  the  separatists 
remained  disparate:  even  in  1916  Pearse  seriously  discussed  the 
possible  investitü\  of  a  German  prince  as  Ard  Ri  of  Ireland,  for 
example,  while  within  the  I.  R.  B.  men  held  diametrically  opposed 
views  as  to  the  legitimate  tactics  of  insurrection. 
In  this  context  of  undefined  separatism  Fianna  was  founded 
and  its  constitution  drawn  up.  Its  object  -  "to  re-establish  the 
independence  of  Ireland"  -  was  stated  without  amplification.  Its 
means  -  "the  training  of  the  youth  of  Ireland  mentally  and  physi- 
cally  ...  by  teaching  scouting  and  military  exercises,  Irish 
history  and  the  Irish  language" 
32 
-  were  specific  enough  but  in  no 
way  specified  how  training  would  be  translated  into  the  achievement 
of  independence.  Just  as  the  separatists  had  agreed  neither  goals 
nor  tactics  at  this  date  so  Fianna  was  established  without  a 
defined  ideology  or  role.  In  later  years  this  fact  would  prove 
crucial,  for  though  ideologically  it  came  to  be  tied  to  the  Republi- 
can  movement  its  role  would  remain  to  a  great  extent  open  to  defini- 
tion  according  to  circumstance  and  as  such  a  matter  of  recurrent 
dispute. 68 
IRISH-IRELANDISM 
One  movement  which  found  adherents  in  most  of  the  small  cot- 
eries,  whose  influence  was  paramount  in  establishing  the  ethic  of 
Fianna,  was  Irish-Irelandism.  Mazzini  had  argued  in  1847  that 
Ireland  could  not  claim  true  nationality  because  her  people  "did 
not  plead  for  any  distinct  principle  of  life  or  system  of  legisla- 
tion,  derived  from  native  peculiarities,  and  contrasting  radically 
with  English  wants  and  wishes",  nor  claim  "any  high  special  func- 
tion"  for  Ireland33,  When  in  1892  Douglas  Hyde  lectured  on  'the 
necessity  for  de-Anglicising  the  Irish  nation'  he  referred  to 
Mazzini`s  assertions 
34. 
The  Irish-Ireland  movement  that  he  was 
helping  to  create  claimed  precisely  for  a  distinct  native  principle 
of  life  at  the  heart  of  Irish  culture  beneath  the  superimposed 
alien  crust;  some  of  its  adherents  further  claimed  a  unique  role 
for  Ireland  in  the  destiny  of  the  world. 
The  movement  took  its  impetus  from  the  rediscovery  of 
Ireland's  ancient  heritage  preserved  in  legend  and  language.  Since 
the  publication  of  MacPherson's  Lays  of  Ossian,  in  the  wake  of  the 
European  Romantic  movement  and  its  fascination  with  the  primitive 
past,  men  of  letters  had  made  ancient  Ireland  their  study.  With 
the  publishing  of  Standish  O'Grady's  History  of  Ireland  in  1878 
this  world  had  been  brought  into  the  public  eye.  Thereafter,  the 
work  of  the  Irish  Texts  Society  and  the  Gaelic  colleges,  the  G.  A.  A., 
and  above  all  the  Gaelic  League  of  1893,  together  created  a  focus 
for  the  movement.  As  Thompson  has  shown35,  it  had  a  typical 
ideology  -  England  was  the  origin  of  Ireland's  ills;  industrial 
society  was  rejected,  and  Ireland's  messianic  role  among  the 
nations  asserted.  It  drew  the  antithesis  between  past  and  pre- 
sent,  small  moral  peasant  nation  and  large  decadent  industrial 
empire,  intuition  and  reason,  Gaelic  and  English. 69 
If  the  movement  was  in  essence  cultural  it  was  potentially 
political,  since  the  concept  of  Ireland's  cultural  identity  led 
some  to  demand  for  her  a  separate  political  existence.  Although 
the  Gaelic  League  resisted  attempts  to  make  it  overtly  political, 
nevertheless  for  those  of  its  members  who  had  not  joined  merely 
"for  the  sake  of  is  and  tall  it  was  their  tutelage  in  political 
separatism 
36. 
PÄDRAIC  PEARSE  AND  FIANNA 
Among  the  most  articulate  expressions  of  the  vision  of  Irish- 
Ireland  was  that  of  Pädraic  Pearse.  His  was  a  synthesis  of_cul- 
tural  and  political  separatism,  in  which  Ireland  would  be  not  free 
merely  but  Gaelic,  not  Gaelic  merely  but  free.  Although  he  was 
never  formally  connected  with  Fianna37  his  influence  upon  the  youth 
organisation  was  profound  through  numerous  points  of  contact  in  the 
years  before  the  Rising.  His  bilingual  school,  St.  Enda's,  opened 
in  Dublin  the  year  before  the  foundation  of  Fianna.  Its  prospec- 
tus  influenced  the  Fianna  concept  and  was  verbally  echoed  in  its 
literature38.  Con  Colbert  instructed  the  scholars  in  drill39 
The  I.  R.  B.  Fianna  Circle,  which  largely  determined  the  policies  of 
the  youth  organisation,  included  among  its  members  at  least  four  of 
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the  St.  Enda's  'Dogs'.  Pearse  himself  taught  Irish  to  An  Chead 
Slua  from  190941  and  wrote  Fianna's  second  Manifesto  and  a  chapter 
in  the  Handbook  of  1914  which  placed  the  organisation  in  direct 
succession  to  the  Gaelic,  heroic  Fianna  of  Fionn. 
The  motto  of  the  ancient  Fianna  -  "Courage  in  our  hands, 
Truth  in  our  tongues,  Purity  in  our  hearts"  -  was  made  the  motto  for 
St.  Enda's  and  in  turn  for  Fianna  Eireann.  Pearse  in  fact  took 
Fionn  with  his  boy  troop  for  his  model  as  a  school  teacher.  To 
him  education  should  be  leadership  by  inspiration  as  in  the  ancient 70 
Irish  system  in  which  the  teacher  was  aite  (fosterer)  and  the 
pupil  dalta  (foster-child).  It  was,  he  wrote,  a  "priest-like 
office"  whose  immediate  task  in  the  service  of  Ireland's  indepen- 
dence  was  to  restore  the  old  "heroic  spirit"42,  by  which  he  implied 
in  particular  the  restoration  of  idealism  and  martial  courage. 
The  first  he-sought  to  teach  through  his  own  rigorous  moral  probity, 
and  in  doing  so  inspired  the  tradition  of  moral  idealism  that  was 
later  so  marked  in  the  Republican  movement43.  The  second  he 
believed  had  been  all  but  erased  in  Ireland  and  for  want  of  it  pre- 
vious  attempts  at  insurrection  had  failed.  In  the  second  Manifesto 
he  argued  that  their  restoration  must  be  the  chief  task  of  the  boys 
of  Na  Fianna 
44" 
In  the  hall  of  St.  Enda's  were  written  the  words  of  Cu 
Chullain  -  "I.  care  not  though  I  were  to  live  but  one  day  and  one 
night,  if  only  my  fame  and  my  deeds  live  after  me".  For  if  Fionn 
was  Pearse's  model  as  a  leader  of  boys  Cu  Chullain  was  his  model 
for  victorious  self-sacrifice,  and  such  was  CU's  influence  that  a 
contemporary  described  him  as  an  important  if  invisible  member  of 
staff  at  the  school45.  It  was  Pearse's  conviction  that  regenera- 
tion  springs  from  self-sacrifice,  that  "from  the  graves  of  patriot 
men  and  women  spring  living  nations".  W.  B.  Yeats  believed  him  to 
be  a  dangerous  man  with  the  vertigo  of  self-sacrifice;  he  himself 
believed  self-sacrifice  to  be  his  destiny.  And  because,  as  he 
constantly  stressed,  nationalism  is  a  religion46,  so  Cu  Chullain 
merged  with  Christ  as  his  divine  model  for  self-sacrifice47. 
The  concepts  of  destiny,  the  chosen  path  of  Christ-like  self- 
sacrifice,  and  victory  in  death,  passed  into  the  ethic  of  Repub- 
licanism  after  Easter  Week48.  As  a  part  of  the  movement  fiannai 
would  learn  by  heart  Liam  Mellows'  conviction,  expressed  on  the 71 
morning  of  his  execution,  that  the  way  forward  for  Ireland  "is  a 
hard  road  but  it  is  the  road  our  Saviour  followed  -  the  road  of 
sacrifice"49.  They  were  warned  that  it  would  take  "the  best  and 
noblest  of  Ireland's  children  to  win  Freedom,  for  the  price  of 
Freedom  is  suffering  and  pain.  It  is  only  when  the  suffering  is 
deep  enough  and  the  pain  almost  beyond  bearing  that  Freedom  is 
won"50,  and  were  themselves  invited  to  choose  the  dreary  cell  of 
Tone,  the  gibbet  of  Emmet  and  the  chains  of  the  Fenians  before  a 
life  of  comfort51 
Pearse's  religion  of  nationalism  had  its  "credo"  of  received 
truth  based  on  the  "testament"  of  past  Republicans  and  he  believed 
that  to  alter  it  "by  one  jot  and  tittle"  was  to  "blaspheme  the 
cause".  It  was  a  belief  upon  which  he  was  prepared  to  stake  "all 
his  mortal  and  all  his  immortal  hopes"52.  Its  assertion  of  apo- 
stolic  succession  would  give  to  later  generations  of  Republicans  a 
conviction  of  absolute  righteousness  and  the  incorruptible  and 
exclusive  possession.  of  truth,  and  a  deep  moral  obligation  to  keep 
faith  with  the  past53" 
Pearse  invested  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  Repub- 
licans  with  the  character  of  the  ancient  heroes,  so  that  myth  and 
unreality  take  their  place  with  history  in  his  writings.  They 
lack  the  realistic  base  of  a  serious  historical  or  social-economic 
analysis54  and  are  in  fact  a  part  of  the  literary  tradition  of 
Romantic  Ireland  which  -  as  Mansergh  has  shown55  -  was  character- 
istically  simplistic  in  its  interpretation  of  a  golden  past  and 
eschatological  in  its  view  of  the  future.  Their  literary  style  is 
periodic  and  often  apocalyptic. 
It  was  Pearse  above  all  who  defined  the  ethic  of  Fianna 
Eireann  in  its  formative  years.  From  him  it  took  a  self-concept 
whose  elements  were  idealism,  service,  sacrifice,  an  obligation  to 72 
keep  faith  with  those  who  have  gone  before,  and  a  conviction  of 
sharing  in  Ireland's  messianic  destiny.  From  him,  also  it  took  a 
characteristic  style,  heroic,  archaic,  Romantic.  Style  and  self- 
concept  would  be  set  before  succeeding  generations  of,  fiannai: 
Fianna!  the  future  is  as  you  make  it  ... 
Before  history  began,  the  men  from  whom  we  were  descended 
shone  out  above  all  the  world  for  their  gallantry  and 
nobility.  More  than  all  the  races  of  the  world  the  Celt 
was  noble  ...  They  were  not  of  the  Greeks,  who  fought  by 
treachery.  They  were  not  of  the  Romans,  who  crushed  weak 
peoples.  They  were  not  of  the  Teutons,  whose  god  was 
gain.  They  were  alone,.  these  darling  Celts,  and  in  them 
was  all  the  beauty  of  the  world,  and  all  the  dreams 
... 
The  Celts  alone  can  give  the  world  an  ideal  of  perfection. 
That  is  their  destiny,  to  teach  the  peoples  of  the  world 
how  to  live..  .. 
Are  you  going  to  fight  for  this  cause,  Fianna  of 
Ireland?  Are  you  ready  to  suffer  death  and  shame,  maybe, 
for  the  noblest  cause  that  the  world  has  known  or  will 
know?  Pearse  and  Mellows,  and  Colbert  and  Heuston,  and 
Barry  and  Sweeney  -  they  are  calling  to  you;  ...  Yours 
it  is  to  make  the  world  worthwhile;  56 
SEPARATIST  YOUTH  ORGANISATIONS 
Fianna  Eireann  was  not  the  first  attempt  to  organise  young 
people  in  the  cause  of  Irish  separatism  but  followed  several  other 
short-lived  ventures  some  of  whose  features  it  incorporated. 
In  1908  Countess  Markievicz  had  joined  Inghinidhe  na 
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hEireann  ,  the  women's  organisation  that  was  the  precursor  of 
Cumann  na  mBan.  She  knew  of  Inghinidhe's  work  with  young  people 
that  had  developed  from  its  Patriotic  Children's  Treat,  staged  to 
rival  the  celebrations  of  Queen  Victoria's  visit  to  Dublin  in  1900. 
The  women  provided  free  classes  of  dancing,  choral  singing,  Irish 
history  and  language,  drama  and  drill  to  children  of  nine  years  and 
over  in  three  halls  in  the  capital58.  High  standards  were  set, 
the  children  winning  many  prizes  at  Provincial  feiseanna.  The 
treats  themselves  attracted  huge  numbers  and  combined  pleasure  with 
patriotic  education,  the  first  summer  outing  being  a  picnic  visit 73 
to  the  grave  of  Wolfe  Tone.  The  organisation's  rule  that  children 
pledge  never  to  enlist  in  the  British  forces  may  well  have  directly 
prompted  the  Fianna  Promise;  its  emphasis  on  cultural  education  with 
drill  certainly  provided  a  model  for  the  Fianna  programme.  It  was, 
indeed,  after  Inghinidhe's  classes  were  discontinued  that  the 
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Countess  first  gave  thought  to  establishing  the  new  organisation. 
Following  the  original  Patriotic  Treat  Inghinidhe  had  sponsored 
a  'National  Boys'  Brigade'  and  actually  enrolled  200  members.  Its 
objects  were  to  train  boys  in  temperance,  foster  a  spirit  of  Irish 
nationality,  cultivate  Irish  history  and  language,  and  encourage 
national  sports  and  pastimes.  One  branch  only  was  established,  in 
the  Phibsboro  district  of  Dublin  Funds  were  collected  for  the 
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venture,  which  apparently  also  went  under  the  name  of  the  'National 
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Guard',  but  it  collapsed  after  six  months, 
In  1901  or  early  1902  the  Inghinidhe  also  established  a  Hurling 
Club.  for  boys,  Fianna  na  hEireann  Ög, 
which  may  justly  claim  to  be 
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the  original  bearer  of  the  name  among  twentieth  century  separatist 
youth  organisations.  It  pre-dated  by  several  months  Bulmer 
Hobson's  Belfast  Fianna. 
Hobson  came  to  Republicanism  from  a  Unionist  background,  having 
fallen  under  the  influence  of  the  heroic  Ireland  of  Standish  O'Grady 
and  the  Shan  Van  Vocht63.  He  rose  to  prominence  in  the  Belfast 
Gaelic  League  and  the  County  Antrim  Board  of  the  G.  A.  A.,  and  in 
1902  had  helped  the  boys  of  his  Irish  class  to  set  up  half-a-dozen 
hurling  clubs  in  the  city.  When  the  G.  A.  A.  rejected  his  suggestion  to 
form  them  into  a  league  he.  resigned  from  the  Board  and  established 
his  own  league  under  the  name  Fianna  Eireann64.  The  subsequent 
history  of  this  organisation  is  recounted  in  Appendix  II.  It 
remained  essentially  a  hurling  league,  though  adding  Gaelic  football, 74 
athletics,  Irish  history  and  language,  and  drama  to  its  programme 
at  different  times.  An  attempt  was  made  in  1906  to  re-establish 
it  as  a  Boys'  Brigade,  while  retaining  the  emphasis  on  members' 
decision-making  that  it  had  had  from  the  beginning. 
The  Fianna  of  1909  clearly  showed  the  influence  of  the  earlier 
venture  :  the  name  itself,  the  educationals  in  language  and  history 
and  the  practice  of  decision-making  by  the  boys,  all  owed  much  to 
the  Belfast  organisation.  But  it  would  be  an  error  to  over-state 
the  similarities,  an  error  to  which  Hobson  himself  may  have  un- 
wittingly  contributed.  His  recent  accounts  of  the  two  organisa- 
tions65  correctly  redressed  the  balance  after  half  a  century  in 
which  his  own  role  in  the  foundation  of  the  1909  Fianna  had  been 
undervalued.  But  by  their  strong  emphasis  upon  the  1902  organisa- 
tion  and  their  reference  to  it  as  "the  first  Fianna"  and  the  1909 
body  as  "a  new  Fianna"66,  they  perhaps  mislead  and  give  the  im- 
pression  of  a  more  direct  relationship  and  similarity  than  in  fact 
existed. 
F.  X.  Martin  has  pointed  out  that  the  1902  Fianna  was  not  a 
uniformed  or  military  organisation  But  he  does  not  mention  an 
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equally  fundamental  difference,  that  it  was  in  no  sense  whatever  a 
scouting  organisation.  Indeed  he  suggests  the  contrary,  adding 
that  "Hobson  was  undoubtedly,  though  unconsciously,  influenced  by 
the  example  of  the  then  highly  successful  boy  scout  organisation  of 
Baden-Powell".  But  in  fact  the  Baden-Powell  Scouts  were  not 
founded  until  1907.  The  Belfast  Fianna  had  no  British  prototype 
as  originally  established,  and  was  a  direct  extension  of  the  G.  A.  A. 
to  boys.  Martin's  statement  may  give  the  impression  of  a  closer 
affinity  between  it  and  the  1909  Fianna  Scouts  than  was  in  fact  the 
case.  Their  real  similarity  lay  in  the  Gaelic-heroic  ethic  and  in 75 
their  attempt  to  promote  political  separatism  by  fostering  in  boys 
a  devotion  to  Irish  culture  and  to  idealism. 
The  founders  of  Fianna  Eireann  were  thus  able  to  draw  upon  the 
example  of  several  earlier  separatist  youth  organisations  and  to 
incorporate  a  number  of  their  features  into  the  new  body.  Its  pro- 
gramme  of  activities,  ethic  and  Brigade  structure  were  all  largely 
to  be  found  in  one  or  more  of  the  earlier  ventures.  Only  scouting 
was  not.  By  1909  the  already  highly  fashionable  B.  P.  organisation 
was  recently  established  in  Dublin,  to  provide  the  element  that 
would  complete  the  compound. 
IMPLICATIONS 
As  we  have  seen,  Fianna  was  founded  within  the  context  of  the 
British  tradition  of  youth  work,  adopting  some  of  the  structures 
and  purpose  of  that  tradition  and  using  them  for  militant  political 
ends.  Thus  a  basic  duality  of  role  was  introduced  from  the  out- 
set.  Whereas  the  purpose  of  a  military  or  political  youth  movement 
is  the  pragmatic  one  of  serving  a  cause,  the  purpose  of  youth  work 
is  the  social  development  of  individual  young  people.  In  addition, 
as  Fianna  came  to  be  associated  inevitably  with  adult  separatist 
organisations  -  the  I.  R.  B.  and  later  the  Volunteers  and  the  I.  R.  A.  - 
it  would  be  confronted  by  the  recurrent  problem,  did  it  exist  for 
the  boys  or  for  the  cause  and  the  movement?  It  was  in  part  a 
moral  problem,  particularly  acute  when  the  demands  of  circumstance 
led  its  members  into  danger,  imprisonment  and  even  death.  It  was 
also  a  problem  of  relationship,  at  the  heart  of  Fianna's  many  dis- 
putes  with  the  adult  movement  in  later  years.  But  it  was  in 
essence  a  problem  of  role  duality  inherent  in  the  Fianna  concept  - 
the  organisation  was  in  effect  attempting  to  perform  two  different 76 
roles,  and  would  not  always  find  them  easily  compatible. 
A  similar  problem  of  role  and  relationship  with  adult  associ- 
ates  confronted  Fianna's  British  counterparts  the  Scouts  and  Boys' 
Brigade  as  a  result  of  their  active  political-military  involvement 
before  and  during  the  Great  War68.  But  in  their  case  the  problem 
evaporated  as  they  developed  in  peacetime  into  the  politically 
'neutral'  and  independent  youth  organisations  that  they  remain  to 
this  day. 
The  ambiguity  of  Fianna's  role  and  relationship,  though  not 
the  moral  problem,  would  have  been  obviated  if  it  had  been  estab- 
lished  on  the  model  of  the  political  youth  movements,  since  the 
purpose  of  the  latter  is  unambiguously  to  mobilise  the  young  as 
participants  in  and  under  the  political  authority  of  the  movement 
as  a  whole.  The  model  was  available  in  1909,  but  at  that  date 
Irish  separatism  was  not  even  a  united  movement,  far  less  a  politi- 
cal  party.  Not  indeed  until  after  1970,  when  the  Republican 
movement  developed  as  a  party,  would  it  look  to  the  model  of 
European  party  political  youth  movements  for  a  re-definition  of 
Fianna's  role. 
We  have  seen  also  that  Fianna  took  its  ethic  from  Irish  sep- 
aratism  (represented  above  all  by  Pearse)  and  from  its  British 
models,  adapting  the  latter  -  committed  as  they  were  to  imperialism 
-  in  order  to  promote  an  ideology  of  freedom.  The  two  sources 
appear  at  first  sight  diametrically  opposed.  But  in  fact  a  broad 
common  ground  existed  between  them.  'Pearse  Republicanism'  and 
Baden-Powellism  were  both  romantic  and  had  common  antecedents  in 
the  European  Romantic  movement.  Both  looked  to  an  ideal  distant 
in  time  or  place..  Both  neglected  social,  economic  analysis  - 
Pearse  by  his  concept  of  the  nation  as  a  spiritual  not  a  material 77 
thing69,  Baden-Powell  by  his  ignorance  of  social  reality.  Both 
were  religious  in  impulse.  Though  Baden-Powell's  sympathy  lay 
with  the  ascendant  class  and  Pearse's  with  the  disinherited70, 
both  envisaged  all  classes  united  in  the  national  cause71.  Both 
displayed  forms  of  national  chauvinism,  though  Baden-Powell's  was 
imperialist  and  Pearse's  a  defence  against  imperialism.  There 
are,  lastly,  clear  affinities  between  the  military  mentality  of 
the  British  cadet  and  uniformed  organisations  of  the  time  and 
Pearse's  glorification  of  arms  per  se72. 
The  two  sources  gave  Fianna  an  emphasis  upon  the  ancient  and 
heroic,  the-chivalrous  and  military,  and  an  almost  total  neglect 
of  social  and  political  issues,  that  would  remain  its  mark  for 
sixty  years. 
Where  Pearse  stands  for  a  certain  type  of  Republican  emphasis, 
Connolly  is  the  exemplar  of  its  converse.  Against  romanticism  and 
the  distant  past  he  posed  realism  and  "the  exigencies  of  the 
moment"73.  Against  spiritual  nationalism  he  urged  that  the  inde- 
pendence  struggle  was  in  essence  a  struggle  for  "the  mastery  of 
the  means  of  life,  the  sources  of  production"74.  Against  the 
assertion  of  bloodshed  as  a  sanctifying  thing  he  denied  the  possi- 
bility  of  humane  war  and  justified  force  not  as  a  principle  but  as 
a  tactic,  "with  no  delusions  as  to  its  elevating  or  civilising 
methods"75.  And  against  Pearse's  united-class  Republicanism  and 
undefined  separatism  -  "as  if  definitions  mattered  ...  "76  - 
he  asserted  Socialist  Republicanism  with  a  rigorous  class  ideology, 
defined  aims77  and  party  organisation78. 
By  their  stature  and  their  historical  role  Pearse  and  Connolly 
defined  two  distinct  traditions  which  have  co-existed  within  Repub- 
lican  political  philosophy  to  the  present  day.  Of  the  two  Pearse 78 
remained  dominant  though  not  unchallenged  for  half  a  century  after 
his  death,  through  his  own  speeches  and  writings  and  through  a 
literature  inspired  by  him79.  During  this  time  Fianna's  military 
form  and  structure,  its  military-heroic  ethic,  and  its  avoidance  of 
political  and  social  action  would  broadly  suit  the  needs  of  the 
movement.  But  when  from  the  late  1960s  the  movement  turned  to 
Connolly  (and  especially  when  the  Official  movement  to  which  Fianna 
belonged  developed  as  a  Socialist  Republican  party  after  1970)  it 
would  become  clear  that  change  would  be  necessary  in  its  youth  wing 
also.  An  attempt  would  be  made  to  graft  on  to  the  existing  scout- 
ing  organisation  a  socialist  ideology  and  a  programme  of  social  and 
political  activity,  but  with  only  partial  success.  The  movement 
would  then  be  confronted  with  the  question  as  to  whether  Fianna's 
traditional  forms  could  be  made  compatible  with  its  new  role; 
whether,  that  is,  the  product  of  one  context  could  adapt  to  fulfil 
the  needs  of  another.  Their  decision,  that  the  appropriate  form 
of  youth  wing  for  a  Socialist  Republican  party  was  the  party  politi- 
cal  youth  movement,  would  spell  the  end  of  Fianna. 79 
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Chapter  3.  TO  THE  RISING  (1913-1916) 
THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  IRISH  VOLUNTEERS 
11  .1  Oglaigh  na  hEireann  -  the  Irish  Volunteers.  -  was  founded  at  a 
public  meeting  at  the  Rotunda  Rink  on  25  November  19131.  Fianna 
officers  helped  to  control  the  overflow  audience  of  7000  and  to  en- 
rol  3000  recruits  on  the  first  night.  Within  a  week  a  Dublin 
Brigade  of  four  battalions  was  organised  and  the  first  parades  were 
2 
held. 
Such 
-a 
response  indicates  the  readiness  for  a  volunteer  force 
that  existed  among  the  people  of  Ireland  in  the  autumn  of  1913. 
The  Lock-out  had  shaken  many  men's  faith  in  constitutional  authority, 
while  the  Ulster  Volunteer  Force,  with  its  open  threat  of  invasion 
from  the  North,  impressed  on  them  the  need  for  organised,  armed 
defence  and  in  effect  altered  the  whole  climate  of  opinion  in 
favour  of  volunteering3. 
It  was  a  change  of  climate  for  which  the  Irish  Republican 
Brotherhood  was  already  prepared,  as  Bulmer  Hobson  has  recalled: 
"In  the  I.  R.  B.  we  knew  that  Carsonism  had  opened  a  door  that  would 
not  easily  be  closed  again,  and  that  we  had  but  to  wait  and  get 
ready  to  take  advantage  of  the  new  situation  that  was  rapidly 
emerging"4.  The  Brotherhood  had  been  'getting  ready'  for  at 
least  a  year  past,  regularly  discussing  the  possibility  of  a  volun- 
teer  army5.  Some  Dublin  members  had  paraded  at  Bodenstown  in  the 
summers  and  since  then  had  been  receiving  secret  military  training 
from  officers  of  the  I.  R.  B.  Fianna  Circle7.  In  the  event  of  a 
force  being  established  they  were  to  be  its  first  officers. 
The  opportunity  for  which  the  Brotherhood  had  been  waiting  was 
provided  quite  unexpectedly  by  the  publication  of  an  article  'The 86 
North  began'  by  Eoin  MacNeill  in  the  1  November  1913  issue  of  An 
Claidheamh  Soluis.  Hobson,  through  The  O'Rahilly,  at  once  approach- 
ed  MacNeill,  who  agreed  to  preside  at  an  exploratory  meeting  to  dis- 
cuss  the  formation  of  a  volunteer  force.  The  final  outcome  was  the 
public  meeting  of  25  November.  Thus  MacNeill's  article  had  given 
the  opening  and  the  impetus,  but  the  recruiting  at  the  Rotunda  Rink 
was  the  fruit  of  a  plan  conceived  and  nurtured  over  many  months  by 
the  I.  R.  B.,  in  which  senior  members  of  Na  Fianna  had  played  an 
essential  part. 
Although  care  was  taken  to  avoid  any  appearance  of  sectional 
interest8  the  Brotherhood  in  fact  secured  an  unobtrusive  hold  upon 
the  new  army  from  the  outset.  Largely  through  the  influence  of 
Hobson  five  of  its  members  were  invited  onto  the  original  twelve- 
man  organising  committee,  and  fifteen  were  elected  onto  the  final 
committee  of  thirty.  The  latter  included  five  officers  of  the 
Fianna  Circle  as  well  as-Hobson  himself9  -  they  were  elected  as 
being  trained  Fianna  officers,  but  they  voted  as  I.  R.  B.  men.  To 
them  was  given  the  crucial  role  of  selecting  the  Volunteers'  first 
N.  C.  O.  s10,  thus  guaranteeing  promotions  suitable  to  the  Brotherhood. 
Finally,  Hobson  as  National  Secretary  and  Mellows  as  his  assistant 
effectively  controlled  the  army's  internal  communications. 
As  an  organisation  of  four  years'  standing,  with  military 
discipline  and  expertise  in  drill,  reconnaissance  and  weaponry, 
Fianna  was  called  upon  to  play  the  major  part  in  training  the  adult 
army  until  such  time  as  it  was  able  to  produce  its  own  officers 
ll. 
(The  Scouts  also  gave  training  at  this  time  to  the  newly  established 
Cumann  na  mBan12  and  provided  the  Citizen  Army  with  its  first  drill 
instructor13.  )  Oglaigh  na  hEireann  based  its  training  course 
entirely  on  Fianna  schedules  which  it  published  as  a  series  in  its 
own  paper  The  Irish  Volunteer14;  from  1914  it  used  the  Fianna 87 
Handbook  as  its  t 
Such  was  the 
early  development 
Volunteers  had  an 
organisation. 
raining  manual15 
influence  of  the  Scouts  upon  the  foundation  and 
of  the  new  army;  in  turn,  the  advent  of  the 
immediate  and  lasting  effect  upon  Fianna  as  an 
THE  IRISH  VOLUNTEERS  AND  FIANNA 
In  the  first  place,  it  offered  a  solution  to  the  growing  prob- 
lem  of  unpromoted  seniors  in  the  juvenile  body.  "Long  before  the 
founding  of  the  Irish  Volunteers  the  officers  of  the  Fianna  were 
armed,  and  out  of  their  own  slender  resources  had  planned  to  arm 
all  the  older  boys  as  they  reached  a  good  standard  of  efficiency. 
The  coming  of  the  Volunteers  relieved  them  of  this  latter  task"16. 
A  rule  was  introduced  for  automatic  transfer  to  the  adult  army  at 
seventeen  years  of  age  for  all  fiannai  who  had  not  reached  the  rank 
of  Lieutenant 
17. 
For  Fianna  this  solved  the  problem  not  only  of 
arms  but  of  what  to  do  with  a  surplus  of  seniors  without  prospects 
of  promotion;  for  the  Volunteers  it  guaranteed  a  supply  of  re- 
cruits  ready  trained  and  disciplined. 
The  transfer  of  unpromoted  seniors  had  the  further  effect  of 
emphasising  the  distinction  between  officers  and  boys  in  Fianna, 
creating  two  classes  of  member  visibly  different  in  age.  Fianna 
became  more  obviously  an  organisation  with  a  mass  juvenile  member- 
ship  and  a  topping  of  young  adults,  in  which  the  rank  and  file  were 
restricted  (at  least  in  theory)  to  a  'scouting'  role,  while 
officers  comprised  an  armed  military  corps.  Fianna  became  in  fact 
two  organisations  in  one,  and  this  characteristic  duality  would 
remain  throughout  its  subsequent  history  though  its  precise  pattern 
might  vary  with  time  and  place. 88 
Secondly,  the  overt  military  function  of  the  Volunteers,  and 
the  steps  they  were  prepared  to  take  to  acquire  arms,  set  an 
example  for  the  youth  organisation  to  follow.  Within  the  month 
Fianna's  National  Secretary  was  openly  inviting  members  to  "arm,  by 
all  means,  and  as  quickly  as  possible"18.  At  the  same  time  new 
regulations  raising  the  minimum  age  and  height  of  recruits19  indi- 
cate  the  growing  military  emphasis.  At  the  1915  Ard  Fheis  dele- 
gates  would  unanimously  pass  resolutions  to  equip  all  third-class 
scouts  with  rifles  and  to  make  musketry  a  compulsory  test20. 
Thirdly,  Fianna  suffered  immediate  losses  of  officer  personnel 
to  the  adult  ranks,  particularly  at  the  level  of  local  o/c.  It 
was  estimated  that  nearly  two-thirds  of  all  slua  officers  joined 
Oglaigh 
na  hEireann21,  while  in  Cork  for  instance  many  seniors  and 
the  entire  organising  committee  were  transferred22,  In  an  attempt 
to  allay  such  losses  Fianna  established  its  own  Officers'  Training 
Corps  in  the  autumn  of  1914,  open  to  fifteen-year-olds  of  particu- 
lar  promise23.  At  the  level  of  central  leadership  the  only  loss 
was  that  of  Liam  Mellows.  No-one  was  appointed  to  succeed  him24, 
and  without  the  regular  personal  contact  that  only  an  itinerant 
National  Organiser  could  provide  several  sluaite  collapsed25  -  by 
February  1914  hardly  more  than  1000  boys  were  thought  to  be  in 
training26. 
From  this  time  it  would  be  Fianna's  permanent  fate  to  suffer 
the  loss  of  its  officers  -  to  the  Volunteers,  and  in  later  years  to 
the  I.  R.  A.;  to  be  cropped  of  those  very  boys  who  had  proved  them- 
selves  its  most  able  members,  at  an  age  when  they  should  have  been 
most  valuable  to  the  organisation.  Such  recurrent  loss  would  in- 
evitably  stunt  Fianna's  development  as  an  independent  youth  organisa- 
tion,  and  by  limiting  the  scope  for  consistent  and  lasting  local 89 
leadership  would  contribute  to  the  ephemeral  quality  that  has  often 
characterised  it  in  all  but  the  strongest  Republican  areas. 
Finally,  the  'climate  of  opinion'  that  created  the  Volunteers 
was  itself  clarified  and  advanced  by  their  foundation.  Within  a 
week  Tom  Clarke  was  enthusing  to  McGarrity  in  America  -  "Joe,  it 
is  worth  living  in  Ireland  these  times  -  there  is  an  awakening 
hundreds  of  young  fellows  who  could  not  be  interested  in  the 
National  Movement,  even  in  the  milk  and  water  side,  are  in  these 
volunteers  and  are  saying  things  which  proves  that  the  right  spot 
has  been  touched  in  them  ...  1127.  By  the  spring  he  reported  the 
country  "electrified  with  the  volunteering  business"28. 
Recruitment  to  Fianna  benefited  by  a  halo  effect  from  the 
popularity  of  the  adult  army.  In  a  number  of  areas  the  establish- 
ing  of  a  Volunteer  unit  signalled  the  foundation  of  a  Fianna  slua29, 
and  by  the  new  year  of  1915  the  youth  organisation  claimed  fifty- 
four  branches  throughout  the  country30.  By  midsummer  the  National 
Secretary  was  able  to  report  a  year's  "really  remarkable"  expansion 
which  he  attributed  in  part  to  "the  great  revival  of  the  national 
and  military  spirit  in  our  people  as  typified  in  the  Volunteer 
movement  "31, 
Outside  the  capital  the  area  of  greatest  strength  was  Munster. 
The  Munster  Conference,  held  in  Limerick  early  in  the  summer, 
revealed  the  existence  of  eleven  sluaite.  in  the  province,  at  Cork, 
Fermoy,  Clonmel,  Tipperary,  Queenstown,  Foynes,  Ballylanders, 
Limerick,  Tralee,  Waterford  and  Thurles.  Nonetheless,  the  con- 
ference  report  admitted  that  "in  Dublin  it  is  not  such  a  hard  task 
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to  keep  the  Fianna  alive  as  in  the  country"2.  Dublin  was  the 
stronghold  of  the  organisation  as  it  was  of  the  Volunteers,  and 
would  remain  so  until  after  the  Rising33. 90 
The  pattern  established  by  1915  would  remain  consistent  for 
half  a  century  or  more  :  the  strength  of  the  youth  organisation 
would  almost  always  correspond  closely  to  that  of  the  adult  army. 
Fianna  would  thrive  where  and  when  the  'senior  movement'  was  strong. 
Sudden  surges  in  the  popularity  of  the  army  (during  its  military 
campaigns  for  instance)  would  at  once  be  recorded  on  the  graph  of 
Fianna's  membership  -  although  because  the  youth  organisation's 
potential  would  be  restricted  by  a  particularly  heavy  loss  of 
training  officers  at  such  times  the  growth  curve  would  normally  be 
shallower.  Equally  inevitably,  decline  would  match  decline. 
IMITATIONS 
As  early  as  1912  Fianna's  leadership  had  recognised  that  the 
organisation  was  only  one  of  a  "number  of  similar  associations  for 
boys".  and  had  proposed  a  loose  alliance  of  those  in  the  Dublin 
area34.  In  the  shadow  of  a  European  war  drilling  was  a  natural 
and  ubiquitous  activity  for  boys,  and  diverse  organisations  were 
adapting  it  to  their  own  needs.  Some  rival  political  groups  saw 
in  Fianna's  success  proof  of  the  value  of  a  youth  wing  in  attracting 
recruits. 
In  the  spring  of  1914  the  Belfast  Parliamentary  Party  M. P.  Joe 
Devlin  was  considering  plans  for  a  boys'  organisation  to  operate  as 
a  juvenile  A.  O.  H. 
35. 
It  is  clear  that  these  plans  were  not  un- 
connected  with  Redmond's  attempt  to  gain  control  of  the  Irish 
Volunteers36.  In  order  to  steal  the  Redmondites'  thunder, 
Clarke's  Separatist  friends  made  preparations  to  establish  an  Irish 
Volunteer  Boys'  Organisation,  following  the  form  and  principles  of 
the  adult  body37  and  counting  on  its  glamour  to  outbid  their  rival. 
A  steering  committee  of  two  Cumann  na  mBan  women  was  appointed38 
and  the  first  Company  was  established  in  the  North  Dock  ward  of 91 
Dublin  in  September39,  Within  a  month,  however,  the  Redmondites 
had  been  expelled  from  the  Volunteers'  Provisional  Committee  and 
Redmond  had  set  up  his  own  National  Volunteers,  taking  into  it  all 
but  12,000  of  the  original  army.  On  11  October  delegates  at 
Fianna's  Ard  Fheis  unanimously  declared  their  support  for  MacNeill's 
Irish  Volunteers40.  There  is  no  record  of  any  slua  seceding  in 
toto  to  the  Redmond  side  though  certainly  some  individual  members, 
including  local  leaders,  were  lost  at  the  time4l. 
It  was  also  with  the  success  of  Fianna  in  mind  that  Countess 
Markievicz  and  others  of  the  Citizen  Army  founded  a  juvenile  Scout 
section  in-the  summer  of  1914.  It  remained  small  in  number, 
never  expanding  beyond  about  twenty  members.  But  it  maintained  a 
remarkably  stable  existence  up  to  the  time  of  Easter  Week  when  its 
members  were.  'out'  in  almost  full  strength.  (For  a  detailed 
account  of  the  Citizen  Army  Scouts,  see  Appendix  III.  ) 
Finally,  a  number  of  independent  scout  troops  had  lately 
emerged  in  rural  areas,  under  the  inspiration  of  Fianna  and  con- 
sidering  themselves  under  its  authority.  The  National  Secretary 
-came  to  hear  of  several  such  groups  in  1915,  organised  as  if  bona 
fide  sluaite,  using  the  official  uniform  and  declaration,  but 
previously  unknown  to  Headquarters42.  They  owed  their  existence, 
he  believed,  to  the  enthusiasm  of  the  times  and  more  particularly 
to  the  previous  work  around  the  country  of  Fianna's  National 
Organiser. 
TOWARDS  CONTROL  AND  COMMUNICATION 
At  this  time  therefore  the  most  pressing  problems  confronting 
the  leadership  concerned  control  and  contact,  particularly  in  the 
country.  As  a  first  step  towards  control  they  had  set  up  a  tests' 
committee  in  the  winter  of  1913,  which  produced  standardised  com- 92 
pulsory  tests  for  every  slua43.  During  the  next  two  years  the 
publication  of  a  Handbook,  a  Christmas  magazine  and  a  monthly  news- 
paper  was  undertaken  with  the  aim  of  reaching  all  members, 
creating  organs  of  contact  and  establishinga  standard  purpose  and 
uniform  procedure  throughout  the  organisation. 
The  Fianna  Handbook  comprised  three  parts.  The  chapters  on 
military,  scouting  and  first-aid  skills  were  the  work  of  Pädraig 
0  Riain  and  had  previously  been  published  in  the  I.  R.  B.  's  paper 
Irish  Freedom.  Chapters  on  the  historical  and  chivalric  tradition 
of  Fianna  were  specially  written  for  the  issue  by  Pearse  and  Case- 
ment.  The  remaining  chapters  defined  the  organisation's  constitu- 
tion  and  structure.  The  Countess,  who  had  studied  art  in  Paris, 
produced  the  artwork  for  the  cover,  and  text  illustrations  were  the 
work  of  Michael  Lonergan  and  Eddie  Morrow44.  There  was  an  irony 
in  the  Handbook's  printing:  Messrs.  E.  Ponsonby  Ltd.,  agents  for 
government  publications,  undertook  the  work  in  the  belief  that  it 
was  an  'ordinary'  (Baden-Powell)  manual.  On  discovering  their 
error  they  at  first  refused  to  complete  it,  but  Hobson  was  able  to 
hold  them  to  their  verbal  agreement  and  received  compensation  for 
the  delay.  The  firm  deleted  their  name  from  the  title  page  which 
thus  bears  no  details  of  publication45. 
The  magazine,  Nodlaigna  bhFiann,  was  produced  for  Christmas 
1914.  Though  at  the  time  envisaged  as  an  annual  the  venture  was 
not  in  fact  repeated.  The  Countess  herself  collected  much  of  the 
material  including  contributions  from  Connolly,  George  Russell  (AE) 
and  Maeve  Cavanagh.  (Several  of  the  articles  -  notably  her  own  on 
the  founding  of  Fianna,  Connolly's  on  'Boys  and  their  parents'  and 
i 0  Riain's  on  the  Howth  Gun  Running  -  soon  became  standard  items  of 
Fianna  lore,  to  be  republished  regularly  over  the  years.  )  Percy 93 
Reynolds  as  Business  Manager  was  responsible  for  financing  the  ven- 
ture,  through  advertisements  from  suppliers  of  scouting  equipment 
and  other  sympathisers 
46. 
Following  the  success  of  the  magazine  the  boys  decided  to 
attempt  a  monthly  newspaper47.  The  early  issues  included  a  serial 
from  the  pen  of  Pearse,  'Dates  from  Irish  History',  biographies, 
poetry  and  one  page  in  the  Irish  language.  Advertisements  were 
largely  for  scouting  requisites,  but  included  one  for  Connolly's 
paper  The  Worker,  no  doubt  through  the  influence  of  Countess 
Markievicz.  Liam  Mellows  has  stated  that  the  paper  was  almost 
entirely  the  work  of  its  editor  Patsy  O'Connor  and  Percy  Reynolds 
his  assistant48.  Enthusiasm  they  had,  but  scant  resources49, 
and  the  publication  proved  a  failure  financially.  Addressed  to 
boys  it  was  ignored  by  adults  and  after  five  issues  the  decision 
was  taken  to  "make  a  fresh  start,  not  as  a  boys'  paper  but  as  a 
journal  for  man  and  boy  combined"50.  The  same  month,  June  1915, 
Patsy  O'Connor  died  of  the  delayed  effect  of  head-wounds  he  had 
received  when  struck  by  a  police  baton  during  the  Lock-out  eighteen 
months  before.  He  was  buried  at  Glasnevin  in  the  first  ever 
Fianna  funeral51. 
The  new  paper,  under  the  same  name  and  edited  by  Percy 
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Reynolds,  ran  from  July  1915  into  the  new  year3  by  which  date  it 
had  built  up  a  circulation  surpassing  1000  copies  a  month 
54 
The 
December  issue  included  an  article  by  Connolly,  whose  open  threat 
of  independent  insurrection  by  the  Citizen  Army  had  already  estab- 
lished  him  as  a  dangerous  man  in  the  eyes  of  the  authorities,  and 
in  addition  strained  his  relations  with  the  Volunteers'  and  I.  R.  B. 
leadership  (it  was  only  a  month  after  this  date  that  he  was  'kid- 
napped'  by  the  I.  R.  B.  Military  Council)55.  To  publish  his  article 
was  therefore  in  effect  to  assert  Fianna's  militant  disloyalty  to 94 
the  state,  and  at  the  same  time  its  staunch  independence  within  the 
Separatist  movement  -  an  independence  which  would  always  remain  its 
hallmark.  The  police  certainly  considered  the  paper  dangerous, 
bracketing  it  with  adult  publications  such  as  The  Irish  Volunteer, 
The  Workers'  Republic,  Nationality  and  The  Gael,  as  "disloyal 
journals  which  spread  dissention  and  exercised  a  deterrent  effect 
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on  recruitment  for  the  Army". 
ACTIVITIES  1914-15 
Anti-enlistment  activity  in  fact  remained  a  major  part  of  slua 
work  at  this  time.  The  disruption  of  an  Army  recruiting  film  show 
in  O'Connell  Street  by  the  Dublin  Fianna  in  Spring  1914  was  a 
typical  tactic57.  But  increasingly  now,  members  were  undertaking 
actions  of  an  overtly  military  nature. 
For  juniors  these  largely  involved  communications  and  recon- 
naissance  for  the  Volunteers  -  in  the  towns  reconnoitring  the 
streets,  checking  distance,  traffic,  shops  and  roads;  in  the 
country  acting  as  guides  for  the  army  on  manoeuvres58. 
For  the  officers  and  older  boys  it  also  involved  collaboration 
i 
with  Oglaigh  na  h  ireann  in  acquiring  arms.  By  the  late  spring  of 
1914  the  Volunteers  had  some  50,000  members,  but  almost  no  arms  or 
funds.  On  the  initiative  of  Roger  Casement  money  was  raised  to 
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purchase  Mauser  rifles  and  ammunition  in  Antwerp,  to  be  shipped  to 
Ireland  in  two  yachts.  The  first  of  these,  Erskine  Childers's 
Asgard,  landed  with  its  cargo  at  Howth  on  26  July.  Hobson  was  in 
sole  charge  of  landing  arrangements  and  had  chosen  Howth  precisely 
because  it  was  close  to  Dublin  so  that  to  land  guns  there  in  broad 
daylight  would  be  a  spectacular  coup.  Because  it  was  a  Sunday, 
the  day  for  route  marches,  the  Volunteers  aroused  no  suspicions  as 
they  marched  to  the  town,  accompanied  by  a  Fianna  detachment  under 95 
Padraig 
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Riain  and  Eamon  Martin60,0  Riain  was  the  one  person 
with  whom  Hobson  had  shared  the  plan  from  the  beginning.  According 
to  his  own  account61  the  Fianna  contingent  largely  comprised  members 
of  An  Chead  and  the  Inchicore  sluaite.  0  Riain,  Heuston  and  the 
Holohan  brothers  had  brought  their  trek  cart,  filled  with  oak 
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batons 
Asgard  waited  outside  the  harbour,  to  make  her  rendezvous  at 
noon.  After  receiving  urgent  signals  from  her63,  two  Fianna  mem- 
bers  of  the  I.  R.  B.  advance  party  at  the  quay  were  sent  to  hurry  the 
main  body  of  Volunteers  who  had  been  delayed64.  Yacht  and  marchers 
reached  the  quay  together.  The  rifles  were  unloaded  and  distri- 
buted  to  every  man.  All  but  2000  rounds  of  ammunition  were  brought 
into  town  in  a  fleet  of  taxis,  the  rest  being  loaded  into  the  trek 
cart.  Hobson  has  explained  that  the  Volunteers  though  given  rifles 
were  still  far  too  raw  and  undisciplined  to  be  entrusted  with 
ammunition,  and  that  Na  Fianna  were  the  only  body  whose  discipline 
he  could  count  on.  The  cart  was  also  filled  with  as  many  rifles 
as  it  could  hold. 
On  their  return  to  the  city  the  party  were  met  by  police  and 
military  on  the  Malahide  Road.  After  a  brief  melee  Hobson  was 
able  to  disperse  most  of  the  men  who  made  their  best  way  home. 
The  main  company,  however,  were  stopped  again  at  Fairview  in  a 
more  serious  encounter.  Several  Volunteers  opened  fire  on  the 
army  who  fortunately  thought  that  the  shots  came  from  bystanders 
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The  Fianna  found  themselves  defending  the  trek  cart  not  only  from 
the  enemy  but  from  a  number  of  Volunteers  who  were  trying  to  get 
hold  of  the  ammunition.  The  cargo  remained  intact  and  they 
managed  to  capture  four  rifles  from  the  soldiers  in  the  struggle 
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As  darkness  approached  the  boys  lay  low  in  a  wood,  contriving 
to  bury  the  rifles  and  ammunition  under  pretence  of  preparing  a 
scout  camp  site 
67. 
Half  a  dozen  of  them  at  last  arrived  at  the 
Countess's  cottage  at  Three  Rock  Mountain  near  midnight,  knowing 
that  they  would  find  friends  camping  there68.  In  the  morning 
Madame  drove  them  into  Dublin  where  they  met  Joseph  Robinson  with 
twenty  rifles  which  they  brought  back  to  the  cottage.  They 
decided  against  storing  them  there  on  learning  that  the  cottage 
was  not  safe  -  Nora  and  Ina  Connolly  of  the  Belfast  Fianna  had  dis- 
covered  that  a  retired  sergeant  lived  close  by.  Nora  returned  to 
Dublin  to  inform  Liam  Mellows  who  sent  a  taxi  out  to  bring  the  arms 
back  to  the  Volunteers'  office.  The  girls  concealed  them  by 
sitting  on  them  into  town  and  in  the  evening  helped  plant  them  in 
safe  houses..  For  their  work  they  were  given  a  rifle  each  to  take 
back  to  Belfast. 
It  is  true  that  Fianna  numbered  only  some  seventy  of  the  900 
who  took  part  in  the  Howth  operation69,  and  that  they  retrieved 
less  than  one  tenth  of  the  cargo.  On  the  other  hand,  their  disci- 
pline  was  crucial  in  the  encounter  with  the  authorities,  particu- 
larly  that  at  Fairview.  Moreover  their  role  cannot  be  measured  in 
terms  of  rifles,  any  more  than  can  the  gun-running  itself.  It  was 
an  adventure  and  a  coup;  as  Casement  declared,  it  had  struck  a  blow 
for  Ireland  that  would  echo  round  the  world70.  It  only  partly 
solved  the  arms  problem  of  the  Volunteers,  but  by  the  public  reac- 
tion  it  inspired  at  home  and  in  the  U.  S.  A.  it  solved  their  finan- 
cial  worries  almost  completely.  It  gave  an  immediate  boost  to 
recruiting,  as  the  Government  recognised71;  by  early  August  the  army 
was  said  to  number  close  on  172,000  men72.  It  is  the  verdict  of 
one  scholar  that  "without  Howth  and  Kilcoole  there  could  hardly  have 97 
been  a  rising  in  1916"73. 
The  Kilcoole  landing  was  made  on  1  August.  It  was  a  secret 
operation  by  a  smaller  party,  without  the  glamour  of  Howth  but,  in 
the  view  of  one  who  participated  in  both  ventures,  more  exacting  and 
much  better  executed74.  Eleven  of  the  fifty-one  man  team  were 
Fianna  officers,  selected  from  among  the  delegates  assembled  in 
Dublin  that  weekend  for  the  annual  Ard  Fheis75.  The  party 
arrived  by  cycle,  car  and  hired  charabanc.  Liam  Mellows  directed 
operations  from  the  side-car  of  a  motor-bike  driven  by  a  young 
little-known  Volunteer  named  de  Valera.  The  cache  was  brought  in 
by  night  irl  small  boats  and  manhandled  to  shore  because  of  the 
shallowness  of  the  strand.  In  the  morning  it  was  brought  by  lorry 
to  St.  Enda's  for  distribution. 
Since  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe  the  shipment  of  foodstuffs 
out  of  Ireland  had  left  a  shortage  at  home  which  many  shopkeepers 
were  making  the  pretext  for  severe  price  increases.  To  Separatists 
it  was  England's  imperialism  in  England's  imperialist  war  that  was 
hitting  the  Irish  shopper.  The  Volunteers  were  therefore  instruc- 
ted  to  picket  profiteering  shops,  in  co-operation  with  the  Trade 
Unions.  From  August  1914  Fianna  sluaite  were  under  orders  from 
An  tArd  Choiste  to  support  the  pickets  by  preparing  price  lists  for 
the  shops  in  their  areas76.  At  the  same  time  they  undertook  a 
major  campaign  in  support  of  home  industries.  Florence  O'Donoghue 
recalls  the  Cork  slua  being  sent  to  challenge  shopkeepers  who 
failed  to  stock  available  Irish-made  articles77.  Headquarters 
later  organised  a  'Supply  Stores'  "to  supply  Irish-made  goods  to 
Irish  Nationalists  and  others,  thereby  to  promote  Irish  indus- 
tries"78.  The  Stores  operated  as  a  postal  information  and  distri- 
bution  service  for  "anything  made  in  Ireland". 98 
RESOURCES 
The  failure  of  Fianna's  first  paper  and  the  gamble  of  its 
second  indicate  the  organisation's  poverty  at  this  time.  Rank- 
and-file  members  were  of  the  working  class  in  Dublin  and  the 
country  towns79,  like  their  colleagues  in  the  Volunteers  and  like 
the  Fenians  before  them.  The  organisation  was  generally  despised 
by  the  middle  class,  Catholic  and  Protestant  alike,  and  remained 
so  until  after  the  1918  elections  had  shown  the  bourgeoisie  where 
its  political  future  lay 
so 
. 
Fianna  recognised  its  poverty,  especially  in  comparison  with 
its  rival  the  Irish  branch  of  the  Baden-Powell  Scouts,  whom  it  knew 
to  be  subsidised  from  London  and  to  be  loaned  premises  and  instruc- 
tors  by  the  British  Army81.  It  had  no  such  friends  and  patrons. 
Its  leaders  therefore  launched  a  fund-raising  scheme  of  Honorary 
Membership  in  1915.  A  membership  roll  was  compiled,  of  "men  and 
girls  mostly,  not  being  eligible  to  become  active  members"82,  at 
3d.  per  week.  A  similar  scheme  was  established  shortly  afterwards 
in  the  United  States  by  Michael  Lonergan  who  had  emigrated  there 
the  previous  year.  Known  as  the  Fianna  League  of  America,  it 
included  Joseph  McGarrity  among  its  directors83.  These  were  the 
first  of  several  such  schemes  over  the  years  in  the  organisation's 
constant  struggle  to  survive. 
Now  as  later,  however,  it  made  a  virtue  of  necessity.  A 
wealthy  movement,  wrote  the  Countess,  would  be  one  "which  boys 
would  join  for  what  they  could  get";  Fianna's  members  had  joined 
only  for  what  they  could  give,  overcoming  difficulties  through 
patience,  work  and  self-denial84.  All  the  evidence  of  contemporary 
witnesses  confirms  the  truth  of  her  claim.  It  was  a  theme  that 
would  be  repeated  in  hard  days. 99 
A  crucial  resource  to  a  slua  and  a  condition  of  its  permanence 
was  its  drill  hall.  Before  the  Rising  the  purpose-built  hall 
owned  by  the  Scouts  in  Limerick  was  unique.  More  typical  would  be 
a  room  hired  from  a  sympathiser  and  liable  to  be  withdrawn  at  short 
notice.  In  the  city  it  was  usually  possible  to  survive  the  loss 
of  premises.  Slua  Emmet,  for  instance,  had  five  homes  in  four 
years.  Their  first  was  a  drawing  room  and  adjoining  room  at  10 
Beresford  Place,  the  premises  of  the  I.  T.  G.  W.  U.;  the  Union's  expan- 
sion  obliged  them  to  move  to  a  small  hall  in  Nelson  Street  in  1911, 
but  within  two  years  the  boys  were  back  with  the  Transport  Workers 
in  a  room  in  their  new  home  at  Liberty  Hall;  during  the  Lock-out 
all  available  space  was  needed  at  the  Hall  and  the  troop  moved  into 
the  Volunteers'  H.  Q.  at  Parnell  Square  temporarily,  before  finally 
settling  at  the  Hardwick  Theatre85.  But  in  the  smaller  towns 
halls  were  less  easily  replaced  and  at  least  one  slua  collapsed 
through  the  loss  of  its  meeting  place. 
From  cramped  and  dilapidated  drill  halls  Madame's  cottage  and 
Hobson's  at  Balroddery  offered  a  retreat.  St.  Enda's  and  Surrey 
House  were  twin  hermitages  in  the  Dublin  suburbs,  and  used  at 
every  excuse.  The  latter,  particularly,  was  so  constantly  in- 
habited  by  fiannai  by  the  winter  of  1914  as  to  prompt  a  visiting 
journalist  to  remark  that  "Countess  de  Markievicz's  Salon  is  not 
like  a  Salon  but  a  G.  H.  Q.:  "86. 
GROWING  ASSOCIATION  WITH  THE  ADULT  ARMY 
Given  the  role  of  Fianna  in  the  foundation  and  early  training 
of  the  Volunteers,  the  system  of  graduation,  the  similarity  of 
training  in  the  two  organisations  and  their  frequent  sharing  of 
premises,  it  was  necessary  and  inevitable  that  a  working  arrangement 
of  common  policy-making  should  be  established  between  them.  Eamon 100 
Martin  has  stated  that  from  the  outset  the  youth  movement  worked 
"in  close  unity"  with 
Öglaigh 
na  hEireann,  and  that  "no  important 
step,  involving  policy  or  action,  was  taken  by  either  without  con- 
sultation  with  the  other"87. 
Even  before  the  founding  of  the  adult  army  the  Scouts  had 
adopted  a  system  of  military  ranks  for  officers.  Now,  within 
88 
weeks  of  its  foundation,  sluaite  in  the  capital  were  re-organised, 
becoming  Companies  of  a  Dublin  Battalion,  under  the  authority  of  a 
Military  Council89,  and  roughly  corresponding  to  the  Dublin 
Brigade  of  the  Volunteers. 
This  arrangement  allowed  for  a  convenient  system  of  dual  member- 
ship  for  those  Fianna  officers  who  had  been  given  commissions  in 
the  adult  force  -  each  paraded  with  his  Volunteer  unit  and  the 
corresponding  local  Fianna  company  where  such  existed.  Sean 
Heuston,  for  instance,  held  the  rank  of  Captain  of  D.  Coy.  in  the 
Volunteers'  1st  Battalion,  -and  of  No.  6  Coy.  Na  Fianna  Eireann. 
Once  the  semi-formal  association  of  the  two  bodies  was  recog- 
nised,  it  became  common  practice  for  Fianna  officers  and  seniors  to 
attend  Volunteer  parades  for  supplementary  training,  since  the 
adult  organisation  with  its  larger  number  of  companies  could  teach 
a  wider  scope  and  great  specialisation  of  skills.  Thus  Garry 
Holohan  chose  to  train  with  A.  Coy.  3rd  Battalion  under  de  Valera 
to  improve  his  knowledge  of  rifle  and  field  exercises90.  By  1915 
dual  training  had  apparently  become  the  norm  for  the  officers  of 
the  Dublin  Fianna. 
In  that  year,  however,  additional  specialist  training  was 
introduced,  for  which  they  were  instructed  to  parade  together  as  a 
section  of  the  Volunteers'  1st  Battalion,  D.  Coy. 
91. 
This 
"special  field  training"  prepared  the  ground  for  the  setting  up  of 101 
their  own  Active  Service  Unit,  under  the  title  Fianna  Commando, 
later  in  the  year92.  The  unit,  which  operated  in  close  collabora- 
tion  with  the  Volunteers,  was  kept  together  until  the  Rising93. 
Each  of  these  developments  brought  Fianna  into  closer  associa- 
tion  with  the  adult  force.  The  fact  that  from  summer  1914  the 
back  page  of  the  Volunteers'  newspaper  was  devoted  exclusively  to 
the  youth  organisation  confirmed  its  image  as  the  junior  wing  of 
00 Oglaigh  glaigh  na  hEireann.  In  effect  the  position  had  been  reached  in 
which  its  officers  were  considered  colleagues  and  its  juniors 
cadets  of  the  Volunteers.  This  relationship  was  given  formal 
recognitioh  during  1915  :  in  the  cities  of  Dublin,  Belfast, 
Limerick  and  Cork,  where  numbers  made  it  practicable,  Fianna  com- 
panies  became  officially  recognised  as  units  of  the  Volunteer 
Brigades 
95. 
Within  Fianna  itself,  however,  many  felt.  an  incongruity  between 
its  dominant  military  role  and  association  with  the  adult  army  on 
the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  its  own  structure  which  remained  at 
national  level  that  of  a  boy  scout  movement.  They  sought  to 
remedy  the  problem  at  the  July  Ard  Fheis. 
FIANNA  ADOPTS  A  MILITARY  STRUCTURE 
The  Ard  Fheis  of  1915  was  considered  the  most  important  in  the 
history  of  the  organisation  to  date96,  At  it,  a  radically  new 
authority  structure  was  adopted  which  formally  changed  Fianna  from 
a  scouting  movement  into  a  young  army.  The  vital  resolution  was 
moved  by  Captain  Eamon  Martin.  His  three-part  motion  called  for 
the  office  of  President  to  be  replaced  by  that  of  Fianna  Chief,  for 
the  Ard  Choiste  to  be  replaced  by  a  Headquarters  Staff,  and  for  the 
election  of  an  Executive  composed  of  County  representatives97. 
He  argued  that  a  President  was  a  "ludicrous  ...  anomaly"  in  what 102 
was  now  "essentially  a  military"  organisation:  Fianna  required  a 
military  chief,  to  give  a  lead  in  military  training.  The  H.  Q. 
staff  should  share  the  routine  work  hitherto  undertaken  by  the 
National  Secretary  single-handed.  The  Executive  would  appoint 
Headquarters  personnel  and  act  as  watchdog  over  them.  The  resolu- 
tion  was  opposed  by  Hobson  who  argued  that  if  it  was  carried 
authority  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  "a  half  dozen  Fianna 
officers",  and  secondly  that  the  "civil  side"  of  the  organisation  - 
by  which  he  meant  its  task  of  educating  boys  in  citizenship  and 
Irish  culture  -  was  more  important  than  its  military  role.  Con 
Colbert  supported  the  latter  argument,  which  however  Barney 
Mellows  nullified  by  pointing  out  that  the  cultural  and  educational 
work  was  itself  already  being  undertaken  by  the  military  leader- 
ship.  At  the  close  of  the  debate  Colbert  seconded  Captain  Dalton's 
amendment  "that  a  Central  Council  of  twelve  members  be  elected 
with  instructions  to  appoint  a  Fianna  Chief  and  Headquarters  Staff 
at  its  first  meeting".  In  this  form  the  motion  was  carried. 
The  change  had  crucial  implications.  Whereas  previously  the 
national  leadership  was  elected  by  representatives  of  the  whole 
organisation  in  public  session,  in  future  a  Headquarters  Staff 
would  be  appointed  by  a  small  group  in  private  meeting  :  power  was 
thus  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  caucus. 
The  Martin-Dalton  resolution  had  the  further  effect  of  ousting 
the  Countess  from  central  leadership.  As  Martin  himself  remembers 
the  meeting,  she  was  in  fact  elected  to  the  office  of  President, 
but  precisely  by  being  elected  was  disqualified  from  a  more  signifi- 
cant  appointment  onto  the  Headquarters  Staff  at-the  next  executive 
meeting98.  Thus  what  appeared  to  be  an  acclamation  of  her  was  in 
fact  a  ruse-to  exclude  her  and  reduce  her  to  a  paper  title. 103 
Madame  was  elected  onto  the  national  executive,  with  J.  A.  Dal- 
ton  of  Limerick  and  ten  Dublin  officers99.  At  its  first  meeting 
on  18  July  this  body  appointed  the  following  G.  H.  Q.  staff100  . 
Chief  of  the  Fianna 
Chief-of-Staff 
Adjutant  General 
Director  of  Training 
Director  of  Organisation 
and  Recruiting 
Director  of  Equipment 
Director  of  Finance 
Pädraig  Ö  Riain; 
Bulmer  Hobson; 
Percy  Reynolds; 
Seän  Heuston; 
Eamon  Martin; 
Leo  Henderson; 
Barney  Mellows. 
The  obvious  choice  for  Chief  (Ard  Fheinne)  in  terms  of  seniority  and 
ability  would  have  been  Hobson,  while  0  Riain's  proven  flair  for 
organisation  would  have  fitted  him  admirably  for  the  post  of  Chief- 
of-Staff.  It  was  apparently  at  Hobson's  own  suggestion  that  the 
appointments  were  made  as  they  were.  Ill-will  had  been  growing 
between  himself  and  the  Countess  ever  since  her  failure  to  persuade 
him  to  commit  Fianna  to  the  side  of  Labour  in  the  Dublin  Lock-out. 
If  she  was  to  be  ousted  from  the  position  of  Chief  he  felt  that  she 
would  accept  this  more  readily  if  someone  other  than  himself 
succeeded  her.  In  fact,  0  Riain  continued  to  perform  much  of  the 
work  of  a  Chief-of-Staff101. 
It  should  not  be  concluded  that  the  new  authority  structure 
radically  transformed  the  organisation.  Rather  it  brought  the  de 
jure  and  de  facto  positions  into  line,  giving  "official  sanction  to 
a  situation  which  had  been  gradually  taking  shape"  for  nearly  two 
102 
years 
THE  I.  R.  B.,  FIANNA,  AND  THE  RISING 
The  Executive  and  the  G.  H.  Q.  Staff  remained  unchanged  from 
July  1915  to  the  Easter  Rising103.  Their  composition  is  notable 
for  the  fact  that,  apart  from  the  Countess,  every  member  of  both 
bodies  was  also  a  member  of  the  I.  R.  B.  Since  the  same  already 
also  applied  to  the  Dublin  Battalion  staff,  at  least  seven  of  the 104 
nine  Battalion  company  captains104,  and  every  senior  officer 
throughout  the  country105,  the  new  appointments  completed  the 
Brotherhood's  local  domination  of  Fianna  at  the  level  of  national 
leadership.  Considering  the  independence  this  leadership  now 
enjoyed  under  the  new  structure,  the  reality  of  I.  R.  B.  control  may 
be  appreciated.  It  was  in  fact  far  tighter  and  more  complete  than 
in  the  case  of  the  Volunteers. 
Fianna's  1915  Ard  Fheis,  with  its  gathering  of  power  into  the 
hands  of  a  caucus,  the  ousting  of  the  Countess,  and  the  methods  by 
which  these  were  effected,  was  in  fact  a  typical  case  of  I.  R.  B. 
engineering.  Behind  its  main  debate  can  clearly  be  seen  the  plan- 
ning  and  manipulation  of  the  John  Mitchel  Circle.  Eamon  Martin's 
resolution,  his  and  Barney  Mellows's  arguments,  Dalton's  amendment 
were  all  on  cue.  Previous  resolutions  had  created  a  suitably 
military  atmosphere106,  and  the  national  secretary  had  resigned 
with  a  strong  recommendation  for  "reorganisation  at  headquarters". 
Even  Colbert's  'opposition'  should  be  seen  as  tactical,  allaying 
fears  that  the  resolution  was  the  work  of  a  clique  and  disarming 
delegates  in  the  final  vote. 
Hobson's  'opposition'  was  less  straightforward  and  is  only  to 
be  understood  in  terms  of  the  internal  politics  of  the  I.  R.  B.  at 
this  time.  Already  before  this  date  a  group  had  emerged  within 
the  Brotherhood  around  the  leadership  of  Clarke  and  MacDiarmada107" 
Its  members  were  united  in  seeking  an  insurrection  in  Ireland  at 
the  earliest  opportunity,  an  aim  in  defiance  of  the  Brotherhood's 
constitution  which  expressly  forbade  any  military  rising  without 
the  sanction  of  the  Irish  people108.  Through  the  influence  of 
this  group  the  I.  R.  B.  Supreme  Council  had  already  secretly  decided 
109 
upon  a  rising  before  the  end  of  the  European  War. 105 
In  spring  1914  Hobson  had  been  at  the  heart  of  the  I.  R.  B.  -a 
member  of  the  Supreme  Council  and,  as  Leinster  Centre,  the  elected 
representative  of  some  three-quarters  of  all  members11°.  But  he 
was  already  distrusted  by  Clarke  and  MacDiarmada  because  of  his 
close  association  with  Casement  and  MacNeill  and  because  like  them 
he  was  opposed  to  an  unprovoked  insurrection 
ill. 
His  tactical 
support  for  admitting  Redmond's  nominees  onto  the  Volunteers  Pro- 
visional  Committee  in  May  1914  provoked  a  bitter  confrontation  with 
Clarke  and  Macfiarmada  and,  indirectly,  his  resignation  from  the 
Supreme  Council.  Having  fallen  foul  of  them  his  eclipse  within 
the  I.  R.  B.  'was  inevitable112 
By  the  time  of  the  1915  Ard  Fheis,  therefore,  his  attitude  to 
the  whole  question  of  Fianna's  role  and  the  role  of  the  I.  R.  B. 
within  it  may  have  become  ambivalent.  Certainly  he  was  now  sus- 
picious  of  the  insurrectionists,  as  "a  secret  society  organised 
within  a  secret  society" 
113; 
perhaps  he  had  reservations  about  the 
very  concept  of  secret  societies,  open  as  they  are  to  such  intrigue. 
Certainly  the  warning  he  gave  at  the  Ard  Fheis  debate  -  that  the 
proposed  new  Fianna  structure  would  be  a  move  towards  militarism. 
and  elitism 
-  was  fundamental  and  prophetic.  He  had  seen  militar- 
ism  and  elitism  working  side-by-side  in  the  plans  of  the  I.  R.  B. 
insurrectionists.  As  one  who  had  twice  founded  a  'boys'  republic' 
he  must  have  feared  for  their  consequences  in  a  juvenile  organisa- 
tion  which  had  special  obligations  to  its  members  as  developing 
young  persons.  He  may  well  have  realised  therefore  that  -  although 
Fianna  still  paid  lip  service  to  'the  needs  of  the  boy'  (and  on 
this  criterion  drew  a  distinction  between  its  own  educational  role 
and  the  pragmatic  role  of  the  adult  army 
114) 
-  this  prime  and 
original  aim  was  now  being  swamped  by  the  elitist-military  dictates 
of  others. 106 
In  the  meantime  the  insurrectionists  continued  to  gather  con- 
trol  within  the  Brotherhood.  Effective  power  was  passing  from  the 
Supreme  Council  itself  to  its  standing  committee  of  President,  Sec- 
retary  and  Treasurer.  In  this  committee  of  three  the  decision  of 
any  two  was  constitutionally  binding.  By  arranging  the  election  of 
Belfast-based  Dennis  McCullough  as  President,  Clarke  and  MacDiarmada 
as  Secretary  and  Treasurer  virtually  created  absolute  control  for 
themselves  in  Dublin115.  The  executive  appointed  a  military  com- 
mittee  comprising  Pearse,  Plunkett  and  Ceannt  in  the  summer  of  1915, 
to  which  Clarke  and  MacDiarmada  were  co-opted  in  the  autumn,  and 
Connolly  and  MacDonagh  the  following  spring 
116. 
This  'Military 
Council'  quietly  replaced  the  more  dispersed  Supreme  Council,  so 
that  real  power  within  the.  I.  R.  B.  finally  rested  in  the  hands  of 
its  seven  members.  In  January  1916  the  Supreme  Council  had  accep- 
ted  MacDiarmada's  motion  in  favour  of  a  rising  "at  the  earliest 
date  possible"117.  All  more  specific  information  was  thereafter 
withheld  from  those,  even  of  the  highest  rank,  who  were  known  to  be 
cool  towards  insurrection  -  Dennis  McCullough,  for  instance,  who  as 
President  of  the  Supreme  Council  was  president-elect  of  any  Repub- 
lic  that  might  be  established,  only  heard  of  the  Rising  plans  by 
chance  eight  days  before  the  event118. 
The  formal  position  of  the  Volunteers,  and  of  their  Chief-of- 
Staff,  in  the  spring  of  1916  was  that  a  rising  would  only  be  justi- 
fied  in  the  event  of  an  attempt  to  disarm  them,  forced  conscription, 
or  an  invasion  of  Ireland119.  The  problem  for  the  insurrection 
caucus  was  therefore  how  to  guarantee  their  participation  when  the 
time  came.  They  counted  on  working  against  the  top  leadership 
through  the  key  positions  held  by  their  own  men  in  the  army. 
Pearse  held  the  crucial  post  of  Director  of  Organisation120,  Mac- 
Donagh  and  Plunkett  those  of  Director  of  Training  and  of  Military 107 
Operations  respectively,  All  five  Dublin  Battalion  Commandants 
favoured  insurrection 
121. 
'Safe'  men  among  the  Volunteer  leader- 
ship  in  the  country  included  Sen  Etchingham  in  Wexford,  Tomas 
MacCurtain  in  Cork  and  Liam  Mellows  in  Galway.  Through  these  and 
others,  it  was  assumed  that  the  Volunteers  would  be  committed  to 
the  Rising. 
Although  Na  Fianna  had  no  formal  policy  on  the  question,  its 
position  was  in  one  respect  identical  to  that  of 
Oglaigh 
na  hEireann: 
its  Chief-of-Staff  was  opposed  to  an  insurrection.  In  addition, 
Ard  Fheinne  Pädraig.  6  Riain  could  not  be  counted  on.  As  with  the 
adult  army;  therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  by-pass  the  top  leader- 
ship,  deliberately  keeping  them  uninformed,  and  to  commit  the 
organisation  to  the  Rising  via  the  rest  of  the  G.  H.  Q.  Staff  and  the 
other  senior.  Dublin  officers122, 
The  remaining  Headquarters  staff  were  summoned  to  a  meeting  at 
2  Dawson  Street  on  the  Monday  evening  of  Holy  Week123.  It  was  in 
no  sense  a  discussion  meeting.  Barney  Mellows  met  the  officers 
and  informed  them  "that  things  were  moving  quickly  and  that  they 
were  to  be  ready  for  any  emergency".  Some  were  given  more  precise 
instructions  -  Eamon  Martin  for  instance  was  ordered  to  select  a 
squad  of  twenty  fiannai  for  the  Magazine  Fort  raid124.  Others 
were  given  further  information  severally  as  deemed  necessary  or  as 
chance  arose  during  the  week  that  followed  -  thus  Garry  Holohan  was 
not  informed  of  his  mobilisation  until  Holy  Thursday  evening. 
It  was  on  Holy  Thursday,  too,  that  Hobson  stumbled  upon  the 
truth  by  chance  at  a  Centres'  Board  meeting125.  He  at  once  in- 
formed  MacNeill.  He  also  contacted 
Ö  Riain,  as  a  result  of  which 
the  latter  decided  to  leave  the  capital  for  Belfast126.  Thus  the 
man  whose  natural  leadership  and  industry  had  made  him  in  Hobson's 108 
view  the  dominating  personality  in  Fianna  from  its  foundation 
turned  his  back  on  the  Rising  and  the  organisation.  Hobson  himself, 
being  powerful  enough  in  the  I.  R.  B.  and  the  Volunteers  to  obstruct 
last  minute  plans,  was  arrested  by  I.  R.  B.  men  on  Good  Friday  and 
held  until  the  Rising  was  under  way. 
The  senior  Fianna  officers  were  undoubtedly  aware  of  Hobson's 
eclipse  within  the  Brotherhood  and  of  his  opposition  to  a  rising. 
For  them  there  must  have  been  something  of  a  conflict  of  loyalties 
during  Holy  Week.  They  knew  his  record  in  Fianna  and  the  movement, 
they  held  him  in  the  highest  esteem  personally  and  retained  im- 
plicit  faith  in  him,  though  they  realised  that,  unlike  themselves, 
he  did  not  enjoy  the  confidence  of  Clarke  and  MacDiarmada127.  He 
was  still  their  Chief-of-Staff. 
On  the  other  hand  there  could  be  for  them  no  ambiguity  as  to 
committing  themselves  and  Fianna  to  the  Rising.  They  were  I.  R.  B. 
men  and  if  it  came  to  a  conflict  they  took  their  orders  not  from 
their  superior  in  Fianna  but  from  the  Brotherhood;  because  of  the 
particular  procedure  of  the  organisation,  this  meant  in  fact  from 
the  Centre  of  their  Circle128.  This  was  the  case  also  for  I.  R.  B. 
members  of  the  Volunteers,  but  in  Fianna's  case  there  was  a  cru- 
cial  difference.  Whereas  the  Volunteers  belonged  to  a  number  of 
circles  all  senior  Fianna  officers  in  Ireland  belonged  to  the  one 
Fianna  Circle.  Ironically,  it  had  been  set  up  by  Hobson.  Con 
Colbert,  as  its  Centre,  was  their  immediate  superior.  He  had 
retained  this  crucial  office,  despite  having  relinquished  his 
membership  of  Fianna  itself  the  previous  year129.  Unequivocably 
a  Clarke-MacDiarmada  man  and  one  of  their  most  trusted  lieutenants, 
it  was  from  Colbert  that  all  instructions  concerning  the  Fianna 
emanated  during  Holy  Week.  It  was  he  who  summoned  the  officers  to 
the  meeting  of  Monday  16  April,  he  who  informed  them  of  their 109 
assignments 
130: 
In  the  preparations  for  insurrection  it  is  Colbert 
who  is  seen  to  be  the  real  power  behind  Fianna.  Through  him,  via 
the  second  rank  leadership,  the  organisation  was  committed  to  take 
its  place  in  the  Rising. 
PREPARING  FOR  INSURRECTION 
Through  the  winter  and  early  spring  of  1915-16  Fianna  meeting 
places  in  Dublin  were  being  used  as  centres  for  military  prepara- 
tion.  The  Active  Service  Unit  were  training  in  explosive  techni- 
ques  at  Fairfield  under  Tomas  MacDonagh131.  The  Countess's  home 
was  now  a  store  and  clearing  house  for  arms  and  ammunition,  from 
which  boys  came  and  went  with  weapons  and  bandoliers  under  their 
coats132.  Even  explosives  were  brought  there. 
One  of  the  main  sources  of  explosive  materials  was  the  West  of 
Scotland.  Prior  to  the  Rising  it  was  still  a  fairly  simple  matter 
to  make  undetected  shipments  between  the  Clyde  and  Ireland,  and  a 
regular  traffic  had  been  built  up  by  Fianna  from  1913.  Robbery  and 
shipment  of  arms  and  explosives  in  fact  comprised  the  main  support 
work  of  the  two  Glasgow-sluaite133.  By  1915  they  were  raiding  con- 
tinually  for  munitions,  according  to  Seumas  Robinson;  "this  acti- 
vity  increased  as  1916  approached.  The  raids  had  become  almost 
'barefaced'  -  they  had  got  away  with  so  much  for  so  long  without 
detection"134.  On  15  January  they  attempted  a  "grand  finale", 
rifling  more  than  a  hundredweight  of  Dynobel  and  Arkite  from  a 
colliery  magazine  in  Uddingston135.  A  dropped  card  led  the  police 
to  Joseph  Robinson  who  was  arrested  within  days,  a  telegram  in  his 
possession  implicating  another  Fianna  officer,  Seamus  Reader. 
Reader  was  arrested  in  Glasgow  where  he  had  been  sent  to  deliver 
despatches  from  Sean  MacDiarmada  to  Volunteer  and  I.  R.  B.  Contacts 
instructing  them  to  post  all  able-bodied  men  to  Dublin.  A  cache 110 
of  arms  and  explosives  was  found  at  his  house.  According  to  the 
police  it  was  his  statement  that  led  them  to  search  four  Fianna 
houses  in  Dublin  and  subsequently  to  raid  the  Countess's  home  where 
the  boys  they  wanted  in  connection  with  the  Uddingston  raid  were 
found  to  be  staying. 
This  was  only  one  of  several  Special  Branch  raids  on  Surrey 
House  in  the  early  spring  of  1916136.  They  were  not  accepted 
meekly.  The  Fianna  were  armed  and  ready  to  "look  to  their  revol- 
vers"137.  Like  Liberty  Hall,  the  premises  were  on  permanent  guard 
and  virtually  a  fortress.  The  boys  were  prepared  to  face  the 
authoritie's  with  open  confrontation  and  armed  resistance. 111 
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Chapter  4.  EASTER  WEEK 
THE  UNSANCTIONED  PARTICIPATION  OF  JUNIORS 
The  structure  of  Na  Fianna,  which  well  before  1916  had  devel- 
oped  into  a  dual  organisation  with  a  junior  scouting  section  and  a 
military  corps  of  seniors  and  officers,  had  provided  the  planners 
of  the  Rising  with  an  obvious  means  of  selecting  members  for  parti- 
cipation  :  officers  and  seniors  were  ordered  to  mobilise  and  all 
others  strictly  excluded. 
In  the  case  of  the  Dublin  juniors  it  was  decided  to  ensure 
their  exclusion  by  sending  them  out  of  town  on  Easter  Monday  morn- 
ing,  and  for  this  purpose  Barney  Mellows  arranged  a  route  march  for 
them  to  the  Featherbed'.  Their  itinerary  took  them  through  Rath- 
farnham  where  they  passed  Pädraic  Pearse  waiting  at  the  tram  term- 
inus.  They  received  the  order  'Eyes  right  and  salute',  not  knowing 
that  Pearse  was  on  his  way  to  the  city  to  proclaim  the  Republic. 
On  arriving  at  their  destination  they  became  suspicious  at  the 
absence  of  any  seniors  and  decided  to  return  to  town.  They  fol- 
lowed  the  railway  as  the  only  guide  they  knew,  from  Dundrum  into 
Harcourt  Street,  and  dispersed  at  Stephen's  Green.  Most  went  home, 
but  a  number  found  their  way  into  the  insurgent  posts,  either  that 
day  or  later  in  the  week. 
Diarmuid  Lynch,  for  example,  recalls  "several"  boys  under  six- 
teen  arriving  at  the  G.  P.  O.  at  12.30  p.  m.,  having  been  ordered  home 
from  another  position  because  of  their  youth,  and  being  allowed  to 
remain  as  part  of  the  garrison2.  Another  eye-witness  remembers 
them  "pleading  for  a  gun  of  any  description  and  begging  to  be 
allowed  to  take  their  places  with  the  men  at  the  windows,  or  on  the 121 
roof,  or  anywhere"3.  Two  of  them  at  least  got  their  way  and  took 
up  sniping  positions  on  the  roof4. 
Other  juniors  made  their  way  to  Boland's  Mill.  Alarmed  by  the 
number  of  boys  in  the  area  Commandant  de  Valera  called  a  parade  of 
all  under-eighteens  on  Easter  Tuesday  at  which  he  ordered  the 
younger  ones  home.  All  were  reluctant  to  leave  and  one,  Richard 
Pearle,  remained  all  week,  ignoring  the  pleas  of  his  mother  whom  he 
sent  away  from  the  post  as  being  "no  place  for  a  woman".  He  was 
interned  in  Britain  with  the  seniors  after  the  surrender.  Other 
boys  arrived  through  the  week,  including  Willie  Fitzgerald  who  was 
constantly'  chased  away  only  to  return  with  fresh  information  con- 
cerning  the  movements  of  the  enemy5.  Boys  like  these  had  heard 
the  gunfire  and  been  drawn  to  the  fighting  areas,  like  the  young 
Ernie  O'Malley,  to  join  "the  grand  adventure"6, 
Quite  a  number  of  young  fiannai  joined  the  Citizen  Army  and 
Volunteers  in  the  College  of  Surgeons.  Some  were  certainly  in  the 
way7,  but  at  least  one,  twelve  year  old  Tommy  Keenan,  gave  in- 
valuable  help  bringing  in  food  and  medicine  to  the  besieged  post. 
On  Tuesday  he  was  persuaded  to  go  gome  to  tell  his  parents  where 
he  was.  His  father  locked  him  in  the  house,  but  he  escaped  and 
returned  to  the  College8.  Another  boy  is  remembered  riding  his 
cycle  round  the  lecture  hall  where  the  men  were  trying  to  snatch 
rest.  He  stayed  to  the  surrender  when  despite  all  attempts  by 
the  British  soldiers  he  refused  to  give  away  any  information9. 
The  Fianna  boys  erected  an  altar  in  the  hall  of  the  College  and 
their  piety  deeply  impressed  Countess  Markievicz,  undoubtedly 
10 
influencing  the  decision  she  took  that  week  to  become  a  Catholic. 
No  complete  list  exists  of  young  participants  in  the  Rising11 
and  some  of  the  eye-witness  accounts  that  mention  Fianna  juniors 122 
are  no  more  than  chance  references  which  may  or  may  not  typify  the 
overall  position12.  Perhaps  the  participation  of  Fianna's  most 
famous  junior  of  Easter  Week,  Sean  Healy,  would  not  have  been  re- 
corded  had  he  not  lost  his  life.  Only  fifteen  years  old,  Healy 
had  been  a  member  of  the  North  Frederick  Street  slua  for  three 
years13.  He  had  spent  Easter  Saturday  night  transporting  arms 
across  the  city,  and  having  received  no  mobilisation  order  made  his 
way  to  Jacob's  on  the  Tuesday.  That  day  Commandant  MacDonagh  gave. 
him  a  despatch  to  carry  to  the  senior  officer  at  Phibsboro  Bridge, 
probably  choosing  Healy  in  the  hope  that  he  would  then  return  to 
his  home  nearby.  The  boy  actually  called  home  to  tell  his  mother 
he  was  safe  and  was  shot  dead  on  his  way  back  to  Jacob's  at  Phibs- 
boro  Corner. 
Carrying  despatches  was  in  fact,  with  sentinel  duty  and 
foraging,  the  main  task  of  Fianna  juniors  in  the  Rising.  As  the 
insurgent  positions  became  isolated  from  one  another  and  lines  of 
communication  were  cut,  boys  (and  women)  made  the  least  conspicuous 
messengers  among  the  Dublin  crowds.  But  even  in  this  the  role  of 
the  scouts  was  limited  for,  according  to  Lynch,  almost  all  despatch 
work  was  undertaken  by  the  Cumann  na  mBan14.  It  seems  indeed  that 
the  policy  of  excluding  juniors  was  largely  effective  and  that  very 
few  took  part  in  the  events  of  Easter  Week. 
THE  ACTIONS  IN  THE  CITY 
Obeying  their  mobilisation  orders,  officers  and  seniors  of 
Fianna's  Dublin  Battalion  joined  the  garrisons  as  partners  of  the 
Volunteers  with  whom  they  had  shared  training  for  two  years  past. 
Two  of  them,  Colbert  and  Heuston,  held  sufficiently  senior  rank  in 
the  adult  army  to  be  given  commands  on  Easter  Monday.  Two  others, 
Pat  Holohan  and  Seän  McLoughlin,  took  over  commands  during  the  week. 123 
Others,  young  men  like  slua  o/c  Joe  Cullen  at  the  Four  Courts15  and 
Battalion  Quartermaster  Seamus  Pounch  at  Jacob'sls,  played  a  less 
prominent  but  more  typical  part  in  the  ranks.  In  all,  members 
fought  in  every  post  in  the  city  except  that  at  Mount  Street- 
Northumberland  Road,  though  since  they  were  fighting  as  individuals 
in  the  adult  army  in  which  most  held  dual  membership  there  are  few 
specific  references  to  Fianna  as  such  in  the  literature  on  the 
Rising17.  Only  one  action  of  the  week  could  be  termed  a  Fianna 
operation,  undertaken  by  the  organisation  as  opposed  to  individual 
members.  This  was  the  attempt  to  blow  up  the  Magazine  Fort  in 
Phoenix  Park  which  in  the  plans  for  the  insurrection  was  to  be  the 
work  of  the  Fianna  A.  S.  U. 
It  was  on  Connolly's  advice  that  Fianna  was  allocated  the 
task18,  for  which  a  dozen  members  of  the'A.  S.  U.  received  several 
weeks'  training  in  explosives  under  Thomas  MacDonagh19.  Paddy 
Daly,  o/c  of  No.  9  Coy.,  was  given  charge  of  the  attack  force  and 
also  planned  the  operation  and  supplied  maps,  as  one  who  knew  the 
Fort  well  through  having  worked  there  as  a  builder's  joiner20. 
A  week  before  Easter  Eamon  Martin  was  instructed  to  make  final  sel- 
ection  of  the  party  of  twenty.  MacDonagh  gave  them  five  bags  of 
.  explosives  on  Good  Friday21 
The  operation  was  intended  to  serve  a  three-fold  purpose  -  to 
destroy  or  capture  enemy  arms,  achieve  an  early  morale-boosting 
coup,  and  audibly  signal  the  start  of  the  Rising  throughout  the 
city.  It  may  have  been  a  "side  show"  to  the  main  actions,  as  Ryan 
observes22,  yet  it  had  many  of  the  qualities  that  typified  Easter 
Week  -  preparation,  eleventh  hour  change  of  plan,  confusion, 
initiative,  adventure,  misadventure. 
With  their  original  plans  upset  by  MacNeill's  countermand,  the 
attack  party  were  called  to  a  meeting  on  Easter  Sunday  evening  at 124 
which  it  was  decided  to  mobilise  the  following  day  at  noon,  apparen- 
tly  under  the  mistaken  impression  that  the  Rising  was  to  begin  in 
the  evening23.  Learning  on  Monday  morning  that  the  attack  itself 
must  be  made  at  noon  Daly's  problem  was  to  contact  his  team  in 
time.  He  was  only  able  to  reach  Martin,  the  Holohan  brothers, 
Barney  Mellows,  Eamon  Murray  and  Louis  Marie,  and  on  Connolly's 
orders  men  were  drafted  in  from  the  Volunteer  units  bringing  the 
force  to  thirty24.  The  party  were  equipped  with  . 
25  automatics, 
the  explosives  and,  the  most  important  item,  a  football. 
Entry  to  the  premises  went  according  to  plan.  Under  cover  of 
a  game  of  football  the  boys  were  able  to  approach  close  enough  to 
rush  the  sentry  and  surprise  and  disarm  the  dozen  soldiers  in  the 
guardroom.  A  second  sentry  was  shot  in  the  leg  and  died  later  of 
the  neglected  wound.  The  plan  to  blow  up  the  building  was  aban- 
doned  when  the  key  to  the  explosives  store  was  found  to  be  missing, 
and  it  was  decided  instead  to  try  laying  fuses  over  the  ammunition 
cases.  The  result  was  two  dull  explosions  and  a  fire  that  burned 
for  a  day.  But  even  had  the  Fort  gone  up  it  would  not  have  signal- 
led  the  revolution  as  planned  because  the  attack  was  a  quarter-of- 
an-hour  late  and  by  then  other  posts  in  the  city  were  already  in 
action 
25 
The  get-away  vehicle  was  a  jaunting  car,  complete  with  reluc- 
tant  jarvey  -  the  Volunteer  detailed  to  arrange  a  motor  van  had  con- 
trived  to  crash  it  and  had  commandeered  the  outside  car  as  a  re- 
placement.  Seven  of  the  party  climbed  aboard  with  the  captured 
arms,  the  rest  making  their  way  out  on  foot.  At  the  park  exit 
they  caught  up  with  the  caretaker's  teenage  son  on  his  way  to  raise 
the  alarm;  he  was  shot  dead  by  Garry  Holohan.  The  car  was  driven 
to  the  Four  Courts  where  several  lads  including  Paddy  Daly  and 
Barney  Mellows  jumped  off.  All  the  other  Fianna  members  continued 125 
to  North  Brunswick  Street  where  they  stayed  to  help  build  and  man 
the  barricades.  Before  taking  his  post,  however,  Eamon  Martin 
walked  on  to  the  G.  P.  O.  to  deliver  his  report,  and  from  there  travel- 
led  in  The  O'Rahilly's  car  to  the  Holohans'  house  to  pick  up  their 
equipment  and  weapons26. 
It  must  have  been  shortly  after  he  left  the  Post  Office  that 
the  flag  was  run  up  on  the  roof,  the  emblem  of  the  Republic  pro- 
claimed  three  hours  before27  Green,  and  with  the  words  'Irish 
Republic'  in  white  and  gold,  it  had  been  made  by  the  Fianna28  and 
was  now  hoisted  by  Fianna  officers  with  Volunteers  and  men  of  the 
Kimmage  Garrison29.  After  the  surrender  the  pole  was  rescued  by 
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Fianna  boys  who  cut  it  into  blocks  to  keep  as  souvenirs, 
Monday  afternoon  also  saw  the  first  Fianna  death  of  the  week. 
Brendan  Donelan,  Loughrea  born  and  now  eighteen  years  old,  was  one 
of  a  party  of  six  retreating  from  Rialto  Gate  across  the  field  in- 
side  the  South  Dublin  Union,  trying  to  reach  the  main  party  under 
Eamonn  Ceannt  holding  the  hospital.  He  was  fired  on  by  soldiers 
from  the  Rialto  Buildings  and  fell  wounded;  further  shots  killed 
him.  His  body,  with  that  of  James  Quinn  beside  him,  lay  for  the 
rest  of  the  day  before  being  retrieved  under  cover  of  darkness31. 
A  second  Fianna  death  occurred  later  that  night.  Twenty 
year  old  Gerald  Keogh,  who  had  joined  the  Scouts  in  1913  and  the 
Volunteers  a  year  later,  was  one  of  the  G.  P.  O.  garrison.  On  Monday 
afternoon  he  was  sent  by  his  old  headmaster  Pädraic  Pearse  with  a 
message  to  the  remaining  Kimmage  reservists  at  Larkfield.  One  of 
these  'Lame  Ducks'  recounts  that  Pearse  had  forgotten  them  and  only 
sent  word.  of  their  mobilisation  through  at  six  o'clock  that  even- 
ing 
32; 
Keogh's  message  probably  concerned  mobilisation  instructions 
therefore.  He  remained  at  Larkfield  until  about  midnight,  and  was 126 
shot  dead  on  College  Green  attempting  the  return  journey,  in  the 
33 
early  hours  of  Tuesday 
. 
The  barricades  in  North  Brunswick  Street  formed  part  of  the 
extensive  area  defended  by  the  Volunteers'  First  Battalion  under 
Ned  Daly  for  which  the  Father  Matthew  Hall  served  as  headquarters. 
It  was  to  here  that  Martin  had  returned  on  Easter  Monday  afternoon. 
The  following  evening  he  and  Garry  Holohan  were  chosen  as  members 
of  a  ten  man  squad  under  Dennis  O'Callaghan  and  Peadar  Breslin 
detailed  to  occupy  Broadstone  Station  just  outside  the  defended  area. 
According  to  the  original  insurrection  plans  this  strategic  position 
was  to  have  been  taken  immediately,  but  the  operation  had  been  post- 
poned  until  Tuesday  by  which  time,  unknown  to  the  rebels,  it  had  al- 
ready  been  occupied  by  British  troops.  Approaching  the  station  as 
dusk  fell  Martin  at  the  head  of  the  party  was  unable  to  distinguish 
the  colour  of  the  uniform  worn  by  the  sentry  at  the  entrance.  As 
he  advanced  he  was  hit  by  a  single  shot  that  bored  through  his  arm 
and  chest,  piercing  his  lung  and  passing  out  at  his  back. 
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O'Callaghan  was  forced  to  retire  to  Church  Street. 
Martin  was  taken  to  Richmond  Hospital  from  which,  according  to 
his  own  account,  he  made  a  remarkable  escape.  Apparently  Sir 
Thomas  Myles,  the  senior  surgeon  of  the  hospital,  entered  Martin's 
room  and  laying  down  his  overcoat  with  an  envelope  upon  it  launched 
into  a  fierce  tirade  against  the  rebels,  complaining  that  but  for 
the  fighting  he  would  be  boarding  a  ship  that  very  day  for  a  holiday 
abroad.  He  stamped  out,  leaving  the  coat  and  envelope.  Martin 
picked  up  the  envelope  and  noticed  a  boat  ticket  inside.  Realising 
Myles's  meaning  at  last,  he  slipped  the  coat  over  his  pyjamas, 
walked  out  of  the  hospital  door,  found  a  cab  waiting  outside,  drove 
to  the  North  Wall  where  he  reached  his  ship  just  as  the  gang  plank 
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was  about  to  be  raised,  and  so  left  the  country. 127 
On  Wednesday  morning  (26  April)  Garry  Holohan  joined  O'Callaghan 
and  his  small  raiding  party  in  an  attempt  to  capture  the  Linenhall 
Barracks36.  After  failing  to  breach  the  wall  with  explosives37 
they  attacked  the  main  door.  The  building  was  surrendered  by  its 
occupants,  forty  unarmed  British  soldiers.  It  was  then  set  alight 
with  bedding,  oil  and  paint.  The  fire  quickly  spread  to  nearby 
tenements.  The  volunteers  were  barely  able  to  contain  it  with 
hoses  and  it  raged  through  the  night. 
The  youngest  of  the  raiding  party  was  Sean  Howard,  a  seventeen 
year  old  Fianna  piper  who  earlier  in  the  week  had  destroyed  a 
bridge  with  the  help  of  Fianna  comrades  to  prevent  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance  on  the  Four  Courts.  Returning  from  the  Linenhall  Barracks 
he  was  defending  the  barricade  at  Red  Cow  Lane  as  dawn  broke  on 
Thursday.  Severely  wounded,  he  and  a  volunteer  were  carried  by 
stretcher  to  the  Father  Matthew  Hall.  It  is  said  that  they  were 
deliberately  fired  on  despite  a  priest's  appeal  that  they  were 
wounded  and  might  be  allowed  to  pass.  Howard  died  in  Richmond 
Hospital  later  that  day 
38. 
Con  Colbert's  part  in  Easter  Week  merits  inclusion  in  the 
present  account  since,  though  he  had  relinquished  his  Fianna  com- 
pany  command  nine  months  previously  and  fought  as  a  Volunteer,  he 
remained  a  member  of  the  National  Executive  and  (as  we  saw)  played 
a  crucial  part  in  Fianna's  mobilisation.  In  addition,  it  was 
partly  as  a  Fianna  organiser  that  he  was  later  judged  and  sentenced 
by  the  British  authorities. 
On  Easter  Monday  he  was  given  command  of  a  garrison  of  fifteen 
men  with  instructions  to  occupy  Watkin's  Brewery,  a  support  out- 
post  of  the  main  insurgent  position  in  the  South  Dublin  Union. 
After  a  day  fruitlessly  waiting  to  make  contact  with  the  enemy  he 128 
requested  instructions  from  Major  MacBride  for  redeployment  of  his 
force.  On  MacBride's  order  he  moved  at  dawn  on  Wednesday  to  re- 
inforce  Seamus  Murphy's  garrison  at  Jameson's  Distillery  in  Marrow- 
bone  Lane.  This  force  already  numbered  a  score  of  Volunteers, 
more  than  twenty  women  of  the  Cumann  na  mBan,  and  seven  fiannai, 
among  them  fifteen  year  old  Paddy  Rigney39.  Colbert  was  made 
Second-in-Command.  The  post  saw  little  action  beyond  a  brief, 
sharp  exchange  on  Thursday  -  it  remained  a  defensive  position  while 
the  British  troops  bypassed  it,  and  one  commentator  has  criticised 
the  command  for  waiting  "unimaginatively"  for  attacks  which  never 
developed40 
In  the  original  plans  for  the  Rising  Sein  Heuston  was  to  have 
commanded  the  Kimmage  reservists  at  the  G.  P.  O. 
41 
but  on  Easter  Mon- 
day  morning  Connolly  informed  him  that  due  to  the  shortage  of 
officers  caused  by,  the  countermand  he  was  to  be  sent  to  hold  the 
Mendicity  Institution  with  a  garrison  of  thirteen  men.  Four  of 
his  party  -  P.  J.  Stephenson,  Seen  McLoughlin,  Liam  Staines  and 
Dick  Balfe  -  were  officers  of  Na  Fianna.  His  instructions  were  to 
delay  the  enemy  for  a  few  hours  thus  giving  Daly's  men  time  to  en- 
trench  themselves  in  the  main  Church  Street  posts  directly  across 
the  river.  Not  expecting  to  be  in  occupation  of  the  Mendicity  for 
long,  therefore,  the  garrison  carried  no  food  and  a  minimum  of 
ammunition42.  Arriving  by  public  tram  Heuston  positioned 
McLoughlin  and  two  other  marksmen  as  cover  while  he  led  the  rush  on 
the  building.  As  soon  as  it  was  taken  four  men  built  a  barricade 
of  carts  along  the  quay  side.  Hardly  had  they  returned  when  a 
Regiment  of  the  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers  appeared  on  the  North  Quays. 
They  were  on  their  way  to  the  Four  Courts,  but  carrying  shovels  not 
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guns.  The  insurgents  at  once  fired  into  the  air  above  them 129 
The  soldiers  scattered  but  then  regrouped  with  reinforcements  and 
surrounded  the  area.  With  his  means  of  retreat  cut  Hauston  was 
forced  to  revise  his  plans. 
Steady  pressure  was  put  on  the  post  throughout  Monday,  Monday 
night  and  Tuesday,  though  Heuston  was  able  to  send  McLoughlin  out 
three  times  to  bring  in  provisions  as  well  as  a  box  of  bombs  they 
had  dumped  earlier.  McLoughlin  called  at  the  Four  Courts  and  the 
Post  Office  to  keep  Headquarters  informed  of  the  situation44. 
Pearse  finally  sent  a  reinforcement  unit  of  thirteen  men  of  the 
North  County  Dublin  Battalion  late  on  Tuesday  evening45,  British 
reinforcements  were  also  arriving  and  on  Wednesday  morning  General 
Lowe  ordered  the  final  elimination  of  this  obstacle  to  his  main 
objective.  Residents  were  warned  to  evacuate  as  soldiers  moved  in- 
to  sniping  positions  at  the  rear  and  across  the  river46.  The  post 
was  now  under  heavy  machine-gun  fire.  McLoughlin  and  Stephenson, 
returning  from  another  despatch  mission  at  the  G.  P.  O.,  heard  the 
firing  and  hurried  back  but  at  the  Queen  Street  Bridge  they  were 
recognised  and  forced  to  dash  back  into  Smithfield47, 
By  noon  the  British  were  under  the  Mendicity  wall,  lobbing  in 
grenades  which  the  rebels  desperately  tried  to  throw  back.  The 
assault  had  lasted  a  quarter-hour  when  Liam  Staines  attempted  to 
hurl  back  a  bomb  at  the  window  which  burst  in  his  hand;  both  he  and 
Dick  Balfe  behind  him  were  severely  wounded.  It  was  probably  this 
incident  that  persuaded  Heuston  to  surrender48.  Twenty-three  men 
filed  out  with  the  wounded  youths;  one,  apparently  the  only  man  over 
twenty-three  years  of  age,  was  shot  dead  by  a  soldier  who  perhaps 
had  not  seen  the  flag  of  surrender.  The  garrison  had  held  out 
against  some  four-hundred  troops. 
Unable  to  reach  his  comrades  McLoughlin  returned  to  the  G.  P.  O. 
to  give  his  report.  On  Thursday  afternoon  (27  April)  Connolly  gave 130 
him  charge  of  thirty  men  with  instructions  to  occupy  the  offices  of 
the  Independent  newspaper  in  Abbey  Street,  to  prevent  an  imminent 
attack  on  the  Post  Office49.  As  he  stood  watching  them  from  the 
street  Connolly  received  the  shrapnel  wound  that  confined  him  to  a 
stretcher  for  the  rest  of  the  week.  On  Friday  morning  McLoughlin 
was  ordered  to  return  to  the  G.  P.  O.  where  he  assisted  The  O'Rahilly 
in  removing  bombs  from  the  basement  now  threatened  by  fire. 
By  dusk  the  premises  were  no  longer  tenable  and  Connolly  and 
MacDiarmada  asked  that  McLoughlin,  with  his  intimate  knowledge  of 
the  enemy's  positions  in  the  surrounding  streets,  should  organise 
the  evacuation.  He  hurried  the  garrison  out  and  into  houses  in 
Moore  Street50 
. 
As  Connolly  was  carried  across  on  his  stretcher 
one  of  the  Fianna  juniors  who  had  remained  at  Headquarters  covered 
him  by  walking  between  him  and  the  line  of  fire.  -  Connolly  was 
heard  to  murmur,  "We  cannot  fail  now  ...  those  young  lads  will 
never  forget".  The  boy  was  barely  fourteen51. 
An  emergency  Headquarters  Command  meeting  was  held  later  that 
night  at  which  McLoughlin  claims  he  was  given  military  command  and 
Connolly's  own  rank  of  Commandant  General52 
On  Saturday  morning  (29  April)  his  plan  for  the  garrison  to 
burst  out  of  Moore  Street  and  link  up  with  Daly's  forces  at  the  Four 
Courts  was  at  first  accepted  and  then  abandoned  when  it  was  reali- 
sed  that  it  would  inevitably  involve  a  heavy  loss  of  civilian  life. 
The  position  was  now  hopeless.  Pearse  sent  out  a  message  of  sur- 
render,  which  General  Lowe  accepted  only  after  Pearse  and  Connolly 
were  themselves  handed  over  to  him.  It  was  agreed  that  nurse 
Elizabeth  O'Farrell  would  carry  copies  of  the  written  surrender 
under  escort  to  the  insurgent  outposts53.  She  returned  first  to 
the  Moore  Street  garrison,  where  McLoughlin  and  MacDiarmada  organi- 
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The  Four  Courts  surrendered  at  about  7.30  p.  m.  One  section  of 
the  force  had  been  cut  off  from  the  main  garrison  and  since  the 
morning,  when  troops  had  occupied  Reilly's  Public  House,  had  been 
pinned  down  in  that  immediate  area,  using  Clarke's  Dairy  as  their 
base.  Pat  Holohan  had  been  given  command  of  the  party54.  His 
brother  Garry  was  actually  leading  a  small  group  tunnelling  along 
,  Church  Street  to  bomb  Reilly's  when  word  came  of  the  surrender 
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Pat  Holohan  refused  to  surrender  without  a  signed  instruction  but 
agreed  to  an  over-night  truce  for  the  removal  of  the  wounded.  He 
had  fifty-eight  men  under  him  and  though  it  would  have  been  possible 
to  slip  away  during  the  night  they  all  voted  to  remain  to  keep  faith 
with  comrades  already  in  custody.  They  surrendered  at  about  11 
o'clock  on  Sunday  morning 
56. 
It  was  Sunday  morning  also  before  nurse  O'Farrell  visited  the 
rebel  positions  on  the  south  side  of  the  Liffey.  MacDonagh  refused 
to  surrender  without  speaking  to  Lowe  personally  and  a  meeting  was 
arranged,  which  Ceannt  also  attended,  after  which  the  men  at  Jacob's 
laid  down  their  arms.  Ceannt  finally  surrendered  at  the  South 
Dublin  Union  at  6.00  p.  m.,  sending  his  order  also  to  the  support 
posts  in  his  area57.  The  garrison  at  Jameson's,  now  over  one  hun- 
dred  strong,  was  given  the  order  by  Colbert  on  Seamus  Murphy's  be- 
half. 
The  story  had  been  perpetuated  in  Republican  accounts  of  Easter 
Week  that  Colbert  assumed  command  at  Jameson's  before  the  surrender 
in  order  to  save  the  life  of  his  captain  who  was  a  family  man 
58 
. 
According  to  some  versions,  Murphy  would  not  hear  of  the  deception 
and  the  garrison  were  forced  to  depose  him59.  In  others  the  two 
exchanged  uniforms  -  and  this  despite  a  difference  of  nearly  a  foot 
in  their  heights.  Murphy  himself  always  denied  the  incident60  and 132 
although  such  a  sacrifice  would  have  been  in  character  with  Col- 
bert's  chivalry  and  idealism61  the  story  is  almost  certainly  a 
fabrication.  It  appears  to  have  originated  as  an  attempt  to  ex- 
plain  the  subsequent  execution  of  one  who  only  held  second  command 
of  a  support  outpost;  but  in  fact  there  were  other  cogent  reasons 
for  Colbert's  sentence. 
THE  RISING  IN  THE  COUNTRY 
Propaganda  issued  by  the  rebel  Headquarters  during  Easter  Week 
claimed  that  "the  country  was  rising  in  answer  to  Dublin's  call"  and 
that  the  flag  of  the  Republic  was  being  "gallantly  protected  by  the 
officers  and  Irish  soldiers  in  arms  throughout  the  country"62 
Rumour  spoke  of  armed  Volunteers  marching  on  the  capital  and  even 
of  a  supporting  German  invasion.  Only  after  the  surrender  did 
rebels  and  citizens  learn  that  apart  from  a  few  vain  and  unco- 
ordinated  local  actions  the  country  had  not  risen  at  all. 
i  Several  factors  account  for  the  failure.  Oglaigh  na  h  ireann 
had  not  yet  been  so  thoroughly  organised  in  the  small  towns  as  in 
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Dublin.  In  many  areas  units  were  ill  armed  and  therefore  hit 
particularly  hard  by  the  failure  of  the  Aud  arms  landing.  Insur- 
rection  plans  for  the  rural  districts  were  vague,  unrealistic  and 
issued  at  the  eleventh  hour,  and  because  communication  with  Head- 
quarters  was  inadequate  were  more  severely  dislocated  by  the  counter- 
mand  than  was  the  case  in  the  city65.  As  Mary  MacSwiney  pointed 
out,  "the  provinces  did  not  wish  to  be  left  out  of  the  affair,  but 
there  certainly  was  a  woeful  disregard  of  the  provincial  conditions 
on  the  part  of  Dublin  (who) 
...  had  been  told  again  and  again 
that  without  help  in  arms  etc.  the  counties  could  do  nothing"66. 
In  those  few  areas  where  the  Volunteers  engaged  the  enemy,  at 
Ashbourne,  Enniscorthy,  Kerry,  Galway  and  County  Louth,  senior 133 
members  of  Na  Fianna  appear  to  have  participated  with  them67  though 
the  accounts  of  participants  make  no  specific  reference  to  the 
youth  organisation68.  In  several  other  centres,  such  as  Limerick 
city,  where  Fianna  units  existed,  officers  and  seniors  paraded  with 
the  adult  army  on  Easter  Sunday  before  dispersing  under  the  im- 
pression  that  the  Rising  was  cancelled69,  In  Cork  over  twenty 
seniors  joined  the  161  officers  and  men  of  the  City  Battalion  at  the 
Volunteer  Hall70 
.  They  comprised  their  own  unit  under  the  direct 
command  of  Seamus  Courtney  within  the  overall  Battalion  command 
structure.  Because  of  conflicting  orders  received  from  Dublin 
their  action  was  confined  to  a  route  march  to  Macroom  and  armed 
defence  of  their  Sheares  Hall  headquarters  throughout  Easter  Week. 
The  Northern  contingent  of  the  Volunteers  assembled  at  Tyrone, 
planning  to  . link  up  with  the  forces  in  the  West.  It  included 
several  Fianna  girls  of  the  Betsy  Gray  slua  who  had  recently  en- 
listed  in  the  Ambulance  Corps  of  the  Belfast  Cumann  na  mBan,  and 
also  three  members  of  the  city  boys'  slua.  The  girls  already  had 
experience  instructing  the  Volunteers  in  First  Aid  and  had  been 
preparing  medical  kits  for  the  Rising.  On  receiving  the  counter- 
mand  on  Easter  Saturday  the  main  body  dispersed,  but  a  number  of 
the  girls  decided  to  make  their  way  to  Dublin  where  six  were  de- 
tailed  to  carry  despatches  back  to  the  northern  counties  with  news 
that  the  capital  had  risen 
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PRISON  AND  EXECUTION 
Of  the  fiannai  who  remained  in  action  until  the  surrender 
several,  including  Seamus  Pounch  and  Joe  Reynolds,  evaded  arrest. 
A  number  of  others  must  have  been  released  because  of  their  youth 
although  due  to  the  indiscriminate  methods  of  the  authorities  juniors 
were  among  those  sent  to  internment  camps  in  Britain.  (It  was  said 134 
that  one  fifteen  year  old  on  being  released  after  only  a  brief  in- 
ternment  in  Wandsworth  Jail  bitterly  resented  this  special  treat- 
ment:  "I  don't  know  why  they  are  releasing  me",  he  complained,  "I 
shot  three  of  them" 
72, 
)  Among  those  sent  to  Prongoch  was  Barney 
Mellows.  Pat  (P.  J.  )  Stephenson,  the  Holohan  brothers  and  Sein 
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McLoughlin  were  all  interned  at  Knutsford.  McLoughlin  escaped 
a  severer  fate  through  the  help  of  one  of  the  intelligence  staff 
during  interrogation  at  Inchicore:  by  stripping  him  of  his  rank 
marks  he  saved  him  from  trial  and  certain  sentence74. 
In  fact  the  only  Fianna  officers  apart  from  Countess  Markievicz 
to  be  tried  by  field  courtmartial  were  Colbert  and  Heuston.  They 
were  both  tried  on  Saturday  6  May  and  received  death  sentences  to 
be  carried  out  at  Kilmainham  the  following  Monday. 
On  the  Sunday  Colbert  asked  that  Mrs.  Murphy  be  sent  to  his 
cell.  The  wife  of  his  o/c  at  Marrowbone  Lane,  she  had  herself  ser- 
ved  in  the  garrison  and  was  now  also  a  prisoner  at  Kilmainham.  She 
found  him  lying  beneath  a  blanket  on  the  flags  of  the  unlit  room75. 
"I  am  one  of  the  lucky  ones,  "  was  how  he  broke  the  news  of  his  sen- 
tence  to  her.  On  the  Monday  morning  there  was  a  moment  of  con- 
fusion  in  the  prison  yard76.  The  soldier  pinning  the  target  to 
his  breast  placed  it  too  low  and  Colbert  noticing  the  error  sugges- 
ted  that  it  be  raised  to  cover  the  heart.  The  soldier  offered  his 
hand  and  shook  Colbert's  warmly  before  gently  binding  his  arms. 
Heuston  spent  the  first  hours  of  the  day  writing  to  his  family. 
"Let  there  be  no  talk  of  'foolish  enterprises',  "  he  had  written  to 
his  sister,  a  teaching  nun,  "I  have  no  vain  regrets.  If  you  really 
love  me  teach  the  children  the  history  of  their  own  land,  and  teach 
them  that  the  cause  of  Caitlin  NI  hUallachäin  never  dies.  "  And  in 
his  letter  to  his  mother  he  had  asked  her  "get  all  the  Fianna  to 
pray  for  me".  At  3.20  a.  m.  Fr.  Albert  visited  him  and  they  prayed 
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together  as  the  candle  burned  out.  At  3.45  Houston  was  summoned. 
He  gave  a  last  message  to  the  priest,  asking  to  be  remembered  to  the 
boys  of  Na  Fianna,  the  Staines  brothers  and  his  Volunteer  company 
comrades.  Bound  and  blindfolded  and  with  the  white  paper  pinned 
over  his  heart,  he  was  directed  to  a  soap  box  in  the  corner  of  the 
yard,  on  which  he  sat.  His  confessor  had  hardly  stepped  aside 
when  the  volley  rang  out.  The  priest  rushed  forward  and  noticed 
that  Heuston's  face  appeared  transformed  with  a  grandeur  and  bright- 
ness  that  he  had  never  observed  before  -  he  felt,  as  he  recalled 
later,  that  he  would  have  given  the  world  to  be  in  his  place  that 
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morning 
The  deaths  of  Colbert  and  Heuston  were  accorded  a  central  place 
in  Fianna  lore  and  myths  grew  around  the  accounts  as  subsequently 
told  to  generations  of  scouts.  One,  which  added  to  the  impression 
of  their  courage  and  the  authorities'  crime,  was  that  they  were 
mere  boys79.  In  fact,  Heuston  was  twenty-two  years  old  and  Colbert 
twenty-seven80.  Another  was  that  they  were  Fianna  twins  (so  to 
speak),  alike  in  their  lives  and  their  deaths.  But  in  fact  it  was 
by  chance  that  they  were  tried  and  executed  on  the  same  day,  for 
their  roles  in  Fianna  and  the  Rising  had  been  quite  different  from 
one  another.  All  courtmartial  sentences  after  Easter  Week  were 
based  on  the  roles  of  the  accused  in  the  Rising  itself  and  their 
known  records  prior  to  it,  for  the  authorities  needed  to  make  quick 
decisions  on  whatever  evidence  they  had.  Heuston  must  have  been 
known  to  the  police  from  his  Limerick  days,  and  since  his  arrival 
in  the  capital  he  would  have  become  a  familiar  name  to  the  Dublin 
Special  Branch  as  a  habitue  of  Tom  Clarke's  shopßl.  But  it  seems 
certain  that  he  was  sentenced  to  death  primarily  as  the  commander 
of  a  garrison  which  had  inflicted  heavy  losses  on  the  British  Army. 136 
Colbert  on  the  other  hand  held  only  second  command  at  the  surrender, 
and  that  of  a  garrison  which  had  barely  engaged  the  enemy.  But  he 
was  better  known  to  the  Castle  authorities  and  had  been  under  close 
surveillance  for  two  years  at  least.  His  name  was  on  their  list 
of  the  founding  Executive  of  the  Irish  Volunteers,  a  document  which 
appears  to  have  been  one  of  their  crucial  guides  in  determining 
sentences  after  the  Rising82.  It  also  figured  on  the  Special 
Branch  list  of  suspected  persons  and  as  such  had  come  to  the  notice 
of  the  Under  Secretary  as  early  as  191483.  At  that  time  the 
authorities  had  been  interested  in  Colbert  specifically  for  his 
activities-in  Na  Fianna,  and  now  with  his  execution  they  eliminated 
the  organisation's  central  figure.  Their  sureness  in  going  for 
the  right  man  is  particularly  notable  in  that  they  could  not  have 
known  of  his.  role  as  I.  R.  B.  Fianna  Centre,  nor  had  more  than  an  ink- 
ling  of  the  connection  between  Fianna  and  the  Brotherhood. 
Indeed,  judging  by  the  evidence  collected  from  police  and 
Castle  sources  for  the  Royal  Commission,  which  makes  no  reference 
whatever  to  the  youth  wing  in  connection  with  the  military  actions 
of  Easter  Week84,  they  were  apparently  unaware  of  Fianna's  partici- 
pation  in  the  Rising  at  all.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the 
organisation  merited  mention  in  the  Report  as  "a  training  school 
for  young  rebels"85  suggests  that  they  recognised  the  indirect  role 
that  it  had  played  in  preparing  the  ground  for  rebellion. 
AN  ASSESSMENT  OF  FIANNA'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  THE  RISING 
While  the  present  chapter  has  presented  an  account  of  the  part 
played  by  fiannai  in  the  fighting,  any  true  assessment  of  Fianna's 
overall  contribution  to  the  Rising  must  also  take  account  of  this 
indirect  role. 137 
A  notable  characteristic  of  the  rebel  army  in  Dublin  during 
Easter  Week,  one  which  Augustine  Birrell  remarked  upon  after  the 
86 
surrender,  was  the  high  proportion  of  young  men  in  its  ranks  . 
The  position  in  the  country  was  similar  -  in  Cork,  for  instance,  "a 
great  number  in  the  ranks"  were  reported  to  be  under  twenty-one 
years  old87.  It  is  clear  that  the  low  average  age  is  partly  attri- 
butable  to  the  success  of  Fianna  since  1909  in  recruiting  and  train- 
ing  a  generation  for  armed  revolt88.  Though  only  a  limited  number 
of  the  insurgents  were  current  members  of  the  youth  organisation  a 
far  greater  number  were  former  members.  Exactly  how  many  cannot 
now  be  ascertained,  but  some  indication  is  given  by  the  fact  that  a 
year  before  the  Rising  it  was  estimated  that  two-thirds  of  all 
Fianna  officers  to  date  had  transferred  to  the  Volunteers89 
According  to  Eamon  Martin  there  was  not  a  single  post  in  the  city 
or  the  country  in  Easter  Week  without  its  quota  of  ex-fiannai90. 
In  this  sense  Fianna's  real  contribution  to  the  Rising  was 
made  between  1909-16,  and  in  particular  from  the  founding  of 
Oglaigh 
i 
na  hEireann,  in  which  it  -  or  more  correctly  a  body  of  young  I.  R.  B. 
men  holding  officer  rank  within  it  -  played  an  essential  part.  In 
his  Manifesto  to  the  Bovs  of  Ireland  Pearse  asserted  that  Fianna 
had  made  possible  the  Volunteers  in  191391;  in  so  far  as  his  claim 
was  true  its  corollary  would  be  that  Fianna  made  possible  the 
Rising  three  years  later.  It  is  therefore  unfortunate  that  the 
1916  Proclamation  itself,  written  largely  by  Pearse,  while  it  ref- 
erred  to  the  training  and  organisation  undertaken  secretly  by  the 
I.  R.  B.  and  openly  by  the  Volunteers  and  Citizen  Army  as  a  necessary 
preparation  for  a  rising,  failed  to  mention  in  the  same  context  the 
preparatory  role  of  Fianna.  It  was  a  notable  omission,  though  no 
doubt  explicable  in  terms  of  the  aims  of  the  document  which  were 
not  primarily  historical.  No  statement  purporting  to  be  histori- 138 
cally  accurate  and  complete  could  be  so  excused,  should  it  omit  to 
acknowledge  the  prominent  contribution  of  Fianna  Eireann  among  the 
forces  that  brought  the  Rising  to  fruition. 139 
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Chapter  5.  FROM  THE  RISING  TO  THE  TRUCE  WITH 
BRITAIN  (1916-1921) 
1916-1918 
Within  five  weeks  of  the  surrender  all  Dublin  Fianna  officers 
not  in  prison  attended  a  meeting  in  the  Lower  Camden  Street  hall 
with  the  aim  of  re-establishing  the  organisation.  A  temporary 
committee  was  elected  at  the  meeting,  comprising  Eamon  Martin  - 
chairman,  Seamus  Pounch,  Liam  Staines,  Theo  Fitzgerald  and  Joe 
Reynoldsl.  Martin  and  Staines  were  elected  in  their  absence,  the 
one  being  abroad  and  the  other  severely  wounded.  Although  the 
committee's  formal  locus  was  the  re-organisation  of  the  Dublin 
Brigade2,  it  in  fact  acted  as  controlling  body  for  the  whole  coun- 
try  during  1916  since  no  national  authority  structure  yet  existed. 
Its  first  aim  was  to  re-establish  the  old  companies,  a  task  for 
which  the  time  was  ripe  in  the  second  half  of  the  year. 
The  conviction  of  the  leaders  of  the  Rising,  that  they  would 
die  but  that  it  would  be  a  different  Ireland  after  them3,  could 
hardly  have  been  fulfilled  so  quickly  but  for  the  insensitive  and 
vengeful  reaction  of  the  British  after  the  surrender,  which  "left 
nothing  undone  to  assist  the  cause  of  separatism"4.  By  June 
General  Maxwell  was  forced  to  admit  "a  strong  recrudescence  of 
Sinn  Feinism"  and  a  virtual  halt  in  recruiting  to  the  British  Army5, 
while  police  reports  from  the  counties  observed  that  persons  who 
had  at  first  frowned  on  the  Rebellion  were  now  "completely  changed"6. 
Many  members  of  the  Parliamentary  Party  also  had  "veered  completely 
round  since  the  military  atrocities  began"?,  and  by  the  autumn  the 
party  itself  had  quite  lost  the  trust  of  the  mass  of  the  Irish 
people,  whose  support  for  it  persisted  only  for  lack  of  an  alter- 
8 
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'An  alternative'  was  meantime  gathering  strength  and  clarity. 
British  jails  and  internment  camps  were  now  schools  of  Republican- 
ism,  while  in  Ireland  the  immediate  task  of  prisoners'  aid  brought 
people  of  diverse  views  together  and  gave  some  cohesion  to  the  new 
Sinn  Fein  movement. 
9 
It  was-in  this  climate  of  public  expectation  that  Fianna  attemp- 
ted  to  re-establish  itself  in  the  early  autumn.  In  Cork,  for 
example,  where  the  public  had  not  yet  responded  openly  to  separa- 
tism,  scouts  took  part  in  a  recruiting  concert  in  which  they  pre- 
sented  as  a  finale  a  tableau  entitled  'The  Wearing  of  the  Green', 
featuring  the  tricolour  and  fiannai  bearing  bayonets.  In  the 
words  of  one  of  the  performers  the  audience  reacted  as  if  their 
inner  needs  had  been  released  -  "any  doubts  there  were  about  the 
spirit  of  the  people  being  dead  were  dispelled  that  night.  It 
10 
was  obvious  that  leadership  was  all  the  people  wanted". 
In  Dublin  o/cs  were  appointed  to  contact  as  many  former  mem- 
bers  as  possible  to  form  the  nuclei  of  the  new  companiesll.  By 
December  they  had  re-established  seven  of  the-nine  pre-Rising 
sluaite  and  amalgamated  the  other  two  into  a  single  eighth  com- 
12 
pany 
All  the  interned  Fianna  officers  except  Countess  Markievicz 
returned  to  Ireland  with  the  first  mass  release  of  prisoners  at 
Christmas.  The  organisation  at  once  appointed  a  Headquarters 
staff  to  replace  the  temporary  committee.  The  Countess  was  voted 
Chief  of  the  Fianna  in  her  absence  and  Eamon  Martin,  though  now 
on  his  way  to  America 
13, 
was  elected  Chief-of-Staff.  The  other 
appointments  were:  Barney  Mellows  Adjutant  General,  with  Pat 
Stephenson  his  assistant;  Garry  Holohan  Quartermaster,  assisted  by 
Alfie  White;  Sean  McLoughlin  Director  of  Training  with  the  duties 148 
of  Chief-of-Staff  pending  Martin's  return14.  At  the  same  time  a 
Dublin  Battalion  Staff  was  named,  with  Mellows  Commandant,  Philip 
Cassidy  his  Adjutant  and  Pounch  Quartermaster.  In  January  a  ninth 
company  was  set  up  in  the  Battalion  area,  based  at  Sgoil  Eanna 
and 
under  the  command  of  Niall  MacNeill,  a  son  of  the  former  Chief-of- 
Staff  of  the  Volunteers15. 
With  the  releases  of  Christmas  giving  people  and  party  the 
leadership  for  which  they  had  been  waiting,  1917  was  to  become  a 
"year  of  awakening"16.  President  Wilson's  January  address  on 
the  rights  of  small  nations,  the  anniversary  of  the  Rising  at 
Easter  and  the  Irish  bishops'  manifesto  against  partition  in  May, 
each  furthered  the  separatist  cause.  With  most  of  its  experienced 
officers  now  returned  Fianna  was  in  a  position  to  match  the  expan- 
sion  of  the  Volunteers  and  Sinn  F6in.  The  youth  organisation 
mounted  a  major  recruiting  campaign  during  the  spring  with  success- 
ful  results.  In  Belfast,  for  example,  which  had  only  supported 
17 
a  single  boys'  company  before  the  Rising,  it  was  now  possible  to 
maintain  three  thriving  groups  with  a-total  membership  of  some 
15018.  In  early  June  the  Countess  received  a  "very  cheering" 
report  of  the  state  of  the  organisation,  sent  to  her  in  Aylesbury 
19 
Jail 
By  this  date,  however,  pressure  was  mounting  for  her  own 
release,  with  that  of  the  other  leaders  still  imprisoned.  On  10 
June  a  huge  protest  meeting  organised  by  Count  Plunkett  was  held 
in  Beresford  Place,  at  which  the  police  were  attacked  by  the  crowd. 
In  the  melee  Inspector  Mills  was  struck  by  a  blow  from  a  hurley, 
from  which  he  died.  The  youth  who  struck  him,  Fianna  officer 
Eamon  Murray,  escaped  into  the  crowd.  He  would  certainly  have 
been  arrested  had  he  not  turned  and  faced  his  pursuers  with  a 149 
revolver:  the  weapon  jammed  but  the  move  gave  him  time  to  make  his 
escape.  He  was  sheltered  by  the  Countess  while  on  the  run,  before 
being  smuggled  across  the  Atlantic.  Mills  was  the  first  represen- 
tative  of  British  rule  to  be  killed  after  the  Rising20  . 
Within  a  week  the  release  of  the  remaining  prisoners  was  announ- 
ced,  and  with  their  return  the  adult  movement,  and  with  it  Fianna, 
entered  a  new  phase  of  development.  Early  in  August  the  youth 
organisation  held  its  first  post-Rising  Ard  Fheis.  Delegates  con- 
firmed  all  existing  appointments  to  the  G.  H.  Q.  staff,  except  that 
of  Mellows  who  had  been  re-arrested  and  imprisoned  in  the  spring21. 
Martin  was-by  now  home  to  take  up  his  post  as  Chief-of-Staff.  The 
election  of  de  Valera  to  the  honorary  office  of  Fianna  Chief  reflec- 
ted  his  unquestioned  position  of  leadership  within  the  separatist 
movement  upon  return  from  prison.  (He  retained  the  post  until 
January  1918,  this  being  the  only  time  between  the  foundation  of 
Fianna  and  her  death  that  Countess  Markievicz  did  not  hold  office). 
The  Ard  Fheis  also  voted  Brigade  status  to  the  organisation  in 
Dublin,  creating  Battalions  north  and  south  of  the  river  and  appoint- 
ing.  Brigade  and  Battalion  staffs  under  Commandant  Garry  Holohan22. 
The  newly  returned  Republican  leaders  assisted  the  growth  of 
the  youth  organisation  in  the  second  half  of  the  year.  In  his 
victory  address  at  the  East  Clare  by-election  in  July  de  Valera 
urged  all  youths  under  eighteen  in  Ireland  to  enlist  in  Fianna 
23 
and  in  November  he  honoured  the  Dublin  Brigade  by  delivering  the 
24 
address  at  its  Manchester  Martyrs'  concert.  The  Countess  paid 
a  recruiting  visit  to  Cork  at  the  request  of  the  city  slua  shortly 
after  her  release25,  and  later  in  the  autumn  made  a  special  appeal 
on  behalf  of  Fianna  at  the  Sinn  Fein  Aeridheacht  at  Newtown  which 
26 
led  to  the  foundation  of  a  new  company  at  Bantry. 150 
Equally  important  to  Fianna's  development  was  the  return  from 
prison  of  trained  Volunteer  officers.  Their  value  was  felt  most 
strongly  in  the  rural  areas  where  their  presence  brought  new  adult 
companies  into  existence,  and  at  the  same  time  provided  leadership 
for  Fianna  units  which  in  areas  of  small  population  often  trained 
alongside  the  senior  army27. 
Finally,  Fianna  and  Volunteers  alike  benefited  from  the  re- 
invigoration  of  the  political  movement  that  followed  the  releases. 
The  uniting  of  disparate  elements  within  Sinn  Fein  begun  by 
Griffith  and  Plunkett  in  the  spring  was  now  confirmed  with  the 
emergence  of  de  Valera  as  undisputed  leader.  The  party  increased 
its  membership  twelve-fold  between  August  and  the  October  Ard 
Fheis,  when.  de  Valera's  election  as  President  and  the  adoption  of 
an  explicitly  Republican  programme  completed  the  process  of  unifi- 
cation.  By  the  end  of  1917  "the  inchoate  movement  which  had 
existed  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  had  been  transformed  into  an 
organised  party"28. 
The  recovery  of  Fianna  after  the  Rising  and  its  re-appearance 
on  the  streets  in  1917  had  not  gone  unchallenged  by  the  authorities. 
Despite  the  ban  on  military  parades  the  Dublin  members  began  organ- 
ising  route  marches  early  in  the  year,  at  first  travelling  to 
departure  points  with  their  uniforms  hidden  beneath  overcoats. 
Police  opposition  was  so  half-hearted  that  they  became  progres- 
sively  more  provocative  during  the  spring,  with  the  result  that 
29 
they  clashed  three  times  with  the  D.  M. P.  in  the  summer30  . 
Members 
were  also  involved  in  a  serious  confrontation  with  the  police  in 
Belfast  on  St.  Patrick's  night.  De  Valera's  public  meeting  in 
the  town  scheduled  for  18  March  had  been  banned,  but  it  was 
decided  to  defy  the  authorities  by  beginning  the  meeting  before 151 
midnight  of  the  17th.  His  arrival  had  already  signalled  running 
fights  in  the  Falls  Road,  and  at  midnight  police  charged  the  plat- 
form.  Though  defended  by  fiannai  and  Volunteers  with  batons  he 
was  arrested31. 
The  funeral  of  Thomas  Ashe  on  the  last  day  of  September  was 
made  the  occasion  for  the  Dublin  Brigade's  first  public  parade 
since  the  Rising.  The  boys  were  among  the  estimated  9,000  Volun- 
teers  marching  in  uniform  in  defiance  of  the  law32;  with  Volunteers 
they  stewarded  the  cortege  from  the  City  Hall,  and  their  buglers 
sounded  the  Last  Post  at  Glasnevin.  In  Cork,  o/c  Seamus 
33 
Courtney  and  Lieutenant  Seän  Healy  were  arrested  on  a  charge  of 
drilling  in.  the  Sheares  Street  hall  and  sentenced  to  eighteen 
months'  hard  labour,  later  reduced  to  three  months  on  account  of 
their  youth34.  Courtney  went  on  a  hunger  strike  that  broke  his 
health;  he  died  the  following  summer 
35. 
At  Fianna's  Ard  Fheis  in  January  1918  Countess  Markievicz  was 
again  elected  Chief,  Eamon  Martin  was  returned  as  Chief-of-Staff 
and  Barney  Mellows  reinstated  Adjutant  General.  It  was  decided 
36 
to  establish  Brigades  outside  Dublin  to  meet  the  growth  of  the 
organisation  in  the  rural  areas37. 
Mellows  held  his  post  only  four  months,  being  one  of  the 
seventy-three  Republicans  arrested  during  the  night  of  17-18  May 
and  deported  for  alleged  implication  in  a  'German  Plot'38.  He 
was  imprisoned  at  Usk  in  Wales.  The  Countess  was  arrested  the 
same  night  and  interned  in  Holloway39.  If  they  were  singled  out 
for  arrest  on  the  strength  of  their  work  for  Fianna,  the  youth 
organisation  itself  was  nonetheless  not  considered  important 
enough  to  be  included  among  the  Republican  bodies  proclaimed  as 
dangerous  associations  in  July40. 152 
The  threat  of  immediate  conscription  and  the  nationwide  pledge 
against  it,  and  the  escalation  of  British  military  repression 
backed  by  the  law41,  had  the  effect  of  swelling  the  ranks  of  Sinn 
Fein  in  the  spring  of  1918  and  at  the  same  time  of  fostering  the 
expansion  of  the  movement's  military  wing.  By  June  the  Volunteers 
certainly  numbered  over  100,000  men42.  The  conscription  threat, 
particularly,  also  increased  recruitment  to  Fianna  :  the  Tralee 
Battalion,  for  instance,  rose  to  a  total  strength  in  excess  of  400 
at  this  time43.  However,  though  complete  numerical  details  are 
not  extant  for  the  period,  it  appears  likely  that  the  threat  of  the 
draft  had  a  milder  effect  upon  Fianna  than  on  the  Volunteers.  For 
whereas  it  caused  a  stiffening  of  the  will  of  the  nationalist 
population  that  benefited  both  organisations,  in  the  case  of  the 
Volunteers  it  also  prompted  men  of  conscription  age  to  enrol  for 
less  selfless  motives.  The  latter,  who  artificially  swelled  the 
numbers  of  Oglaigh  na  hEireann  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1918, 
disappeared  with  the  signing  of  the  Armistice  in  November44. 
The  ceasefire  announcement  itself  signalled  a  climax  of  the 
mob  attacks  on  Republican  property  that  had  been  occurring  sporadi- 
cally  since  1915.  On  Armistice  night  ex-British  soldiers  mingled 
with  the  crowds  attacking  the  Sinn  Fein  election  committee  rooms 
in  Dublin45.  The  national  headquarters  building  at  6  Harcourt 
Street  was  fired  and  badly  damaged,  and  would  have  been  destroyed 
had  it  not  been  defended  by  Volunteers  aided  by  seniors  of  'A' 
Coy.  First  Dublin  Battalion,  Fianna  Eireann46. 
In  the  weeks  that  followed  candidates  and  their  supporters 
prepared  for  the  general  elections  on  14  December.  Countess 
Markievicz  was  standing  for  St.  Patrick's  ward  Dublin  from'her  cell 
in  Holloway,  and  older  members  of  the  local  Fianna  companies  were 153 
enlisted  to  canvass  on  her  behalf47.  In  Belfast,  where  de  Valera 
was  standing  for  the  West  constituency,  fiannai  defended  party 
workers  against  the  nationalist  supporters  of  Joe  Devlin,  and  on 
election  day  helped  at  the  booths.  Devlin's  victory  led  to  con- 
frontations  between  the  two  groups,  particularly  in  the  Pound  Loney, 
but  such  incidents  brought  a  surge  of  youthful  recruits  to  Fianna 
and  at  least  one  new  company,  the  Henry  Joy  McCracken  in  the  Bone, 
was  established  in  December48.  The  pre-election  work  welded 
existing  sluaite,  while  Sinn  Fein's  sweeping  successes  at  the  polls 
in  every  part  of  Ireland  except  the  North  East  brought  an  influx  of 
new  members  and  companies  into  Fianna  as  into  the  the  Volunteers 
49 
themselves. 
Even  before  the  elections,  in  the  face  of  British  attempts  to 
"suppress  disaffection"  which  -  it  could  be  argued  -  themselves 
amounted  to  an  incitement  to  rebellion50,  Republicans  recognised 
the  inevitability  of  war.  Their  own  public  statements,  indeed, 
implied  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  from  at  least  the  autumn  of 
191851,  In  readiness  for  the  inevitable  their  most  pressing  task 
was  to  remedy  a  chronic  shortage  of  arms52.  Fianna  had  been  re- 
building  its  own  stock  of  weapons  during  the  year,  independently  of 
the  Volunteers.  Garry  Holohan  organised  and  led  a  successful  night 
arms  raid  on  a  pawn  shop  on  the  Dublin  Quays  in  April53.  The  Cork 
Fianna  units  made  several  raids  on  Murray's  gun  shop  and  acquired 
other  weapons  by  disarming  R.  I.  C.  men  on  the  streets54.  Dublin 
companies  recovered  a  surprising  amount  of  British  Army  equipment 
from  the  Liffey  at  the  end  of  the  war55.  Because  they  gathered 
material  where  they  best  could  and  thus  acquired  a  variety  of 
weapons,  companies  effected  frequent  exchanges  among  one  another 
and  with  the  Volunteers56;  and  because  most  remained  short  of  arms 
thefts  from  one  another  were  commonplace57. 154 
Army  raids  formed  a  part  of  the  escalating  pattern  of  un- 
provoked  or  retaliatory  actions  with  which  local  Volunteer  units 
met  British  repression,  often  without  G.  H.  Q.  consent58,  by  which 
the  country  was  drifting  into  war.  glaigh  na  hEireann  had  not 
formally  declared  war  at  this  time  upon  the  British,  who  for 
their  part  maintained  as  long  as  possible  the  fiction  of  a  civil 
disturbance  and  denied  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  at  all. 
But  if  any  date  is  to  be  taken  as  marking  the  beginning  of  the 
Anglo-Irish  War,  it  should  be  21  January  1919,  the  day  of  the  in- 
augural  session  of  Däil  gireann, 
which  appeared  to  give  legitimacy 
to  the  actions  of  the  Volunteers  as  the  Army  of  the  Republic  and 
the  military  arm  of  a  democratically  elected  government59,  and  which 
effectively  affirmed  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  by  its  claim 
of  belligerancy  status  for  Irelands  The  same  day  also,  by 
chance,  witnessed  at  Soloheadbeg  the  first  killings  of  the  up- 
holders  of  British  rule. 
THE  WAR  FOR  INDEPENDENCE 
As  the  Dail  deputies  dispersed  from  their  first  session  Barney 
Mellows  was  hauling  himself  over  the  wall  of  Usk  Prison61.  Plans 
for  the  escape  of  all  twenty  Republican  prisoners  in  the  jail  had 
been  thwarted  by  a  national  'flu  epidemic  which  had  left  only 
four  men  fit  enough  to  attempt  it.  The  four  succeeded  in  reach- 
ing  Liverpool  where  they  were  sheltered  by  the  I.  R.  B.  Two  were 
smuggled  to  Ireland  almost  at  once  but  Mellows  waited  a  week  before 
boarding  a  ship  disguised  as  a  seaman.  He  lay  low  in  Dublin  until 
the  release  of  the  German  Plot  internees  in  March,  when  he  resumed 
his  work  with  Fianna. 
De  Valera,  who  like  Mellows  had  been  on  the  run  from  prison, 
also  emerged  from  hiding  in  March.  It  had  been  planned  to  honour 155 
him  with  the  freedom  of  the  city  of  Dublin,  with.  Fianna  among  the 
organisations  represented  at  the  presentation  of  keys,  but  the 
ceremony  was  proscribed  by  the  authorities61  and  on  de  Valera's 
insistence  replaced  by  a  more  modest  reception  at  Mount  Street 
Bridge,  with  representatives  of  Sinn  Fein, 
Oglaigh 
na  hEireann  and 
Fianna 
64. 
De  Valera  attended  the  second  session  of-the  Dail  on  1  April, 
when  he  accepted  office  as  Priomh-Aire  and  appointed  his  cabinet. 
In  order  to  facilitate  communication  among  the  new  ministerial 
departments  whose  offices  were  scattered  throughout  the  city,  a 
courier  or.  'orderly'  was  appointed  for  each  minister.  In  nearly 
every  case  the  appointee  was  a  Fianna  officer.  Sean  Harling  was 
made  courier  for  de  Valera  himself,  and  Seän  Saunders  for  William 
Cosgrave65.  Other  appointments  were  subsequently  made  to  all 
government  and  Army  departments,  the  last  being  that  of  Pädraig 
O'Hanrahan  to  Liam  Mellows  upon  the  latter's  return  from  U.  S.  A.  in 
autumn  192066, 
From  the  spring  of  1919  Fianna  sought  to  improve  its  military 
organisation  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  war.  At  company  level 
specialist  sections  were  established  for  Intelligence,  Engineering, 
Semaphore  and  Musketry,  which  frequently  worked  in  association  with 
the  Volunteers.  Engineering  sections,  for  example,  normally 
received  general  mobilisation  orders  from  the  o/c  of  the  local 
I.  A.  A.  company's  engineering  section  to  meet  with  their  weapons  at 
specified  rendezvous  for  detailed  instructions67.  Almost  every 
boy  in  a  company  was  selected  for  one  or  other  section  and  trained 
as  such. 
At  battalion  level  Active  Service  Units  were  set  up  through- 
out  the  country.  The  Dublin  A.  S.  U.  had  already  been  established 
as  early  as  February  1918  to  meet  the  threat  of  conscription,  when 156 
it  had  been  envisaged  that  members  would  be  posted  into  the  country 
areas  as  guerillas  to  organise  resistance  in  the  event  of  a  call- 
up68.  Modelled  on  the  'Fianna  Commando'  that  had  existed  in  the 
city  before  the  Rising,  it  comprised  selected  officers  and  seniors 
under  the  command  of  Garry  Holohan.  Thirty  youths  made  up  the 
Cork  city  A.  S.  U.  under  Battalion  o/c  Paddy  Hooley.  They  trained 
with  small  arms  and  rifles,  and  all  had  their  own  weapons  which 
they  stored  in  the  graveyard  of  the  Christian  Brothers'  monastery. 
In  time  they  became  in  effect  a  full-time  unit  when  forced  to 
abandon  their  jobs  and  go  on  the  run69.  Almost  all  Fianna's  mili- 
tary  assignments  were  given  to  Active  Service  personnel,  either 
independently  or  as  members  of  I.  R.  A.  squads. 
During  the  early  months  of  1919  their  main  work,  like  that  of 
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the  Army,  still  concerned  the  acquisition  of  arms,  ammunition 
and  explosives71.  But  already  they  were  turning  to  retaliatory 
action.  As  early  as  February  the  authorities  had  proclaimed 
Tipperary  a  military  area  in  response  to  the  attacks  at  Soloheadbeg 
and  Knocklong,  and  children  had  been  among  those  harrassed  and 
interrogated72.  By  September  no  less  than  5,588  raids  on  private 
homes  had  been  reported  throughout  Ireland73,  in  one  of  which  fif- 
teen  year  old  Fianna  boy  Francis  Murphy  of  Glann  County  Clare  was 
shot  dead  through  his  kitchen  window 
74. 
Wherever  possible  Repub- 
lican  forces  took  relatiatory  action  against  the  government's 
representatives  and  propagandists.  In  December  they  destroyed  the 
print  shop  of  the  Irish  Independent  newspaper  in  retaliation  for 
its  hostile  report  on  the  ambush.  of  Lord  French  at  Ashtown.  The 
operation  was  carried  out  by  a  squad  of  two  dozen  men,  many  of 
them  dockers  who  had  brought  sledge  hammers  from  work.  The  party 
was  commanded  by  Peadar  Clancy  and  included  Fianna's  Quartermaster 157 
Garry  Holohan75,  In  a  similar  operation  carried  out  by  over  forty 
Fianna  officers  under  Frank  McMahon  the  Cork  Examiner's  presses 
were  smashed.  In  the  early  part  of  the  war,  especially,  when  the 
people  had  not  yet  come  down  decisively  on  the  side  of  the  Repub- 
lican  forces,  it  was  essential  to  minimise  the  effects  of  pro- 
British  propaganda.  At  stations,  and  especially  at  dock-sides, 
armed  Fianna  units  regularly  confiscated  and  destroyed  newspapers 
as  they  arrived  from  Britain76. 
Thus  the  war  intensified  through  retaliation  and  counter- 
retaliation.  The  authorities  stepped  up  their  policy  of  repres- 
sion  following  the  urban  and  municipal  elections  of  January  1920  in 
which  Sinn  Fein's  successes  in  a  peacetime  vote  confirmed  the  sup- 
port  they  had  registered  in  the  general  election  during  the  European 
war77.  Republicans  replied  with  ambushes  and  attacks  on  official 
property.  In  Kerry,  officers  of  the  Tralee  Fianna  A.  S.  U.  joined 
local  I.  R.  A.  units  in  the  ambushes  at  Castlemaine  and  Lispole,  the 
destruction  of  official  documents  in  the  Tralee  Custom  House,  and 
attacks  on  Black-and-Tans  at  Glenbeigh  and  the  Fenit  barracks78. 
In  Belfast  fiannai  assisted  the  Volunteers  in  burning  the  Tax 
Office,  and  in  a  combined  operation  engineers  of  the  two  forces 
succeeded  in  dislocating  the  electricity  supply  as  far  afield  as 
Derry79.  In  Cork  city  the  organisation  intercepted  all  vans  deli- 
vering  to  Victoria  Barracks  where  half  a  dozen  of  its  officers 
were  held  prisoner,  and  distributed  the  goods  to  their  dependents; 
its  members  later  mounted  a  concerted  operation  in  which  every  post 
office  in  town  was  raided  on  the  one  night  and  the  stamps  stolen80. 
Younger  boys  of  the  Dublin  Brigade  made  their  own  protest  in 
characteristic  fashion.  For  their  Aeridheacht  in  May  they  con- 
structed  wooden  caricatures  of  police  and  soldiers  and  charged  the 158 
visitors  to  shy  at  them.  The  event  was  a  "tremendous  success" 
according  to  Countess  Markievicz  who  no  doubt  inspired  the  joke81. 
After  August,  however,  such  a  meeting  would  not  have  been  possible. 
On  21st  of  the  month  the  Restoration  of  Order  in  Ireland  Act  be- 
came  law,  greatly  increasing  the  power  and  immunity  of  the  mili- 
tary.  In  the  words  of  the  Commander  of  the  Auxiliaries  it  opened 
the  floodgates  of  crime  by  the  Crown  forces  and  enabled  the  British 
government  to  effect  its  pogrom  plan  for  Ireland82, 
On  22  August  R.  I.  C.  District  Inspector  Swanzy  was  shot  on 
Collins'  orders  in  Lisburn,  having  been  transferred  there  for  his 
own  safety'in  the  spring  following  the  assassination  of  Tomäs 
MacCurtain  in  Cork.  His  car  registration  number  was  known,  and 
Fianna  Intelligence  sections  had  monitored  his  movements83.  This 
was  only  one  of  a  number  of  Intelligence  operations  in  which  Fianna 
worked  in  close  association  with  the  I.  R.  A.  Following  suspected 
informers  was  a  regular  task;  another  was  the  location  of  British 
military  vehicles  for  their  destruction  by  visiting  vehicle  repair 
depots  under  the  pretext  of  seeking  work84.  Several  of  the  most 
decisive  operations  organised  by  Collins  in  Dublin  were  the  direct 
result  of  information  relayed  by  Fianna's  Intelligence  department85, 
In  the  North  Swanzy's  assassination  had  the  effect  of  intensi- 
fying  the  pogroms  against  the  nationalist  population  that  had 
broken  out  in  several  towns  two  days  earlier86.  The  pogrom  con- 
tinued  in  Belfast  into  September,  prompting  a  retaliatory  boycott 
of  Belfast-made  goods  in  some  areas  during  the  autumn 
87 
, 
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support  of  the  boycott  Fianna  raided  suppliers  trading  with  Belfast 
firms,  intimidated  proprietors,  confiscated  and  destroyed  their 
goods,  and  in  Belfast  itself  distributed  propaganda  literature88. 159 
The  I.  R.  A.  took  its  campaign  to  England  in  the  autumn  of  1920, 
planning  several  operations  including  the  destruction  of  the  Stuart 
Street  Power  Station  and  the  Clayton  Vale  Pumping  Station  in  Man- 
chester.  Garry  Holohan,  who  himself  worked  at  the  Clontarf  Pump- 
ing  Station  in  Dublin,  was  selected  to  organise-the  actions89. 
Having  visited  Manchester  in  October  and  obtained  a  pass  into  the 
power  station,  he  produced  a  detailed  plan  for  an  operation  in- 
volving  sixty-five  men.  This  document  was  seized  in  a  raid  on 
Richard  Mulcahy's  home  and  published  in  the  Irish  Times90,  and  al- 
though  it  had  only  been  signed  with  his  initials  Holohan  was 
arrested  an  Christmas  Day. 
Countess  Markievicz  was  a  prisoner  in  Mountjoy  throughout  the 
autumn,  having  been  arrested  on  26  September.  While  she  was  there 
Kevin  Barry.  was  hanged  at  the  jail.  The  Dublin  Fianna  A.  S.  U.  had 
been  on  standby  for  his  rescue  but  the  attempt  was  cancelled  on 
Mulcahy's  order 
91. 
Madame-was  eventually  tried  by  Court  Martial 
on  a  charge  of  conspiring  "with  other  persons,  and  with  one  Eamonn 
Martin,  to  promote  a  certain  organisation  (Fianna  Eireann)  for  the 
purpose  of  committing  murders  of  military  and  police,  the  drilling 
of  men,  the  carrying  and  using  of  arms,  and  furnishing  and  training 
of  Irish  Volunteers"92.  Refusing  to  recognise  the  court  she 
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thoroughly  discredited  the  prosecution  case  in'cross  examination. 
Nonetheless,  when  the  verdict  was  at  last  announced  almost  a  month 
later  she  received  a  sentence  of  two  years'  hard  labour.  Her 
spirits  irrepressible  as  ever,  she  wrote  her  sister  that  Baden- 
Powell  had  received  a  baronet  for  a  similar  offence,  and  that  at 
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least  the  case  was  a  "fresh  'ad'  for  the  boys!  "  . 
The  curfew,  first  imposed  in  Dublin  in  February  1920,  had  been 
extended  to  every  militant  Republican  area  during  the  year.  It 160 
was  in  Cork,  one  of  the  curfew  towns,  that  R.  I.  C.  Sergeant  Donoghue 
was  shot  dead  on  17  November.  His  murder  signalled  a  night  of 
revenge.  Shortly  before  midnight  local  residents  heard  shots 
fired  in  Broad  Lane,  and  ran  to  find  Eugene  Connell  lying  dead,  and 
Charles  O'Brien,  a  sixteen  year  old  Fianna  boy,  severely  wounded  in 
the  mouth95.  Sometime  after  midnight  men  in  police  uniform 
entered  a  house  in  nearby  Broad  Street  and  fired  on  three  people  as 
they  slept:  one  was  seriously  wounded,  a  second  -  who  had  thrown 
himself  to  the  floor  -  was  left  for  dead,  and  the  third,  Patrick 
Hanley,  was  shot  through  the  heart.  Hanley  was  seventeen  and  men- 
tally  retarded,  and  though  other  fiannai  in  Cork  had  ceased  wearing 
uniforms  for  reasons  of  safety  he  had  continued  to  wear  his  in  pub- 
1ic96.  It  was  undoubtedly  for  this  reason  that  he  was  singled  out, 
for  contrary.  to  the  claims  of  the  Chief  Secretary  for  State  the 
shootings  were  not  random97.  Hanley  was  laid  out  in  his  uniform, 
the  visiting  crowds  stewarded  by  his  slua  comrades.  The  shootings 
were  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  British  parliament,  where  it 
was  urged  that  they  had  taken  place  after  curfew  hours  and  that  eye- 
witnesses  had  identified  police  uniforms,  but  without  satisfaction98. 
On  29  November  the  wooden  Fianna  Hall  in  Limerick  was  burned 
to  the  ground  by  the  Black-and-Tans99.  Like  Cork,  the  city  was  a 
'military  area'.  Here,  as  in  all  towns  under  Martial  Law,  Fianna 
juniors  played  a  particularly  valuable  part  in  maintaining  supplies 
because  persons  under  sixteen  were  allowed  to  come  and  go  more 
readily  than  adults100 
It  was  their  unobtrusiveness,  in  fact,  that  determined  the 
kind  of  support  duties  given  to  the  younger  fiannai  throughout  the 
country  during  the  war.  Despatches  could  be  easily  hidden  inside 
a  bicycle  frame,  and  enemy  communications  effectively  blocked  by 161 
cutting  telegraph  wires  or  digging  trenches  in  familiar  country 
roads;  boys  could  stand  unchallenged  at  crossroads  with  horse  and 
trap,  carry  weapons  to  rendezvous  in  relative  safety,  and,  as  they 
had  always  done,  distribute  literature,  paste  up  and  tear  down 
posters,  steward  Republican  meetings  and  heckle  those  of  their 
opponents101 
It  would  nevertheless  be  an  error  to  exaggerate  either  the 
extent  or  the  formality  of  the  support  role  of  the  younger  members. 
Boys  helped  the  Army,  after  all,  in  areas  where  the  youth  organisa- 
tion  did  not  exist;  and  even  where  it  did  were  probably  often  chosen 
for  tasks  through  personal  or  family  connections  with  Army  men 
rather  than  through  their  membership  of  Fianna  as  such.  Indeed 
for  many  juniors  Fianna  membership  was  only  an  extension  and  formal- 
isation  of  family  Republicanism102, 
Moreover  -  and  the  point  applies  to  juniors  and  seniors  alike  - 
the  organisation  was  not  uniformly  active  and  militant  throughout 
the  country.  On  the  one  hand  areas  such  as  Tralee,  which  was 
later  cited  as  the  outstanding  Fianna  Battalion  in  Ireland103,  saw 
almost  constant  action.  On  the  other,  in  companies  like  Ballymore, 
in  the  relatively  inactive  Kildare  Brigade  area  where  the  Army  it- 
self  was  only  established  after  the  onset  of  the  war,  Fianna  "did 
a  few  odd  things"  but  had  become  moribund  before  the  Treaty,  most 
of  the  boys  having  "given  it  up  because  there  was  nothing  to  do"104. 
In  this  the  youth  organisation  resembled  the  senior  army,  for 
the  brunt  of  the  war  was  in  fact  carried  by  a  minority  of  I.  R.  A. 
Brigades,  particularly  in  the  South  and  West,  while  some  others  saw 
almost  no  action105  As  we  shall  see  (pp.  168  f"  below)  the  areas 
of  Fianna  strength  quite  closely  matched  those  of  the  Volunteers. 
The  parallel  was  not  fortuitous,  but  derived  in  fact  from  the  close 162 
association  that  had  developed  between  the  two  organisations  since 
the  Rising106. 
FIANNA  AND  THE  I.  R.  A.  (i) 
In  recognition  of  its  part  in  the  Rising  Fianna  was  re- 
organised  from  the  autumn  of  1916  to  be  a  junior  section  of 
6glaigh 
na  hEireann107  The  following  year  representatives  of  the  senior 
army  met  the  newly  appointed  Fianna  G.  H.  Q.  staff  for  tentative 
discussions  towards  the  eventual  integration  of  the  two  forces 
108. 
It  was  already  becoming  clear  that  in  a  protracted  independence 
struggle  the  centre  of  Volunteer  activity  would  move  to  the  country 
and  especially  to  the  south109.  The  Army's  task,  therefore,  was 
not  only  to  ensure  a  regular  flow  of  trained  recruits  from  Fianna 
in  those  areas  where  companies  already  existed,  but  also  to  extend 
the  youth  organisation  in  those  rural  areas  where  it  was  itself 
establishing  new  units.  It  was  agreed  that  both  aims  could  only 
be  achieved  effectively  by  matching  the  command  structures  of  the 
two  bodies.  As  a  first  step  towards  this  end  Fianna  was  re- 
organised  on  a  Brigade  basis  at  its  1918  Ard  Fheis110.  It 
appears,  in  fact,  that  the  Republican  leaders  had  already  by  this 
date  drawn  up  long-term  plans  for  a  professional  national  army  to 
be  developed  from  the  Volunteers,  under  the  authority  of  a  Republi- 
can  government  whenever  the  latter  should  be  established,  and 
supported  by  a  National  Guard  and  Fianna-style  Cadets,  the  whole 
having  an  integrated  regional  structurelll. 
The.  advent  of  Dail  Eireann  in  January  1919  brought  such  plans 
closer  to  reality  and  in  fact  totally  altered  the  status  of  the 
Volunteers  and  Fianna.  The  Volunteers,  hitherto  an  independent 
force  answerable  to  its  own  executive,  now  became  the  Army  of  the 
Irish  Republic 
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under  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  and  its  members 163 
were  now  required  to  swear  allegiance  to  the  government113.  Fianna 
in  turn  became  an  official  junior  section  of  the  new  national  army, 
under  the  control  of  the  same  government  department.  The  youth 
organisation  formally  pledged  allegiance  to  the  Republican  Dail  at 
its  Ard  Fheis  of  1919114. 
Early  in  the  same  year  acting  Adjutant  General  Pat  Stephenson 
held  discussions  with  members  of  the  Army's  Headquarters  Staff  with 
a  view  to  formulating  a  common  policy  of  organisation  and  transfer. 
After  the  meeting  Michael  Collins  wrote  Fianna's  Chief-of-Staff  re- 
laying  the  Army's  proposals: 
In  each  Volunteer  Company  area  where  the  Fianna  does  not 
exist  a  section  Commander  would  be  told  off  to  do  the 
necessary  organising  for  you.  Provided  we  come  to  some 
arrangement  like  this  it  will  be  an  easy  matter  to  fix 
up  the  details  as  to  how  it  is  to  be  done.  Also  the 
details  as  to  how  and  at  what  age  members-of  the  Fianna 
will  pass  into  the  Volunteer  ranks115. 
However,  as  the  war  escalated  it  became  clear  that  a  common  military 
policy  could  only  be  operated  in  practice  under  a  combined  central 
authority.  It  was  for  this  purpose  that  a  Composite  Council  of 
Fianna  and  the  I.  R.  A.  was  set  up  by  Minister  of  Defence  Cathal 
Brugha  in  December  1920,  composed  of  three  members  of  each  G.  H.  Q. 
Staff  with  the  Minister  or  his  nominee  presiding116.  The  represen- 
tatives  appointed  were:  for  Fianna,  Liam  Langley,  Mellows  and 
Holohan,  and  for  the  Army,  Geäroid  O'Sullivan,  Diarmuid  O'Hegarty 
and  Eamon  Price117. 
The  Council  at  once  addressed  itself  to  the  situation  in  the 
capital  and  instructed  that  Fianna's  Dublin  Brigade  be  re-organised 
into  five  Battalions  corresponding  to  the  structure  of  the  I.  R.  A.  in 
the  city118 
It  also  discussed  in  detail  the  practical  implications  of 
partnership,  agreeing  procedures  which  were  then  circulated  to  all 164 
companies  by  Fianna's  Adjutant  General.  His  memorandum119  ex- 
plained  that  Fianna  would  "assist  the  Volunteers  in  every  manner 
possible"  under  its  own  officers,  and  though  acting  in  co- 
operation  with  them  would  "remain  in  most  respects  a  separate 
organisation".  All  Fianna  Battalion  areas  would  be  made  standard 
with  those  of  the  Army,  and  in  the  case  of  incomplete  Battalions 
the  Army  would  be  responsible  for  setting  up  and  training  companies 
until  Fianna  officers  became  available.  Fianna's  Battalion 
Commandants  would  act  as  liaison  officers  between  the  two  organisa- 
tions  at  Battalion  level,  and  attend  I.  R.  A.  Battalion  and  Brigade 
Councils. 
Fianna's  military  role  would  normally  be  confined  to  giving 
assistance  "where  required"  in  joint  operations  in  which  its  own 
commanding  officers  would  themselves  be  answerable  to  Volunteer 
officers  of  equivalent  rank.  Independent  operations  by  Fianna 
Active  Service  Units  would  require  prior  sanction  by  the  local 
Army  Battalion  Commandant. 
The  memorandum  noted  current  plans  for  the  selection  of  boys 
and  officers  to  attend  I.  R.  A.  officers'  training  classes,  pending 
which  every  Fianna  o/c  should  instruct  all  ranks  in  skills  re- 
quired  for  the  adult  army.  Transfer  to  the  I.  R.  A.  at  eighteen 
was  in  future  compulsory  for  any  member  "unless  his  services  were 
necessary  for  the  successful  management  of  the  company". 
Within  a  month  of  the  companies  receiving  Mellows'  memorandum 
the  British  had  captured  documents  of  Collins  that  referred  to  the 
Council  decisions  and  were  aware  of  the  imminent  "linking  up"  of 
the  two  organisations120 
Considering  that  in  many  areas  the  average  age  of  the  I.  R.  A. 
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was  little  higher  than  that  of  Fianna  itself,  it  might  have  been 165 
expected  that  the  proposed  association  would  be  effected  easily. 
But  in  fact  the  agreed  procedures  were  by  no  means  completely 
carried  out  in  the  five  months  that  remained  of  the  war.  Few 
I.  R.  A.  Battalions  established  their  full  complement  of  Fianna 
companies,  even  in  the  cities122.  In  some  areas  the  Fianna  com- 
pany  officers  themselves  resisted  close  formal  association.  Their 
own  organisation  after  all  pre-dated  the  Volunteers,  and  the  deeply 
instilled,  legendary  ideal  upon  which  it  was  founded  made  it  in 
their  eyes  more  than  a  cadet  force  of  the  purely  pragmatic  I.  R.  A. 
It  had  status  in  its  own  right,  and  they  had  standing  within  it123. 
Others,  fearing  redundancy,  were  also  determined  to  preserve 
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Fianna's  constitutional  independence,  The  extent  to  which  the 
agreed  authority  structure  was  observed  also  varied  according  to 
local  conditions  and  in  particular-the  conditions  imposed  by  war. 
Brigades  such  as  Belfast  enjoyed  association  without  subordination, 
and  though  protocol  demanded  permission  to  be  sought  from  the 
Volunteers  matters  requiring  prompt  action  were  usually  decided 
independently  in  practice125. 
Prime  responsibility  for  any  failure  to  implement  the  agreed 
procedures,  however,  appears  to  rest  with  the  Volunteer  Company  o/cs, 
many  of  whom  had  little  real  sympathy  with  the  aims  of  the  youth 
wing.  In  his  half-yearly  report  to  Army  Headquarters,  written  in 
August  1921,  Fianna's  Adjutant  General  noted  that  the  Scouts  still 
existed  "in  a  more  or  less  disorganised  state"  in  many  areas, 
through  a  failure  on  the  Volunteers'  part  to  honour  the  memorandum: 
Strictly  speaking,  the  only  places  where  the  spirit  of 
the  terms  of  (the  Memorandum)  is  carried  out  are  Dublin, 
Cork  and  Belfast.  The  attitude  adopted  by  the  I.  V.  (sic) 
towards  the  Fianna  is  one  which  is  rather  incompre- 
hensible  ...  We  have  found  that  in  most  cases  the  I.  V. 
have  not  made  the  slightest  attempt  to  avail  themselves 
of  the  advantage  of  boys  over  men,  and  that  the  general 
opinion  is  that  the  Fianna  are  only  youngsters  and 
should  be  treated  like  children126. 166 
He  added  that  in  some  areas  the  Volunteers  refused  to-accept  Fianna 
communications  through  their  own  lines,  and  suggested  that  in  cer- 
tain  less  active  Brigades  development  of  Fianna  companies  had  been 
deliberately  neglected  because  strong  local  sluaite  "would  force 
the  Volunteers  to  get  into  the  fighting".  The  nation-wide  pro- 
gramme  of  training  had  similarly  suffered.  Bombing  and  musketry 
practice,  in  particular,  had  been  neglected  due  to  a  shortage  of 
grenades  and  weapons:  --"It  was  expected  that  the  I.  V.  would  loan 
these  articles  for  lectures  and  practice",  Mellows  reported,  "but 
outside  the  cities  our  boys  have  found  it  impossible  to  obtain  this 
privilege".  He  warned  that  the  Army's  attitude  would  "require 
immediate  handling"  if  recruitment  of  fiannai  to  the  senior  ranks 
was  to  be  effective.  Overall,  he  considered  transfer  "not  very 
satisfactory"  to  date:  Fianna  Headquarters  did  not  hold  a  complete 
record  of  transfers  but  calculated  that  in  Belfast,  Dublin  and 
Dundalk  some  150  boys  in  all  had  graduated  to  the  I.  R.  A.  over  the 
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previous  six  months 
In  Dublin  in  fact  perhaps  fifty  percent  of  members  trans- 
ferred128,  and  in  certain  areas  such  as  Cork  the  proportion  was  far 
higher129,  In  others  it  was  minimal  -  in  one  Battalion  in  the 
West,  for  example,  which  numbered  150  boys  all  ranks,  only  four 
graduated  to  the  Volunteers  before  the  Truce 
130. 
In  all  it  is  clear  that  neither  aim  of  the  Army  -  establishing 
Fianna  companies  in  all  Volunteer  areas,  and  recruiting  trained 
youths  in  number  -  was  fully  achieved  during  the  Anglo-Irish  War. 
It  is  apparent,  also,  that  the  agreed  association  between  adult  and 
youth  forces  was  not  effected  with  the  thoroughness  and  harmony 
that  have  been  claimed  for  it131;  nor  did  it  imply  an  equal  partner- 
ship  in  any  sense.  Fianna  did  nonetheless  operate  as  a  section  of 167 
the  Army  of  the  Republic  between  1919-21,  under  the  authority  of 
Dail  gireann, 
and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  parliamentary  pro- 
ceedings  of  the  time  made  no  specific  reference  to  its  separate 
existence 
132. 
TRUCE 
The  truce  was  signed  on  11  July  1921.  Ten  days  later,  as  a 
direct  result  of  it,  Loyalist  mobs  launched  a  pogrom  against  the 
nationalist  population  of  Belfast  that  started  in  the  shipyards, 
spread  to  the  Clonard  and  Lower  Falls  and  eventually  to  all  Catholic 
areas.  The  Volunteers  managed  to  mobilise  units  in  the  Falls  but 
elsewhere  could  only  take  their  places  as  individuals  in  hastily 
mustered  civilian  corps133.  They  were  ill  prepared  and  ill  armed. 
Fiannai  played  only  a  minor  part  as  individuals  in  the  actions. 
But  the  pogrom  had  proved  the  vulnerability  of  unarmed  neighbour- 
hoods  and  the  Scouts  recognised  the  necessity  of  arming  themselves. 
Weapons  were  acquired  from  the  South,  from  the  British  Army,  from 
dumps  in  County  Antrim;  and  even  from  weak  links  in  the  Ulster 
Protestant  Association  willing  to  sell  to  anyone  for  cash134. 
Throughout  the  country  Fianna's  membership  had  declined  in 
the  intensity  of  the  latter  stages  of  the  war.  Many  boys  had 
resigned  or  been  withdrawn  by  parents,  and  some  companies  had  been 
disbanded  by  their  own  officers135.  The  Dublin  Brigade  had  been 
reduced  to  three  battalions136,  But  the  ceasefire  brought  an 
immediate  expansion,  as  it  did  in  the  I.  R.  A.  itself.  In  the 
latter,  some  companies  doubled  their  strength  and  many  new  units 
were  formed  composed  wholly  of  'trucers'137.  So  too  in  Fianna, 
existing  companies  were  swelled  to  twice  or  three  times  their  for- 
mer  size  by  the  'Johnnie  Come  Latelies»138,  and  a  number  of  new 
ones  were  established.  Reporting  to  Mulcahy  in  August  Mellows 168 
noted  that  almost  one  third  of  the  companies  known  to  be  operating 
in  Ireland  had  only  sent  in  their  returns  since  the  Truce,  and  that 
many  of  these  appeared  to  have  been  recently  established  since  their 
existence  was  previously  unknown  to  G.  H.  Q. 
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. 
His  reports  included  a  detailed  breakdown  of  membership  by 
Brigades,  Battalions  and  companies,  an  abridged  version  of  which  is 
set  out  in  Table  I  below: 
Table  I.  Abridged  breakdown  of  membership  of  Fianna, 
based  largely  on  returns  of  company  o/cs; 
August  1921 
Brigades  Companies 
for  which  for  which  Total  Com-  Member- 
Province 
Brigades  company 
panier 
membership 
ship  data  data 
available  available 
Munster  16  14  84  40  1114 
Ulster  9  5  20  8  277 
Connacht  8  3  10  5  74 
Leinster  14  13  41  36  1193 
Total  47  35  155  86  2658 
Cork  city  ) 
and  county) 
3  3  24 
Cork  city  7  7  338 
Limerick  city  6  6  180 
County  Kerry  3  3  37 
Belfast  6  6  247 
Dublin  16  16  785 
From  these  data  Mellows  calculated  a  known  membership  of  2738  in 
132  companies,  statistics  which  cannot  be  readily  matched  with  the 169 
figures  here  presented.  His  membership  total,  however,  covered  less 
than  three-fifths  of  the  companies  in  only  three-quarters  of  the 
Brigade  areas.  It  did  include  the  complete  strength  of  the  four 
largest  population  centres,  which  accounted  for  57%  of  the  total, 
and  -  since  it  was  based  on  o/cs'  returns  -  probably  included  the 
more  effective  areas.  Taking  these  factors  into  account  a  realis- 
tic  estimate  of  the  total  national  membership  in  August  1921  might 
be  something  over  4,000  all  ranks. 
The  provincial  details  revealed  that  in  its  national  develop- 
ment  Fianna  had  broadly  but  not  exactly  followed  the  I.  R.  A.,  with 
the  heaviest  concentration  of  sluaite  outside  Dublin  and  Belfast 
being  in  the  active  Army  Brigade  areas  of  the  South  and  South- 
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West 
The  Scouts  took  the  opportunity  of  peace  to  hold  their  Ard 
Fheis  in  August.  Barney  Mellows  was  re-elected  Adjutant  General 
and  Garry  Holohan  Quartermaster,  with  a  reshuffle  of  the  rest  of 
the  Headquarters  Staff.  The  offices  of  Director  of  Organisation 
and'Director  of  Education,  previously  held  by  Eamon  Martin  and 
Liam  Langley  respectively,  were  now  combined  and  Langley  elected 
to  the  new  post.  Holohan,  who  had  replaced  Martin  as  Chief-of- 
Staff  eight  months  earlier,  was  himself  succeeded  by  Corkman 
Frank  McMahon.  Martin  became  Director  of  Training,  and  the  Coun- 
tess  remained  Fianna  Chief141. 
Pressure  by  the  British  government  upon  the  Irish  people  to 
accept  a  treaty  under  threat  of  renewed  war  was  from  this  date  in- 
tensified  and  given  the  "whitest  glare  of  publicity"142,  Despite 
the  ceasefire,  therefore,  development  of  the  I.  R.  A.  and  the  con- 
tinued  transfer  of  Fianna  seniors  into  its  ranks  remained  an  im- 
perative  through  the  autumn.  To  meet  this  aim  Fianna  officer 170 
training  camps  were  arranged  in  a  number  of  Battalion  areas,  and  a 
major  national  camp  was  held  at  Loughlinstown  in  September, 
organised  and  financed  by  the  I.  R.  A. 
143. 
The  latter  took  place 
in  the  field  adjoining  the  Union,  with  over  two  hundred  youths 
attending.  Training,  under  the  Army's  Director  Tom  McMahon  assis- 
ted  by  Sean  Saunders,  Holohan  and  Langley  of  the  Fianna,  included 
despatch  carrying,  route  marches,  close  order  formation,  assault 
courses,  first  aid  and  weapon  assembling.  The  chance  to  inspect 
one  of  the  recently  imported  Thompson  machine  guns  was  a  memorable 
experience  for  the  boys144. 
The  I.  R.  A.  's  own  Brigade  returns  for  the  autumn  only  served 
to  confirm  Mellows'  August  report  that  Fianna  Battalions  were  in- 
complete  and  even  non-existent  in  some  areas145.  The  Army's 
Director  of  Organisation  Diarmuid  O'Hegarty  certainly  considered 
the  position  serious146  and  sought  a  firm  date  for  a  meeting  of 
the  Composite  Council  to  "determine  the  best  means  of  securing  the 
mutual  co-operation  of  the  two  organisations"  during  the  cease- 
fire 
147. 
The  meeting  was  probably  held  during  the  Loughlinstown  fort- 
night.  Both  sides  agreed  to  the  appointment  of  a  national  Fianna 
organising  officer,  with  further  officers  in  every  Volunteer 
Division,  following  the  precedent  of  the  recent  appointment  in  the 
1st  Southern  Division148.  But  they  may  well  have  put  different 
interpretations  on  the  role  of  the  new  officers.  O'Hegarty  and 
Mulcahy  envisaged  that  they  would  replace  Fianna's  own  G.  H.  Q. 
Staff  altogether  and  made  this  recommendation  to  the  I.  R.  A.  Execu- 
tive  following  the  meeting149.  And  since  their  memorandum  also 
advocated  a  tighter  control  over  Fianna  units  by  Volunteer  company 
o/cs150  and  their  restriction  to  the  role  of  "junior  auxiliary", 171 
it  was  in  fact  recommending  total  absorbtion  and  the  surrender  of 
all  autonomy.  It  is  hardly  credible  that  Fianna's  representatives 
on  the  Council  interpreted  the  meeting  in  this  sense,  or  that 
G.  H.  Q.  would  willingly  have  agreed  to  the  Army's  recommendations. 
In  the  event,  however,  the  youth  organisation  retained  its  own 
Headquarters  command.  In  December  the  Treaty  was  signed,  and  with 
the  signing  any  possible  moves  towards  its  abolition  were  put  into 
abeyance. 172 
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Chapter  6.  TREATY  AND  CIVIL  WAR  (1922-1923) 
TREATY 
The  signing  of  the  Treaty,  and  its  acceptance  by  a  majority  of 
T.  D.  s  on  7  January  1922,  split  the  Republican  movement  and  called 
in  question  the  position  of  the  Dail,  the  Army,  and  thus  also 
Fianna.  De  Valera  at  once  appealed  for  unity  in  the  ranks  of 
the  I.  R.  A.,  urging  at  a  convened  meeting  of  senior  officers  that 
the  organisation  must  remain  intact  whatever  the  parties  might  say 
or  dol.  And  as  early  as  10  January  Fianna  G.  H.  Q.  issued  a  cir- 
cular  warning  company  o/cs  not  to  allow  the  political  situation  to 
interfere  with  normal  work:  "Political  discussions  of  any  nature 
are  strictly'  forbidden  in  drill  halls  or  at  any  Fianna  meetings 
Until  the  Ard  Fheis  meets  it  is  expected  that  all  ranks  will 
stop  the  talk  and  get  on  with  the  work"Z. 
With  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  the  Volunteers  were  ac- 
corded  the  status  of  regular  professional  soldiers.  Fianna 
seniors  and  officers  were  granted  the  same  standing  and  wages  as 
members  of  the  senior  army3.  Republican  forces  began  occupying 
the  local  barracks  vacated  by  the  departing  British  Army  and  on 
the  last  day  of  January  took  over  Beggar's  Bush  in  Dublin  as  a 
national  headquarters4.  Acquisition  of  premises  was  made  more 
difficult  for  Fianna  by  the  premium  on  barracks,  possession  of 
which  -  it  was  becoming  clear  -  would  be  strategically  crucial  in 
the  event  of  the  Army  splitting.  In  some  areas  possession  was 
effected  by  mutual  consent.  In  Cork,  for  instance,  it  was  agreed 
that  the  I.  R.  A.  would  share  Victoria  Barracks  with  senior  Fianna 
officers,  whose  other  ranks  would  be  accommodated  in  the  barracks 182 
at  Empress  Places.  Elsewhere-the  Scouts  were  forced  to  occupy 
premises  without  authorisation.  The  Dublin  Brigade  took  over  the 
drill  hall  in  North  Great  George  Street  in  this  way.  Fianna's 
Adjutant  General  defended  the  action  in  the  face  of  questions  from 
Beggar's  Bush,  stating  that  it  indicated  the  "desperate  conditions" 
under  which  the  youth  section  was  forced  to  operate  and  requesting 
that  the  Minister  of  Defence  should  consider  Fianna's  needs  when 
re-allocating  barracks  vacated  by  the  British6. 
The  Sinn  F4in  party  had  succeeded  in  preserving  a  fragile 
unity,  having  agreed  in  February  to  postpone  an  election  fought  on 
the  Treaty  issue7.  But  the  division  within  the  I.  R.  A.  was  widen- 
ing.  On  26  March  the  long  requested  Convention  of  Army  officers 
was  held  at  the  Mansion  House.  Fianna  was  not  included  in  the 
prior  invitation  of  delegates,  but  the  agenda  contained  an  early 
motion  to  admit  the  Chief-of-Staff  and  Adjutant  General,  as  well  as 
8 
the  Chief  of  the  Republican  Police.  The  convention,  which 
adjourned  and  re-met  a  fortnight  later,  voted  to  withdraw  allegiance 
from  the  Dail,  pledging  it  directly  to  the  Republic,  and  to  vest 
authority  over  the  Army  in  its  own  executive,  to  be  elected9.  The 
banning  of  the  meeting  by  Mulcahy  and  his  stipulation  that  attend- 
ance  would  involve  suspension  from  the  Volunteers  in  effect  drove 
the  anti-Treaty  forces  into  the  position  of  a  rebel  army.  Within 
four  days  they  occupied  the  Four  Courts  as  a  rival  Headquarters 
10. 
The  attendance  of  Fianna's  two  most  senior  officers  at  the  conven- 
tion  served  as  an  affirmation  of  its  leadership's  defiance  of  the 
Provisional  government.  The  Dublin  Brigade  had  already  asserted 
its  position  publicly  when  on  2  April  several  hundred  of  its  mem- 
bers  took  part  in  the  anti-Treaty  demonstration  at  Smithfield  at 
ll 
which  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Republic  was  renewed. 183 
Over  the  country  as  a  whole,  however,  the  organisation  was  in 
fact  deeply  divided  on  the  issue.  But  whereas  the  I.  R.  A.  was 
split  as  an  organisation  by  Mulcahy's  refusal  to  convene  a  full 
convention  to  decide  its  position  and  his  effective  expulsion  of 
anti-Treaty  volunteers,  Fianna  maintained  its  organisational  unity 
by  permitting  a  democratic  convention  but  postponing  it  to  the 
latest  reasonable  date 
12, 
and  meantime  avoiding  internal  confronta- 
tion.  The  Ard  Fheis  was  finally  fixed  for  Easter  Sunday,  16  April, 
before  which  date  it  was  still  open  to  individual  members  and  com- 
panies  to  give  political  support  to  either  side,  since  -  though  it 
must  have  been  widely  known  that  Headquarters  opposed  the  Treaty  to 
a  man13  -  no  formal  position  had  yet  been  decided  by  the  national 
organisation.  This  freedom  to  choose  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
situation  in  Belfast14.  When  the  I.  R.  A.  split  in  the  city  in 
March  most  of  the  officers  and  'strong  men'  took  the  Free  State 
side  on  the  argument  that  'if  it  was  good  enough  for  Collins  it 
was  good  enough  for  them'.  On  9  April  the  Fianna  Brigade  con- 
vened  an  extraordinary  meeting  to  decide  a  policy  to  take  to  the 
Ard  Fheis.  Most  of  the  company  captains  supported  the  Treaty  and 
although  a  minority  with  Brigade  o/c  Johnnie  Bateson  urged  the 
adoption  of  a  neutral  stance  their  arguments  were  brushed  aside. 
Pro-Treaty  delegates  were  elected  to  represent  the  Brigade  in 
Dublin. 
Prior  to  the  Ard  Fheis,  therefore,  the  only  major  losses 
experienced  by  the  organisation  were  through  the  transfer  of 
senior  members  into  the  adult  ranks.  In  South  County  Dublin,  for 
example,  every  officer  of  the  Battalion  transferred  into  the  pro- 
Treaty  wing  of  the  Army  in  March,  with  the  resultant  disbanding  of 
all  four  local  companies15. 184 
THE  1922  ARD  FHEIS 
At  Fianna's  Ard  Fheis,  held  one  week  after  the  anti-Treaty 
Army  convention  and  three  days  after  the  occupation  of  the  Four 
Courts,  the  leadership  achieved  almost  all  their  aims  and  by  win- 
ning  crucial  resolutions  put  the  organisation  unequivocably  on  the 
side  of  de  Valera.  In  the  first  major  resolution  delegates  voted 
to  amend  the  Constitution  whereby  all  members  would  be  required  to 
pledge  allegiance  to  the  Republicls.  A  further  resolution  was 
then  carried  recording  "appreciation  of  those  members  of  An  Däil 
who  opposed  the  subversion  of  the  Republic"  and  promising  "to 
stand  on  their  side  in  the  gap  of  danger"17.  Following  the 
example  of  the  banned  Army  convention,  delegates  then  formally  dis- 
associated  Fianna  from  the  government  and  vested  sole  authority  in 
its  own  G.  H.  Q.  staff18. 
The  meeting.  passed  two  further  resolutions  of  significance. 
The  first,  by  which  the  ceiling  age  of  membership  was  raised  to 
twenty-one  years  wi 
culated  to  create  a 
independent  Fianna. 
withholding  support 
Fianna  companies  to 
th  the  arming  of  all  over-eighteens19,  was  cal- 
senior  section  equivalent  to  the  Army  within  an 
The  second  confirmed  that  independence  by 
from  both  factions  of  the  I.  R.  A.  and  permitting 
carry  out  military  operations  without  Army 
sanction20.  The  clear  aim  of  both  resolutions  was  the  development 
of  an  autonomous  force  able  to  defend  itself.  The  decisions  were 
undoubtedly  taken  because  at  that  date  in  April  delegates  were  un- 
certain  of  the  final  outcome  of  the  Army  split,  or  of  the  final 
political  allegiance  of  the  Army  should  it  be  re-united,  and  feared 
possible  civil  war. 
Nonetheless,  the  decision  to  withhold  support  from  the  Four 
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is  perhaps  only  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  large  minority  of 
pro-Treaty  delegates  present.  It  was  apparently  impossible  to 
prevent  the  decision  or  carry  a  more  explicitly  anti-Treaty  amend- 
ment.  Headquarters  certainly  regretted  the  position  in  which 
Fianna  was  now  placed,  which  they  saw  as  dangerous  and  open  to 
local  abuse  as  well  as  being  contrary  to  their  own  aim  of  close 
.  association  with  the  Republican  forces21 
Despite  the  controversy  of  the  spring  Fianna  had  enjoyed  the 
greatest  expansion  in  its  history  during  the  nine  months  that 
followed  the  Truce,  and  Liam  Langley  reported  to  the  Ard  Fheis  a 
total  membership  exceeding  26,00022.  The  figure  was  certainly  an 
exaggeration,  and  in  addition  based  on  returns  already  out-of-date 
since  by  April  membership  was  on  the  decline.  It  was  challenged 
at  the  time  by  the  Chief-of-Staff  who  suggested  that  a  realistic 
total  might  be  between  one  half  and  two  thirds  of  Langley's.  claim. 
A  comparison  with  membership  figures  for  the  Dublin  Brigade  bet- 
ween  August  1921  and  January  1922  offers  a  pointer  to  the  national 
figure.  During  those  five  months  membership  in  the  capital  rose 
from  785  to  2,51523.  If  this  expansion  was  typical  for  the 
country  as  a  whole  it  would  indicate  a  national  membership  of 
somewhat  over  13,000  in  January,  in  which  case  an  accurate  April 
figure  might  lie  between  11,000-14,000. 
The  Ard  Fheis  returned  Countess  Markievicz  unopposed  as 
Fianna  Chief;  she  was  not  herself  present  at  the  meeting,  being  at 
this  date  on  a  Republican  propaganda  tour  of  the  United  States24. 
Delegates  also  accepted  the  resignation  of  Garry  Holohan  from  the 
office  of  Quartermaster  General,  electing  Joe  Reynolds  as  his 
successor.  Holohan  nevertheless  continued  his  daily  liaison  work 
25 
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It  appears  likely  that  the  Ard  Fheis  weekend  was  also  made  the 
occasion  for  solving  the  now  pressing  problem  of  Fianna's  position 
vis-A-vis  the  I.  R.  B. 
The  Brotherhood  had  been  re-organised  under  a  temporary  council 
almost  immediately  after  the  Rising,  and  within  eighteen  months  had 
fully  re-established  itself  under  the  control  of  a  Supreme  Council26. 
It  had  also  re-established  its  former  dominance  within  the  Volun- 
teers,  at  least  from  the  time  of  the  latter's  re-organisation  in 
191727.  Before  and  during  the  Anglo-Irish  War  it  recruited  new 
members  exclusively  from  the  Army,  concentrating  on  officers  so 
that,  though  it  controlled  perhaps  only  one  in  twenty  of  all  volun- 
teers  directly,  it  exerted  its  influence  through  the  higher  ranks 
and  especially  the  central  leadership  which  it  totally  dominated28. 
Its  position  within  Fianna  was  certainly  similar  in  Dublin, 
where  almost  all  senior  officers  were  I.  R.  B.  men.  Many  held  posts 
as  orderlies  for  Government  and  Army  departments,  and  since  eleven 
of  the  thirteen  Headquarters  staff  officers  of  the  I.  R.  A.  and  half 
the  Cabinet  ministers  of  the  Däil  were  I.  R.  B.  members,  it  was  in- 
evitable  that  Fianna's  Dublin  Brigade  officers  came  in  close  and 
frequent  contact  with  the  Brotherhood29.  In  addition,  every  mem- 
ber  of  the  Dublin-based  Fianna.  G.  H.  Q.  Staff  in  autumn  1921  belonged 
to  the  I.  R.  B.  In  the  provinces,  on  the  other  hand,  the  position 
was  diverse.  In  Cork  city  the  Brotherhood  was  thought  of  as  an 
organisation  for  older  men  and  apparently  not  even  the  highest 
ranking  Fianna  officers  were  invited  to  membership30.  In  Belfast, 
also,  hardly  any  Brigade  officer  was  a  member  at  the  time  of  the 
Truce 
3l. 
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solely  of  Fianna  officers,  had  already  before  the  Rising  been 
extended  to  include  others  who  though  young  were  not  fiannai. 
Several  alumni  of  Sgoil 
fanna, 
and  Jack  and  George  Plunkett,  were 
among  those  admitted32.  After  the  Rising  a  number  of  former 
Fianna  boys  had  retained  membership  of  the  circle  after  transfer- 
ring  to  the  Volunteers.  In  the  spring  of  1918  the  circle  was  re- 
organised.  The  I.  R.  A.  members  formed  a  separate  group  retaining 
the  name  'John  Mitchel  Circle',  with  the  remnant  group  of  Fianna 
officers  adopting  the  title  'Fianna  Circle'33.  The  latter  con- 
tinued  to  meet  on  the  eve  of  Ard  Fheiseanna  throughout  the  war34. 
The  Brotherhood's  Supreme  Council,  meeting  four  days  after 
the  signing  of  the  Treaty  and  sensing  division  among  the  member- 
ship,  decided  against  taking  a  stand  on  the  question35.  Two 
days  later  its  members  in  the  Dail  were  wrongly  notified  that  the 
Council  had  ratified  the  Treaty  but  given  individual  T.  D.  s  freedom 
of  conscience  on  the  issue.  The  Däil's  acceptance  of  the  Treaty 
prompted  an  extraordinary  convention  of  I.  R.  B.  centres  and  Supreme 
Councillors  on  10  January  which,  like  further  meetings  in  March 
and  April,  ended  indecisively  with  a  majority  of  the  central 
hierarchy  supporting  the  Treaty  and  most  of  the  local  centres 
opposing  it.  The  division  and  indecision  were  fatal  to  the 
Brotherhood,  shattering  the  discipline  upon  which  it  was  founded, 
so  that  from  February  it  disintegrated  and  ceased  to  function  as  a 
national  organisation.  The  full  Supreme  Council  never  convened 
again,  and  local  circles  met  irregularly.  Many  dissolved  them- 
selves.  Among  them  was  the  Fianna  Circle,  the  majority  of  whose 
members  opposed  the  Free  State.  In  the  spring  of  1922,  very 
possibly  at  its  meeting  on  the  eve  of  Fianna's  Ard  Fheis,  its  mem- 
bers  ejected  the  'visitor'  and  voted  to  secede  from  the  Brother- 
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Local  Fianna  company  officers,  with  their  new-won  independence, 
carried  out  a  number  of  anti-government  actions  in  the  second  half 
of  April,  on  local  initiative  and  to  the  disquiet  of  the  Four  Courts 
leadership37.  Similar  incidents  by  the  adult  forces,  which  both 
Headquarters  Staffs  were  anxious  to  curtail,  were  halted  when  a 
'truce'  was  agreed  between  Beggar's  Bush  and  the  Four  Courts  on 
4  May.  Later  in  the  month,  following  the  political  'pact'  between 
Collins  and  de  Valera,  efforts  were  made  to  re-unite  the  I.  R.  A. 
with  the  establishment  of  an  Army  Conference  representing  both  fac- 
tions38.  But  Fianna  was  not  bound  by  the  'truce'  or  the  Con- 
ference  and  incidents  involving  its  members  continued.  In  two 
such  in  Limerick  city  in  the  first  week  of  the  truce  scouts 
threatened  and  fired  on  young  fellow  members  who  had  taken  the 
Treaty  side39 
By  adopting  an  explicit  political  position  at  its  Ard  Fheis 
Fianna  now  left  no  place  in  its  ranks  for  any  but  convinced  Repub- 
licans,  and  as  a  result  suffered  immediate  and  heavy  losses  of 
members.  It  had  preserved  its  unity  but  in  doing  so  its  numbers 
were  decimated.  In  the  Kingstown  area,  for  example,  some  thirty 
percent  of  seniors  took  the  Treaty  side40,  and  in  Cork  perhaps 
half  of  the  rank-and-file  and  a  quarter  of  the  officers  were  lost 
to  the  Free  State  army41.  In  the  confusion  of  the  times  some 
youths  made  purely  arbitrary  decisions  for  one  side  or  the 
other42.  The  only  course  for  Fianna  juniors,  and  for  the  neu- 
tral  and  the  uncertain,  was  resignation,  and  many  hundreds  must 
have  been  lost  in  this  way  during  April  and  May.  Companies  dis- 
banded  en  masse,  and  in  the  two  months  that  followed  the  Ard 
Fheis  whole  areas  completely  disintegrated.  Belfast  was  one 189 
such;  there  each  company  made  its  decision  independently,  with  the 
total  collapse  of  the  Brigade  by  late  May  when  Sen  McNally  re- 
ported  the  position  to  his  old  Commandant  Joe  McKelvey  at  the  Four 
Courts.  He  was  posted  back  to  the  city  to  attempt  to  re-establish 
some  elementary  organisation  with  the  help  of  other  dual  members, 
but  the  tide  was  by  now  against  it43 
Even  the  national  leadership  were  not  immune  from  the  exhaus- 
tion  and  disillusionment  besetting  an  organisation  which  they  saw 
breaking  up  and  impotent  to  turn  the  political  tide  in  Ireland. 
Eamon  Martin,  who  had  held  unbroken  office  since  1909,  wrote  Barney 
Mellows  in.  May  tendering  his  resignation  -  "My  only  reason  is  in- 
ability,  "  he  wrote,  "whatever  help  I  could  give  the  Fianna  would 
now  be  irregular  ...  I  am  spent  ... 
I  see  no  immediate  activity 
now  for  the  Fianna  beyond  the  plod-plod"44.  He  was  expressing 
what  the  others  probably  felt  -  there  no  longer  seemed  to  be  an 
immediate  role  for  Fianna  in  halting  the  nation's  plunge  to  dis- 
aster,  and  they  must  return  to  the  hard  graft  of  the  long-term  task 
of  rebuilding  from  basics  among  the  young  generation  for  a  future 
Republic.  In  June  they  announced  the  decision  to  return  to 
Fianna's  original  and  prime  role,  the  Republican  education  of  the 
young,  which  had  been  almost  totally  abandoned  for  some  years  due 
to  the  pressures  of  war,  and  for  want  of  which  (they  believed)  so 
many  had  defected: 
The  educational  side  of  our  programme  has  been  completely. 
neglected.  For  instance,  how  many  of  our  officers  and 
boys  have  qualified  to  wear  the  Fainne?  ... 
While  still 
keeping  in  view  military  training  we  must  devote  more 
time  to  the  training  of  the  mind  and  body.  Physical 
training  has  had  to  be  cut.  Gaelic  games  have  been 
neglected,  both  necessary  if  we  are  to  raise  up  strong 
and  virile  Irishmen  fit  to  take  a  soldier's  part  in  the 
national  struggle  of  tomorrow45. 
As  early  as  1913  individual  leaders  had  warned  that  with  the  grow- 190 
ing  dominance  of  a  military  role  Fianna  was  in  danger  of  losing 
sight  of  its  original  basic  aims46.  Every  member  of  the  1922 
leadership  had  grown  up  in  the  organisation  as  it  had  been  before 
the  founding  of  the  Volunteers,  and  knew  the  old  ideal.  It 
appears,  moreover,  that  they  were  again  influenced  by  one  who  was 
now  a  legend  of  Fianna's  early  years,  Liam  Mellows,  who  since  his 
return  from  U.  S.  A.  in  1920  had  become  closely  associated  with  the 
Headquarters  staff  through  his  brother  Barney,  his  own  friendship 
with  Alfie  White,  and  the  fact  that  his  Army  department  and 
Fianna's  G.  H.  Q.  shared  the  same  office47.  He  had  been  their  guest 
at  the  1922  Easter  Week  Commemoration  concert  and  delivered  the 
oration  at  their  Bodenstown  Commemoration  in  June48.  The  pro- 
gramme  of  action  for  the  Republican  movement  that  he  compiled  in 
August  included  a  section  on  youth  that  at  once  affirmed  the  cru- 
cial  validity  of  Fianna's  role  and  the  primacy  of  the  educational 
element  within  it.  His  cryptic  prison  notes  echoed  the  hopes  of 
Fianna's  own  leaders  - 
We  must  concentrate  on  youth  -  salvation  of  country 
lies  in  this  -  both  boys  and  girls.  Fianna  never  got 
proper  help  or  encouragement.  Fianna  ideal  can  save 
future.  The  reason  for  so  many  young  soldiers  going 
wrong  is  that  they  never  had  a  proper  grasp  of  funda- 
mentals.  They  were  absorbed  into  movement  and  fight 
-  not  educated  into  it.  Hence  no  real  convictions 
49 
It  is  thus  clear  that  in  the  summer  of  1922  Fianna's  leader- 
ship,  and  at  least  one  enlightened  leader  in  the  senior  movement, 
already  grasped  the  priorities  for  the  organisation  now  that  the 
Republic  seemed  to  be  slipping  from  their  grasp.  Their  long-term 
aims  would  be  taken  up  again  two  years  later,  at  Fianna's  first 
Ard  Fheis  after  the  final  defeat  of  the  Republic.  But  meantime 
they  were  forced  to  shelve  them  in  favour  of  the  immediate  mili- 
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announced  on  25  June,  in  the  first  issue  of  a  Fianna  newspaper 
launched  explicitly  to  promote  their  new  aims50.  But  even  before 
this  date  the  Collins-de  Valera  'pact'  had  been  broken  and  the 
Free  State  Constitution  published,  irrevocably  splitting  the  I.  R.  A.; 
Sir  Henry  Wilson  had  been  assassinated  and  the  Provisional  govern- 
ment  were  already  under  pressure  from  Westminster  to  attack  the 
Four  Courts.  On  28th  of  the  month  they  did  so. 
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For  three  days  their  forces  bombarded  the  Republican  Head- 
quarters,  using  heavy  artillery  lent  by  the  British52  and  under 
the  command  of  Brigadier  Padraig  0  Dalaigh,  the  same  Paddy  Daly 
who  as  a  Fianna  officer  had  led  the  attack  on  the  Magazine  Fort  in 
Easter  Week.  By  the  morning  of  Friday  30  June  the  building  was 
in  flames  and  the  garrison,  unable  to  break  out  through  the  barri- 
caded  gates,  were  driven  into  the  cellars.  After  an  explosion  in 
the  chemical  store  had  killed  some  thirty  Free  State  troops  attemp- 
ting  an  entry,  the  Cumann  na  mBan  nurses  were  sent  out,  and  in  the 
early  afternoon  the  rest  of  the  garrison  surrendered  on  the  advice 
of  Brigade  Commandant  Oscar  Traynor53.  Two  men  had  been  fatally 
wounded  in  the  siege;  one  of  them,  Tom  Wall,  was  a  lieutenant  in 
Na  Fianna54.  After  the  surrender  Free  State  forces  found  a  fur- 
ther  thirty-three  people  in  the  building.  According  to  Rory 
O'Connor's  contemporary  account  they  were  orderlies  who  had  been 
herded  into  one  room  for  their  own  safety55.  They  were  Fianna 
youths,  none  of  them  more  than  eighteen  years  old56. 
On  the  first  day  of  the  Four  Courts  attack  Traynor  had  set 
up  his  Brigade  headquarters  in  Barry's  Hotel  while  his  units  occu- 
pied  hotels  and  other  buildings  in  Parnell  Square  and  the  O'Connell 
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by  nurses  of  the  Cumann  na  mBan  who  set  up  a  field  hospital  in  the 
basement.  Countess  Markievicz  was  among  them,  having  left  her 
digs  on  hearing  the  first  shells  fired,  and  her  marksmanship  was 
welcome  in  defence  of  the  position58,  On  Thursday  the  Gresham 
was  occupied  by  a  force  under  the  command  of  Garry  Holohan,  who 
also  attempted  to  capture  Free  State-held  posts  at  the  upper  end  of 
59 
O'Connell  Street,  The  same  day  the  Hammam  was  seized  by  Citizen 
Army  men  and  made  the  operation  headquarters.  During  the  ex- 
changes  of  fire  in  the  area  fian  Willie  Clarke  was  shot  dead  in 
Hill  Street60. 
After"a  brief  lull  in  the  firing  following  the  fall  of  the 
Four  Courts  the  exchanges  began  again  on  Saturday  afternoon,  and 
by  Sunday  afternoon  most  anti-Treaty  positions  were  under  fire. 
The  Cumann  na  mBan  evacuated  Moran's,  retreating  to  the  Gresham 
and  later  to  the  Hammamsl.  The  Hammam  itself  was  under  sustained 
attack  and  at  7.30  p.  m.  Traynor  ordered  part  of  the  garrison  to 
surrender62.  Among  those  in  the  building  were  Joe  Reynolds, 
Garry  Holohan,  the  Countess,  and  Barney.  Mellows  who  had  been  placed 
in  charge  of  supplies  for  the  Republican  forces  in  the  area63. 
The  last  three  were  among  the  party  who  stayed  on. 
Government  forces  resumed  their  attack  on  the  remaining  posts 
before  first  light  on  Monday  (3  July)  and  by  noon  the  whole  west 
side  of  O'Connell  Street  as  well  as  several  streets  on  the  east 
side  were  in  their  hands64.  Traynor's  plan  was  to  evacuate  the 
Hammam  by  stages.  Barney  Mellows  organised  the  first  group  to 
leave,  shepherding  them  to  St.  Thomas's  Church  whence  they  escaped 
under  cover  across  Marlborough*Street.  The  Countess  was 
apparently  with  them.  In  a  separate  sortie  Traynor,  de  Valera 
and  Stack  escaped  unchallenged  via  Poole's  Lodging  House.  By 
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Tuesday  much  of  the  east  side  of  O'Connell  Street  had  been  reduced 
to  rubble  and  only  the  Hammam  remained  in  Republican  hands.  The 
surrounding  area  was  cleared  of  civilians  and  Brugha  was  ordered 
to  surrender  with  the  seventeen  men  and  three  nurses  who  remained. 
The  final  assault  began  early  the.  next  morning.  Sometime  in  the 
afternoon  Brugha  sent  Garry  Holohan  with  six  men  to  secure  the 
Gresham.  They  found  the  building  burning  beyond  saving  and 
attempted  to  evacuate.  Trapped  by  the  flames,  they  were  forced 
to  climb  out  by  the  fire  escape  and  surrender66.  They  were  brought 
to  Amiens  Street  Station,  where  they  were  later  joined  by  the  rest 
of  the  Hammam  garrison  who  had  at  last  been  persuaded  to  surrender, 
leaving  Brugha  alone  in  the  burning  building. 
Sometime  later  in  the  week  the  Countess,  who  had  been  in 
hiding  at  a  friend's  house,  moved  to  Whelan's  Hotel  from  where  she 
sent  a  party  of  nurses  to  join  the  Republican  forces  in  the  West 
of  Ireland67.  From  now  the  war  would  be  fought  in  the  country, 
for  with  the  fall  of  the  Hammam  the  battle  for  Dublin  was  over. 
The  anti-Treaty  forces  had  lost  part  of  their  National  Execu- 
tive  and  a  number  of  rural  Battalion  officers  in  the  Four  Courts 
surrender,  as  well  as  other  local  captains  who  had  been  unable  to 
return  to  their  areas  from  the  convention  in  Dublin.  Thus  handi- 
capped  they  lost  the.  initiative  in  the  country  from  the  outset  and 
were  never  able  to  regain  it.  Lacking  the  resources  of  the 
enemy,  their  own  policy  of  autonomous  local  commands  denied  them 
any  concentration  or  mobility  of  those  resources  they  had.  Lack- 
ing  any  strategy  beyond  that  of  holding  the  'Munster  Republic', 
they  were  forced  to  wage  a  defensive  war68.  And  lacking  the 
pragmatism  of  the  Free  State  Army  they  were  bound  by  the  moral 
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a  war-weary  people  to  fight  for  that  vision69. 
As  early  as  mid-July  many  country  units  had  been  ordered  to 
adopt  guerilla  tactics,  and  de  Valera  already  favoured  a  cease- 
fire70.  By  11  August  every  major  town  between  Waterford  and 
Limerick,  including  the  city  of  Cork,  had  fallen  to  the  government. 
The  role  of  the  I.  R.  A.  and  Fianna  changed  from  defence  to  harrass- 
ment. 
On  12  August  all  barracks  in  and  around  Cork  were  burned  down 
as  Republican  forces  evacuated  the  town.  Fiannai  fired  the 
Empress  Place  Barracks  with  whiskey  and  petrol,  and  assisted  the 
I.  R.  A.  in  destroying  the  Victoria  military  barracks  as  well  as  all 
police  barracks  and  the  premises  at  Fermoy,  Kinsale,  Charles  Fort 
and  Ballincollig71.  Two  days  later,  after  the  barracks  at  Dundalk 
were  retaken.  with  the  capture  of  the  large  Free  State  garrison 
occupying  it,  fiannai  were  detailed  to  guard  the  building  and 
prisoners72.  By  now,  however,  such  a  success  was  rare.  "By  mid- 
August  the  feeling  ...  that  the  war  was  over  was  general  and  wel- 
come.  The  Press  prophesied  complete  victory  within  a  few  days"73 
But  the  government's  emergency  measures  introduced  in  September 
dispelled  any  chance  of  surrender  and  forged  in  Republicans  a 
resolve  to  refuse  amnesty  and  carry  on.  the  war  "either  to  victory 
?4 
or  utter  defeat  and  extermination". 
Fiannai  were  among  the  victims  of  the  government  drive  to 
crush  resistance  during  the  autumn.  As  early  as  August  the 
Republican  press  reported  a  "systematic  vendetta"  against  the 
organisation  in  the  capital.  It  claimed  that  in  one  incident 
nineteen  boys  were  taken  as  prisoners  to  Wellington  Barracks 
after  their  drill  hut  had  been  surrounded  and  fired  on  by  eighty 
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Later  that  month  Sean  Cole  and  Alfred  Colley  were  seized  by 
government  troops  at  Newcomen  Bridge,  brought  to  Yellow  Road  and 
there  shot76.  They  were  two  of  the  most  senior  officers  in 
Fianna's  Dublin  Brigade,  nineteen  year  old  Cole  being  Commandant  of 
the  Second  Battalion,  and  Colley,  two  years  his  senior,  Commandant 
of  the  First  Battalion  and  Vice  Brigadier77.  It  appears  likely, 
as  both  Republicans  and  British  intelligence  believed78,  that  their 
murders  were  a  reprisal  for  the  shooting  of  Michael  Collins. 
Colley  was  afterwards  buried  privately  with  a  small  Fianna  guard  of 
honour;  Cole  was  given  a  military  funeral  with  Fianna  firing  party 
and  an  oration  delivered  by  Countess  Markievicz79, 
On  27  September  the  government  passed  new  legislation  giving 
its  forces  emergency  powers  and  licence,  including  the  use  of  sec- 
ret  military-  courts,  and  Cosgrave  warned  that  rebels  would  not  be 
treated  as  prisoners  of  war.  Within  a  day  seventeen  year  old 
Bertie  Murphy,  captain  of  the  local  Fianna  company,  was  murdered 
on  the  steps  of  the  Great  Southern  Hotel  in  Castleisland  as  a 
reprisal  for  an  ambush  on  a  Free  State  patrol80. 
On  the  morning  of  7  October  two  youths  were  found  on  the  out- 
skirts  of  Dublin  riddled  with  bullets81.  A  third  was  found 
severely  wounded  close  by,  having  apparently  crawled  away  and 
fallen  into  a  quarry  in  the  darkness.  He  died  later  that  day. 
The  boys  were  identified  as  Eamon  Hughes,  Brendan  Holohan  and  Joseph 
Rogers  of  Fianna's  Dublin  Brigade82. 
17  November  saw  the  first  executions  under  the  new  emergency 
powers.  One  of  the  four  young  men  sentenced  was  a  serving  member 
of  Fianna83.  Coinciding  with  the  opening  of  the  military  trial 
of  Erskine  Childers  on  a  similar  charge,  the  executions  were  in- 
tended  to  create  a  precedent  for  his  own  death  sentence84. 196 
Fianna's  national  leadership  were  among  the  government's  tar- 
gets  in  the  autumn.  The  Countess  only  avoided  arrest  by  going  on 
the  run,  using  a  succession  of  safe  houses  in  DublinSS.  (She 
remained  in  hiding  until  the  new  year  when  she  crossed  to  Scotland 
for  a  propaganda  tour  that  kept  her  in  Britain  until  the  end  of  the 
war86.  )  Before  the  end  of  September  the  entire  G.  H.  Q.  Staff  apart 
from  Mellows  and  Frank  McMahon  had  been  arrested87.  Without  them 
all  pretence  of  a  national  organisation  was  abandoned;  and  without 
central  support,  the  local  structures  collapsed  one  by  one. 
In  Dublin,  where  it  was  claimed  that  over  400  officers  and  boys 
had  taken  part  in  the  fighting88,  the  Brigade  structure  disinte- 
grated  almost  as  soon  as  the  firing  ceased,  and  the  remnant  of  mem- 
89 
bers  were  formed  into  semi-autonomous  Active  Service  Units.  By 
the  end  of  August  only  about  thirty  members  remained  in  four  units, 
with  former  First  Battalion  o/c  Tony  Black  now  acting  Commandant  of 
the  city90.  With  Black's  arrest,  the  disbanding  of  one  unit  and 
the  mass  arrest  of  two  others  in  October,  there  now  remained  a 
single  squad  of  eight  members  under  Frank.  Sherwin.  On  8  November 
this  last  remnant  disbanded  after  the  arrest  of  two  of  its  number 
at  Doody's  Dairy  following  an  I.  R.  A.  -Fianna  attack  on  Wellington 
Barracks91.  A  temporary  A.  S.  U.  was  then  formed  of  younger  boys 
attached  to  the  Army's  5th  (Engineer)  Battalion,  and  several  seniors 
joined  the  I.  R.  A.  as  individuals.  But  as  an  organisation  the 
Dublin  Fianna  appears  to  have  ceased  to  function  before  the  end  of 
the  year 
92 
Despite  a  paucity  of  documentary  evidence  for  the  guerilla  war 
in  the  country,  due  to  the  erratic  state  of  Army  communications 
with  Headquarters 
93 
and  the  destruction  of  almost  all  local 
records  at  the  surrender94,  it  is  possible  to  assess  the  position 
of  Fianna  with  some  confidence.  It  seems  certain  that  in  most 197 
areas  companies  were  no  longer  strong  enough  to  operate  alone. 
With  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Fianna  had  revoked  its  1922  Ard  Fheis 
decision  to  disassociate  from  the  I.  R.  A.,  and  had  returned  to  the 
former  procedure  of  dual  membership95.  In.  some  areas,  therefore, 
the  few  remaining  Fianna  activists  must  have  joined  the  I.  R.  A.  's 
flying  columns96. 
Cork  was  one  area  in  which  Fianna  survived  as  a  separate 
organisation,  though  even  here  every  company  disbanded  after  the 
evacuation  of  the  city  and  remained  in  abeyance  for  several 
months97.  As  in  all  Battalion  areas,  the  members  were  known  by 
the  enemy,  -many  of  whose  officers  were  former  comrades.  Some 
dozen  were  arrested  and  interned  in  the  city  jail,  and  the  rest 
were  forced  to  go  to  ground.  It  was  late  autumn  before  they  were 
able  to  re-establish  skeleton  companies  in  the  Blackpool,  Firhill 
and  Blarney  Street  districts,  which  were  eventually  combined  into 
a  single  Active  Service  Unit  of  sixty  youths.  '  With  the  local 
I.  R.  A.  virtually  wiped  out  this  unit  became  the  main  focus  of 
Republican  resistance  though-confined  to  hit-and-run  actions. 
Hiding  out  in  the  country  through  the  winter,  where  with-some  Army 
assistance  it  organised  the  armed  attacks  on  Blarney,  Bantry  and 
Dunmore,  its  members  returned  to  the  city  in  the  spring. 
Unlike  the  War  for  Independence  the  Civil  War  was  not  the 
struggle  of  a  people  against  an  alien  enemy,  but  of  a  people 
divided  against  itself.  In  many  areas  Republicans  found  them- 
selves  a  besieged  minority,  and  even  in  the  anti-Treaty  strongholds, 
as  the  civilian  population  became  alienated  by  the  need  of  the 
98 
I.  R.  A.  to  live  off  the  people,  their  active  support  dissolved 
This  affected  Fianna  in  several  ways.  Recruiting  could  nowhere  be 
undertaken  easily  or  openly,  and  in  an  increasingly  hostile  popula- 198 
tion  the  flow  of  new  young  members  dried  up.  Parades  and  training 
became  an  impossibility  and,  in  what  was  now  turning  into  a  war  of 
localised  mass  vengeance,  there  was  no  longer  a  place  for  the  work 
of  communication  between  army  and  people  that  the  youth  organisa- 
tion  had  carried  out  with  such  effect  between  1919-21.  These 
roles  that  it  was  forced  to  abandon  were  the  very  ones  that  had 
previously  bound  it  to  the  local  population  and  ensured  its  own  sur- 
vival  and  growth.  But  without  them  there  no  longer  remained  the 
membership,  opportunity  or  call  for  sluaite  as  such.  These  fell 
into  abeyance;  only  the  directly  military  role  remained,  and  the 
organisation,  where  it  survived,  contracted  into  tiny  and  tenuous 
groups  on  active  service,  isolated  from  one  another  and  largely 
isolated  from  the  people99. 
These  remnant  units  were  made  up  mainly  but  not  entirely  of 
seniors.  Even  in  the  first  week  of  the  war  the  anti-Treaty  leader- 
ship  had  been  accused  of  using  mere  boys  in  defence  of  the  Four 
Courts100.  Later,  as  Republican  resistance  crumbled,  the  growing 
numerical  disadvantage  under  which  their  remaining  forces  fought 
may  well  have  forced  them  to  draft  juniors  into  the  fighting  units, 
just  as  it  increased  the  part  played  by  women101  and  even,  it  was 
102 
asserted,  by  young  girls  Certainly,  boys  as  young  as  fourteen 
were  among  those  interned  in  later  months103, 
Hundreds  of  the  10,000  Republicans  held  in  Irish  jails  and 
camps  in  spring  1923  were  in  fact  fiannai.  There  were  huts  in  some 
camps  occupied  entirely  by  scouts:  Tintown  3  in  the  Curragh,  for 
instance,  held  some  thirty  members  including  Headquarters  Staff 
officer  Alfie  White  who  acted  as  hut  o/c104" 
As  the  evenings  lengthened,  with  no  chance  of  victory  or  quar- 
ter  for  negotiation,  the  inevitability  of  surrender  became  apparent. 199 
Advised  that  their  units  could  not  survive  the  summer,  the  Army 
Executive  were  already  considering  peace  moves  when  the  death  of 
Liam  Lynch  on  10  April  virtually  decided  the  matter.  After  their 
first  ceasefire  orders  and  peace  proposals  had  been  ignored  by  the 
government  forces  a  decision  to  dump  arms  was  taken  on  14  May. 
Chief-of-Staff  Frank  Aiken's  order  to  this  effect  issued  ten  days 
later  marked  the  end  of  the  war105 
In  a  letter  written  to  O'Malley  in  Mountjoy  a  month  after  the 
ceasefire  attempting  to  account  for  the  defeat,  Aiken  presented  an 
analysis  of  the  Republican  movement  covering  both  its  military  and 
its  civilian  support  organisations  ("non-fighting  men").  It  was 
in  the  latter,  rather  than  in  military  inferiority,  that  he  be- 
lieved  the  war  had  been  lost: 
I  am  continually  impressing  on  our  divisions  the  fact  that 
the  lack  of  civilian  organisations  to  back  us  was  chiefly 
responsible  for  our  present  position  and  that  it  is  their 
duty  to  see  that  our  civilian  supporters  are  organized,  106 
also  that  the  Fianna  are  re-organized  and  trained  at  once 
His  reference  to  Fianna  as  a  part  of*the  movement's  civil  and  not 
its  military  organisation  was  significant.  He  clearly  envisaged 
its  prime  role  to  be  that  of  providing  recruits  and  support  but  not 
of  direct  involvement  in  war.  In  this  he  complemented  the  role 
concept  of  Fianna's  own  leaders  and  Liam  Mellows  in  1922  -  the  edu- 
tion  of  young  people  into  Republicanism.  In  both  cases  its  role 
would  be  preparatory  not  participatory;  building  a  base  for  the 
movement  through  the  recruitment  and  education  of  the  coming  genera- 
tion  towards  the  eventual  reconquest  of  the  defeated  Republic. 
In  fact,  the  years  of  war  were  over,  and  with  them  Fianna's 
role  and  standing  as  an  army.  As  would  later  become  clear  in 
retrospect,  Fianna  abandoned  the  role  of  direct  military  participa- 
tion  at  the  ceasefire  of  1923,  and  only  rarely  and  in  exceptional 200 
circumstances  would  it  ever  again  adopt  it.  Recruitment,  prepara- 
tion  and  education  would  be  its  normal  role  from  this  date,  as  it 
entered  the  second,  post-Civil  War  era  of  its  history. 201 
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Chapter  7.  INTO  THE  SECOND  ERA  (1923-1940) 
RECONSTRUCTION 
When  the  anti-Treaty  forces  laid  down  arms  their  position  was 
one  of  military  defeat  without  surrender.  While  recognising  that 
"military  victory-must  be  allowed  to  rest  for  the  moment  with  those 
who  had  destroyed  the  Republic"1,  they  rejected  the  truce  terms  of 
a  government  whose  legitimacy  they  denied.  And  for  this  they  were 
considered  "disaffected  revolutionaries",  and  treated  as  such: 
"The  government  were  strong,  they  were  victorious  and  they  called 
the  truce,  secure  in  the  knowledge  that  they  had  made  an  offer  to 
their  opponents  which  had  been  rejected"2  The  "ferreting  out"  of 
3 
Republicans  began. 
A  Public  Safety  Act.  passed  in  June  1923,  allowing  arrest 
without  trial,  swelled  the  number  already  imprisoned  to  16,000 
about  half  of  whom  were  now  on  hunger  strikes.  For  those  not  in 
prison,  the  movement  seemed  on  the  point  of  disintegration,  scat- 
tered,  vilified  in  press  and  from  pulpit  and  having  lost  nearly  all 
of  its  party  branches6.  But  preparation  for  the  August  elections 
and  their  surprisingly  respectable  outcome,  the  campaign  for  the 
release  of  prisoners  and  the  very  repression  itself,  strengthened  it 
and  kept  it  intact.  The  I.  R.  A.  was  able  to  heal  its  divisions,  re- 
group  and  re-organise  before  the  mass  release  of  members  in  the  sum- 
mer  of  19247,  while  the  continued  recovery  of  the  movement  in  the 
second  half  of  that  year  was  reflected  in  the  foundation  of  over 
700  Sinn  Fein  cumainn8. 
Within  months  of  the  ceasefire  the  first  steps  were  taken  to- 
wards  rebuilding  Na  Fianna.  Since  the  new  year  there  had  been  no 
national  structure  or  headquarters  staff,  no  communication,  and 209 
virtually  no  units,  and  the  task  was  now  indeed  as  the  Countess  des- 
cribed  it,  "to  start  again  from  the  very  beginning  with  nothing"9. 
As  early  as  July  1923  the  I.  R.  A.  Executive  discussed  the  position 
of  the  Scouts  and  agreed  to  donate  £200  towards  their  re- 
organisation 
10. 
With  the  help  of  Army  men  selected  for  their  pre- 
vious  membership  experience  in  Fianna,  sluaite  were  established  on 
the  North  and  South  sides  of  Dublin  and  in  Cork  before  the  end  of 
the  year 
11 
In  December  several  thousand  prisoners  were  released,  among 
and  the  Coun-  them  Barney  Mellows,  Garry  Holohan,  Liam  Langley12 
tess13,  and  by  the  early  spring  of  1924  Fianna  was  able  to  hold  its 
first  Convention  for  two  years,  Madame  presiding.  Called  hurriedly 
"for  the  purpose  of  getting  the  machinery  working",  the  meeting's 
main  open  business  was  a  formal  ratification  of  the  1922  Constitu- 
tion  and  the  election  of  a  caretaker  Executive,  pending  a  full  Ard 
Fheis.  For  security  reasons  the  election  was  conducted  by  secret 
ballot,  and  the  names  of  the  successful  candidates  were  not  pub- 
lishedl4. 
Two  Convention  resolutions,  though  omitted  from  press  reports, 
were  of  crucial  importance  in  that  they  effectively  dissolved  the 
amalgamation  of  Fianna  and  the  I.  R.  A.  that  had  obtained  with  one 
brief  interruption  since  1921.  The  first  instructed  that  "in 
time  of  peace  the  Fianna  was  to  carry  on  as  a  separate  organisation, 
distinct  from  the  Army  organisation,  having  its  own  Executive, 
G.  H.  Q.,  Divisions,  Brigades,  etc.  In  time  of  war  it  was  to  support 
the  Army  as  far  as  in  its  power,  both  morally  and  physically". 
The  second  directed  that  "the  Fianna  control  all  arms  which  are 
15 
proved  to  be  their  property"  . 
In  his  report  the  Adjutant  General  noted  that  from  the  begin- 
ning  of  the  War  for  Independence  pressing  military  demands  had 210 
forced  the  organisation  to  neglect  its  educational  role,  the  im- 
portance  of  which  "was  never  realised  until  the  Civil  War  broke 
out".  Desertions  to  the  Treaty  side  at  that  time  were  mainly 
attributable  to  members'  lack  of  a  sound  national  grounding,  he 
claimed,  assuring  delegates  that  education  would  receive  "special 
attention  in  the  future". 
Thus  the  major  themes  of  the  Convention  were  building  and 
organisation,  relationship  with  the  adult  movement,  and  role  defini- 
tion.  They  would.  remain  the  major  themes  throughout  Fianna's  sub- 
sequent  history.  In  the  meantime  they  represented  urgent  questions 
to  be  tackled  in  the  first  years  of  the  Free  State. 
Building  and  organisation  were  directed  initially  by  the  care- 
taker  Executive,  and  from  the  New  Year  of  1925  by  a  G.  H.  Q.  staff 
comprising  the  following  members: 
Adjutant  General 
Assistant  Adjutant  General 
Director  of  Training  and 
Organisation 
Assistant  Director  of 
Training  and  Organisation 
Quartermaster  General 
Assistant  Quartermaster  General 
-  Barney  Mellows; 
-  Alfie  White; 
-  Liam  Langley; 
-  Frank  Sherwin; 
-  Joe  Reynolds; 
-  Sean  Harlingl6. 
The  Countess  remained  Honorary  President.  During  the  year  Barney 
17 
Mellows  was  elected  Chief-of-Staff,  Joe  Reynolds  added  the  duties 
of  national  Secretary  to  those  of  Quartermaster 
18, 
and  the  Head- 
quarters  staff  was  depleted  by  the  courtmartial  of  Sean  Harling19. 
The  main  obstacle  to  rebuilding  was  a  severe  lack  of  resources. 
Fianna  was  bankrupt20  and  the  I.  R.  A.  themselves  were  in  no  position 
to  help21.  The  Army  could  not  even  honour  their  undertaking  to 
finance  the  printing  of  the  new  Fianna  Handbook,  for  which  Joe 
Reynolds,  who  was  employed  by  the  printers,  was  threatened  with  a 
deduction  from  his  wages22.  The  incident  illustrates  the  poverty 
to  which  Fianna  and  the  movement  were  reduced  at  this  time. 211 
The  organisation  also  often  found  it  impossible  to  acquire 
premises.  For  the  purposes  of  correspondence  the  national  address 
was  given  as  Frankfort  House  in  Dartry  Park,  which  was  in  fact  the 
home  of  the  Coghlan  family  where  the  Countess  had  lodged  since 
192123.  The  G.  H.  Q.  staff  either  met  there  or  at  Alfie  White's 
house24.  Sluaite  found  most  owners  unwilling  to  rent  them  halls 
because  of  the  political  situation.  Of  the  three  branches  opera- 
ting  on  the  south  side  of  Dublin  in  the  summer  of  1925,  for  in- 
stance,  only  one  could  find  premises;  the  others  were  forced  to 
postpone  parades  until  a  hall  was  acquired  in  High  Street  in  the 
autumn25.  "  Under  such  circumstances  it  was  difficult  to  sustain 
interest  and  establish  permanent  sluaite. 
During  the  summer  G.  H.  Q.  arranged  a  meeting  of  invited  Repub- 
licans  to  discuss  possible  re-organisation26.  De  Valera  was  among 
those  who  attended.  The  consensus  view  was  that  Fianna  should 
revert  to  being  a  boys'  scouting  movement.  The  age  range  was  fixed 
at  ten  to  eighteen  years.  An  adult  Re-organisation  Committee  was 
elected  to  co-ordinate  development27.  As  a  first  step  towards 
abandoning  the  military  structure  that  had  operated  from  1915,  it 
was  agreed  that  branches  should  be  organised  by  the  boys  themselves 
under  local  adult  committees  approved  by  G.  H.  Q.  Lastly,  it  was 
decided  to  revert  to  a  solely  educational  role,  training  boys  in 
ideals  "clean  and  manly  and  Gaelic"  through  scouting  and  other 
activities  closely  similar  to  those  originally  envisaged  for  Fianna 
by  its  founders 
28 
Press  statements  shortly  after  the  meeting  emphasised  the  radi- 
cal  change  from  military  to  social-educational  role,  and  made 
specific  reference  to  the  Baden-Powell  ethic:  Fianna  was  now  organ- 
ised,  they  claimed,  "on  an  entirely  new  basis,  making  it  a  complete 212 
scouting  and  educational  organisation,  similar  to  the  Boy  Scout 
organisations  throughout  the  world,  teaching  and  training  the  boys 
to  be  good  citizens  and  good  Irishmen".  Military  training  would 
be  minimised,  P.  T.  and  squad  drill  retained  "solely  for  disciplinary 
purposes",  and  weaponry  excluded  as  "harmful  to  the  youthful  mind" 
and  liable  "especially  at  that  impressionable  age  ...  to  awaken 
an  interest  in  methods  of  taking  life"29 
In  line  with  these  changes  the  organisation  announced  a  return 
to  a  system  of  sluaite  and  comhairli  ceanntair30,  and  abolished 
military  ranks  for  leaders:  'o/c'  was  replaced  by  'scoutmaster', 
'adjutant"became  'secretary',  and  'quartermaster'  'treasurer';  the 
31 
office  of  Chief-of-Staff  was  discontinued. 
It  might  be  supposed  that  the  press  announcements,  published 
as  they  were.  within  months  of  the  passing  of  the  Treason  Bill 
32 
were  made  more  with  an  eye  to  the  Government  in  power  than  with 
serious  intent  for  change.  But  this  was  not  the  case.  G.  H.  Q.  had 
already  issued  orders  for  all  arms  to  be  dumped33,  and  their  deter- 
mination  to  demilitarise  Na  Fianna  was  shared  by  the  Sinn  Fein  and 
Army  leadership  and  in  particular  by  de  Valera.  A  meeting  was  held 
in  the  autumn  to  discuss  the  subject,  attended  by  most  of  Fianna's 
Headquarters  staff,  the  I.  R.  A.  Chief-of-Staff  Frank  Aiken,  'Minister 
of  Defence'  Sean  Lemass,  and  de  Valera  himself34.  The  Fianna 
representatives  readily  agreed  to  de  Valera's  demand  that  the  organi- 
sation  be  restricted  to  a  civilian,  scouting  role.  It  seems 
likely  that  Countess  Markievicz  especially  now  saw  Fianna's  role,  at 
this  time  of  her  life  and  Ireland's  history,  as  being  to  foster  the 
national  ideal  and  citizenship  among  the  children  of  the  poor35. 
During  the  autumn  G.  H.  Q.  also  took  the  decision  to  dissociate 
Fianna  from  all  political  parties,  thus  complementing  with  political 213 
independence  the  military  autonomy  declared  the  previous  year 
36. 
The  decision  was  made  at  a  time  of  strain  between  the  military  and 
political  wings  in  the  senior  movement.  It  corresponded  in  fact 
to  a  similar  decision  taken  at  the  I.  R.  A.  's  November  Convention, 
where  delegates  -  fearing  the  imminent  capitulation  of  Sinn  Fein  on 
the  principle  of  the  Oath  -  voted  that  the  Army  should  dissociate 
from-the  party  and  operate  under  its  own  Executive.  The  effects 
37 
of  the  latter  decision,  in  the  event,  would  be  to  separate  the 
I.  R.  A.  from  Sinn  Fein  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  and  to  make  it, 
constitutionally  and  in  reality,  a  'non-political'  organisation 
38 
far  reaching  consequences  for  a  body  whose  very  raison  d'etre  was 
to  change  the  political  status  of  Ireland.  And  in  the  same  way  the 
G.  H.  Q.  decision  made  Na  Fianna  a  non-political  organisation,  a  role 
it  would  retain  until  the  late  1960s,  turning  its  back  on  political 
activities  and  the  consideration  of  political.  solutions. 
Despite  its  new  position  as  a  civilian  and  independent  body, 
Fianna  remained  suspect  in  the  eyes  of  the  Cosgrave  government.  In 
December  1925  twelve  Wexford  scouts  were  arrested  and  held  in  Water- 
ford  Jail.  Their  arrest  attracted  widespread  protest;  a  demonstra- 
tion  in  Dublin  was  addressed  by  Maud  Gonne  MacBride  and  Mrs.  Despard, 
and  support  was  expressed  by  the  Transport  Union39.  The  trial  of 
one  of  the  twelve,  Patrick  Connick,  promised  to  be  something  of  a 
test  case,  since  the  crux  of  the  prosecution's  argument  was  to 
establish  that  Fianna  was  a  military  organisation.  Defence  council 
referred  to  the  unhindered  drilling  of  Baden-Powell  Scouts  in 
Ireland,  observing  that  if  Fianna  should  be  outlawed  for  drilling 
then  so  should  they,  and  if  for  its  name  and  uniform  then  so  should 
the  Salvation  Army!  The  case  was  dismissed40, 214 
Poor,  without  premises  and  harrassed  by  the  authorities41,  the 
organisation  laboured  to  re-establish  itself  during  the  first  years 
of  the  Free  State.  Progress  was  made;  delegates  attending  the  Ard 
Fheis  on  Easter  Sunday  1926  reported  branches  in  Belfast,  Waterford, 
Wexford,  Tralee,  Cork  and  Droheda  in  addition  to  Dublin42,  and  by 
the  end  of  the  summer  scouts  were  drilling  in-twenty-six  counties 
43. 
At  this  time,  however,  the  Dublin  sluaite  were  shocked  by  fur- 
ther  incidents  involving  Seän  Harling44.  Following  his  court- 
martial,  he  had  by  now  so  far  re-established  himself  within  Fianna 
as  to  have  been  appointed  o/c  of  the  Dublin  Command  Staff.  The 
appointment  prompted  Frank  Sherwin  -  who  as  Fianna's  unofficial 
Director  of  Intelligence  had  made  the  original  enquiries  that  led 
to  Harling's  courtmartial  -  to  restate  to  Countess  Markievicz  his 
conviction  that  Harling  was  a  spy.  Madame,  who  had  a  particular 
liking  for  Harling45,  apparently  threatened  to  expel  Sherwin  from 
Fianna,  whereupon  he  resigned,  taking  with  him  (in  his  own  words) 
"practically  all"  the  Dublin  Brigade  staff.  Eighteen  months  later 
the  I.  R.  A.,  satisfied  that  Harling  was  indeed  a  tout  for  the  Free 
State  police,  tried  unsuccessfully  to  assassinate  him,  losing  one 
of  their  own  gunmen  in  the  attempt.  The  government's  Tribunal  of 
Enquiry  into  the  shooting  subsequently  confirmed  the  Army's  and 
Sherwin's  suspicions 
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In  April  1926  de  Valera  launched  the  Fianna  Flail  party,  taking 
with  him  into  it  many  leading  Republicans.  His  relationship  with 
the  remnant  of  the  movement  remained  for  a  while  ambivalent  :  if 
some  factions  in  Sinn  Fein  considered  his  new  party  a  betrayal, 
faith  in  him  as  "the  sole  surviving  commandant"  of  Easter  Week  died 
hard,  and  -  at  least  while  in  opposition  in  the  D6i1  -  he  was  given 
by  the  I.  R.  A.,  and  gave  to  it,  a  qualified  support47.  And  since 215 
Fianna  Eireann  had  already  declared  itself  independent  of  all  par- 
ties  and  of  the  Army,  it  could  justifiably  give  a  general  support 
to  any  Republicans,  including  Fianna  Fail,  and  in  turn  could 
reasonably  look  to  help  from  them.  De  Valera.  had  given  the  Fianna 
leadership  a  verbal  promise  of  financial 
Sinn  F4in48,  and  they  now  approached  his 
national  Secretary  addressed  the  party's 
requesting  help  in  the  form  of  funds  and 
aid  before  the  split  with 
new  party.  Fianna's 
first  Ard  Fheis  in  November, 
through  party  cumainn  set- 
ting  up  local  sluaite49.  The  request  was  given  further  point  in 
June  of  the  following  year  when  Fianna's  President  took  her  seat 
for  the  party  in  the  Dail50.  The  Treasurer's  report  to  the  Fianna 
Ard  Fheis  in  September  1927  revealed  that  financial  aid  had  been 
received  from  both  the  Fianna  Fail  and  Sinn  Fein  parties,  as  well 
as  from  individual  wellwishers.  By  this  time,  however,  the 
51 
Countess  was  dead. 
THE  DEATH  OF  COUNTESS  MARKIEVICZ 
She  had  died  on  the  15  July.  Worn  out  and  in  poor  health,  she 
had  continued  to  tax  herself  with  her  commitments  and  in  fact  took 
ill  finally  at  a  Fianna  Executive  meeting  at  the  beginning  of  the 
month.  The  meeting  was  curtailed,  she  was  helped  home,  and  ad- 
mitted  to  hospital  the  next  day52.  After  her  death  her  coffin  was 
borne  from  Sir  Patrick  Duns  to  church  and  thence  to  the  Rotunda  on 
the  shoulders  of  fiannai,  and  there  lay  in  state  with  a  Fianna  guard 
of  honour53.  It  was  said  that  "thousands  and  thousands"  walked  or 
lined  the  route  of  her  funeral  procession,  which  was  led  by  an 
advance  guard  of  Fianna.  At  Glasnevin  six  scouts  marched  ahead  to 
the  graveside54  and  at  the  burial  itself  the  following  morning  a 
Fianna  bugler  sounded  the  Last  Post. 216 
In  the  short  term  her  death  actually  benefited  Fianna  by  draw- 
ing  public  attention  to  the  organisation  through  its  prominent  role 
at  her  lying-in-state  and  funeral55.  The  long  term  loss  would  be 
harder  to  assess.  Her  place  in  the  public  imagination,  in  affec- 
tion  and  esteem,  had  always  out-matched  her  actual  role  in  the 
independence  movement,  in  which  she  had  been  "a  second-in-command, 
an  instrumental  but  not  a  determining  figure"56.  Similarly  in  the 
smaller  world  of  Fianna,  though  in  terms  of  real  power  she  had  been 
little  more  than  a  figurehead  for  a  decade  and  a  half,  her  personal 
authority  among  the  younger  rank-and-file  remained  unrivalled. 
Thus  those.  of  the  author's  interviewees  who  held  leadership  posi- 
tions  at  the  time,  or  who  had  fought  with  Fianna  in  the  two  wars, 
tended  to  minimise  her  loss.  But  those  who  had  been  ordinary 
scouts  were  likely  to  assert  that  her  death  "broke"  the  movement 
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It  was  Madame,  more  than  the  military  command  staff,  whom  they  re- 
called.  In  the  last  years,  approaching  sixty,  she  was  a  mother  to 
them;  they  were  often  at  Frankfort  House,  as  they  had  been  at 
Surrey  House  in  the  old  days;  in  no  way  in  awe  of  her,  they  "loved 
her  because  she  did  mad  things"58.  What  Fr.  Albert  had  written  of 
the  boys  of  the  Rising  perhaps  still  held  good:  "Her  influence  over 
(them)  was-remarkable:  they  had  the  deepest  and  most  beautiful 
reverence  for  her.  There  was  not  one  of  those  -  and  I  have  met 
hundreds  of  them  -  that  would  not  die  for  her"59Above 
all,  her  death  severed  Fianna  from  its  heroic  age.  With 
the  eclipse  of  Hobson  she  had  come  to  be  spoken  of  as  the  founder. 
By  1927  all  the  other  original  members  and  almost  all  subsequent 
leaders  were  gone:  as  in  the  movement  itself  they  were  either  dead 
or  had  fallen  away.  Now  with  her  death,  in  the  year  that  some 
Republicans  entered  the  Dail,  Fianna  seemed  to  be  moving  into  a  new 
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In  the  circumstances  it  was  decided  to  postpone  the  Ard  Fheis 
scheduled  for  the  last  day  of  July 
60 
and  to  appoint  national 
Treasurer  Liam  Langley  to  the  Countess's  post  pending  an  election. 
A  member  of  Fianna  since  1911  and  the  founder  and  first  o/c  of  the 
Tuam  Slua61,  Langley  had  been  on  the  G.  H.  Q.  staff  throughout  the 
62 
Anglo-Irish  War,  holding  the  office  of  Director  of  Organisation. 
With  the  arrest  of  Headquarters  colleagues  he  had  acted  as  tem- 
porary  Director  of  Training  and  even  as  Chief-of-Staff  for  three 
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months  from  December  1920 
When  the  Ard  Fheis  finally  took  place  on  25  September  Langley 
took  the  chair.  He  was  formally  elected  Chief  Scout  by  the  large 
gathering  who  also  re-elected  Joe  Reynolds  to  the  office  of  national 
Secretary 
64. 
FIANNA  IN  THE  NORTH 
The  passing  of  the  Civil  Authorities  (Special  Powers)  Act 
(Northern  Ireland)  in  April  1922  was  of  crucial  importance  to  the 
subsequent  development  of  Fianna  in  the  North.  The  act  gave  the 
Minister  for  Home  Affairs,  or  any  R.  U.  C.  officer  delegated  by  him, 
authority  to  take  "all  such  steps  and  issue  all  such  orders  as  may 
be  necessary  for  preserving  the  peace  and  maintaining  order",  in- 
cluding  search  and  arrest  without  warrant,  closure  of  roads  and 
seizure  of  property.  In  effect,  it  made  illegal  a  number  of 
organisations,  including  the  I.  R.  A.,  Cumann  na  mBan,  the  I.  R.  B.  and 
Na  Fianna.  Passed  initially  as  a  temporary  measure,  the  act  was 
renewed  annually  until  1933  when  new  legislation  gave  it  indefinite 
duration65. 
From  it  as  much  as  from  any  social-political  differences  stem- 
med  the  differences  that  developed  between  Fianna  North  and  South. 
It  directly  determined  the  conditions  of  recruitment  and  membership 218 
in  the  Six  Counties66.  There  recruits  had  to  be  approached  by 
Fianna  (rather  than  vice  versa)  and  required  the  recommendation  of 
two  current  members,  and  the  probationary  period  -  which  in  the 
South  was  a  formality  -  was  used  to  scrutinine  them  for  suitability 
and  in  particular  for  discretion.  For  whereas  it  remained  a  task 
of  members  in  the  Free  State  to  win  recruits  by  displaying  their 
own  membership,  Fianna  became  a  "closed  mouth  organisation"  in  the 
North.  And  while  the  Southern  sluaite  remained  uniformed,  North 
of  the  Border  uniform  was  now  confined  to  a  badge  worn  behind  the 
lapel,  except  at  Republican  demonstrations  where  numbers  afforded 
immunity. 
As  with  joining  so  with  leaving:  a  simple  even  casual  matter 
in  the  South,  to  leave  Fianna  in  Belfast,  particularly,  required 
formal  resignation  in  writing,  since  for  security  reasons  boys 
could  not  be  allowed  merely  to  drift  out  of  the  organisation. 
Illegality  also  posed  problems  in  acquiring  premises,  and 
like  other  sections  of  the  movement  the  scouts  were  obliged  to  hire 
or  borrow  rooms  under  false  pretences.  In  Belfast,  for  instance, 
premises  at  Crown  Entry  off  the  High  Street  were  used  by  the  I.  R.  A. 
in  the  late  1920s  under  the  front  name  of  a  'Hall  Committee',  and 
lent  by  them  to  Fianna;  and  the  small  wooden  hall  in  Ardoyne  owned 
legally  by  Sinn  Fein  was  borrowed-by  the  scouts  as  well  as  the 
Army,  Cumann  na  mBan  and  the  Cailfni.  Fortunately,  the  Falls 
sluaite  still  had  the  use  of  the  old  Willowbank  huts.  The  G.  A.  A. 
and  the  Gaelic  League  were  usually  willing  to  accept  requests  from 
boys'  'football  teams'  or  'Irish  classes'  at  face  value,  and  school 
rooms  might  be  used  if  the  janitor  was  willing  to  risk  lending  the 
keys67.  It  was  normal  practice  to  post  sentries  on  the  door  at 
branch  meetings,  and  frequently  in  addition  to  post  a  look-out  with 219 
flashlight  up  the  road. 
Drilling  took  place  on  open  ground,  often  after  dark,  the  foot- 
ball  fields  behind  Falls  Park  and  the  Claypits  at  Whiterock  being 
favourite  venues  though  often  in  the  eye  of  the  police;  if  necessary 
the  boys  drilled  on  Divis  Mountain.  For  summer  camp  they  usually 
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chose  sites  south  of  the  Border  or  in  County  Down69. 
Despite  all  precautions,  arrests  were  inevitable.  Youths  were 
charged  merely  for  membership  of  Fianna,  and  if  found  guilty  could 
face  jail  with  hard  labour.  Even  boys  as  young  as  twelve  were  con- 
victed  of  'promoting'  the  organisation  by  collecting70. 
Illegality  had  other  less  direct  effects  upon  the  organisation. 
If  a  positive  attraction  for  the  boys  it  was  an  obstacle  for  many 
parents,  despite  the  pride  in  'their'  scouts  that  existed  in  the 
ghettos.  And  since  the  authorities  and  the  Church  could  put 
pressure  on  boys  through  their  parents  many  were  never  informed  of 
their  sons'  membership.  This  in  turn  created  a  problem  of  con- 
science  for  slua  leaders. 
Because  of  the  dangers,  the  illegality  and  the  frequent  decep- 
tion  of  membership  a  threshold  age  of  fourteen  years  was  set  during 
the  1930s  in  the  North.  In  the  South  on  the  other  hand  a  boy 
could  join  at  seven  and  -  if  he  persevered  -  might  remain  fifteen 
years  in  membership.  In  time  in  fact  a  northern  and  a  southern 
membership  type  developed.  The  Free  State  type  was  -  for  the 
majority  -  pre-adolescent,  and  comprised  a  fairly  brief  and  low- 
pressure  training  in  the  Republican  ideal,  with  an  emphasis  on 
scouting,  tests  and  badges;  for  a  core  minority  it  involved  an  ex- 
tended  and  specific  training  aimed  at  producing  officer  material 
for  the  I.  R.  A.  The  Six  Counties  type  was  adolescent,  and  comprised 
specific,  disciplined  and  martial  training  with  the  conscious  pur- 220 
pose  of  transfer  to  the  Army,  which  in  some  ghettos  was  virtually 
automatic.  The  Northern  type,  with  its  demonstrably.  relevant  role 
within  the  movement,  came  to  enjoy  a  correspondingly  greater  status 
and  glamour  in  the  community  than  its  counterpart  in  the  South, 
accounting  in  part  for  the  more  consistent  and  buoyant  state  of 
.  Fianna  in  the  Six  Counties  over  the  years71 
Finally,  the  fact  that  Fianna  was  an  illegal  organisation  made 
for  local  autonomy  in  the  North,  at  slug  and  particularly  at  Com- 
mand  Staff  levels  Dublin  could  not  know  the  local  problems, 
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nor  could  time  be  afforded  to  request  and  communicate  directives. 
Prompt  and  personal  decisions  had  to  be  made  locally  by  slua  and 
Battalion  leaders,  taking  their  orders  in  practice  from  the  I.  R.  A. 
Headquarters  "seemed  a  world  away,  and  left  the  North  to  its  own 
devices".  The  only  points  of  contact  were  the  Bodenstown  commemora- 
tions  and  Ard  Fheiseanna;  and  even  at  the  latter,  because  fear  of 
the  Law  gave  a  pretext  for  anonymity,  it  was  possible  to  maintain  a 
degree  of  secrecy  for  the  purpose  of  "standing  up  to  Dublin". 
In  many  ways,  therefore,  Fianna  began  to  reflect  the  two  states 
in  Ireland  virtually  from  the  time  of  their  foundation.  And  in 
time  it  developed  into  "two  different  organisations",  whose  unity 
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lay  mainly  in  their  shared  political  philosophy  and  their  name. 
EXPANSION  1927-34 
The  Ard  Fheis  of  September  1927  reflected  the  gradual  recovery 
of  the  organisation  after  the  Civil  War.  Recent  expansion  was  in- 
dicated  by  the  attendance  of  delegates  from  "practically  every 
county  of  Ireland"  as  well  as  from  Britain,  and  by  the  composition 
of  the  incoming  Ard  Choiste,  with  members  from  Dublin,  Belfast, 
Wexford,  Waterford,  Clare,  Glasgow  and  Liverpool74.  The  meeting 
was  marked  by  a  spirit  of  optimism  which  in  the  event  would  be 221 
proved  justified:  the  consolidation  of  1927  would  be  sustained  for 
a  further  seven  years. 
The  expansion  of  Fianna  between  1927  and  1934  mirrored  the 
growth  of  the  I.  R.  A.  during  the  same  period.  The  Army  increased 
its  membership  every  year  from  1925  to  193375.  Its  growth  was  in 
part  attributable  to  the  calibre  of  its  leadership76,  and  in  part 
to  a  growing  dissatisfaction  with  the  Cosgrave  regime  and  the  re- 
emergence  of  Republican  sentiment  in  the  Irish  people. 
Although  it  was  becoming  clear  that  charges  made  on  the 
grounds  of  Fianna  being  a  military  organisation  would  not  be  upheld 
in  Free  State  courts77,  the  organisation  continued  to  suffer  police 
harrassment.  National  headquarters  were  raided  and  damaged  in  the 
spring  of  192778.  Nonetheless,  steady  development  over  the  next 
three  years.  found  the  Scouts  by  1930  "in  a  much  healthier  position 
than  for  some  years"  with  sluaite  operating  in  a  number  of  areas, 
including  Limerick,  Cavan,  Kerry,  Sligo,  Roscommon,  Leitrim  and 
London 
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in  addition  to  the  more  permanent  centres.  Several 
branches,  including  those  established.  in  Clonmel  later  in  the  year 
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and  at  Cobh  and  Carrickmoss  in  193181,  were  the  first  in  their  areas 
since  pre-Truce  days.  At  this  time  too  G.  H.  Q.  staff  moved  into  an 
office  in  Hardwicke  Hall,  a  former  Carmelite  convent  that  had  been 
acquired  by  the  Plunkett  family  and  served  for  most  of  the  decade 
as  the  'public'  headquarters  of  Republicanism  in  Dublin82. 
Fianna's  acquisition  of  the  office  followed  the  election  of 
George  Plunkett  as  Chief  Scout,  a  post  he  would  hold  throughout  the 
1930s83.  An  Army  man  with  no  Fianna  background,  his  credentials 
were  otherwise  exactly  suitable.  A  brother  of  Joseph  Mary  Plun- 
kett,  as  a  twenty-one  year  old  student  he  had  been  closely  involved 
in  preparations  for  the  Rising,  training  the  Kimmage  Garrison, 222 
(apparently)  printing  the  'Castle  Document'84,  and  being  present  at 
the  conference  of  the  Military  Council  at  Liberty  Hall  on  Easter 
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Sunday.  He  had  remained  throughout  the  Rising  in  the  G.  P.  O.  and 
taken  part  in  the  final  evacuation  into  Moore  Street  where  he  dis- 
tinguished  himself  in  aiding  a  wounded  British  soldier 
86.. 
Sen- 
tenced  to  death,  his  penalty  was  commuted  to  ten  years87.  This 
would  be  the  first  of  several  terms  of  imprisonment  -  jailed  twice 
during  the  War  for  Independence  and  again  during  the  Civil  War  after 
surrendering  at  the  Four  Courts,  he  was  finally  released  in  192488. 
Some  of  his  letters  from  prison  were  written  in  Irish 
89; 
in 
his  love  of  the  language  he  became  a  member  of  the  Irish  Texts 
Society  and  raised  his  family  in  a  bilingual  household90.  He 
wrote  Irish  poetry,  taught  himself  sculpture  and  the  harp,  and  lec- 
tured  on  antiquities.  He  was  a  man  of  high  moral  ideals  -  it  is 
said  that  on  the  morning  of  the  Rising,  when  commandeering  a  tram 
to  take  his  men  into  Dublin,  he  astonished  the  guard  by  insisting 
on  paying  the  fifty-four  fares91.  His  combination  of  national 
culture  and  idealism  exactly  matched  the  twin  emphases  of  Fianna 
and  his  whole  background  made  him  a  model  for  boys.  His  role  as 
Chief  Scout  was  in  fact  that  of  figurehead  or  patron;  while  real 
power  and  initiative  lay  with  his  Adjutants  General  his  was  the 
name  that  attracted  boys  and  their  parents92. 
The  Constitution  (Amendment  no.  17)  Act  of  October  1931  was 
the  culmination  of  a  series  of  acts  passed  by  the  Cosgrave  govern- 
ment  which  had  progressively  eroded  the  rights  and  liberties  of 
the  Free  State  constitution.  It  authorised  the  government  to 
declare  any  organisation  illegal,  gave  judicial  authority  in  civil 
cases  to  a  military  tribunal,  and  extended  the  death  penalty  to  a 
wide  range  of  political  offences. 
93 223 
The  growth  of  Fianna  in  the  last  years  of  the  1920s  and  its 
recent  provocative  public  appearances  had  brought  it  again  under 
close  surveillance  by  the  police  Special  Branch,  who  had  accumu- 
lated  detailed  information  on  the  movements-of  its.  leaders94  Not 
surprisingly,  therefore,  it  was  one  of  the  twelve  Republican  and 
socialist  organisations  proscribed  under  the  law95. 
Members  were  now  liable  to  prosecution  if  in  possession  of 
Fianna  documents  or  literature,  and  a  number  of  charges  were  prefer- 
red96,  In  some  country  towns  the  Scouts  were  driven  underground 
and  forced  to  resort  to  front  organisations  such  as  football  or 
cycling  clubs  to  remain  alive;  in  others  where  they  had  an  under- 
standing  with  the  police,  they  continued  to  drill  and  "keep  the 
badge  up"  with  impunity,  the  only  effect  of  the  act  being  to  in- 
crease  Fiann.  a's  appeal97, 
The  determined  opposition  that  the  1931  legislation  provoked 
among  Republicans  precipitated  a  general  election,  and  in  the  pre- 
election  campaign  gave  the  I.  R.  A.  common  cause  with  Fianna  Fail. 
In  many  areas  the  Army  supported  de  Valera's  party  with  "extra- 
legal  aid",  and  with  votes  on  the  day,  a  support  that  contributed 
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to  election  victory.  The  new  government's  first  action  was  to 
free  prisoners  sentenced  by  the  military  tribunal  and  suspend  the 
operation  of  the  Act,  giving  the  Republican  movement  a  new  freedom 
and  impetus  which  had  an  immediate  effect  upon  recruitment.  The 
I.  R.  A.  grew  "by  leaps  and  bounds"  and  within  fifteen  months  was  able 
to  muster  16,000  at  Bodenstown99.  Fianna  expanded  in  proportion. 
Reports  for  the  summer  of  1933  showed  sluaite  established  in  Derry, 
Armagh,  Tyrone,  Clare,  Tipperary  and  Waterford  Counties;  four 
branches  operated  in  County  Limerick,  and  it  was  claimed  that  new 
units  were  being  formed  "every  week"  in  Munster.  North  County 224 
Carlow  supported  a  Battalion  of  five  sluaite  and  a  hundred  mem- 
bers101,  the  Dublin  Brigade  were  able  to  send  "several  hundreds"  to 
their  summer  camp  at  Bohernabreena102,  and  numbers  had  so  increased 
in  Belfast  that  the  city  command  was  divided  into  a  North  and  a 
South  Comhairle  Ceanntair103,  Six  months  later  national  secretary 
Sean  Mooney  reported  that  the  organisation  was  in  its  strongest 
104 
position  since  the  Treaty,  with  104  affiliated  branches  Momen- 
tum  was  sustained  into  the  summer  of  1934  when  30,000  Republicans 
marched  in  "the  greatest  rally  ever"  at  Bodenstown,  which  included 
a  Fianna  contingent  of  over  800  drawn  from  nearly  thirty  centres105. 
Republicanism's  traditional  ties  with  radical  socialism,  which 
had  been  suppressed  during  the  1920s,  began  to  re-emerge  before  the 
end  of  the  decade106.  The  movement  established  socialist  and 
international  contacts107,  founded  Saor  fire 
on  socialist-republican 
principles  in  1931108  and  on  the  same  principles  forged  links  with 
109 
Belfast  Protestant  workers  the  following  year  With  the  Labour 
and  Trade  Union  movement  ineffectual  and  divided,  the  I.  R.  A.  became 
for  a  time  the  vanguard  of  the  Left110. 
Fianna  reflected  the  new  emphasis.  From  the  late  1920s  its 
educational  programme  treated  the  exploitation  of  Ireland  in  econo- 
mit  as  well  as  political  and  military  termslll.  Explanation  was 
given  of  the  socialist  content  of  the  writings  of  Tone,  Pearse  and 
Mellows;  the  social  conscience  of  members  was  challenged 
112 
and 
Ard  Fheis  resolutions  dwelt  on  the  capitalist  basis  of  British 
"  imperialism 
113 
Although  the  Scouts  remained  on  good  terms  with  Fianna  Fail  at 
a  local  level,  sometimes  using  their  halls114,  relations  between 
the  movement  as  a  whole  and  de  Valera's  party  had  changed  since  the 225 
latter's  accession  to  power 
115. 
Where  previously  a  common  adver- 
sary  had  driven  the  two  to  find  a  common  cause  in  opposition,  the 
victory  of  Fianna  Fäil  forced  the  movement  to  re-consider  its  posi- 
tion.  The  I.  R.  A.  gave  the  party  only  qualified  support  in  the 
electoral  campaign  of  January  1933,  issuing  a  manifesto  that  urged 
the  electorate  to  compel  a  new  Fianna  Fail  government  to  guarantee 
its  freedom  to  arm  and  train.  It  was  lending  its  support,  it 
stated,  in  order  to  prevent  the  civil  war  which  would  be  forced  up- 
on  the  country  by  a  victorious  Free  State  party116.  The  threat  of 
war  was  real  -  Irish  politics  were  dominated  by  violence  during 
1933  and  into  the  following  year,  with  the  newly  formed  Fine  Gael 
increasingly  adopting  the  concepts  and  methods  of  European 
Fascism117.  Fianna  Eireann  supported  the  adult  Republican  move- 
ment  in  its  confrontations  with  the  Blueshirts,  particularly  in 
Cork  and  in  Dublin  where  sluaite  were  able  to  muster  several  hun- 
dred  members  armed  with  batons  at  any  time  for  the  purpose118. 
On  more  than  one  occasion  Belfast  Brigade  members  in  Dublin  on 
annual  camp  dispersed  Blueshirt  rivals  at  gunpoint119. 
The  movement's  reconsideration  of  its  attitude  towards  Fianna 
Fäil  necessarily  also  involved  a  scrutiny  of  self;  and  self-analysis, 
at  a  time  when  the  Army  was  moving  to  the  left,  revealed  among  its 
members  divisions  that  had  lain  dormant  since  the  Civil  War. 
Broadly,  the  division  was  between  those  -  led  by  Chief-of-Staff  Moss 
Twomey  and  Seen  MacBride  -  who  wished  to  continue  the  nationalist 
emphasis  of  the  1920s,  and  those  who  -  following  Michael  Price, 
Peadar  O'Donnell,  George  Gilmore  and  Frank  Ryan  -  wished  to  emphasise 
the  movement's  socialism  and  internationalism120. 
One  effect  of  the  division  was  that  Fianna  gained  the  services 
of  Frank  Ryan.  A  veteran  of  the  Independence  and  Civil  Wars  he 226 
had  worked  on  the  I.  R.  A.  's  newspaper  An  Phoblacht  since  1929,  lat- 
terly  as  its  editor.  At  the  end  of  June  1933  he  resigned  the  post, 
finding  his  editorial  freedom  restricted  by  Twomey;  he  was  appointed 
Adjutant  General  of  Na  Fianna  in  Septemberl? 
l. 
A  Celtic  Studies 
graduate,  Gaelic  Leaguer  and  Irish  teacher,  he  became  a  highly  suc- 
cessful  Adjutant  despite  a  lack  of  previous  membership  experience. 
He  has  been  described  by  his  successor  as  a  leader  idolised  by  the 
boys  and  perhaps  the  first  since  Mellows  to  give  serious  and  creative 
consideration  to  Fianna's  role  within  the  movement122. 
The  division  finally  split  the  I.  R.  A.  in  1934.  O'Donnell 
narrowly  failed  to  win  support  for  the  formation  of  a  Republican 
Congress  at  the  Army  Convention  in  March,  and  the  following  month 
held  a  foundation  conference  for  the  new  organisation  in  Athlone. 
All  Army  men.  who  attended  were  dismissed  by  courtmartial  from  the 
I.  R.  A. 
123, 
Ryan  as  a  leading  founder-member  among  them.  His  dis- 
missal  also  involved  resignation  from  his  post  in  Fianna,  after  only 
eight  months'  service. 
Though  the  Congress  deprived  the  Army  of  many  of  its  leaders 
and  men,  its  direct  effect  on  Fianna  was  slight.  Ryan  himself 
ensured  that  the  youth  organisation  was  not  split,  and  the  question 
of  allegiance  rarely  arose 
124. 
Even  where  families  were  lost  to 
the  movement  the  sons  often  remained  in  Fianna.  In  Cork,  for 
example,  many  adult  Republicans  who  remembered  the  miseries  of  the 
1920s  joined  the  Congress,  but  such  was  the  personal  influence  of 
I.  R.  A.  leader  Tom  Barry  in  the  area  that  hardly  a  boy  was  lost125. 
The  Dublin  Brigade  was  likewise  barely  affected,  although  Slua 
Cathal  Brugha  was  forced  to  close  on  the  south  side  of  town  and  the 
boys  to  transfer  to  the  Hardwicke  Hall126.  At  slua  officer  level 
a  number  of  Congress  men  remained  in  Fianna  despite  dismissal  from 227 
the  I.  R.  A. 
127. 
The  real  and  significant  effect  was  indirect:  the 
progressive  diminution  of  the  youth  wing  during  the  second  half  of 
the  decade  that  followed  the  decline  of  the  divided  adult  movement. 
FIANNA  AND  THE  I.  R.  A.  (ii) 
The  Scouts  had  declared  themselves  independent  of  the  I.  R.  A.  in 
1924,  and  of  all  political  parties  in  1925.  Their  constitution 
pledged  allegiance  only  to  the  Irish  Republic,  and  during  the  1930s 
A.  G.  M.  resolutions  and  public  statements  periodically  reaffirmed 
this  position128.  In  practice,  however,  the  Army  exercised  ulti- 
mate  control  over  them  as  over  all  branches  of  the  movement129,  a 
control  based  on  its  own  history  and  the  present  circumstances  of 
Republicanism. 
During  and  after  the  War  for  Independence  6glaigh 
na  hEireann 
had  enjoyed  considerable  autonomy  even  when  formally  under  the 
Däil's  authority,  and  had  resisted  attempts  to  curtail  its  free- 
dom130,  The  Republican  section  of  the  Army  interpreted  this 
independence  as  giving  it  the  "right"  to  ignore  the  government  after 
the  latter's  acceptance  of  the  Treaty  in  the  spring  of  1922,  and  at 
its  subsequent  Convention  to  vest  sole  authority  in  its  own  Execu= 
tive131.  In"Republican  eyes  the  legal  and  moral  authority  to 
govern  lay  with  the  Sinn  F6in  deputies  elected  to  the  second  Dail. 
Thus  after  the  Army  Convention  of  autumn  1925  which  dissociated 
the  I.  R.  A.  from  Sinn  Fein,  the  Army  came  to  be  recognised  as  the 
sole  and  supreme  authority  within  the  Republican  movement.  It 
would  retain  this  status  until  the  mid-1960s132,  augmenting  it  in- 
deed  from  1938  when  the  Republican  survivors  of  the  second  Dail 
ceded  to  the  Army  Council  de  jure  authority  for  the  government  of 
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The  I.  R.  A.  's  theoretical  authority  over  the  movement  was  con- 
firmed  in  practice  by  the  circumstances  of  the  movement  itself. 
Republicans  were  tied  not  only  by  ideology  but  by  an  extremely 
strong  in-group  awareness,  born  of  shared  struggle,  persecution 
and  danger  and  often  reinforced  by  family  and  social  ties134. 
Except  when  specialist  tasks  were  to  be  undertaken  there  was  little 
conscious  demarcation  between  sections  of  the  movement,  and  thus  a 
high  sense  of  unity  -  "those  who  were  in  were  in" 
35. 
At  the  same 
time  there  had  developed  traditions  of  local  freedom  and  loyalty, 
deriving  from  the  autonomy  of  the  local  I.  R.  A.  units  in  the  War  for 
Independenbe136,  Whereby  Republicans  often  looked  first  to  their 
own  local  leadership. 
It  was  therefore  natural  for  Fianna  to  fall  under  the  national 
and  local  control  of  the  Army,  particularly  since  -  having  lost  its 
immediate  role  after  the  Civil  War  -  it  had  assumed  the  role  of 
Army  cadet  force.  In  addition,  from  1930  control  was  effected  in 
terms  of  personnel.  By  recruiting  Fianna's  best  trained  members 
and  potential  leaders  the  Army  took  away  its  capacity  for  freedom. 
Liam  Langley  was  the  last  national  leader  with  a  Fianna  background. 
After  his  retirement  it  became  the  I.  R.  A.  practice  to  make  good 
Fianna's  losses  by  posting  its  own  men  to  positions  of  central 
leadership,  selecting  them  rather  as  exemplifying  the  Republican 
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ideal  than  from  their  qualities  as  leaders  of  youth  George 
Plunkett  and  his  assistants  Frank  Ryan  and  Diarmuid  Mac  Giolla 
Phädraig  were  three  such  appointments.  Another  was  Sgamus  Grace, 
made  Director  of  Training  in  1933  and  elected  to  the  Ard  Chomhairle 
the  following  year 
138, 
An  Army  veteran  ,  he  had  played  a  heroic 
part  in  the  battle  of  Mount  Street  Bridge,  one  of  the  most  cele- 
brated  actions  of  Easter  Week139.  The  I.  R.  A.  also  made  local 229 
appointments,  placing  its  own  men  in  charge  of  sluaite140  or,  more 
frequently,  of  the  boys'  training141.  Their  deployment  further 
strengthened  Army  control,  as  did  the  practice  of  dual  membership 
among  slua  officers,  which  varied  locally  but  was  certainly  normal 
in  Dublin,  Cork  and  Belfast  at  this  time142. 
Fianna  itself  resented  the  I.  R.  A.  's  domination  and  the  appoint- 
ment  of  leaders  rather  than  their  democratic  election 
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it 
periodically  warned  against  interference  in  the  columns  of  the  Army's 
own  newspaper144.  A  major  article  published  in  1933,  whose  author 
held  dual  membership,  claimed  that  Fianna's  "greatest  problem"  was 
the  I.  R.  A.  -'s  failure  to  understand  its  real  aims.  The  movement  had 
"allowed  the  Scouts  to  struggle  along  as  a  complementary  part,  if 
not  a  junior  branch-,  of  the  Republican  Army,  which  was  the  worst 
thing  we  could  have  done";  most  Army  men  considered  Fianna  solely 
as  a  recruiting  ground  and  gave  no  thought  to  its  other  potential 
roles 
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The  Scouts'  desire  for  autonomy  should  also  be  viewed  in  the 
context  of  the  I.  R.  A.  's  history  of  illegality  and  schism.  Repub- 
licans  were  ever  aware  that  the  Army  might  at  some  future  date 
either  "go  down"  or  "go  wrong"146.  Should  it  "go  down"  an  inde- 
pendent  Fianna  could  survive  for  the  movement  to  fall  back  on; 
should  it  "go  wrong",  as  in  the  major  splits  of  1922  and  1934,  only 
an  independent  Fianna  could  avoid  following  it  into  error. 
Army  control  over  the  Scouts'  military  activities  varied  from 
area  to  area  and  over  time.  In  some  Dublin  sluaite  in  the  late 
1920s  arms  training  was  given  to  all  members  over  fifteen147,  but 
during  the  1930s  it  was  restricted  to  one  specially  selected  senior 
slua  in  the  city148  Cork  Fianna  supported  an  A.  S.  U.  trained  by 
the  Army  until  1935  when  it  disbanded  following  a  dispute  over  the 
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ownership  of  weapons  In  Belfast  specialist  training  was 230 
available  to  older  members  throughout  the  period,  though  latterly 
confined  to  those  areas  of  the  city  where  the  I.  R.  A.  itself  was 
numerically  weak150. 
At  national  level,  military  control  was  tightened  in  1934  with 
the  appointment  of  Diarmuid  Mac  Giolla  Phädraig  as  Fianna  Adjutant 
General.  He  accepted  the  post  only  on  condition  that  arms  training 
would  be  suppressed.  On  his  estimate  the  "clean  up"  took  two 
years 
151. 
Nonetheless,  elements  in  the  Army  continued  to  press 
for  the  militarisation  of  the  Scouts.  A  brief  attempt  was  made  in 
Belfast  in  1935152,  and  one  more  serious  after  Michael  Fitzpatrick 
had  succeeded  Moss  Twomey  as  I.  B.  A.  Chief-of-Staff  in  1937,  which 
culminated  in  the  arrest  of  Fianna's  Quartermaster  by  the  Army  Coun- 
cil  in  an  attempt  to  force  the  development  of  the  Dublin  senior  slua 
into  an  I.  R.  A.  Active  Service  Unit153  George  Plunkett  reluctantly 
accepted  re-election  as  Chief  Scout  at  this  time  solely  so  that,  as 
a  member  of  the  Army  Council,  he  could  resist  pressures  from  within 
the  I.  R.  A.  to  militarise  the  Scouts154. 
During  Se.  n  Russell's  term  as  I.  R.  A.  Chief-of-Staff  from  April 
1938  the  military  wishes  of  Fianna's  Headquarters  staff  were  res- 
pected155.  During  preparations  for  the  English  bombing  Campaign 
Russell  readily  complied  with  the  determination  of  Plunkett  and  Mac 
Giolla  Phadraig,  which  they  had  expressed  at  every  Fianna  Ard  Fheis 
since  1934156,  that  the  Scouts  would  on  no  account  be  committed  to 
the  war. 
FIANNA  AND  THE  C.  B.  S.  I. 
From  about  the  time  of  the  Countess's  death  Fianna  had  faced  a 
potential  rival  in  its  efforts  to  recruit  members.  Gasöga 
Catolici  na  hLreann,  initially  founded  in  1926,  may  be  said  to  have 231 
become  effectively  established  with  the  election  of  its  first 
National  Committee  in  November  of  the  following  year157.  It  ex- 
panded  rapidly  during  the  first  five  years,  partly  through  the 
benefits  of  Church  resources  and  publicity,  partly  through  its  role 
in  the  Catholic  Emancipation  Centenary  celebrations  of  192q  and 
again  at  the  Eucharistic  Congress  in  Dublin  in  1932,  when  scouts 
acted  as  stewards.  By  the  latter  date  it  numbered  close  to 
15,000  members158. 
It  was  founded  as  a  denominational  scouting  movement  and  "based 
totally  on  Baden-Powell's  thoughts"159.  Whether  it  was  formed  with 
the  conscious  intention  of  edging  out  Fianna  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
existing  Baden-Powell  Scouts  on  the  other  is  open  to  question. 
Certainly  it  was  established  with  the  blessing  of  a  hierarchy  who, 
having  unanimously  supported  the  Treaty  side  four  years  previously, 
now  saw  a  growing  trend  back  towards  Republicanism  in  Ireland. 
Apparently,  too,  its  recruiting  drives  were  often  in  practice  a 
direct  reaction  to  Fianna  recruiting160"  And  it  undoubtedly  viewed 
the  Baden-Powell  Scouts  as  'Protestant'  and  'British'  despite  their 
mixed  membership,  because  they  were  still  at  the  time  largely  based 
on  Church  of  Ireland  parishes  and  led  by  Unionists  and  particularly 
because  they  continued  to  operate  as  an  Irish  branch  of  the  London- 
based  British  section  of  the  movement 
161. 
Ireland  was  not  the  only 
country  in  the  1920s  in  which  the  Catholic  Church,  losing  its  youth 
to  scouting  organisations  of  which  it  did  not  approve,  adopted  the 
scouting  method  and  applied  to  it  its  superior  resources  in  order  to 
outbid  its  rivals162.  By  offering  a  sectarian  and  decently 
'national'  environment  the  C.  B.  S.  I.  confidently  hoped  to  win  the 
broad  middle  ground  of  Irish  boyhood. 232 
This  certainly  was  how  Fianna  viewed  its  rival  at  the  time. 
"Their  aim  is  to  capture  for  Imperialism  those  Irish  boys  who  have 
too  much  National  spirit  to  join  the  Baden-Powell  organisation,  but 
who  may  be  hoodwinked  by  Imperialism  masquerading  as  Irish  Catholi- 
cism  and  teaching  'loyalty'  to  the  'Free  State"',  declared  An  Phob- 
lacht's  Fianna  Notes  in  1928163.  It  pilloried  the  C.  B.  S.  I.  for 
sectarianism  "which  only  aids  England's  old  game  of  divide  and  con- 
quer",  for  its  "Cawstle  Cawtholic"  class  ethic,  and  its  "seonin 
atmosphere  ...  imitating  the  British  scouts  in  practically  every- 
thing  they  do  -  soccer,  jazz  and  foolish  plays"164.  At  the  same 
time  it  emphasised  its  own  Gaelic  nationalism,  its  non-sectarian 
but  nonetheless  Christian  ethic,  and  its  civilian  educational  role, 
in  the  face  of  accusations  of  godlessness  and  militarism 
165. 
By  1930.  the  Republican  movement  faced  the  possibility  that  the 
C.  B.  S.  I.  might  already  be  replacing  its  own  Scouts166,  The  extent 
to  which  this  in  fact  happened  during  the  next  decade  appears  to 
have  varied  from  area  to  area.  Thus  in  Cork  city  Fianna  remained 
"the  organisation  to  belong  to"  and  the  Catholic  Scouts  had  almost 
no  effect  upon  its  appeal 
167, 
but  -  in  the  view  of  one  Dublin  con- 
temporary  -  the  rivalry  eventually  "smashed"  the  organisation  in 
the  capital168.  The  effect  was  generally  strongest  in  the  country 
areas  since  in  the  city  the  C.  B.  S.  I.  tended  to  recruit  from  a  dif- 
ferent  ("more  respectable")  stratum  of  society169.  Class  had  less 
relevance  in  the  small  towns,  and  since  these  areas  could  hardly 
support  two  organisations  much  depended  on  which  established  a 
troop  first. 
It  is  true  that  the  C.  B.  S.  I.  had  nothing  to  offer  a  boy  with 
serious  Republican  intentions.  But  for  the  boy  chiefly  requiring 
an  activity-based  youth  club,  and  who  might  perhaps  -  had  he  chosen 233 
Fianna  -  have  later  acquired  an  interest  in  Republicanism,  it 
offered  an  alternative  whose  resources  appealed  to  him  and  whose 
Catholic,  legal  environment  appealed  to  his  parents.  In  effect, 
therefore,  Fianna  lost  whatever  minor  inroads  it  might  have  hoped 
to  make  among  non-aligned  youth,  and  henceforth  caught  only  the 
converted,  the  sons  of  Republican  families  and  sympathisers.  It 
thus  became  an  inverted,  self-perpetuating  and  diminishing  organisa- 
tion,  failing  to  play  what  might  have  been  its  major  role  as  a 
youth  wing,  to  broaden  the  base  of  recruitment  to  the  senior  move- 
ment. 
It  should  be  said,  however,  that  the  rivalry  of  the  C.  B.  S.  I. 
represented  only  one  factor  in  this  process  of  diminution,  which 
more  generally  reflected  parallel  developments  within  the  Republi- 
can  movement  as  a  whole  after  1934. 
DECLINE  1934-1939 
The  second  half  of  the  decade  was  in  fact  marked  by  the  de- 
cisive  decline  of  the  movement  and  its  isolation  from  the  mainstream 
of  Irish  politics.  Divided  and  impoverished  by  the  Congress170 
outmanoeuvred  by  the  Fianna  Fail  government171,  with  its  army  out- 
lawed  by  the  Church  in  1935  and  the  Dail  in  1936,  it  also  found  it- 
self  out  of  tune  with  the  people.  Its  "doctrines  of  militarism 
palled  in  a  decade  surfeited  with  violence"172,  and  in  the  new  and 
profound  equilibrium  of  Irish  political  life  it  no  longer  counted 
as  a  major  force 
173. 
Fianna  declined  with  the  other  branches  of  the  movement. 
Only  eighteen  sluaite  had  delegates  speaking  at  the  1936  Ard 
Fheis174,  and  several  of  these  had  only  a  brief  existence.  Only 
in  the  traditionally  strong  Fianna  areas  of  Belfast,  Derry,  Cork, 
Limerick,  Dublin,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Galway  and  Tipperary,  were 234 
the  sluaite  stable175.  The  capital  itself  was  reduced  to  three 
branches  and  able  to  muster  fifty  members  at  most  for  public  demon- 
strations176. 
Na  Fianna  was  made  illegal  in  the  Free  State  in  June  1936, 
along  with  other  Republican  organisations177.  Being  forced  into 
clandestine  activity  had  the  secondary  effect  of  inducing  an  atti- 
tude  of  secrecy  within  its  own  ranks.  Several  local  'jobs'  were 
carried  out  unofficially  and  dumps  were  used  unknown  to  G.  H.  Q. 
Discipline  deteriorated178  ,  just  as  it  did  at  this  time  in  the 
I.  R.  A.  In  the  latter  case  a  number  of  ill-conceived  local  enter- 
prises,  including  two  assassinations,  damaged  the  movement's  name 
in  the  public  mind  and  prompted  many  parents  to  forbid  their  sons 
to  be  associated  with  Fianna179.  Indicative  of  the  contraction  of 
the  youth  wing  in  the  last  years  of  the  decade  was  the  collapse  of 
the  Dublin  Brigade  structure  in  1936.  City  sluaite  operated  from 
this  date  only  under  the  general  guidance  of  the  Chief  Scout  and 
later  attempts  by  Brigade  Quartermaster  Dan  Stephenson  to  revive 
the  structure  were  unsuccessful 
ISO 
. 
The  Bodenstown  Commemorations,  which  to  a  small  and  scattered 
organisation  served  as  a  rallying  point  of  annual  renewal,  were 
also  proscribed  from  1936.  The  Scouts  were  nonetheless  ordered  to 
attend  the  1937  gathering  if  possible.  Those  who  succeeded  met  the 
same  old  faces,  but  fewer  new  members.  It  was  clear  that  only  the 
dedicated  remained,  and  that  it  was  now  increasingly  difficult  to 
sustain  momentum181.  After  the  movement  had  "temporarily"  laid 
down  arms  in  1923  Fianna  had  been  left  without  any  immediate  role. 
The  boys  had  been  "kept  busy"  since  then  with  drill,  parades,  mes- 
sages  for  the  Army  and  training  "for  the  next  round".  But  many  of 
the  1936  generation  had  not  been  born  when  the  Civil  War  ended,  and 235 
for  them  the  inactivity  and  the  promises  had  little  appeal  and  the 
credibility  of  "training  for  the  day"  was  wearing  thin182. 
Although  the  movement,  having  shed  its  left  wing  at  the  Con- 
gress  split,  gradually  adopted  the  rightward  nationalist-militarist 
path  that  led  to  the  1939  Bombing  Campaign,  it  had  remained  for  a 
while  coloured  by  the  influence  of  its  former  members.  And  when 
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in  December  1936  former  Fianna  Adjutant  General  Frank  Ryan  led  the 
first  contingent  of  Irishmen  to  fight  for  the  Spanish  Republic,  his 
party  largely  comprised  serving  or  ex-I.  R.  A.  men184.  As  the  James 
Connolly  Unit  they  at  first  joined  the  14th  International  Brigade, 
and  after  that  unit  was  disbanded  took  their  place  in  the  Abraham 
Lincoln  15th  Brigade  of  which  Ryan  became  Adjutant.  In  all  127 
fought  on  the  Republican  side  between  1936  and  September  1938,  of 
whom  at  least  three  were  current  members  of  Fianna  Eireann185. 
Fian  Tommy  Woods  was  killed  at  the  front  near  Cordoba  on  Christmas 
Eve  1936186;  Assistant  Adjutant  General  Eamon  McGrotty  fell  at  the 
Battle  of  Jarama;  Paddy  Smith  survived  wounding  at  Cordoba  and 
Jarama  to  return  to  Ireland  where  he  was  among  those  Republicans 
interned  during  and  after  the  1939  Campaign.  Ryan  himself  was  cap- 
tured  near  Aragon  in  March  1938  and  received  a  death  sentence  later 
commuted  to  thirty  years'  imprisonment. 
With  the  aim  of  instilling  fresh  purpose  into  the  organisation 
delegates  at  Fianna's  1938  Ard  Fheis  voted  to  set  up  an  Advisory 
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Council  composed  of  respected  adult  Republicans.  Invitations 
were  extended  to  Count  Plunkett,  the  poet  Brian  0  hUiginn,  Mire 
and  Aine  MacSwiney  and  Madge  Daly  among  others.  Recruiting  never- 
theless  continued  to  decline.  The  firm  of  W.  J.  O'Hora's  had  dis- 
continued  supplying  Fianna  items  due  to  lack  of  custom188,  and  in 236 
the  spring  of  1939  the  Irish  Press  noted  that  Fianna  drilling  had 
become  a  sporadic  and  local  spectacle,  "little  more  than  a  fast  dis- 
appearing  carry-over  from  the  events  of  troubled  times"189. 
Cork  city  and  county  was  one  of  the  few  areas  holding  their 
ground.  Morale  and  standards  remained  very  high  in  the  city 
branches,  partly  because  of  the  quality  of  leadership  (particularly 
that  of  city  o/c  Paddy  Lane),  but  more  specifically  because  of  cir- 
cumstances  peculiar  to  Cork:  the  very  strong  Republican  tradition, 
the  long  established  Thomas  Ashe  Hall,  the  stature  of  Tom  Barry  and 
the  MacSwineys.  The  country  branches  were  still  able  to  recruit  a 
high  proportion  of  the  boyhood  of  the  area.  The  decline  that  marked 
most  other  areas  was  not  felt  in  and  around  Cork  until  after  1939 
when  Tom  Barry  resigned  from  the  I.  R.  A, 
190. 
Belfast  also  remained  strong,  with  sluaite  in  every  national- 
ist  neighbourhood  though  little  sign  of  expansion191  until  the  end 
of  1938  when  a  significant  rise  in  membership  occurred,  rapid,  un- 
expected,  and  unconnected  with  any  initiative  on  the  part  of 
Fianna.  In  December  over  thirty  members  of  the  city  Battalion  of 
the  I.  R.  A.  were  arrested  and  interned  in  Crumlin  Road  Jail,  includ- 
ing  all  the  senior  staff  and  a  number  of  Fianna  officers  holding 
dual  membership192.  The  result  was  sudden  promotion  for  young  men 
in  both  organisations  -  men  with  "1922  ideas"  were  replaced  by 
others  brought  up  in  the  1930s;  above  all,  known  men  were  replaced 
by  unknown.  The  movement  in  Belfast  was  now  able  to  build  "one 
of  the  tightest  and  best  security  systems  ever  in  Ireland",  and 
upon  this  base  of  security  Fianna  was  able  to  fulfil  its  potential 
for  development.  Hundreds  of  boys,  and  whole  new  areas  were  re- 
cruited  as  a  result  of  which  it  again  became  necessary  to  divide 
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the  city  into  two  districts3. 237 
On  15  January  1939,  after  issuing  an  ultimatum,  the  I.  R.  A. 
declared  war  on  Britain.  The  campaign  had  been  planned  since  the 
previous  April  by  a  new  leadership  determined  to  end  the  aimless 
drifting  that  had  characterised  the  movement  since  de  Valera  "pre- 
empted  the  stage"  in  1936194.  The  decision  lost  the  Army  several 
noted  members,  including  Tom  Barry  and  Seän  MacBride,  but  it  gave  a 
sense  of  purpose  and  the  promise  of  action  to  the  average  volun- 
teer,  and  recruitment  rose  at  once. 
The  same  effect  was  not  felt  in  Fianna.  The  youth  organisa- 
tion  did  not  experience  the  direct  impetus  of  participation  in  the 
war.  Nor-did  it  benefit  from  any  significant  quickening  of  the 
nationalist  pulse  in  Ireland,  since  the  campaign  was  conducted  by 
Active  Service  Units  operating  far  away  in  England,  and  was  general- 
ly  ignored  by  the  Irish  people  and  even  opposed  by  some  Republi- 
cans195.  Only  after  the  execution  of  Barnes  and  McCormack  in 
February  1940  was  the  public  aroused  to  awareness  and  sympathy196, 
in  the  wake  of  which  Fianna  enjoyed  a  brief  upsurge  in  member- 
ship 
197. 
On  the  other  hand  it  was  obviously  desirable  to  a  movement  en- 
gaged  in  war  that  there  be  a  steady  flow  of  recruits  into  its 
youth  wing.  To  this  end  the  Army's  Headquarters  staff  discussed 
198 
the  appointment  of  a  national  Fianna  organiser  in  spring  1939, 
and  in  June  offered  the  post  to  twenty-two  year  old  Joe  Atkinson 
from  the  Short  Strand199.  Atkinson  held  dual  membership  at  the 
time,  and  was  o/c  of  the  East  District  of  Fianna's  Belfast  Brigade. 
Equipped  with  a  Rudge  bicycle  provided  by  the  Army  and,  amazingly, 
a  letter  of  introduction  typed  on 
Oglaigh 
na  hEireann  notepaper,  he 
covered  almost  all  the  South  between  July  and  December,  lodging  in 
Republican  homes  and  calling  roadside  meetings.  New  sluaite 238 
marked  his  route,  in  Longford  and  Roscommon  in  August,  County  Sligo 
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in  early  September  and  Donegal  at  the  end  of  the  month  In  the 
first  months  of  1940  he  worked  with  Dublin's  o/c  building  up 
membership  in  the  city  sluaite,  before  being  elected  Adjutant  Gen- 
eral  at  Fianna's  St.  Patrick's  Day  Ard  Fheis.  Since  the  post  re- 
quired  his  residence  in  Dublin,  Liam  Nolan  of  Kerry  was  elected  to 
succeed  him  as  itinerant  organiser.  At  the  same  meeting  George 
Plunkett  was  re-elected  Chief  Scout,  for  what  would  be  his  last 
term  -  he  was  already  on  the  run,  having  avoided  the  arrest  suffered 
by  most  other  members  of  the  Army  Council  in  September  and  Feb- 
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In  the  event,  it  would  also  be  Fianna's  last  Ard  Fheis  for 
eight  years.  By  March  the  Bombing  Campaign  was  already  all  but 
over,  the  years  of  internment  had  begun,  and  the  movement  was  slid- 
ing  into  despair  and  disarray.  Fianna,  which  as  usual  reflected 
the  fortunes  of  the  senior  movement,  would  before  the  end  of  the 
year  have  collapsed  to  a  point  of  virtual  extinction. 239 
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Chapter  8.  SURVIVAL,  RECOVERY,  CONTROVERSY  (1940-1962) 
THE  THREAD  UNBROKEN 
The  years  1940-1945  mark  the  lowest  ebb  in  the  history  of  the 
Republican  movement.  Although  the  I.  R.  A.  did  not  formally  declare 
a  ceasefire  until  the  spring  of  19451  it  in  fact  saw  little  action 
after  February  1940  and  by  1941  had  ceased  to  pose  any  serious 
threat  to  the  governments  of  Britain,  Northern  Ireland  or  the  Free 
State.  However,  Leinster  House  and  Stormont  were  determined  to 
destroy  it  in  its  weakened  state,  and  so  heavy  was  its  loss  of  man- 
power  through  internment,  execution  and  hunger-strike  that  at  one 
stage  it  was  averaging  a  new  leadership  every  six  weeks2.  The 
internment  camps  themselves  were  riven  by  dissention  and  faction 
while  outside  the  movement  all  but  destroyed  itself  in  the  wake  of 
the  courtmartial  of  Stephen  Hayes3.  The  I.  R.  A.  in  Dublin  had  be- 
come  "little  more  than  a  truncated  G.  H.  Q.  staff  living  from  day  to 
day"4  In  Cork  the  movement  was  down  to  a  dozen  men,  the  Army 
gone  altogether5.  In  the  country  "the  intricate  and  long-lived 
infrastructure  ..  began  to  fray  and  break"  by  the  autumn  of 
1942.  Even  the  security-conscious  Belfast  Brigade  suffered  losses 
6 
and  ceased  to  function  entirely  during  19437.  In  the  winter  of 
1944  the  last  thread  was  broken  with  the  arrest  of  Chief-of-Staff 
Charlie  Kerins. 
By  this  date,  however,  the  first  of  the  internees  were  being 
released.  Some  came  home  to  re-form  their  old  units,  while  the 
campaign  for  the  release  of  those  still  inside  afforded  a  propa- 
ganda  platform  for  the  movement.  In  spring  1945  though  the  Army 
was  still  miniscule  it  was  at  least  in  a  position  to  elect  a  new 253 
Council  and  Chief-of-Staff8. 
Any  account  of  Fianna  during  the  Campaign  period  must  be  limi- 
ted  by  the  nature  of  the  evidence  available.  No  internal  docu- 
ments  survive9,  communication  across  the  country  was  at  the  time 
non-existent,  and  the  Republican  movement  published  no  paper  bet- 
ween  1939  and  1948.  The  author  has  been  obliged  to  rely  on  verbal 
statements  alone,  made  nearly  forty  years  after  the  events  they  re- 
call  by  participants  who  had  no  Fianna  contacts  outside  their  own 
areas.  Given  these  limitations  it  would  be  difficult  to  judge  the 
completeness  of  the  present  account  or  to  confirm  its  accuracy  in 
every  detail. 
One  certain  conclusion  emerges,  however.  Fianna  suffered 
with  the  decline  and  disintegration  of  the  movement,  both  in  its 
recruitment  of  boys  and  its  loss  of  adult  leaders.  But,  unlike 
the  I.  R.  A.,  at  no  time  was  the  thread  of  its  existence  completely 
broken. 
In  Belfast  the  organisation  was  confined  to  the  Falls  Road 
10 
and  even  there  was  but  a  shadow  of  its  1939  strength  Though 
sluaite  continued  to  parade  until  the  autumn  of  1942,  meetings  had 
become  irregular  with  most  of  the  leadership  transferred  to  the 
hard-pressed  Army11,  and  internment  had  alienated  parents  by  taking 
the  bread  winners  from  their  homes.  Like  the  I.  R.  A.  the  Scouts 
were  disbanded  in  1943,  but  were  re-established  in  October  of  the 
following  year  a  month  or  so  before  the  first  internees  returned 
to  re-form  the  Army12. 
Fianna  remained  intact  in  Cork  throughout  the  Campaign  years 
though  reduced  in  numbers,  chiefly  because  its  meeting  place  at  the 
Tomas  MacCurtain  Hall  was  some  distance  from  the  I.  R.  A.  's  head- 
quarters  on  the  south  side  and  the  boys  were  shielded  from  the 254 
worst  of  police  harrassment.  The  slua  was  unable  to  maintain  its 
13 
pipe  band,  but  continued  to  drill. 
Four  branches  survived  in  Dublin  in  1940.  The  largest  and 
oldest,  Slua  Con  Colbert,  owed  its  stability  to  the  Hardwicke  Hall 
where  it  had  paraded  for  almost  a  decade,  but  at  least  one  other 
14 
was  obliged  to  meet  in  a  private  house  and  drill  in  the  street. 
The  Battalion  Command  had  been  re-established  and  survived  under 
o/c  Jack  Rowan  until  spring  1942.  Despite  its  own  pressing  con- 
cerns  the  Army  continued  to  support  the  youth  wing  by  placing  tried 
and  responsible  men  from  its  own  ranks  into  the  leadership  posi- 
tions.  City  Adjutant  Kevin  Hudson  was  one  such,  as  was  Mattie 
O'Neill  who  on  his  release  from  a  brief  internment  in  April  1941 
was  considered  too  well  known  to  risk  active  service;  asked  "to 
help  with  the  Fianna"  he  was  appointed  o/c  of  Slua  Sean  Healy  in 
15 
Phibsboro 
With  the  arrest  of  Rowan  in  May  1942  and  the  loss  of  the 
Hardwicke  Hall  in  the  same  year  the  Battalion  command  again  fell 
into  abeyance.  The  city  sluaite,  now  reduced  to  three16,  opera- 
ted  in  isolation  though  the  older  boys  -  among  them  Wattie  Bell, 
Paddy  Dillon,  Mattie  Carey  and  Noel  and  Dessie  Goulding  -  kept 
up  such  communication  as  they 
circle  of  Republican  families 
having  older  members  of  those 
known  to  the  police  and  under 
youth 
18 
could17.  Being  members  of  the  small 
they  were  known  to  one  another;  and 
families  interned  they  were  also 
constant  surveillance  despite  their 
1943  was  perhaps  Fianna's  most  tenuous  year.  George  Plunkett 
was  released  on  parole  in  the  spring,  but  he  had  suffered  in,  the 
Curragh  and  took  no  further  part  in  Fianna  activities;  he  died  pre- 
maturely  the  following  winter  at  the  age  of  forty-four.  By  now 255 
the  Dublin  organisation  had  shrunk  so  far  that  its  very  existence 
had  come  to  depend  on  one  youth,  Peadar  Timmins19. 
Timmins  was  the  youngest  of  a  family  of  active  Republicans 
20 
his  brother  Dick  had  been  interned  in  1939.  But  Peadar  himself 
was  then  only  thirteen,  and  since  he  did  not  join  the  I.  R.  A.  until 
1943  he  lived  through  the  internment  years  neither  on  the  run  nor 
touched  by  the  feuds  within  the  adult  movement.  In  January  1942, 
though  only  fifteen  years  old  and  small  for  his  age,  he  succeeded 
Mattie  O'Neill  as  captain  of  the  Sean  Healy  Slua  when  the  latter 
was  arrested.  In  the  vital  period  1943-1945  he  carried  Dublin 
virtually  single  handed  though  holding  no  formal  office  beyond 
slua  o/c.  At  this  time  staffs  were  merely  names  on  paper,  meet- 
ings  were  sporadic,  standards  and  discipline  slack.  But  by  1945 
enough  mature  men  had  returned  to  the  movement  to  inherit  the  tiny, 
ailing  organisation  and  build  upon  it.  Timmins's  had  been  frankly 
a  holding  operation:  in  the  words  of  one  of  his  successors  -  "The 
great  thing  Peadar  did  was  to  ensure  the  continuity  of  Fianna,  for 
us  to  be  there  in  '45"21. 
To  a  movement  so  deeply  committed  to  keeping  faith  with  the 
past  'the  unbroken  tradition'  was  at  the  very  heart  of  its  self- 
belief.  And  precisely  because  the  thread  had  been  briefly  severed 
in  the  adult  Army,  the  preservation  of  continuity  by  the  youth  wing 
was  considered  so  important.  It  forestalled  allegations  that  the 
Fianna  of  1945  was  merely  the  work  of  '1930s  men'  taken  up  again. 
And  it  ensured  that  "the  uniform  had  been  seen  every  Easter",  as  a 
public  proof  that  another  young  generation  of  Republicans  was  'com- 
ing  through'. 256 
UNDER  THE  LEADERSHIP  OF  BELL  -  1945-1952 
When  Dick  Bell  was  released  after  five  years'  internment 
Timmins  was  grateful  to  hand  over  the  leadership  to  him.  Bell 
contacted  other  ex-internees,  including  Con  Dillon,  and  with  these 
and  the  surviving  remnant  was  able  to  begin  re-building.  In  the 
winter  of  1945  he  formed  a  'G.  H.  Q.  staff',  drafting  in  Mattie 
O'Neill  as  his  Adjutant  and  Dillon  as  Quartermaster.  For  over 
22 
a  year  it  remained  a  Headquarters  Staff  in  name  only  -  its  command 
extended  no  further  than  the  capital  with  the  Cork  and  Belfast 
sluaite  still  operating  independently  and  in  isolation. 
Having  no  previous  experience  of  Fianna  leadership  Bell  sought 
advice  where  he  could.  He  discussed  scouting  with  local  C.  B.  S.  I. 
and  B.  P.  leaders,  made  contact  with  Seamus  Reader  who  had  been  in 
the  Glasgow  Fianna  before  the  1916  Rising  and  had  many  years'  ex- 
perience  with  the  Catholic  Scouts,  and  through  Reader  even  met  mem- 
bers  of  the  Scottish  Republican  group  Fianna  na  h-Alba.  With  the 
information  he  gleaned,  and  armed  with  map-reading  and  scouting 
23 
manuals,  he  established  leaders'  courses  in  Dublin 
Though  without  any  formal  mandate  for  office  from  Fianna  it- 
self  Bell  and  his  colleagues  came  to  be  recognised  in  the  movement 
for  their  work  in  re-building  Dublin  on  a  sound  basis  virtually 
from  scratch,  and  it  was  accepted  that  if  a  national  organisation 
was  to  be  developed  at  all  it  would  be  by  them.  As  a  result, 
local  Army  men  contacted  them  for  help  in  setting  up  sluaite  in 
their  areas,  and  the  existing  sluaite  in  Belfast  and  Cork  looked  to 
24 
them  for  a  lead  in  establishing  a  national  structure. 
Towards  this  end  a  separate  Dublin  Command  was  formed  in  1946, 
with  Des  Carron  o/c  and  Bell's  younger  brother  Wattie  Adjutant. 
The  able  and  articulate  Carron  had  declined  a  place  on  the  Head- 257 
quarters  Staff,  preferring  the  Dublin  post  which  kept  him  in  touch 
with  grass-roots  members25.  In  addition  he  undertook  much  of  the 
national  secretarial  work,  through  which  -  with  his  natural  ability 
and  drive  -  he  perhaps  exercised  as  great  an  influence  upon  the 
26 
developing  organisation  as  Bell  himself. 
Both  men  held  the  view  that  the  best  hope  of  winning  recruits 
lay  in  raising  standards  at  slua  level.  Carron  drew  up  merit  tests 
in  history,  drill  and  woodcraft;  punctuality  and  neatness  were 
demanded  on  parade;  uniforms  -  very  few  of  which  were  to  be  seen  in 
1945  -  were  provided  from  funds,  the  boys  themselves  cutting  down 
the  material  and  supplying  belts  and  buckles;  every  attempt  was  made 
to  give  members  positions  of  responsibility27. 
The  first  summer  camp,  held  in  1947,  set  a  pattern  for  organisa- 
tion  and"discipline,  as  a  result  of  which  Fianna  parties  were  always 
welcome  back  at  campsites.  Attendance  at  camp  was  made  a  compul- 
sory  commitment.  of  membership,  as  were  the  twice-weekly  parades  and 
the  Sunday  outings.  The  boys  were  encouraged  to  see  membership  as 
a  commitment  to  an  ideal  and  no  mere  pastime,  and  as  such  they 
appreciated  the  demands  made  upon  them.  For  the  type  of  boy  pre- 
pared  to  made  this  commitment  the  appeal  and  satisfaction  of  being 
a  fian  were  high.  Strong  loyalties  were  forged;  turnover  became 
insignificant,  and  gradually  the  organisation  broke  new  ground28. 
In  1947  Carron  and  Wattie  Bell  cycled  by  tandem  to  Clonmel  and 
Tralee  where  sluaite  were  established  following  their  visit 
29 
By  October  of  the  following  year  Fianna  was  strong  enough  to  hold 
its  first  Ard  Fheis  since  1940.  Delegates  -  representing  branches 
in  Tralee,  Dundalk,  Clonmel,  Cork,  Tullow,  Belfast  and  Dublin  - 
ratified  the  existing  command  structure  and  leadership  appointments. 
The  meeting  may  therefore  be  said  to  mark  the  re-emergence  of  a 258 
genuine  and  national  organisation. 
Of  the  sluaite  represented,  Tralee  maintained  a  semi- 
independent  existence  because  of  its  geographical  isolation;  the 
Dundalk  and  Clonmel  branches  proved  short-lived;  Cork  enjoyed 
stronger  ties  with  the  local  I.  R.  A.  than  its  own  Headquarters;  the 
Tullow  branch  owed  its  existence  entirely  to  one  local  man,  Seamus 
Kavanagh,  later  Fianna's  Adjutant  General30  . 
There  were  now  three 
sluaite  in  Belfast:  those  in  the  Lower  Falls  and  St.  James's  had 
been  set  up  in  1944,  and  a  third  serving  Carrick  Hill  was  estab- 
lished  in  the  year  of  the  Ard  Fheis.  They  operated  under  a  city 
o/c,  but  without  a  command  staff31,  and  numbered  in  all  some 
seventy  boys.  Despite  the  expansion  achieved  in  Dublin  itself 
the  organisation  there  was  restricted  to  a  single  slua  due  to  lack 
of  premises:.  the  only  available  meeting  place  at  this  date  was  in 
the  Sinn  Fein  Hall  at  9  Parnell  Square  to  which  the  boys  had  moved 
in  1942. 
The  recovery  of  Fianna  between  1945  and  1948  was  not  matched 
by  any  comparable  expansion  in  the  Republican  movement  as  a  whole. 
It  is  true  that  the  desperation  of  internment  was  now  passed. 
But  the  movement  struggled  for  its  existence  in  the  new  Ireland 
that  was  emerging  from  its  neutrality  and  isolation  in  a  World  War 
to  even  higher  unemployment  and  emigration,  an  Ireland  of  declining 
agriculture  and  a  rising  industrial  population32,  now  more  con- 
cerned  with  social  and  economic  issues  than  the  question  of  the 
Republic33.  The  founding  of  Clann  na  Poblachta  in  1946  seemed  to 
imply  a  recognition  by  many  Republicans  that  the  old  path  was  now 
a  blind  alley.  In  1948  the  movement  was  at  "rock  bottom"34. 
Fianna  had  in  fact  expanded  under  its  own  momentum  and  its 
recovery  was  attributable  almost  entirely  to  the  influence  of  a 
handful  of  men  of  calibre  and  energy.  Indeed,  the  Bell  era  is 259 
notable  as  the  period  when  -  perhaps  more  than  at  any  time  before 
or  since  -  the  organisation  took  its  shape  and  character  not  from 
political  events  within  or  without  the  movement  but  from  the  in- 
fluence  of  individuals. 
After  1950,  however,  developments  within  the  I.  R.  A.  came  to 
exert  an  increasing  influence  upon  it.  The  Army  was  at  last  moving 
forward  and  in  some  areas,  particularly  in  the  North,  its  recruit- 
ment  included  wholesale  transfers  from  Fianna35.  The  Belfast  slua- 
ite  above  all  were  affected  by  the  policies  -  and  the  internal 
politics  -  of  the  senior  movement. 
On  their  release  from  Crumlin  Road  Jail  in  1944-1945  the  Bel- 
fast  internees  had  at  once  made  a  start  at  re-establishing  Army 
units  in  the  city;  by  1948  they  had  a  Battalion,  but  because  its 
command  staff  were  self-appointed  they  were  never  formally  recog- 
nised  by  Dublin.  The  convicted  prisoners  -  many  of  them  household 
names  in  Republican  Belfast  -  were  not  released  until  1949  where- 
upon  they  formed  a  separate  Battalion,  recognised  by  G.  H.  Q.  The 
old  prison  animosities  persisted  between  the  two  groups,  and  each 
looked  to  Fianna  for  allegiance  and  recruits.  In  1951  the  Fianna 
o/c,  a  member  of  the  ex-internees'  Battalion,  was  replaced  by  a 
leading  officer  of  the  'official'  Battalion.  The  new  o/c  called 
a  meeting  of  city  officers  early  in  the  following  year,  at  which 
the  instruction  was  given  that  all  fiannai  over  sixteen-and-a-half 
should  transfer  to  the  Army.  In  the  resulting  exodus  Fianna  vir- 
tually  collapsed.  Shortly  afterwards  the  rival  groups  settled 
their  differences  at  a  meeting  in  Corrigan  Park  and  re-affiliated. 
But  the  damage  to  Fianna  was  already  done36. 
Bell  and  his  colleagues  were  determined  to  preserve  the 
organisation  they  had  created.  They  had  built  it  to  a  membership 260 
touching  four  figures  by  summer  1951,  with  sluaite  in  Belfast, 
Derry,  Lurgan,  Sligo,  Dundalk,  Droheda,  Tullow,  Cork  and  Dublin  and 
able  to  parade  close  on  500  boys  at  Bodenstown37.  Through  their 
emphasis  on  campcraft  and  standards  of  excellence  they  had  steered 
it  to  a  position  where  it  was  losing  its  image  as  'the  young 
I.  R.  A.  '  and  attracting  members  as  a  youth  organisation  in  its  own 
right.  (Indicative  of  its  new  standing  were  the  Fianna  Notes 
carried  at  this  time  by  the  Dublin  Evening  Mail,  the  first  in  a 
non-Republican  paper  for  at  least  a  quarter  of  a  century.  )  Boys 
with  no  Republican  background  were  being  recruited,  and  the 
organisation  was  now  in  fact  beginning  to  perform  a  role  that  it 
had  notably  failed  to  perform  since  the  early  1930s,  broadening 
its  base  among  Irish  youth38. 
The  leadership  considered  it  essential  for  the  future  well- 
being  of  Fianna  to  maintain  its  new  role  and  image,  and  to  safe- 
guard  its  independence  and  immunity  from  the  post-war  divisions  in 
the  movement.  It  was  a  policy  that  inevitably  brought  them  into 
confrontation  with  I.  R.  A.  Headquarters. 
FIANNA  AND  THE  I.  R.  A.  (iii) 
On  tactical  grounds  alone  Bell  and  Carron  would  have  wished 
Fianna  independent  of  the  Army,  association  with  which  had  always 
restricted  recruitment  and  invited  police  surveillance.  But 
independence  was  also  and  more  importantly  a  fundamental  requisite 
of  their  whole  concept  of  the  youth  organisation  as  an  environment 
for  personal  development.  The  social  maturity  that  they  aimed  to 
foster  must  also  apply  in  the  case  of  a  boy's  commitment  to  the 
movement.  They  "abhorred  the  no-thought  situation  prevalent  in 
Fianna,  the  drift  mentality  in  which  it  was  assumed  without  ques- 
tion  that  in  the  small  pond  of  Republicanism  the  tadpole  scout  must 261 
necessarily  grow  via  the  Fianna  officer  into  the  Volunteer  frog"39 
They  believed  that  commitment  should  be  freely  given  by  conscious 
decision  at  a  mature  age.  To  this  end  they  sought  to  abolish  the 
practice  of  dual  membership  so  that  graduation  to  the  Army  would 
first  require  a  decision  to  resign  from  the  Scouts. 
The  leadership  were  in  fact  facing  the  conflict  inherent  in 
all  ideologically  committed  youth  organisations,  between  the  needs 
of  the  individual  members  for  personal  development  and  the  needs  of 
the  movement  for  the  recruitment  and  training  of  cadres.  They  sought 
to  pitch  Fianna  as  far  as  possible  towards  the  former:  in  Carron's 
own  words,  -  "We  were  Republican  Youth,  but  we  were  more  'Youth'  than 
'Republican  "'40.  At  the  same  time,  they  were  convinced  that  an 
independent  Fianna  could  revitalise  a  movement  that  had  become  "in- 
cestuous  and  inward-looking". 
Bell  and  Carron  saw  their  policies  not  as  any  new  departure 
but  as  a  restoration  of  the  original  vision  of  Countess  Markievicz 
and  a  return  to  the  Constitution.  As  emended  in  1924  the  Constitu- 
tion  explicitly  declared  Fianna's  independence  of  the  Army.  The 
I.  R.  A.  's  practice  of  appointing  Fianna  leaders  -  which  had  obtained 
during  the  1930s  and  outside  Dublin  still  obtained  -  was  in  fact  an 
unconstitutional  intrusion  to  which  time  had  given  the  appearance 
of  law.  To  change  the  practice  would  now  require  an  addendum  to 
the  Constitution  specifying  that  such  posts  be  filled  by  democratic 
election. 
A  resolution  to  this  effect,  concerning  the  election  of  the 
Chief  Scout,  was  put  forward  for  debate  at  the  Ard  Fheis  of  1949. 
News  of  the  impending  move  reached  Army  Headquarters  in  the 
spring41.  The  new  Chief-of-Staff  Tony  Magan  was  rigid  and  dog- 
matic  by  temperament,  and  at  a  time  when  the  movement's  most  pres- 
sing  need  was  for  unity  and  discipline42  he  was  certainly  not  pre- 262 
pared  to  tolerate  an  independent  youth  wing.  He  detailed  Seän 
O'Neill  to  relay  an  order  to  Fianna's  G.  H.  Q.  to  declare  its  direct 
allegiance  to  the.  Army  Council  at  the  forthcoming  Ard  Fheis. 
G.  H.  Q.  replied  that  constitutionally  it  did  not  have  the  authority 
to  cede  allegiance  to  any  organisation. 
The  immediate  reaction  of  the  Army  Council  was  to  ban  the 
Scouts  from  Republican  parades  and  to  deprive  them  of  what  was 
traditionally  the  main  annual  source  of  income  for  all  branches  of 
the  movement,  the  sale  of  Easter  lilies.  (It  was  the  custom  for 
Cumann  na  mBan  to  make  the  lilies  and  sell  them  to  the  other  Repub- 
lican  organisations  for  resale  at  profit.  )  In  reply  the  boys  made 
lino  blocks,  produced  their  own  lilies  and  sold  them  so  effectively 
that  they  were  able  to  hold  their  summer  camp  on  the  proceeds. 
And  on  Easter  Sunday  though  banned  from  the  parade  they  took  the 
biggest  contingent  to  Mass  and  were  eventually  asked  to  lead  the 
afternoon  procession. 
Magan  now  attempted  to  apply  personal  pressure  on  the  Fianna 
leaders.  With  his  Adjutant  Gerry  McCarthy  he  visited  Des  Carron's 
home,  where  after  a  fruitless  discussion  McCarthy  drew  a  gun  on  his 
host.  Carron  put  the  two  of  them  out43. 
A  discussion  meeting  was  subsequently  arranged  at  which  the 
Army  Council  was  represented  by  its  most  prestigious  member,  Toma's 
MacCurtain,  son  of  the  murdered  Mayor  of  Cork44.  He  required  an 
answer  to  two  points  -  firstly,  did  Fianna  recognise  the  Army 
Council's  authority  over  the  movement?  secondly,  if  so,  did  it 
accept  the  Council's  instruction  to  agree  to  its  nominees  for 
Fianna's  leadership  positions?  The  answer  to  his  first  question 
was  affirmative  -  Fianna's  Constitution  declared  allegiance  to 
'the  Republic',  over  which  the  Army  Council  had  been  granted  sole 
de  jure  authority  by  the  surviving  Republican  members  of  the  second 263 
Däil  in  1938.  As  to  the  second  question,  the  fact  of  the  Council's 
authority  was  not  disputed  but  merely  its  bounds  of  competence; 
G.  H.  Q.  insisted  that  it  could  not  be  held  to  extend  to  the  constitu- 
tional  autonomy  of  Fianna,  which  predated  the  Army  itself  and  had 
been  recognised  by  Däils. 
At  the  autumn  Ard  Fheis  that  autonomy  was  re-affirmed,  the 
resolution  requiring  democratic  election  of  Chief  Scouts  was 
carried,  and  Bell  was  duly  re-elected.  The  meeting  gave  a  clear 
indication  of  the  general  support  within  Fianna  for  the  policies  of 
the  leadership,  and  of  the  leaders'  ability  to  pursue  them  in 
defiance  of  the  I.  R.  A.  with  apparent  impunity.  It  is-not  clear 
however  to  what  extent  this  was  a  question  of  Fianna's  mettle  or 
the  Army's  lack  of  will.  The  Army  did  not  even  send  a'representa- 
tive  to  the  meeting,  and  certainly  had  other  more  pressing  problems 
at  this  date  -  re-establishing  itself,  healing  its  own  internal 
divisions  and  salvaging  a  respectable  public  image45.  Three  years 
later  and  stronger,  when  it  again  turned  its  attention  to  the  con- 
trol  of  Fianna,  it  did  so  decisively. 
The  1952  Ard  Fheis  was  held  in  March46  and  it  was  known  that 
Bell  would  not  be  seeking  re-election.  Tomas  MacCurtain  himself 
was  proposed  as  his  successor  despite  being  a  considerably  older 
man  and  not  even  a  member  of  the  Fianna.  In  the  event  no  election 
was  held  since  MacCurtain  was  unopposed  for  office,  and  Army  con- 
trol  was  thus  restored  within  the  letter  of  the  Constitution47 
MacCurtain  held  the  position,  an  overseer  rather  than  an  active 
leader,  for  one  year  by  which  time  his  purpose  was  served. 
From  1953  a  succession  of  young  leaders  held  office,  usually 
for  short  terms  of  one  or  two  years  only,  and  this  would  remain  the 
typical  pattern  into  the  1970s.  With  one  exception  they  were  all 264 
serving  Fianna  officers  risen  through  the  ranks,  and  not  Army  men 
on  loan.  But  the  I.  R.  A.  was  still  able  to  retain  control  of  the 
youth  wing,  though  now  indirectly,  through  the  manipulation  of  Ard 
Fheiseanna,  the  re-introduction  of  dual  membership,  and  above  all 
by  influencing  the  choice  of  Chief  Scout. 
It  was  standard  practice  for  the  Army  Council  to  be  represented 
at  the  Ard  Fheiseanna  of  all  sections  of  the  Republican  movement, 
including  Fianna's.  The  visiting  delegate  never  took  a  leading 
part  at  such  meetings,  more  often  than  not  confining  himself  to  a 
read  statement  of  Army  policy  on  any  controversial  topics  to  be 
debated.  He  did  not  issue  directives  nor  have  the  right  to  block 
votes.  But  such  was  the  I.  R.  A.  's  moral  authority  within  the  move- 
ment  that  a  mere  statement  of  its  views  normally  ensured  their  being 
acted  upon 
48. 
Traditionally,  this  authority  derived  from  the  Army  Council's 
de  jure  position  as  'the  government  of  the  Republic'.  But  by  the 
1950s.  such  an  appeal  had  become  less  meaningful  for  the  younger 
generation  of  Republicans  and  the  I.  R.  A.  was  coming  to  rely  in- 
creasingly  on  control  by  co-operation49.  In  the  case  of  Fianna 
its  main  guarantee  of  co-operation  lay  in  dual  membership,  which 
was  re-introduced  with  the  departure  of  Bell.  From  1953  all  slua 
officers  of  the  Cork  Battalion  held  dual  membership50;  elsewhere 
in  the  South  it  remained  the  exception  outside  Dublin  where  it 
applied  to  the  entire  Battalion  officer  staff51;  in  Belfast,  where 
Bell  had  never  been  able  to  enforce  his  policies  fully,  it  had 
been  virtually  automatic  for  seniors  to  take  membership  of  the 
I.  R.  A.  since  194852;  in  Newry  an  Army  man  had  been  appointed  o/c 
of  the  slua  established  in  195153. 
Most  important,  dual  membership  applied  in  the  case  of  the 265 
Chief  Scout.  With  the  exception  of  one  every  Chief  Scout  since 
1953  has  been  a  serving  member  of  the  I.  R.  A.  Moreover  the  power 
of  the  office  increased  during  the  1950s,  ironically  as  a  result  of 
the  achievements  of  Bell.  A  Chief  Scout  remained  accountable  to 
the  Ard  Fheis  in  theory  but  in  practice  was  never  called  to 
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account.  Having  sole  authority  to  appoint  and  dismiss  his  staff 
he  controlled  the  organisation  almost  unchallenged.  If  the  Army 
could  control  the  Ard  Thaoiseach,  it  controlled  the  Fianna. 
At  the  1953  Ard  Fheis  MacCurtain  was  succeeded  by  Ned  Kelly,  a 
young  officer  of  the  I.  R.  A.  's  Dublin  Brigade.  The  Army  Council 
assumed  that  their  control  would  be  secure  with  his  election,  but 
in  fact  it  was  Kelly  himself  who  challenged  their  authority  and  re- 
opened  the  old  questions  of  Fianna's  role  and  relationship  with  the 
Senior  movement.  The  controversy  was  to  dominate  his  own  term  of 
office  and  dictate  the  election  of  his  two  successors. 
QUESTIONS  OF  LEADERSHIP 
Kelly  was  an  able  and  sympathetic  youth  leader  who  commanded 
a  loyalty  from  his  boys  similar  to  that  which  had  marked  the  Fianna 
under  Bell.  He  was  indeed  strongly  influenced  by  Bell  and  shared 
his  view  of  Fianna's  role.  He  also  emulated  his  success  in 
55 
broadening  the  organisation's  appeal  by  making  it  more  'open'  -  to 
this  end,  for  example,  he  established  a  parents'  day  at  the  annual 
summer  camps56.  He  believed  strongly  in  scouting  as  a  social 
training  for  young  people,  as  envisaged  by  Baden-Powell  whom  he  held 
in  high  regard.  These  considerations  alone  would  have  prompted  him 
to  guard  Fianna's  independence.  But  in  addition,  as  an  Army  man  he 
had  watched  at  close  hand  the  divisions  growing  inside  the  I.  R.  A. 
and  knew  the  danger  of  Fianna  being  drawn  into  them.  Already  fac- 
tions  were  looking  to  the  Scouts  for  allegiance,  with  promises  or 266 
threats.  His  fear  was  that  Fianna  might  itself  be  split  and  that 
boys  and  parents  could  be  scared  off.  With  its  unique  history 
and  Constitution  Fianna  had  always  remained  apart  from  and  accept- 
able  to  all  factions  within  the  movement,  and  Kelly  considered  it 
vital  to  maintain  this  independence. 
He  therefore  actively  resisted  the  early  transfer  of  his  best 
officers  to  the  I.  R.  A.  Early  in  1955  he  contacted  his  local  slua 
o/cs  encouraging  them  to  sever  links  with  the  Army  units  in  their 
areas  and  informing  them  that  the  matter  would  be  debated  at  the 
spring  Ard  Fheis. 
At  the  same  time,  weapon  training  and  field  craft  practice 
with  live  rounds  had  been  introduced  to  selected  boys  of  junior 
age57.  This  development  apparently  began  the  previous  summer  after 
fiannai  had  been  allowed  to  attend  the  I.  R.  A.  's  national  training 
camp  as  cooks  and  orderlies.  It  is  claimed  that  when  these  boys 
were  found  handling  weapons  it  was  decided  that  they  should  receive 
formal  weapon  training  for  their  own  safety. 
The  Army  Council  were  uneasy  at  the  introduction  of  military 
training  and  the  signs.  of  growing  independence,  and  detailed  three 
Fianna  officers  to  keep  them  informed  of  developments58.  On  the 
basis  of  the  reports  they  received  and  with  a  majority  on  the 
Council  already  opposed  to  Kelly59,  the  decision  was  taken  to 
courtmartial  him.  The  main  charge  was  that  of  permitting  boys  to 
train  with  weapons;  lesser  charges,  including  embezzling  Fianna 
funds  and  failing  to  ensure  that  boys  on  camp  attended  Sunday  Mass, 
were  aimed  at  damaging  his  character  and  eroding  the  loyalty  he 
commanded60.  His  courtmartial  was  the  Council's  method  of  clear- 
ing  the  ground  for  replacing  him  with  their  own  man. 
After  the  verdict  he  was  instructed  to  convene  an  extraordinary 
Ard  Fheis.  The  meeting  was  attended  by  thirty-four  delegates  as 267 
well  as  Tony  Magan  and  the  I.  R.  A.  's  Dublin  Brigade  Recruitment 
Officer  Seoirse  Dean  e61.  Dear  le  had  never  been  a  member  of 
Fianna  but  he  had  successful  experience  of  scouting  in  the  C.  B.  S.  I. 
and  Magan  argued  the  case  for  him  as  Kelly's  successor.  The  dele- 
gates,  many  of  whom  had  dual  loyalties,  insisted  on  a  secret  bal- 
lot.  The  result  was  a  conclusive  rejection  of  Dearle  who  received 
only  five  votes. 
Kelly  declined  to  accept  his  election  to  office  and  urged  that 
an  Ard  Choiste  be  appointed  in  a  caretaker  capacity  pending  the  elec- 
tion  of  a  successor.  This  body  would  be  composed  of  adult  ex- 
members  and  would  be  an  advisory  group  only,  without  executive 
powers 
62. 
His  suggestion  was  adopted  and  nominations  for  the  Ard 
Choiste  were  taken,  with  provision  for  further  co-option  later. 
He  then  formally  resigned  his  office.  Most  sluaite  refused 
to  accept  his  resignation,  and  a  number  of  boys  -  including  a 
specially  selected  troop  from  Dublin  whom  he  had  groomed  as  future 
leaders  -  urged  him  to  set  up  a  'Countess  Markievicz  Club'  in 
defiance  of  the  Council.  He  refused,  adamant  that  he  would  make 
a  clean  break  from  the  movement.  The  boys  continued  to  meet  at 
his  home  but  there  was  no  way  forward  for  them  in  Republican  scout- 
ing;  eventually  they  all  followed  him  into  the  C.  B.  S.  I. 
Two  months  after  the  extraordinary  general  meeting  the  Army 
Council  called  a  full  Ard  Fheis,  which  Kelly  attended  as  an  in- 
vited  guest.  Dearle  was  elected  Ard  Thaoiseach  in  what  was,  as  he 
himself  admits,  "quite  bluntly  a  takeover  by  the  Army"63.  Kelly 
read  out  a  prepared  statement  signed  by  all  members  of  the  Ard 
Choiste  intimating  their  acceptance  of  the  Ard  Fheis  decisions  and 
their  resignation  "in  the  interests  of  peace  and  unity" 
64 
. 
Some  weeks  earlier,  however,  Gear6id  6  Ceallaigh  -  as  the  most 268 
senior  member  of  the  Ard  Choiste  -  had  volunteered  to.  take  on  the 
office  of  Chief  Scout  in  order  "to  save  Fianna's  name  and  pay  its 
debts"65.  He  claims  that  the  proposal  was  accepted  by  his  col- 
leagues,  although  even  if  so  such  a  ratification  would  have  had  no 
validity,  given  the  status  of  the  committee.  Before  the  election 
of  Dearle  he  had  already  in  effect  installed  himself  Chief  of  a 
breakaway  organisation  under  the  name  'Fianna'.  The  new  movement 
sought  to  "restore  the  original  aims  of  the  Countess  and  Hobson". 
It  supported  three  sluaite  in  Dublin  and  a  fourth  at  Droichead 
Nuadh  and,  though  it  never  exceeded  200  members,  survived  in  its 
isolation  for  almost  eight  years.  In  autumn  1962 
0 
Ceallaigh  was 
ambushed  at  night  by  three  Fianna  officers  and  tarred  and  feathered 
at  gun-point.  If  the  attack  was  intended  to  ridicule  him  and  his 
scouts  it  succeeded  -  he  was  sixty-one  and  badly  shaken;  he  "deci- 
ded  he  had  had  enough". 
Dearle's  term  of  office  proved  as  controversial  as  the  manner 
of  his  election66.  He  discovered  that  Fianna  was  "organisationally 
a  bit  of  a  joke"  but  his  attempts  to  increase  efficiency  met  with 
the  same  local  resistance  as  his  efforts  to  eliminate  military 
training  and  re-emphasise  camp-craft.  Ill  will  was  especially 
strong  in  Dublin  where  personal  loyalty  to  Kelly  had  been  greatest. 
Furthermore,  the  factions  that  had  threatened  Fianna  under  his  pre- 
decessor  still  divided  the  movement 
67. 
Under  the  circumstances 
the  Army  Council  concluded  that  the  only  solution  to  Fianna's  con- 
tinuing  leadership  crisis  lay  in  electing  a  G.  H.  Q.  staff  untouched 
by  the  internal  politics  of  the  movement  in  the  capital.  They  made 
their  move  at  the  1957  Ard  Fheis. 
The  two  nominees  for  the  post  of  Chief  Scout  that  year  were 
Frank  Leigh  of  Dublin  and  Paddy  Madden  of  Cork.  It  was  calculated 269 
before  the  meeting  that  Leigh  commanded  the  vote  of  the  majority  of 
delegates,  but  many  switched  support  after  the  Army  Council's 
representative  Mick  McCarthy  let  it  be  known  that  "the  I.  R.  A. 
believed  that  Madden  should  get  the  post".  Madden  was  elected  by 
a  decisive  majority68, 
He  appointed  a  G.  H.  Q.  staff  from  his  own  city  Battalion,  with 
Alfie  Lane  Adjutant  and  his  own  brother  John  Quartermaster.  Dub- 
lin  was  given  semi-autonomous  status  as  a  'Leinster  Division'  and 
remained  geographically  the  centre  of  the  organisation,  the  monthly 
rendezvous  for  Headquarters  Staff,  Dublin  officers  and  representa- 
tives  from.  the  North.  The  system  worked  well  enough  for  Madden 
to  accept  a  second  term  of  office,  which  however  he  was  forced  to 
curtail  due  to  his  pressing  duties  as  county  Training  Officer  in 
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the  senior  movement. 
With  his  resignation  the  leadership  returned  to  Dublin.  But 
the  period  in  Cork  had  taken  the  heat  out  of  the  disputes  of  the 
early  1950s.  Fianna  had  tightened  its  ranks.  The  question  of 
its  relationship  with  the  I.  R.  A.  was  put  aside  for  the  time  being, 
and  incoming  Chief  Scout  Jimmy  Cruise  enjoyed  a  term  of  office 
largely  free  of  controversy70 
FIANNA  IN  THE  '56  CAMPAIGN 
By  1954  the  patient  rebuilding  of  the  Republican  movement  was 
beginning  to  show  results.  The  successful  raid  on  Gough  Barracks 
and  the  daring  failure  at  Omagh  gave  it  a  new  momentum  that  was 
reflected  in  the  Sinn  Fein  vote  in  the  Westminster  and  the  Southern 
local  elections  the  following  summer 
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The  mood  of  the  1955 
Army  Convention  showed  that  "the  events  of  the  previous  year  had 
transformed  the  I.  R.  A.  ...  What  everyone  felt  was  that  the  momen- 
tum  could  not  now  be  stopped.  The  Army  was  on  the  move"72.  By 270 
May  1956  the  Army  Council  believed  that  it  was  ready  and  the  politi- 
cal  climate  right  for  a  military  campaign  in  the  North.  They 
spent  the-autumn  raising  and  training  the  Northern  units  and  the 
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four  mobile  columns  which  would  spearhead  the  operation, 
Fianna  also  profited  from  the  Omagh  and  Armagh  raids.  The 
Belfast  sluaite,  for  instance,  which  had  almost  collapsed  in  1952, 
fully  recovered  their  former  strength  by  the  autumn  of  1954  despite 
pursuing  a  policy  of  strict  selection74.  But  over  the  country 
gains  were  erratic,  being  offset  in  some  areas  by  losses  brought 
about  by  the  divisions  within  the  movement.  The  Dublin  Battalion 
in  particular  suffered  from  the  Army's  Joe  Cristle  split  in  the 
summer  of  1956  though  it  remained  intact  and  independent  of  the  fac- 
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tions 
The  Campaign  was  launched  on  11  December.  It  has  been  des- 
cribed  as  a  disaster  that  petered  out  within  weeks76.  It  is  true 
that  arrests  in  the  first  month  took  away  most  of  the  Army  Council 
and  G.  H.  Q.  staff  and  that  in  their  absence  the  military  initiative 
was  lost 
?  7. 
But  the  political  wing  of  the  movement  remained  buoy- 
ant,  commanding  high  polls  and  vast  demonstrations  and  newspaper 
sales  through  the  spring  and  summer  of  195778. 
From  the  start  of  the  Campaign  Fianna's  membership  rose  and 
new  sluaite  were  established.  Forty-six  branches  were  represented 
at  the  Ard  Fheis  of  December  1957,  the  National  Secretary  reporting 
"a  considerable  increase  in  strength  over  the  past  year"79. 
Reasonable  momentum  was  held  into  the  winter  of  1958  despite  the 
Army's  diminishing  success,  with  at  least  three  dozen  sluaite  still 
parading,  including  eight  in  Dublin  and  a  similar  number  in  the 
80 
North 
On  the  other  hand  the  youth  organisation  failed  to  match  its 
potential  for  expansion  due  to  a  shortage  of  local  leaders.  For 271 
several  years  it  had  neglected  the  training  of  its  own  officers81, 
and  now  the  traditional  loss  of  its  officers  to  the  Army  was 
exacerbated  by  the  build-up  of  the  latter  before  and  during  the 
Campaign82.  Several  men  until  recently  holding  leadership  posi- 
tions  in  Fianna  now  held  prominent  senior  posts,  the  most  notable 
being  Noel  Kavanagh  now  o/c  of  one  of  the  I.  R.  A.  's  mobile  attack 
columns.  Officers  of  the  Lurgan  and  Derry  sluaite  were  either  on 
active  service  or  on  the  run.  And  in  the  Army's  severest  loss  of 
the  Campaign,  when  four  volunteers  were  blown  up  by  their  own  mine 
at  Edentubber  in  November  1957,  one  of  the  victims  -  Paul  Smith  - 
was  a  serving  Fianna  officer  and  a  second  -  Oliver  Craven  -a 
recent  recruit  from  the  Scouts83  Most  damaging  of  all,  twenty  of 
the  Dublin  Fianna  Battalion  staff  were  arrested  at  a  training  camp 
at  Colencree  in  the  autumn  of 
With  the  loss  of  officer; 
were  promoted  and  the  average 
Cruise  was  only  nineteen  when 
and  in  addition  undertook  the 
195784 
s  in  many  areas  inexperienced  youths 
age  of  the  leadership  fell.  Jimmy 
elected  Chief  Scout  in  autumn  1958 
role  of  acting  o/c  of  two  Dublin 
sluaite  which  otherwise  would  have  collapsed85.  In  several  areas 
it  proved  impossible  to  maintain  existing  sluaite  or  to  open  new 
branches  to  meet  demand,  and  elsewhere  many  a  potential  recruit  was 
lost  because  parents  hesitated  to  commit  their  sons  to  the  care  of 
teenage  leaders. 
In  September  1958  the  Campaign  suffered  a  severe  setback  with 
the  loss  of  Chief-of-Staff  Sean  Cronin.  Momentum  was  irretrievably 
lost.  The  following  spring  a  major  feud  broke  out  within  the  Army 
leadership  with  the  loss  of  good  men.  By  the  winter  the  "rot  of 
defeatism"  had  set  in86  -  with  the  nationalist  public  disenchanted, 
safe  houses  scarce  and  the  police  vigilant  on  both  sides  of  the 
Border,  some  harrassed  units  were  hard  put  to  remain  intact  at  all. 272 
Without  the  assistance  of  the  adult  movement  or  any  resources 
of  their  own,  the  Scouts  were  unable  to  use  their  Silver  Jubilee 
to  mount  a  serious  recruiting  drive87.  They  were  themselves  now 
under  surveillance  in  all  areas  and  a  number  of  reports  of  police 
harrassment  appeared  in  the  Republican  press.  The  Finglas  slua 
was  watched  repeatedly  by  Special  Branch  throughout  1960  and  before 
the  end  of  the  year  all  the  Dublin  branches  were  reported  to  be 
under  constant  observation88.  The  Six  Counties  sluaite,  especially 
those  near  the  Border,  suffered  similarly.  Surveillance  had  long 
been  an  everyday  fact  of  life  for  the  Belfast  Brigade  in  peace  or 
war  -  it  ie  said  that  the  Branch  trained  new  recruits  by  giving 
them  Fianna  assignments;  it  was  therefore  not  particularly  intensi- 
fied  during  the  Campaign.  Although  city  sluaite  had  been  used  to 
check  targets  during  1956,  the  Campaign  was  so  planned  as  to  ex- 
clude  military  actions  in  the  Belfast  area  and  once  it  had  begun 
the  boys  had  little  part  to  play  except  as  carriers89.  With  a 
number  of  its  officers  including  the  o/c  interned,  the  Brigade  was 
in  fact  probably  less  active  between  1957  and  1962  than  in  the 
years  of  peace  before  and  after 
90 
By  the  autumn  of  1961  the  Campaign  was  all  but  dead  in  the 
North;  the  Military  Tribunal  had  been  re-introduced  in  the  South, 
where  the  Dail  elections  gave  a  stark  indication  of  the  movement's 
dwindling  support.  Fianna,  under  the  leadership  of  Brian  6  Murchü 
for  the  past  year91,  was  reduced  in  membership  by  about  half  with 
only  six  sluaite  still  operating  in  the  Republic  outside  of  Dub- 
92 
lin.  The  United  Irishman  carried  an  optimistic  report  of  the 
September  Ard  Fheis:  "In  the  opinion  of  long-serving  members  this 
was  the  most  successful  Oireachtas  for  many  years  ... 
The  Adju- 
tant  General's  report  showed  that  there  is  a  100%  improvement  in 273 
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the  organisation,  in  all  its  aspects,  over  the  previous  year"  . 
It  was  an  optimism  akin  to  that  of  the  I.  R.  A.  's  own  public  state- 
ments  at  the  time  and  bore  little  resemblance  to  reality. 
The  Army  Council  were  in  fact  already  considering  a  cease- 
fire94,  though  another  five  months  passed  before  they  finally  de- 
clared  it  in  February  1962. 
THE  CHARACTER  OF  FIANNA  IN  THE  MIDDLE  YEARS 
By  its  self-exclusion  from  parliamentary  politics  from  the 
1920s  and  its  gradual  isolation  from  the  political  mainstream  there- 
after,  the  Republican  movement  (whose  policies  had  commanded  the 
support  of  the  great  majority  of  Irish  people  in  1921)  was  driven 
increasingly  to  take  on  the  role  and  character  of  an  extremist 
minority.  It  neither  sought  nor  enjoyed  a  mandate  from  the  people 
but  took  its  authority  from  a  bygone  Dail  and  an  immutable  prin- 
ciple.  Its  ultimate  mission  remained  the  restoration  of  the  be- 
trayed  Republic  by  force  of  arms,  in  preparation  for  which  it  saw 
its  immediate  tasks  as  training  for  the  day  and  handing  on  the 
Republican  ideal. 
But  as  the  rest  of  Ireland  came  to  accept  parliamentary  demo- 
cracy  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  state  its  own  intransigence  became 
increasingly  unrealistic,  and  from  the  1930s  to  the  1960s  made  it 
the  willing  victim  of  successive  anti-Republican  legislation95. 
Disillusion  with  the  high  and  seemingly  fruitless  price  of  member- 
ship,  dwindling  support,  recrimination  and  faction  were  the  in- 
evitable  results96.  Bypassed  by.  the  present,  its  consolation  was 
to  see  itself  as  the  true  remnant  keeping  pure  and  uncompromised 
faith  with  the  past. 
A  note  of  make-believe,  in  which  the  wish  was  made  the  real- 
ity,  came  to  mark  its  propaganda.  Past  Republicans  were  canonised; 274 
present  rulers  were  dismissed  as  fools  or  knaves  and  their  positive 
initiatives  as  political  stunts  at  best97;  its  own  future  triumph 
was  inevitable  since,  no  matter  how  few,  "the  angels  were  all  on 
one  side"98 
In  turn,  Fianna  reflected  the  senior  movement  in  the  middle 
years.  Its  role  had  been  defined  from  1923  as  being  to  support 
the  movement  in  its  mission  to  restore  the  Republic,  firstly  by  re- 
cruiting  and  training  boys  for  the  Army,  and  secondly  by  schooling 
some  of  each  new  generation  in  the  Republican  ideal99.  But  in 
fact  by  the  late  1930s  its  recruiting  role  had  become  largely  in- 
effectual,  -in  Dublin  particularly100,  while  the  staple  training  it 
offered  in  the  peripherally  military  skills  of  drill  and  scouting 
was  now  of  little  real  value  to  a  changing  Army.  In  the  South, 
at  least,  its  first  role  was  no  longer  usually  considered 
seriously,  and  where  it  had  declined  the  second,  educational  role 
rose  by  comparison.  Each  new  generation  still  learned  by  rote 
the  rudiments  of  Irish  language  and  Republican  history,  the  gospel 
of  the  martyrs  and  its  own  obligations,  in  order  to  be  "worthy  of 
all  the  noble  and  sacred  traditions  of  Fianna,  of  its  inheritance 
bequeathed  by  the  boys  of  '16  and  '23  ...  ready  to  hand  on  the 
torch  to  the  coming  generation"101. 
The  Scouts  stood  as  the  visible  proof  of  the  perpetuation  of 
the  ideal.  But  because  of  this,  they  had  come  in  time  to  exist 
in  the  mind  of  the  adult  movement  less  as  an  organisation  of  flesh- 
and-blood  people  with  day-to-day  processes  and  problems  than  as  a 
symbol  and  rallying  point,  to  be  paraded  on  the  Republican  feast 
days  and  forgotten  between-times102.  Their  continued  existence 
remained  unquestioned  latterly  not  because  of  their  real  effective- 
ness  but  through  a  belief  among  adult  Republicans  that  "you  had  to 275 
have  Fianna  in  the  movement"103,  But  such  a  role  concept  formed 
no  sound  basis  for  the  constructive  development  of  the  youth  organi- 
sation.  It  accounts  for  the  failure  to  create  any  serious  machin- 
ery  for  support  and  -liaison  in  the  post-Civil  War  era,  and  Fianna's 
extraordinary  neglect  by  the  senior  movement  nationally,  which  often 
co-existed  with  a  high  degree  of  sentimental  regard  and  support  for 
it  at  a  local  and  personal  level 
104. 
The  Scouts  also  faithfully  mirrored  the  diminution  and  lower- 
ing  of  standards  that  befell  the  Republican  movement  from  the 
second  half  of  the  1930s,  the  damage  done  to  it  by  internment,  and 
its  self-inflicted  wounds  of  the  1940s  and  1950s,  so  that  -  despite 
the  achievements  of  Bell  and  others  -  they  never.  recaptured  the 
numbers,  momentum  or  morale  of  pre-war  days105. 
Like  the  parent  movement,  also,  they  were  inclined  to  become 
106 
super-purists,  turning  the  high  morality  of  the  Code  and  Motto 
into  a  moral  superiority.  In  some  sluaite  a  court  conviction, 
even  for  truancy,  brought  instant  dismissal107,  Fianna's  own 
courtmartial  system,  which  appears  to  dominate  its  thinking  by 
1960108,  symbolised  the  impeding  and  introspective  obsession  with 
purity.  But  in  a  changing  Ireland  the  strict  and  Gaelic  environ- 
went  fostered  by  the  adult  leaders  often  held  less  appeal  for  boys 
than  the  "soccer,  jazz  and  foolish  plays" 
109 
that  they  derided. 
Fianna  shared  the  escapism  to  which  the  movement  was  subject 
in  that  it  made  the  wish  of  its  own  destiny  and  importance  the 
reality.  The  deception  allowed  it  to  find  significance  even  in 
its  own  insignificance,  in  that  its  very  minuteness  stood  as  proof 
that  its  boys  were  "the  few"  who  carried  the  flame 
110: 
"if  they  saw 
few  around  them  on  parade  they  only  had  to  look  back,  to  Markievicz, 
1 
Mellows,  Heuston  and  Colbert,  and  all  was  well" 
11, 
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therefore  frequently  restrospective,  its  concepts  reiterative. 
Significantly,  no  attempt  was  made  to  revise  its  1924  Handbook  for 
forty  years.  Its  literature  in  the  1930s  largely  comprised  often 
verbatim  repetition  of  pre-Rising  publications 
111, 
and  twenty-five 
years  later  its  notes  in  the  Republican  press  were  still  repeating 
old  refrains  with  much  psychological  comfort  and  scarcely  a  forward- 
looking  thought113.  The  Fianna  ideal  could  still  "save  the 
future".  The  ideal  might  be  valid  yet,  but  times  had  changed  and 
with  them  Fianna's  hope  of  influencing  'the  future'  one  way  or 
another  in  Ireland.  The  organisation  was  still  doing  fine  work 
for  a  few  young  people  against  heavy  odds,  but  conceptually  it  was 
atrophied  long  since  :  convinced  of  its  mission,  fettered  by  ritual, 
and  fixated  upon  its  own  heroic  age. 
The  Republican-movement's  commitment  to  physical  force  on  the 
authority  of  a  bygone  D6il  and  irrespective  of  the  will  of  the 
Irish  people,  its  self-exclusion  from  the  political  mainstream  and 
its  "absolute  inability  to  read  anyone's  mind  but  its  own",  had  led 
directly  to  the  1956  Campaign  and  to  its  failure114.  Defeat  would 
now  lead  it  to  self-analysis  and  re-appraisal.  And  re-appraisal 
would  lead  it  to  a  radical  metamorphosis  from  within,  which  would 
have  crucial  implications  for  its  adult  sections  and  its  youth  wing 
alike. 277 
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Chapter  9.  THE  YEARS  OF  CHANGE  (1962-1969) 
REBUILDING 
In  the  spring  of  1962  the  Republican  movement  was  at  its  low- 
est  ebb  since  the  1940s,  and  "seethed  with  bitter  faction  and  the 
advanced  rot  of  despair"1.  The  failure  of  the  Northern  Campaign 
and  the  ceasefire  in  February  had  brought  about  dissention  within 
the  movement  itself,  desertions  from  its  ranks,  and  disenchantment 
among  all  but  its  staunchest  supporters.  Its  military  and  poli- 
tical  wings.  were  in  dispute  and  in  the  Army  itself  the  old  power 
holders  found  their  views  irreconcilable  with  those  of  the  new. 
So  much  was  apparent  at  the  Army's  autumn  convention:  "it  was  clear 
to  all  that  for  many  the  I.  R.  A.  held  no  further  charms.  During 
the  years  in  prison  or  on  the  run  they  had  discovered  alternatives, 
political  or  personal,  forsaken  violence  if  not  their  beliefs,  and 
withdrawn  into  private  life  or  the  blurred  periphery  of  Republican 
activities  ...  there  were  many  familiar  faces  missing.  It  was 
not  a  happy  convention"2.  The  position  was  perhaps  worst  in  Bel- 
fast.  There  was  not  a  single  volunteer  in  the  city  when  A.  McM. 
was  released  from  jail  in  19613,  and  the  Belfast  Brigade  Commandant 
has  stated  that  after  the  ceasefire  the  I.  R.  A.  was  "just  a  joke"  in 
his  area  -  "nobody  wanted  to  know  about  it"4 
As  usual,  the  state  of  Fianna  mirrored  that  of  the  adult 
movement.  Recruitment  to  the  youth  wing  depended  in  general  upon 
the  climate  of  public  opinion  towards  Republicanism  and  in  parti- 
cular  upon  the  attitudes  of  the  parental  generation  within  the 
movement.  Moreover,  since  at  this  time  the  day-to-day  organisa- 
tion  of  sluaite  was  in  many  areas  left  in  the  hands  of  the  local 
I.  R.  A. 
$ 
their  very  existence  depended  upon  the  continued  local 
presence  of  the  Army. 284 
Yet  in  the  immediate  post-campaign  period  Fianna  was  quicker 
to  recover  and  rebuild  than  the  I.  R.  A.  itself.  "Finance  was  the 
secret",  according  to  Sean  0  Cionnaith  who  was  chiefly  responsible 
for  its  growth  at  this  time6.  In  the  autumn  of  1962  Paddy  Fitz- 
maurice  had  been  sent  from  London  to  become  National  Organiser. 
The  difficulties  were  considerable  and  he  remained  for  six  months 
only.  The  leadership  envisaged  the  post  as  combining  organisation 
and  fund-raising,  and  the  decision  to  give  it  to  6  Cionnaith  was 
based  on  his  proven  flair  for  both.  He  had  played  a  leading  part 
in  successful  fund-raising  while  o/c  of  the  London  slua  and  was 
expected  to-do  the  same  in  Ireland.  G.  H.  Q.  were  determined  that 
Fianna  should  be  made  financially  independent  of  the  Army.  Upon 
his  appointment  they  set  up  a  Department  of  Associate  Membership? 
with  the  same  explicit  purpose  of  giving  it  an  indepencence  of 
"other  organisations"  that  it  had  lacked  hitherto,  and  thus  a 
greater  immunity  from  fluctuation  in  their  fortuness.  At  the 
same  time  he  was  detailed  to  re-develop  the  national  structure  which 
had  fallen  apart  in  the  latter  stage  of  the  campaign. 
6  Cionnaith's  post  was  full-time  with  a  salary  of  £5  per  week. 
His  base  was  Cashel,  from  where  he  covered  the  South  and  West,  par- 
ticularly  the  counties  of  Galway,  Clare,  Kerry,  Cork,  Tipperary  and 
Wexford,  using  billets  and  transport  provided  by  local  Army  units, 
as  well  as  his  bicycle,  as  Fianna  organisers  before  him  had  done. 
He  avoided  areas,  such  as  Waterford,  where  the  I.  R.  A.  was  weak  or 
for  any  reason  unable  to  help.  There  were  strong  reasons  for  his 
making  no  attempt  to  organise  in  the  Six  Counties:  Fianna  was  non- 
existent  in  Belfast  at  this  time,  its  illegal  status  in  the  North 
would  have  hampered  an  itinerant  organiser,  and  above  all  the  move- 
ment  was  anxious  not  to  jeopardise  the  campaign  for  the  release  of 
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In  practice  fund-raising,  organisation  and  recruiting  went 
together.  The  contacts  made  seeking  financial  support  also  devel- 
oped  goodwill  and  enthusiasm,  in  some  areas  resulting  in  the 
foundation  of  sluaite.  Thus  some  of  the  new  branches  set  up  -  at 
Mitchelstown9,  Cork  City 
10, 
Limerick  and  Galway 
11 
-  clearly  reflec- 
ted  the  itinerary  of  the  national  organiser. 
Ö  Cionnaith  never- 
theless  encountered  certain  problems.  Disruption  of  the  adult 
movement  had  left  Fianna  short  of  senior  personnel,  resulting  in 
a  very  young  local  and  national  leadership.  It  was  not  unknown 
for  a  sixteen  year  old  to  be  in  charge  of  a  G.  H.  Q.  department. 
This  had  its  effect  in  terms  of  experience  and  competence,  but 
equally  damaging  for  an  organisation  which  was  at  best  suspect  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Law  it  made  for  wildness  at  a-time  when  the  move- 
ment  needed  restraint.  He  therefore  recognised  the  need  to  estab- 
lish  a  mature  organisational  structure  whenever  a  slua  was  founded 
-  in  practice  this  involved  the  local  Army  unit  taking  care  of  the 
boys. 
Despite  these  obstacles  the  Republican  leadership  considered 
that  he  had  met  with  "tremendous  success" 
12, 
prompting  G.  H.  Q.  to 
appoint  three  further  full-time  organisers  during  the  spring  of 
196413.  With  them  he  completed  a  collection  of  £1,200,  enabling 
premises  to  be  rented  in  Dublin  and  a  new  Handbook  to  be  published, 
the  first  in  forty  years.  The  elation  with  which  its  publication 
was  announced14  indicated  the  part  it  was  to  play  in  bringing  uni- 
fortuity  and  financial  stability  to  a  small-scale  and  impoverished 
organisation. 
The  appointments  allowed  0  Cionnaith  to  undertake  new  duties 
in  Dublin  in  the  spring  of  1964.  At  its  March  meeting  the  Ard 
Choiste  accepted  the  resignation  of  Uinsionn  0  Cathain  as  Chief 286 
Scout  and  appointed 
6  Cionnaith  to  the  post  pending  the  Ard  Fheis15. 
The  capital  was  a  growth  area  at  this  time  with  new  sluaite  in 
North  City16,  Cabra,  Rathmines  and  Raheny17,  and  over  the  Twenty- 
six  Counties  Fianna  now  numbered  perhaps  400  members.  Expansion 
18 
engendered  a  new  optimism  and  the  November  Ard  Fheis  was  considered 
"the  most  successful  held  for  many  years"19.  The  delegates  for- 
wally  elected  0  Cionnaith  Chief  Scout,  a  post  he  held  however  for 
only  five  months  before  being  sent  to  England  as  the  first  National 
Organiser  of  the  newly  founded  Clann  na  hEireann  in  March  196520. 
Just  as  the  '56  Campaign  had  damaged  the  adult  movement  more 
severely  in-Belfast  than  elsewhere,  so  Fianna  suffered  most  in  the 
city.  Indeed  from  the  last  years  of  the  campaign  until  1965  it 
had  ceased  to  exist  at  all21.  Late  in  that  year  a  group  of  some 
dozen  boys  approached  the  I.  R.  A.  Brigade  leadership  to  request  its 
re-formation22.  They  were  all  from  Republican  families  and  the 
sons  of  Army  men;  all  were  aged  thirteen  to  fourteen  years.  In 
response  to  their  request  the  Commandant  approached  A.  McM.  to 
organise  them.  McM.  was  well  experienced  for  the  role,  having 
previously  held  the  post  of  unit  o/c  from  the  end  of  internment  in 
the  1940s  until  himself  interned  in  1957.  He  held  an  exploratory 
meeting  at  the  Dal  Hall  in  Divis  Street  attended  by  some  thirty 
boys.  From  it  a  slua  was  founded  early  in  1966  to  serve  the  hous- 
ing  estates  at  the  top  of  Falls  Road.  A  second  was  added  later  in 
the  year  in  the  Ardoyne,  and  the  following  year  branches  were 
23 
organised  in  the  Lower  Falls  and  the  Bombay  Street  area  of  Kashmir 
Road24.  Membership  was  low,  averaging  perhaps  a  dozen  boys  per 
slua. 
McM.  considered  it  desirable  that  the  boys  should  as  far  as 
possible  organise  themselves  and  for  this  purpose  he  established 287 
Officers'  Training  classes  with  drill  and  semaphore  and  later 
weaponry  and  engineering.  He  impressed  upon  the  members  that  the 
prime  role  of  Belfast  Fianna  should  be  to  produce  officer  material 
for  the  I.  R.  A. 
25. 
This  aim  was  amply  fulfilled  for  from  among  the 
boys  gathered  at  the  inaugural  meeting  would  emerge  most  of  the 
city's  Fianna  and  Army  leaders  in  the  years  following  196926, 
The  Jubilee  of  the  Rising,  1966,  did  not  bring  any  significant 
upsurge  of  recruiting  to  the  Republican  movement.  Membership  had 
in  fact  continued  to  decline  after  the  ceasefire,  while  the  criti- 
cally  declining  support  reached  its  nadir  about  Jubilee  year  when 
monthly  sales  of  The  United  Irishman  slumped  to  14,000  from  nearly 
ten  times  that  figure  a  decade  before27.  Fianna  on  the  other 
hand  considerably  extended  the  progress  of  the  past  three  years. 
It  marked  the  anniversary  with  a  major  demonstration  in  Dublin  and 
Belfast,  and  set  up  a  dozen  new  sluaite  during  the  summer,  from  the 
east  coast  to  Carraroe  and  from  Tipperary  to  Donegal28.  Expansion 
in  the  West  was  such  that  it  was  possible  to  establish  a  Battalion 
in  Mayo  -  Galway,  with  six  sluaite  and  a  total  membership  of 
ninety 
29. 
From  the  movement's  incomplete  files  and  contemporary  Fianna 
publications  it  is  possible  to  compile  a  list  of  branches  in  exis- 
tence  in  the  Twenty-Six  Counties  at  this  date.  G.  H.  Q.  records 
name  twenty-four30,  to  which  should  be  added  seven  of  those  estab- 
lished  during  the  summer  as  well  as  two  other  Dublin  branches  and 
at  least  one  in  the  Country31.  Slua  membership  varied  greatly  - 
the  units  of  the  Dublin  Battalion  for  instance  ranged  from  ten  mem- 
bers  in  Slua  Cathal  Brugha,  North  City,  to  forty-three  in  Slua 
McKee-Ashe  in  the  strong  Fianna  district  of  Finglas32.  Total  mem- 
bership  in  the  Republic  might  be  conservatively  estimated  at  600. 288 
In  the  North  the  organisation  was  still  largely  confined  to 
Belfast  with  its  thirty  boys.  Despite  several  attempts  it  had 
proved  impossible  to  develop  Derry  beyond  a  small  group  unsupported 
by  the  Army33.  In  Newry,  where  the  slua  had  collapsed  in  1957 
upon  the  arrest  of  nearly  all  senior  members,  a  tenuous  continuity 
had  been  maintained  since  1960  through  a  number  of  Army  men  in  the 
town  who  held  dual  membership.  A  concert  organised  in  1965  to 
raise  funds  for  an  anniversary  monument  introduced  several  new  re- 
cruits,  enabling  a  slua  to  be  set  up  again  in  1967  when  forty  boys 
34 
paraded. 
THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  MOVEMENT  IN  THE  1960s 
Before  the  end  of  the  Border  Campaign  in  1962  the  Army  Execu- 
tive  had  already  drawn  their  own  conclusions  as  to  the  reasons  for 
its  failure.  Announcing  the  ceasefire  they  had  admitted  that  the 
main  factor  determining  their  decision  had  been  the  lack  of  public 
support  for  the  war35. 
Defeat  had  brought  recrimination  and  new  men  to  the  top  with 
fresh  ideas.  Some  of  the  new  leaders  -  notably  the  Army's  Chief- 
of-Staff  Cathal  Goulding,  Sein  Garland,  and  Sinn  F4in  President 
Tomas  MacGiolla36  -  believed  that  the  time  had  come  to  look  again 
at  the  movement  in  an  attempt  to  explain  its  consistent  failure 
to  win  popular  support.  Their  questions  led  them  to  a  fundamen- 
tal  re-appraisal  of  Republicanism  in  the  years  that  followed. 
A  complete  account  of  their  analysis  and  the  radical  changes 
that  it  prompted  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study,  which 
confines  itself  to  defining  those  elements  that  later  directly 
affected  the  movement's  youth  wing. 
The  leadership  believed  that  "the  Irish  Republican  Army  had 
become  remote  from  the  people.  The  people  respected  the  stand 289 
which  they  were  taking  and  indeed  they  cheered  from  the  sidelines. 
But  they  were  spectators  and  not  participants  in  the  Republican 
struggle".  Such  an  "elitist  force,  divorced  from  the  struggles 
of  the  people,  but  calling  on  the  people  to  support  it,  could  never 
win"37.  This  remoteness  was  seen  to  derive  from  "major  weaknesses" 
in  the  Army,  and  in  particular  from  its  lack  of  a  "solid  political 
base  among  the  people"  and  of  a  "clear-cut  ideology  which  could  de- 
fine  to  the  people  what  the  struggle  was  all  about"38.  Without 
the  latter  it  had  failed  to  recognise  the  real  enemy,  attacking  the 
British  military  occupation  of  the  Six  Counties  instead  of  the 
political,  economic  and  cultural  roots  of  British  imperialism  and 
native  collaboration  both  North  and  South39.  From  now  on,  the 
Border  -  which  had  dominated  the  minds  of  Republicans  for  forty 
40 
years  -  should  not  be  considered  the  fundamental  issue  The 
central  objective  should  be  "the  re-conquest  of  Ireland,  not  simply 
to  place  an  Irish  government  in  political  control  of  the  geographi- 
cal  entity  of  Ireland  but  to  place  the  mass  of  the  people  in  actual 
control  of  the  wealth  and  resources  of  the  Irish  nation  and  to  give 
them  a  cultural  identity"41  -  phrases  which  consciously  echoed  the 
socialist  Republicanism  of  Lalor,  Connolly,  The  Sovereign  People  of 
Pearse,  and  the  Democratic  Programme  of  the  first  Dail. 
It  was  recognised  that  mass  support  among  the  people  was  only 
to  be  won  by  giving  them  leadership  in  specific  and  relevant  issues, 
"helping  them  to  fight  their  immediate  struggles  for  jobs,  houses, 
land  and  civil  liberties",  and  explaining  the  connection  of  these 
with  imperialism42.  Economic,  cultural  and  political  struggle 
would  be  supported  and  defended  where  necessary  by  military  action 
43 
. 
In  short,  'Republicanism'  was  to  take  on  a  new  and  far  wider  meaning 
in  terms  of  its  objectives  and  methods. 290 
From  1963  the  task  of  the  radicals  was  to  win  majority  support 
among  the  leadership,  take  the  grass-roots  members  with  them,  and 
so  in  time  change  the  movement  as  a  whole.  To  do  so  would  involve 
a  fundamental  change  of  heart  for  those  whose  tradition  had  been 
intransigence,  preservation  and  'principle',  since  it  would  require 
at  the  outset  a  recognition  that  the  movement  was  not  "sacrosanct" 
but  merely  "a  weapon  or  instrument"  which  if  ineffective  "must  be 
ruthlessly  scrapped  and  a  new  weapon  forged  to  do  the  job"44 
With  the  aim  of  raising  the  political  awareness  of  members 
education  courses  were  established  in  196545.  The  new  concepts 
were  promoted  through  private  and  public  statements,  and  in  parti- 
cular  at  the  annual  orations  in  Bodenstown  which  traditionally  were 
used  to  reflect  current  thinking  and  point  the  way  forward.  The 
old  attitudes  nevertheless  continued  to  predominate  for  several 
years,  most  members  neither  contemplating  change  nor  conscious  of 
the  need  for  regular  political  work  as  opposed  to  occasional 
parades.  By  1967,  with  the  movement  bankrupt  and  in  some  areas 
virtually  extinct46,  it  was  recognised  that  a  new  commitment  to 
work  was  now  imperative  as  a  matter  of  very  survival47.  Goulding 
chose  the  Bodenstown  commemoration  that  year  to  stress  the  need 
for  radical  change48,  and  his  speech  marked  a  turning  point.  The 
local  units  began  increasingly  to  undertake  political  action. 
Through  their  work  in  Tenants'  Associations,  Housing  Action  Groups 
and  Citizens'  Advice  Bureaux  existing  members  became  politicised 
and  a  new  type  of  recruit  was  attracted  to  the  movement  untouched 
by  the  former  attitudes 
49. 
The  new  direction  involved  a  tactical  realism  notably  lacking 
in  the  past.  Strategy  had  previously  been  determined  more  by  a, 
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of  what  was  politically  opportune,  with  the  resultant  military  dis- 
asters  justified  in  terms  of  Pearse's  concept  of  victory  in  defeat 
-  "We  seem  to  have  lost.  We  have  not  lost.  To  refuse  to  fight 
would  have  been  to  lose,  to  fight  is  to  win"50.  In  fact,  as  the 
leadership  saw  it,  the  movement  had  never  given  a  thought  to  winning 
a  war,  but  only  to  starting  one51.  If  in  future  it  was  to  avoid 
"vainglorious  failure  in  another  lost  cause,  fit  only  for  romantic 
balladeers",  they  agreed,  its  tactics  would  need  to  be  founded  not 
only  on  Republican  principles  but  also  on  a  realistic  analysis  of 
the  condition  of  the  country  and  the  people52.  So  the  movement 
took  on  a  new  flexibility  as  the  distinction  came  to  be  drawn  bet- 
ween  the  small  corpus  of  immutable  principles  and  tactics  which  had 
been  elevated  into  principles.  The  latter,  if  judged  to  be  self- 
defeating,  would  be  jettisoned. 
A  prime  case  in  point  was  the  principle  of  parliamentary  absten- 
tion.  An  internal  document  presented  at  the  Army  Convention  of 
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1964  first  recommended  abandoning  the  abstention  rule,  and  the 
change  was  finally  ratified  at  the  1969  Convention.  Recognising 
the  de  facto  existence  of  the  British  and  Irish  parliaments,  though 
emphatically  denying  their  de  jure  authority,  the  intention  of  the 
movement  was  to  contest  elections  and  thus  subvert  them  from  within, 
rather  than  condemn  them  impotently  from  without59. 
The  new  realism  meant  for  Republicans  a  shift  of  attention 
away  from  Pearse's  'spiritual  nation'  to  Connolly's  'exigencies  of 
the  moment'55.  It  implied  also  the  attempt  to  place  their  own 
movement  objectively  in  its  historical  context,  to  replace  myth  with 
history  and  the  old  simplistic  separation  into  good  and  evil  by  an 
analysis  of  cause  and  circumstance.  Hitherto  it  would  have  been  in- 
conceivable,  for  instance,  to  suggest  as  Tomäs  Mac  Giolla  did  at 292 
Bodenstown  in  1969  that  -  apart  from  exceptional  individuals  such 
as  Mellows  -  the  leadership  of  the  opposing  sides  in  the  Civil  War 
had  held  the  same  basic  ideology 
56 
- 
Lastly,  the  new  direction  of  the  movement  implied  the  subordina- 
tion  of  its  military  to  its  political  role.  Traditionally  its 
'political  wing'  had  been  little  more  than  a  support  group  for  the 
Army,  providing  publicity,  finance  and  sanctuary,  but  now  the  roles 
would  be  reversed.  Physical  force  would  still  be  an  essential 
element  of  revolution57,  but  in  future  the  I.  R.  A.  would  be  used  only 
in  defence  of  political  gains,  o.  r  for  offence  only  if  supported  by 
the  great  majority  of  the  people.  In  short,  it  would  be  at  the  dis- 
posal  of  the  political  movement.  Volunteers  would  be  expected  to 
carry  out  regular  political  work  and  could  no  longer  remain  "elite" 
military  men.  As  Garland  pointed  out,  "this  changed  drastically 
the  movement's  traditional  line  of  tactics.  There  were  no  longer 
two  different  types  of  Republicans,  physical  force  men  and  politi- 
.. 
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cians 
The  reversal  of  the  priority  of  military  and  political  roles 
was  matched  by  a  reversal  of  the  old  primacy  of  Army  over  party. 
Since  the  coming  together  of  Sinn  Fein  and  the  I.  R.  A.  in  1948  the 
former  had  remained  in  theory  an  autonomous  party  under  the  authority 
of  its  own  Ard  Fheis  and  Ard  Chomhairle59.  But  in  practice  the  Army 
Council  had  frequently  made  decisions  binding  on  the  whole  movement 
without  referring  to  the  political  wing,  and  had  even  vetted  the 
election  of  the  Ard  Chomhairle  itself.  But  with  the  gradual  politi- 
cisation  of  the  movement  the  need  was  felt  in  the  local  party  cumainn 
for  genuine  decision-making  authority,  and  the  confidence  now  existed 
to  demand  it.  (The  demand  in  any  case  coincided  with  the  wishes  of 
the  Army  leaders  themselves.  )  The  standing  of  the  Sinn  Fein  Ard 293 
Chomhairle  within  the  movement  rose  following  discussions  in  1964, 
and  again  in  1966  when  the  I.  R.  A.  abandoned  the  practice  of  select- 
ing  its  members.  Finally,  in  the  same  year  the  Army  Council 
handed  over  supreme  authority  to  the  party  leadership.  The  author- 
ity  structure  of  the  movement  now  accurately  reflected  the  sub- 
ordination  of  its  military  to  its  political  role.  The  term  'the 
leadership  of  the  movement',  traditionally  a  euphemism  for  the  Army 
Council,  came  in  time  to  be  used  by  Republicans  in  reference  to  the 
Ard  Chomhairle  of  Sinn  Fein. 
FIANNA'S  FAILURE  TO  MATCH  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MOVEMENT 
From  1966  Fianna's  leadership  followed  the  parent  movement  in 
beginning  a  reappraisal  of  their  own  organisation.  In  that  year 
they  held  discussions  with  the  adult  leadership  on  the  question  of 
Fianna's  development,  and  it  was  agreed  that  change  towards  a  more 
political  role  would  be  necessary  sooner  or  later60.  The  matter 
was  not  explored  further  at  the  time,  but  the  general  direction  was 
clear. 
The  traditional  staple  slua  activities  of  scouting,  drill  and 
occasional  parades  would  become  less  important  than  regular  political 
work.  The  educational  programme  would  be  revised  with  an  emphasis 
upon  political,  social  and  economic  training,  particularly  for  senior 
members.  Central,  ideological  control  by  Sinn  Fein  would  in  time 
replace  the  traditional  local  control  by  the  I.  R.  A.  based  on  the 
standing  of  the  Army  and  its  local  commandants. 
In  the  event,  Fianna's  development  in  the  1960s  failed  to  match 
that  of  the  adult  movement.  The  Scouts,  it  is  true,  took  part  in  a 
number  of  political  actions  undertaken  by  Sinn  Fein  and  the  I.  R.  A.  in 
the  South,  including  demonstrations  against  a  Springboks'  rugby 
tour61  and  a  campaign  for  the  public  ownership  of  the  Powerscourt 294 
estate62.  In  1968  they  played  a  part  in  the  demonstration  of  the 
Dublin  Housing  Action  Committee  at  the  city's  annual  St.  Patrick's 
Day  parade;  on  the  decision  of  the  Committee,  which  was  dominated 
by  Sinn  F4in,  the  Fianna  contingent  marching  in  the  parade  was 
chosen  to  make  the  protest,  but  the  fact  that  the  incident  prompted 
a  fierce  dispute  between  the  Scouts  and  the  party  indicates  Fianna's 
failure  to  accept  a  political  role  at  this  date63" 
Members'  education  at  slua  level  was  based  on  the  Fianna  Hand- 
book,  published  at  great  expense  in  1964  and  unlikely  to  be  revised. 
In  a  sense  the  Handbook  had  been  produced  several  years  too  early: 
it  included  no  political  content  whatever  and  in  subject  and  style 
perpetuated  the  romantic  nationalism  of  the  1950s64.  The  decision 
of  G.  H.  Q.  to  include  Casement's  1914  article  on  chivalry  in  it,  and 
the  dispute  with  the  adult  movement  that  this  provoked65,  exemplify 
the  different  stages  of  political  development  of  the  two  organisa- 
tions  at  the  time.  Later  attempts  by  Fianna's  leadership  to 
supplement  the  programme  with  socialist-Republican  material  probably 
had  little  effect  upon  the  grass-roots  members66,  and  by  the  end  of 
the  decade  they  were  obliged  to  concede  that  the  organisation  "had 
no  educational  policy  on  the  political  side  and  was  lagging  behind 
other  branches  of  the  movement  in  these  matters"67. 
Several  factors  may  be  identified  to  explain  Fianna's  failure 
to  develop  politically  during  the  1960s.  In  the  first  place,  it 
lacked  any  political  tradition.  Historically,  its  whole  self- 
concept  was  military.  Its  boys  had  always  been  taught  the  physical 
force  tradition,  taught  their  role  in  rote-learned  military  slogans 
68 
Secondly,  it  lacked  the  necessary  organisational  machinery.  Unlike 
the  adult  movement  it  had  no  'political  wing'  through  which  to  ex- 
press  political  development  in  action.  Most  important,  however,  it 
lacked  guidance  and  encouragement  from  the  parent  movement,  whose 295 
local  and  national  leaders,  with  problems  and  pressures  of  their 
own,  "simply  never  got  round  to  Fianna"  and  remained  largely  un- 
interested  in  and  unaware  of  its  existence 
69" 
FIANNA  FOR  GIRLS 
During  1968  the  question  of  expanding  Fianna  to  include  sluaite 
for  girls  became  a  matter  for  debate.  At  the  Ard  Fheis  in  October 
an  attempt  was  made  to  change  the  constitution  so  as  to  "re-form" 
the  Girl  Scouts,  but  after  discussion  an  amendment  was  carried  "that 
the  matter  be  left  to  the  incoming  Ard  Choiste  and  Ard  Oifig"70 
. 
During  the  following  month  some  members  of  the  executive  held  an  in- 
conclusive  exploratory  meeting  on  the  subject  with  leaders  of  exist- 
ing  Republican  organisations  for  girls71,  shortly  after  which  the 
movement  in  Dundalk  founded  a  girls'  slua  on  their  own  initiative 
and  without  permission72.  The  branch  was  named  after  George  Plun- 
kett,  with  Patricia  Brown  its  first  o/c.  The  Ard  Choiste  was  thus 
presented  with  a  fait  accompli  -  and  the  new  slua's  minute  book  as 
evidence  -  at  its  next  meeting  and  reluctantly  agreed  to  recognise 
the  existence  of  Fianna  for  girls  in  Dundalk  meantime.  A  second 
meeting  of  interested  parties  was  arranged  for  January  at  the  Kevin 
Barry  Hall,  Parnell  Square,  before  which  however  a  second  girls' 
branch,  Slua  Paul  Smith,  had  been  set  up  in  Newry.  The  meeting  was 
attended  by  the  o/cs  of  both  sluaite  as  well  as  representatives  of 
Cumann  na  gCailini,  Cailini  na  hEireann  and  Clann  na  nGael.  The 
last-named  body,  which  had  been  independent  of  the  Republican  move- 
ment  for  forty  years,  chose  to  retain  its  independence.  The  other 
representatives  agreed  to  support  the  foundation  of  Fianna  Girl 
Scouts  on  the  basis  of  equal  status  with  the  boys  and  the  continued 
existence  of  their  own  organisations.  The  meeting,  which  took  place 
on  5  January  196973,  marks  the  establishment  of  the  girls'  organisa- 
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It  is  possible  that  girls  were  admitted  into  Fianna  in  Belfast 
even  earlier  than  in  Dundalk,  though  exact  dates  cannot  be  determined. 
Although  no  internal  documents  are  extant  due  to  the  normal  practice 
of  destroying  written  evidence  in  the  Six  Counties  organisation, 
interview  evidence  suggests  a  date  at  least  as  early  as  196874. 
When  K.  0'K.  undertook  supervision  of  the  city's  Republican  groups 
for  girls  in  that  year  she  found  some  twenty  members  of  Cumann  na 
gCailini  in  the  Lower  Falls  and  Clonard  areas,  and  in  addition  per- 
haps  two  dozen  girls  in  the  Lower  and  Upper  Falls  already  organised 
into  two  Fianna  sluaite  "under  the  control  of  Belfast  H.  Q.  ". 
Although  the  Cailini  were  a  separate  organisation  under  the  aegis 
of  Cumann  na  mBan,  the  reality  in  Belfast  was  that  they  were  pre- 
paring  for  precisely  the  same  adult  military  roles  as  the  Fianna 
girls.  It  was  therefore  more  appropriate  to  combine  the  two  bodies 
into  a  single  structure  and  then  to  re-divide  the  girls  on  the  basis 
of  age.  By  virtue  of  her  position  in  Cumann  na  mBan  K.  O'K.  had  the 
authority  to  do  this.  She  therefore  re-established  the  Cailini  for 
the  younger  girls  and  Fianna  for  the  thirteen  to  sixteen  year  olds. 
From  early  in  1969  she  had  established  the  beginnings  of  a  Command 
Staff,  a  task  completed  during  the  year  as  sluaite  were  formed  in 
most  Republican  areas  of  the  city  in  the  wake  of  the  Troubles.  From 
the  outset  the  girls  and  boys  worked  closely  together  at  both  slua 
and  command  levels,  in  the  latter  case  meeting  monthly.  It  was  a 
comradeship  that  would  grow  even  closer  as  the  military  situation 
developed. 
Belfast  and  Dublin  were  the  only  centres  to  maintain  sluaite  to 
the  end  of  the  year.  The  Dundalk  branch  disbanded  late  in  August75 
because  of  the  new  military  situation  in  the  Border  town:  the  Belfast 
Pogroms  of  14-15  August  had  brought  scores  of  refugees  to  Dundalk 297 
from  the  North,  and  field  hospitals  and  peace-keeping  units  from 
76 
the  South.  The  capital  on  the  other  hand  enjoyed  a  steady  dev- 
elopment.  Fifty  girls  had  taken  the  declaration  in  March,  of 
whom  forty  marched  in  the  St.  Patrick's  Day  parade.  By  the  time 
77 
of  the  summer  camps  four  sluaite  had  been  formed  in  the  city,  and 
The  United  Irishman  claimed  an  attendance  of  over  100  girls  at  what 
78 
was  the  largest  Bodenstown  assembly  since  the  1930s  .  The  four 
branches  were  granted  Battalion  status  in  September79  and  early  in 
the  same  month  the  Ard  Choiste  ratified  a  Girl  Scout  Committee  as 
"the  governing  body  of  Na  Fianna  Girl  Scouts  ... 
its  terms  of  ref- 
erence  to  be  the  complete  control  and  organisation  of  Na  Fianna  Girl 
Scouts"$0.  Liaison  between  the  committee  and  the  overall  leader- 
ship  was  strengthened  at  the  September  Ard  Fheis  by  the  election 
onto  the  Ard.  Choiste  of  Hanna  O'Farrell,  Quartermaster  of  the  Dublin 
81 
Girls'  Battalion,  At  the  same.  meeting  the  resolution  was  formally 
carried,  post  factum,  to  establish  a  girls'  branch  of  the  organisa- 
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tion  ,  thus  securing  the  constitutional  position.  In  practice 
however  the  development  of  girls'  sluaite  continued  to  meet  obstruc- 
tion  from  several  of  the  Dublin  leadership  during  the  year83,  and  an 
unsuccessful  attempt  was  made  at  the  1970  Ard  Fheis  to  reverse  the 
constitutional  position  established  in  196984, 
The  foundation  of  Fianna  for  girls  must  be  viewed  in  relation 
to  contemporary  developments  in  the  Republican  movement  and  the 
Irish  political  context.  It  is  true  that  the  first  girls'  sluaite 
preceded  the  outbreak  of  war  in  the  North.  But  the  Troubles  created 
mass  recruitment  of  Republican  youth,  especially  in  Belfast,  with 
which  the  existing  girls'  organisation,  Cumann  na  gCailini,  was  in- 
adequate  to  cope.  Cailini  was  restricted  in  scope  and  numbers,  not 
exceeding  100  members  throughout  the  Thirty-two  Counties  even  after 298 
the  autumn  of  1969,  and  existing  only  in  the  capital,  Cork, 
Limerick,  Newry  and  Belfast85.  It  was  under  the  local  authority 
of  Cumann  na  mBan,  the  women's  Army,  each  of  whose  branches  was 
obliged  by  constitution  to  organise  and  support  a  girls'  unit.  All 
communication  was  conducted  at  local  level,  the  Cailini  o/c  being 
responsible  to  her  opposite  number  in  the  adult  unit.  Cailini  was 
therefore  in  no  sense  a  national  organisation:  it  had  no  Constitu- 
tion,  no  G.  H.  Q.,  no  Ard  Fheis,  no  destiny  of  its  own.  Clearly  its 
potential  for  expansion  was  limited.  It  enjoyed  a  status  inferior 
to  Fianna's  akin  to  that  of  Cumann  na  mBan  compared  to  the  Army. 
Furthermore-,  the  position  of  Cumann  na  mBan  itself  was  latterly  in 
doubt  and  cogent  practical  and  ideological  reasons  were  being  put 
forward  for  disbanding  it  -  at  a  personal  level  it  had  long  been  a 
source  of  discord  with  the  I.  R.  A. 
86, 
while  at  the  level  of  ideology 
the  Republican  leadership  now  favoured  the  Marxist  concept  of  an 
integrated  guerilla  army  of  men  and  women.  For  several  reasons 
therefore  the  future  of  girls  in  Cailini  appeared  in  jeopardy,  and 
their  future  in  Fianna  secure. 
EXPANSION  IN  THE  NORTH  FROM  1969 
It  is  not  possible  to  state  with  certainty  the  strength  of 
Fianna  between  1968  and  1970  and  thus  to  gauge  the  effect  on  recruit- 
ment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Troubles  in  1969.  Interviewees  from 
the  leadership  of  the  period  have  remarked  on  the  frequently  short 
life  of  sluaite  and  the  not  unknown  practice  of  setting  up  paper 
sluaite  prior  to  Ard  Fheiseanna  for  voting  purposes,  and  have  there- 
fore  not  been  able  to  offer  an  exact  statement  of  numbers  and  loca- 
tions  in  every  case87.  Moreover,  written  records  are  non-existent 
for  the  Six  Counties  and  incomplete  for  the  South.  However,  it  has 
been  possible  to  compile  an  approximate  list  of  branches  in  the 299 
Twenty-six  Counties  from  the  monthly  returns  of  o/cs,  and  a  more 
exact  profile  of  the  North  from  the  recollections  of  the  Belfast 
leadership. 
In  1968  there  were  some  twenty  sluaite,  in  the  Republic  with  a 
total  membership  of  perhaps  350.  Of  these,  three  were  in  Cork 
where  the  organisation  was  divided  into  two  areas  corresponding  with 
the  city's  natural  geographical  division.  Boys  from  the  north  side 
enrolled  in  Slua  Patrick  Hanley.  Those  from  the  south  drilled  at 
the  Thomas  Ashe  Hall  where  the  stability  and  strength  of  Slua  Mac- 
Curtain/MacSwiney  reflected  the  long  tradition  of  Fianna  in  the  city. 
A  second  and  by  now  ailing  branch  shared  the  Scouts'  room  upstairs, 
being  maintained  merely  to  preserve  Battalion  status  for  the  city 
organisation.  Its  membership  had  declined  to  3  by  1969  when  it  was 
absorbed  into  the  older  slua  and  the  city's  Battalion  structure  dis- 
solved  by  G.  H.  Q. 
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Of  the  six  branches  in  the  Dublin  area  one  was 
founded  during  1968  and  appears  to  have  enjoyed  a  brief  existence, 
but  at  least  four  -  Sluaite  Mellows,  Colbert  and  Cathal  Brugha  and 
in  particular  Slua  McKee/Ashe  at  Finglas  -  were  permanent  organisa- 
tions.  Outwith  the  two  cities  the  branch  at  Portarlington  was 
newly  established  that  summer89  and  only  those  at  Letterkenny  and 
Dundalk  could  be  considered  permanent90.  In  the  North  sluaite  now 
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existed  at  Newry,  Lurgan  and  Belfast.  The  four  city  branches  had 
expanded  moderately  to  an  aggregate  membership  of  close  on  fifty  and 
were  able  to  muster  half  that  number  for  a  joint  camp  in  Leitrim  in 
the  autumn.  From  that  successful  camp  a  fifth  slua  was  formed  in 
the  New  Queen  Street  area  early  in  196992.  The  girls  still  had 
their  two  sluaite  in  the  Upper  and  Lower  Falls. 
During  1969  reports  in  the  Republican  press  gave  the  impression 
of  consistent  expansion  throughout  the  Thirty-two  Counties.  The  June 
issue  of  The  United  Irishman  noted  that  Fianna's  growth  in  numbers 300 
"up  and  down  the  country"  had  brought  an  urgent  need  for  more  adult 
leaders.  The  number  of  boys  and  girls  assembled  for  Bodenstown  and 
the  summer  and  Whit  camps  was  the  highest  for  years93,  as  was  the 
attendance  of  slua  delegates  at  the  Ard  Fheis  in  November94.  In 
reality,  however,  expansion  was  almost  entirely  confined  to  the 
North  and  to  Belfast  in  particular. 
Interview  data  suggests  that  by  the  end  of  the  year  the  Belfast 
Battalion  comprised  some  fifteen  boys'  sluaite  with  a  total  member- 
ship  of  about  45095.  They  covered  almost  every  Republican  district 
of  the  city  -  Unity  Flats,  Divis  Flats,  Lower  Falls,  Clonard,  Beech- 
mount,  Whiterock  and  Ballymurphy,  Turf  Lodge,  Andersonstown  and 
Lenadoon  in  the  West,  and  New  Lodge  Road,  Old  Park,  Ardoyne  and 
Ormeau  Road  elsewhere.  Branches  were  also  established  in  Clifton- 
ville  and  Newington,  and  later  in  Glengormley  and  Bawnmore.  In 
the  two  last  named  areas  the  usual  process  of  I.  R.  A.  activity  pre- 
paring  the  ground  for  the  formation  of  a  Fianna  unit  was  reversed96. 
At  the  same  time  ten  sluaite  were  established  for  girls  in  West  Bel- 
fast  and  three  others  in  the  Antrim  Road,  Short  Strand  and  the  Mar- 
kets,  with  a  maximum  Battalion  strength  somewhat  short  of  20097. 
Overall,  therefore,  the  organisation  expanded  at  least  eight-fold  in 
the  city  as  a  direct  effect  of  the  Troubles. 
On  the  other  hand  growth  elsewhere  appears  to  have  been  slight. 
By  mid-1970  the  Dublin  boys'  Battalion  comprised  six  sluaite  with 
only  57  registered  members  all  told,  though  it  is  certain  that  a 
greater  number  were  parading98.  The  girls'  Battalion  numbered  about 
140  paid-up  members  in  four  branches99,  one  of  which  was  disbanded  in 
the  summer  and  its  members  absorbed  into  the  other  three100.  The 
traditional  high  turnover  of  members  and  sluaite  persisted  in  the 
country  towns  -  with  the  setting  up  of  branches  in  Youghal  and 301 
Tipperary101  and  their  collapse  in  Ennis  and  Thurles102  -  with  how- 
ever  a  general  decline  in  numbers  such  that  by  autumn  1970  member- 
ship  was  said  to  be  "practically  non-existent  in  the  country 
areast»° 
3. 
Total  membership  in  the  South  was  probably  no  greater 
in  1970  than  it  had  been  two  years  previously. 
Over  the  Thirty-two  Counties,  therefore,  Fianna  emerged  within 
a  year  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Troubles  a  very  differently  balanced 
organisation  from  that  of  1968.  It  was  now  concentrated  in  the 
larger  urban  areas  and  in  Belfast  particularly,  where  it  now  far 
outweighed  the  rest  of  the  country  in  both  numbers  and  political 
significance. 302 
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Chapter  10.  DIVISION,  DEVELOPMENT,  DECLINE  (1969-1973) 
THE  OFFICIAL-PROVISIONAL  SPLIT 
By  1969  the  movement  had  progressed  some  way  towards  realising 
its  objectives,  but  in  doing  so  had  disenchanted  some  traditionalist 
members  who  viewed  the  changes  as  an  alien  deviation  and  a  betrayal 
of  the  martyrs  who  had  not  died  "for  any  'ism'  but  Republicanism"2, 
Some  of  those  who  held  this  view  had  remained  despite  their  reserva- 
tions;  others  had  left  the  movement  but  -  in  many  cases  -  returned 
with  the  outbreak  of  the  Troubles  in  1969.  The  two  groups  together 
would  form  the  nucleus  of  the  future  Provisional  organisation. 
After  months  of  growing  dissent  the  movement  finally  split 
following  the  I.  R.  A.  's  convention  in  December,  when  a  group  withdrew 
their  support  of  the  leadership  and  set  up  a  Provisional  Army  Council. 
The  military  secession  was  followed  by  a  split  in  Sinn  Fein  at  the 
party's  Ard  Fheis  in  January  1970 
2, 
The  Provisionals  particularly  rejected  the  movement's  de  facto 
recognition  of  parliaments  and  what  they  called  its  "extreme  social- 
ism  leading  to  totalitarian  dictatorship"3.  They  immediately  re- 
turned  to  the  traditional  nationalist  objectives,  re-emphasising  mili- 
tary  methods  and  the  authority  of  the  Army4.  Claiming  that  they 
themselves  stood  firm  "on  the  rock  of  the  Republic"  they  castigated 
the  Official  movement  as  "Free  State  Party  number  four",  that  is,  as 
the  latest  of  those  who  had  sold  out  the  Republican  principle  for 
political  advantages. 
1970  -A  YEAR  OF  NEUTRALITY 
Throughout  1970  Fianna  maintained  a  position  of  neutrality  to- 
wards  the  opposing  camps.  For  several  months  it  still  seemed  possible 309 
that  the  rift  might  be  healed,  and  even  after  it  became  clear  that 
this  would  not  be  the  case  the  policy  of  Fianna's  leadership  was  to 
6 
"keep  out  of  what  was  considered  an  Army  matter"  .  For  the  G.  H.  Q. 
staff,  in  addition,  there  was  a  second,  tactical,  motive  for  pre- 
serving  neutrality:  the  Chief  Scout  Liam  Mac  an  Ultaigh  had  held  the 
post  since  1965,  and  like  all  Chief  Scouts  had  originally  been  nom- 
inated  and  elected  in  consultation  with  the  I.  R.  A.  as  acceptable  to 
the  Army  leadership7.  He  was  a  Goulding  man,  a  Socialist  Republi- 
can,  and  had  at  once  taken  the  Official  side  after  the  split.  His 
most  recent  G.  H.  Q.  staff  had  been  selected  as  favouring  the  new 
path,  and  could  also  be  relied  upon  to  support  the  Official  Republican 
movement.  On  the  other  hand  only  three  members  of  the  Ard  Choiste 
were  reliably  of  the  same  persuasion,  and  these  included  the  Chairman 
with  a  casting  vote  only  and  the  Chief  Scout  himself  who  only  en- 
joyed  the  rights  of  observer.  In  effect  the  executive  comprised  one 
Official  vote,  four  Provisional,  and  four  neutral  or  neutralised. 
Mac  an  Ultaigh's  tactic  therefore  was  to  avoid  confrontations  at 
executive  meetings  while  attempting  to  win  over  the  neutrals  and  re- 
place  opponents.  Within  the  organisation  as  a  whole  he  used  G.  H.  Q. 
statements  to  maintain  neutrality  and  at  the  same  time  to  create  pre- 
texts  for  expulsion. 
The  focal  points  of  controversy  at  this  time  which  were  most 
likely  to  put  a  strain  upon  Fianna's  neutrality  were  the  sale  of 
rival  papers  and  attendance  at  rival  commemorations.  On  the  first 
the  leadership  ruled  that  "the  selling  of  either  The  United  Irishman 
or  An  Phoblacht  in  Fianna  uniform  was  completely  out  of  line  with  the 
non-committal  attitude  of  Na  Fianna  as  regards  the  split  in  the  move- 
ment"8.  The  second  was  more  serious  in  that  it  involved  the  leader- 
ship  also.  The  problem  arose  for  the  first  time  at  Easter,  the  in- 310 
struction  of  the  Ard  Choiste  being  that  where  there  was  only  one 
commemoration  in  an  area  Fianna  should  take  part  in  it9.  The  instruc- 
tion  frankly  hedged  the  problem  in  an  attempt  to  hold  the  membership 
in  the  face  of  reports  of  splinter  groups  formed  or  about  to  be  for- 
med10.  In  response  to  the  same  reports  G.  H.  Q.  addressed  a  circular 
to  all  slua  o/cs  in  June  reminding  them  of  Fianna's  positionll.  The 
document  pointed  out  that  immediately  after  the  split  both  I.  R.  A. 
Chiefs-of-Staff  had  agreed  to  the  organisation's  neutral  stand,  and 
that  accordingly  Headquarters  had  ordered  sluaite  to  adopt  a  position 
of  neutrality  but  permitted  freedom  of  choice  to  individual  members, 
a  decision  endorsed  in  March  by  the  Ard  Choiste.  It  warned  against 
forming  independent  groups  which  would  fragment  an  organisation  al- 
ready  critically  small12.  The  circular  was  timed  to  coincide  with 
the  annual  Bodenstown  commemoration,  for  which  the  executive  also 
issued  specific  instructions:  the  decision  as  to  which  parade  to 
attend  should  rest  with  the  local  sluaite  or  Battalion  staffs,  indi- 
vidual  members  should  retain  the  right  to  choose  their  allegiance, 
and  G.  H.  Q.  should  attend  both  parades13. 
At  Easter  the  Provisionals  had  excluded  several  of  the  Fianna 
leadership  from  their  parade  and  a  confrontation  was  anticipated  at 
Bodenstown.  On  the  day  several  Fianna  officers,  including  Sein 
McCabe  of  Portarlington  and  Pat  Varian  of  Cork  -  both  members  of  the 
Ard  Choiste  -  refused  to  march  in  the  Fianna  contingent  and  chose  to 
take  their  place  as  individuals  in  the  Provisional  party14.  They 
were  ordered  to  join  the  Fianna  ranks  by  the  Chief  Scout,  who  had 
decided  that  this  was  the  opportunity  for  gaining  a  tactical  advan- 
tage.  His  intention  was  to  use  the  incident  to  secure  their  temp- 
orary  suspension  pending  appeal  in  the  knowledge  that,  constitu- 
tionally,  disqualified  members  were  unable  to  take  an  active  part  in 311 
the  organisation  and  that  active  participation  was  a  condition  of 
membership  of  the  Ard  Choiste.  On  this  ground  he  hoped  to  gain 
their  expulsion  from  the  executive.  He  succeeded  in  his  aim  at  the 
June  meeting,  though  only  on  the  Chairman's  casting  vote.  In  doing 
so  he  sacrificed  the  sluaite  at  Portarlington  and  Cork. 
The  leadership  of  the  Provisional  movement  were  aware  of  the 
purpose  behind  the  expulsions  and  of  the  threat  to  real  neutrality 
that  they  posed.  In  September  Sean  Mac  Stiofäin  contacted  the  Fianna 
Ard  Choiste,  accepting  the.  continued  neutrality  of  the  organisation  on 
condition  of  four  of  the  leadership  being  expelled15.  Since  one  of 
the  four  was  Mac  an  Ultaigh  it  appeared  likely  that  Fianna  would  split 
as  the  Army  had  done  should  he  be  re-elected  Chief  Scout  at  the  Octo- 
ber  Ard  Fheis.  It  was  a  critical  time.  Two  of  the  executive  even 
took  the  precaution  of  going  armed  to  the  Ard  Fheis  since  a  rumour 
was  about  that  Provisional  members  planned  to  take  the  meeting  over 
at  gunpoint16.  Twenty  minutes  before  the  elections  Mac  an  Ultaigh 
made  a  private  arrangement  with  S.  F.  that  the  latter  would  stand  for 
the  office  of  Chief  Scout  and  he  himself  withdraw  his  nomination,  too 
late  (it  was  hoped)  for  opponents  to  use  the  situation  to  advantage17. 
S.  F.  was  a  member  of  the  Official  movement,  but  as  a  Newry  man  was 
less  well  known  and  likely  to  be  more  acceptable  than  Mac  an  Ultaigh 
who  had  personal  as  well  as  political  enemies  among  the  Dublin  dele- 
gates 
18. 
In  the  election  the  vote  of  the  Belfast  delegates  proved  deci- 
sive.  There  is  evidence  that  their  unanimous  vote  for  S.  F.  was  the 
result  of  strong  pressure  and  the  threat  of  disciplinary  action  by 
their  Battalion  o/c  in  what  should  not  have  been  a  Battalion  matter19. 
S.  F.  was  elected  in  preference  to  his  Provisional  opponent,  to  be- 
come  only  the  second  Chief  Scout  from  outwith  the  capital  in  Fianna's 312 
history.  His  G.  H.  Q.  staff,  however,  were  all  Dubliners  and  Dublin- 
based20,  and  enjoyed  greater  power  because  of  it.  Mac  an  Ultaigh 
in  particular,  in  the  strategic  office  of  Director  of  Training  and 
Organisation  and  in  close  communication  with  the  Official  Army  leader- 
ship,  now  had  as  much  influence  as  before  and  more  freedom  of  action. 
Most  important,  a  split  had  been  averted,  formal  neutrality  pre- 
served,  and  -  with  only  one  Provisional  now  on  the  Ard  Choiste  -  the 
.  hand  of  the  Officials  strengthened21 
For  Provisional  members,  in  fact,  the  Ard  Fheis  was  a  turning 
point.  They  recognised  that  neutrality  was  now  an  empty  formula  and 
that  their  own  future  must  inevitably  lie  not  in  the  existing  body 
but  in  an  organisation  of  their  own  making. 
ESTABLISHING  PROVISIONAL  FIANNA 
As  early  as  the  spring  of  1970  many  had  realised  that  because  of 
the  political  complexion  of  the  G.  H.  Q.  staff  Fianna's  neutrality  would 
not  be  to  their  advantage  in  the  long  term.  They  had  therefore  set 
about  developing  their  own  local  groups  and  where  possible  withdrawing 
existing  sluaite  from  the  national  organisation. 
Four  Dublin  officers  decided  in  April  to  break  with  G.  H.  Q.  and 
set  up  new  sluaite  in  the  city22.  They  took  a  number  of  members  with 
them,  including  almost  all  the  boys  of  Slua  Cathal  Brugha,  but  no 
branch  seceded  entirely.  In  the  following  month  three  officers  of 
the  girls'  Battalion  followed  the  example  of  the  men23.  Because  slua 
officers  in  the  north  side  of  the  city  in  most  cases  supported  the 
Official  movement  all  the  new  sluaite  were  based  South  of  the  Liffey. 
During  the  summer  branches  under  Provisional  leadership  were  also 
established  in  Armagh  and  Dundalk24,  and  the  nucleus  of  a  branch  was 
set  up  in  Newry  comprising  three  ex-members  of  the  existing  town  slua 
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New  branches  were  also  organised  in  Belfast.  After  the  split 
in  the  movement  Republicans  in  the  city  had  at  first  tended  to  align 
with  one  or  other  side  less  according  to  ideology  than  local  loyalty, 
as  a  result  of  which  allegiance  during  1970  assumed  a  fairly  easily 
defined  geographical  form26,  Thus,  for  example,  the  Lower  Falls 
remained  largely  Official  under  the  leadership  of  Liam  McMillan  and 
Jim  Sullivan  whereas  Kashmir  Road  followed  local  leader  Billy  McKee 
of  the  Provisional  Army  Council.  In  the  case  of  Fianna,  slua  o/cs 
enjoyed  far  less  personal  influence  because  of  their  youth  and  brief 
tenure  of  office  before  transfer  to  the  I.  R.  A.  Members'  first  loy- 
alty  was  therefore  given  to  their  local  Army  leader,  whose  personal 
standing  in  the  community  was  often  very  great.  As  a  result,  the 
pattern  of  allegiance  in  the  city  almost  exactly  matched  that  in  the 
senior  ranks.. 
During  1970  the  Provisional  I.  R.  A.  became  the  dominant  faction 
in  almost  all  Republican  areas  of  the  city.  In  the  second  half  of 
the  year  its  numbers  rose  "dizzily  fast"27  to  three  or  four  times 
the  manpower  of  the  Officials  who  were  at  this  time  confined  mainly 
to  the  Lower  Falls  and  Turf  Lodge 
28. 
In  the  Provisional  strong- 
holds  wholesale  transfer  of  members  to  the  newly  established  sluaite 
might  therefore  have  been  expected.  But  in  fact  such  was  the 
escalating  military  situation  in  Belfast  that  existing  and  new  sluaite 
together  were  barely  able  to  absorb  the  hundreds  of  new  recruits,  and 
while  formal  neutrality  operated  branches  under  Official  leadership 
recorded  very  few  defections29. 
In  the  city  of  Cork  the  Fianna  Battalion  in  fact  comprised  two 
sluaite  in  1970.  Slua  MacCurtain/MacSwiney  was  the  older  established, 
but  Slua  Patrick  Hanley  was  now  the  larger  branch.  The  dominant 
figure  in  the  town  organisation  was  Donal  Varian,  Fianna's  representa- 314 
tive  for  the  South  of  Ireland 
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and,  with  his  brother  Pat,  a  member 
of  the  national  executive.  Both  had  joined  the  Provisional  movement 
in  the  spring.  In  June  Donal  Varian  sought  the  permission  of  G.  H.  Q. 
for  his  slua  to  acknowledge  the  Provisional  movement  but  to  remain 
within  the  national  organisation;  when  his  request  was  refused  with 
the  threat  of  expulsion31  the  Cork  Battalion  staff  agreed  to  honour 
the  neutrality  of  Fianna  scrupulously32. 
But  honouring  neutrality  was  made  a  virtual  impossibility  for 
Provisionals  after  the  October  Ard  Fheis  at  which  their  worst  fears 
were.  confirmed,  It  appeared  now  only  a  matter  of  time  before  Fianna 
would  take  some  step  towards  formal  recognition  of  the  Official  move- 
ment.  They  therefore  began  preparations  for  an  independent  national 
structure.  The  four  boys'  sluaite  in  Dublin  were  at  once  brought 
under  a  Battalion  command  with  Art  Sherwin  o/c,  the  five  girls'  bran- 
ches  were  organised  as  a  city  Battalion  under  Bairbre  Ni  Läoire,  and  a 
combined  Battalion  staff  was  appointed33.  Belfast  was  established  as 
a  Battalion  early  in  November34,  between  which  date  and  the  end  of  the 
year  the  alliance  of  Provisional  sluaite  around  the  country  openly 
styled  itself  'Fianna  Eireann'  and  undertook  a  major  recruiting  drive 
"with  a  view  to  taking  over  the  name"35.  By  now  Cork  was  the  only 
area  under  Provisional  leadership  to  remain  neutral. 
The  town  Battalion  staff  had  met  after  the  October  Ard  Fheis  and 
agreed  to  "give  the  new  Ard  Choiste  a  chance"  despite  their  suspi- 
cions  of  the  methods  by  which  it  had  been  elected36.  Staff  meetings 
took  place  at  the  Thomas  Ashe  Hall  which  had  been  retained  by  the 
Official  movement,  and  it  is  claimed  that  members  were  on  several 
occasions  inti  ated  by  Official  I.  R.  A.  personnel  who  sought  to  evict 
them.  They  also  received  visits  from  G.  H.  Q.  staff  aimed  at  persuading 
them  to  give  more  overt  allegiance  to  Ard  Choiste  policies.  By  Dec- 
ember  they  had  agreed,  after  an  almost  unanimous  secret  ballot,  to 315 
sever  their  association  with  Headquarters,  but  the  decision  was  kept 
secret  and  formal  neutrality  maintained:  their  motive  in  this  was  a 
desire  to  retain  use  of  the  Thomas  Ashe  Hall,  traditionally  con- 
sidered  to  be  the  home  of  Republicanism  in  the  city37. 
The  adult  Provisional  movement  had  meantime  continued  to  make 
overtures  to  the  existing  national  organisation  in  an  eleventh  hour 
attempt  to  secure  its  allegiance.  As  the  seceding  faction  in  the 
split  it  had  particular  need  of  recognition  by  prestigious  organisa- 
tions  as  it  sought  to  establish  credibility  during  1970,  and  Fianna 
with  its  respected  and  relatively  independent  tradition  within  the 
movement  was  one  such38.  Provisional  Army  Chief  Sean  Mac  Stiofain 
had  arranged  a  meeting  with  Fianna's  Chief  Scout  in  November  for  this 
purpose  at  which  he  attempted  to  effect  replacements  on  the  Ard 
Choiste  and  the  expulsion  of  several  Official  members.  He  was  in- 
formed  that  Fianna  as  a  constitutionally  independent  organisation 
owed  allegiance  to  the  Republic  and  not  to  any  individual  (even  an 
I.  R.  A.  Chief-of-Staff),  and  that  a  Chief  Scout  had  no  authority  to 
alter  an  Ard  Fheis  decision.  A  second  approach  was  made  by  Leo 
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Martin  in  January  1971  at  the  Fergal  O'Hanlon  memorial  parade  in 
Monaghan.  The  message  was  now  explicit  -  the  Provisionals  were 
"looking  for  allegiance".  The  reply  was  as  before40. 
The  position  now  was  that  the  Provisional  movement  could  not  hope 
to  win  over  the  constituted  body,  and  at  the  same  time  that  they  had 
sluaite  in  many  parts  of  the  country  prepared  to  form  a  new  national 
organisation.  An  exploratory  meeting  was  held  later  in  January  to 
which  all  officers  interested  in  establishing  such  a  body  were  in- 
vited  and  which  RuairiO  Bradaigh  attended  as  representative  of  the 
senior  movement41.  Despite  a  plea  by  the  Cork  Battalion  that  they 
should  remain  and  fight  within  Fianna  delegates  voted  to  create  a  new 316 
organisation  and  fixed  a  date  at  the  end  of  the  month  for  an  in- 
augural  Ard  Fheis.  From  the  latter  meeting,  at  which  Gerry  Campbell 
was  elected  Chief  Scout42,  may  be  dated  the  existence  of  'Provisional 
Fianna'  as  a  national  organisation. 
Donal  Varian,  the  most  respected  member  of  the  new  body  and  sub- 
sequently  its  longest  serving  Chief  Scout,  still  holds  the  view  that 
the  adult  Provisional  movement  were  misguided  in  creating  a  new 
organisation  when  they  might  yet  have  infiltrated  the  existing  one43. 
As  a  result  of  their  action  Provisional  Fianna  cannot  claim  to  be 
Fianna  Eireann  in  a  constitutional  sense  and  the  direct  descendant  of 
the  1909  organisation,  and  this  irrespective  of  the  validity  of 
claims  to  authenticity  on  the  part  of  the  rival  adult  movements.  As 
such  its  subsequent  history  cannot  rightly  form  a  part  of  the  present 
narrative.  Nonetheless,  as  a  significant  offshoot  of  Fianna  which 
has  in  fact  outlived  its  constitutional  rival  it  has  been  made  the 
subject  of  Appendix  IV. 
FIANNA  TAKES  THE  OFFICIAL  SIDE 
The  October  Ard  Fheis  had  given  Fianna  a  national  leadership  al- 
most  entirely  composed  of  members  of  the  Official  movement.  At  slua 
level  also  all  officers  were  now  Officials  except  for  a  few  politi- 
cally  neutral  leaders  whose  interest  in  the  organisation  lay  more  in 
its  scouting  activities  than  its  ideology44.  The  fact  that  the  Pro- 
visionals  adopted  an  aggressive  recruiting  drive  after  October  with 
the  apparent  aim  of  establishing  a  separate  organisation  itself 
prompted  Fianna  to  adopt  a  more  overtly  Official  position.  This  was 
particularly  the  case  after  the  Edentubber  Martyrs'  memorial  in 
November  at  which  Fianna  sent  contingents  to  both  Official  and  Pro- 
visional  parades  but  were  refused  permission  by  the  Provisionals  to 
carry  their  banner.  "They  put  us  at  the  back  and  their  own  slua  boys 317 
up  front",  recalled  the  Chief  Scout,  "but  we  carried  our  flag.  That 
pretty  well  set  the  seal  on  things.  From  that  day  we  were  deter- 
mined  to  be  Official  de  facto"45. 
The  founding  of  the  Provisional  Scouts  in  January  1971  gave 
urgency  to  a  reconsideration  of  Fianna's  own  political  position.  An 
emergency  Ard  Fheis  was  therefore  called  for  7  March  and  all  branches 
were  instructed  to  debate  the  question  before  the  meeting.  It  was 
clear  from  the  written  resolutions  received  for  the  agenda  that  the 
outcome  would  lie  between  continued  neutrality  and  allegiance  to  the 
Official  movement46.  During  the  debate  many  slua  representatives 
argued  for  the  former  course,  but  the  resolution  was  finally  carried 
by  a  majority  of  over  thirty  "that  Fianna  Eireann  recognise  the 
I.  R.  A.  under  the  leadership  of  Cathal  Goulding,  and  Sinn  F4in  under 
the  leadership  of  Tomäs  Mac  Giolla,  as  being  the  Official  Republican 
movement,  and  that  it  respects  the  view  of  every  member  whether  they 
be  'Official'  or  'Provisional  "'47.  The  wording  was  decisive  enough 
but  was  aimed  at  leaving  sufficient  room-  for  manoeuvre  to  retain  the 
greatest  possible  proportion  of  the  membership.  After  the  vote  the 
defeated  minority  formally  expressed  acceptance  of  the  national  deci- 
sion  by  unanimously  supporting  the  resolution48. 
The  way  was  now  clear  for  Fianna  to  develop  in  unobstructed 
allegiance  to  Gardiner  Place,  with  constitutional  authority  to  en- 
force  orthodoxy  at  slua  level.  At  the  end  of  the  year  the  Ard  Choiste 
tightened  its  control  over  individual  fiannai,  forbidding  membership 
of  any  political  organisation  other  than  the  Official  Republican  move- 
ment  except  by  express  permission.  And  at  the  October  Ard  Fheis 
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the  wording  of  the  Constitution  was  further  amended  to  bring  the  aims 
of  the  youth  organisation  into  line  with  those  of  the  parent  movement, 
the  definition  of  objectives  being  changed  from  "promote  scouting 
among  boys  and  girls"  to  read  "promote,  through  scouting  and  youth 318 
activities,  the  establishment  in  Ireland  of  a  Democratic  Socialist 
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Republic" 
The  most  immediate  result  of  the  split  for  Fianna  was  loss  of 
membership  and  particularly  of  local  leadership.  Almost  every  edi- 
tion  of  Nuacht  in  the  summer  of  1970  had  reported  the  resignation  of 
obviously  good  slua  o/cs.  The  split  had  also  been  used  as  a  ration- 
alisation  of  personal  disputes,  particularly  in  Dublin  where  dissent 
centred  round  the  family  of  the  boys'  Battalion  o/c  and  had  originated 
at  a  1969  summer  camp51.  It  was  G.  H.  Q.  's  opinion  that  the  effects  of 
the  split  "would  have  been  minimised  if  our  membership  had  been  united 
on  other  issues.  It  (was)  a  matter  for  great  regret  and  sorrow  that 
the  split  was  used  by  members  to  push  their  own  lines.  The  result 
had  been  disastrous 
...  We  will  never  know  how  many  good  people 
"  were  lost  unnecessarily  ., 
52, 
Losses  had  occurred  at  a  time  when  the  organisation  in  the  South 
was  already  barely  above  a  critical  threshold  size  for  existence, 
while  in  the  North  they  were  masked  by  the  general  upsurge  in  re- 
cruiting.  Overall,  therefore,  they  aggravated  the  growing  imbalance 
of  the  national  organisation. 
Less  measurable  but  ultimately  more  destructive  was  the  effect 
upon  internal  morale  and  discipline.  During  1970  acts  of  indisci- 
pline  had  been  committed  by  members  in  the  name  of  loyalty  and  G.  H.  Q. 
had  been  forced  to  threaten  dismissal  to  anyone  attacking  rival 
groups  and  the  houses  of  Provisional  officers53.  The  problem  persis- 
ted  after  the  ending  of  neutrality. 
Fianna's  leadership  recognised  with  hindsight  that  the  split  in 
the  adult  movement  had  inflicted  decisive  damage  upon  the  youth  wing54, 
and  pointed  to  1971  as  the  beginning  of  a  deterioration  that  there- 
after  gathered  momentum  so  that  within  two  years  the  organisation  all 
but  disintegrated  in  the  Twenty-Six  Counties55. 319 
FIANNA  AND  THE  NORTHERN  MILITARY  CAMPAIGN  1969-7256 
Any  explanation  of  Fianna's  part  in  the  hostilities  of  1969-72 
must  take  account  of  the  position  of  the  I.  R.  A.  in  the  North  at  the 
time.  A  report  received  by  the  Irish  Army  Intelligence  in  Dublin 
in  August  196957,  describing  the  I.  R.  A.  as  undermanned,  under- 
equipped  and  totally  without  finance,  was  undoubtedly  accurate.  It 
was  numerically  small;  its  organisation  was  incomplete  and  in  some 
nationalist  areas  non-existent;  it  lacked  expertise  in  some  depart- 
ments,  notably  engineering;  it  was  certainly  not  in  a  position  to 
take  the  fight  to  the  British58.  In  addition,  its  role  was  not  so 
much  an  offensive  as  a  day-to-day  reaction  to  the  contingencies  of 
military  and  political  developments  partly  of  its  own  making  but 
largely  outwith  its  control 
59. 
Its  role  was  therefore  quite  dif- 
ferent  from  those  of  either  the  1939  or  the  1956  campaigns  which  it 
had  itself  initiated.  These  factors  in  turn  determined  the  role  of 
Fianna  and  in  general  assured  that  its  role  in  relation  to  the  I.  R.  A. 
would  be  more  important  than  at  any  time  since  the  War  for  Indepen- 
dence.  Between  1969  and  1972  indeed  Fianna  in  Belfast  has  been  des- 
cribed  by  one  who  held  leadership  positions  in  both  organisations  as 
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"a  part  and  parcel  of  the  I.  R.  A.  ". 
In  the  first  place  it  supplied  personnel,  particularly  in  the 
summer  of  1969  when  the  Army  and  whole  communities  were  struggling  to 
survive.  At  that  time  fiannai  were  reported  in  the  Republican  press 
to  be  "manning  the  barricades  against  machine  guns,  armoured  vehicles 
and  heavily-armed  Crown  Forces,  with  sticks,  stones  and  petrol  bombs" 
because  of  the  failure  of  the  I.  R.  A.  in  the  South  to  send  men  and 
materials61.  Two  years  later,  when  the  Army  was  decimated  by  intern- 
ment,  scores  of  Fianna  boys  filled  their  places62. 
Secondly,  it  was  necessary  for  the  youth  organisation  to  under- 
take  the  I.  R.  A.  's  work  completely  in  several  areas  such  as  Bawnmore 320 
and  Glengormley  where  no  Army  units  operated63, 
Thirdly,  Fianna  officers  were  required  to  give  specialist  train- 
ing  to  the  I.  R.  A.  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  campaign.  Their 
own  training  was  more  advanced  and  rigorous  than  that  of  the  adult 
army,  and  had  since  1967  included  engineering  instruction  with  anti- 
handling  devices,  nail  and  petrol  bombs,  time  bombs  and  explosives. 
In  1969  they  were  almost  the  only  experienced  engineers  in  Belfast64. 
In  some  areas  of  the  city  they  continued  to  hold  the  major  responsi- 
bility  for  explosives  until  at  least  1971,  and  it  was  while  moving 
explosive  equipment  for  the  Army  in  the  autumn  of  that  year  that  Rose 
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Currie  and  Gerard  O'Hare  blew  themselves  up 
On  the  other  hand  the  organisation's  part  in  gun  battles  was 
usually  slight,  being  limited  by  a  shortage  of  weapons.  The  major 
gun  battle  of.  the  early  part  of  the  campaign,  the  Lower  Falls  Curfew 
of  July  1970,  well  illustrates  its  role66.  The  British  Army's 
announcement  of  a  curfew  and  house-to-house  search  prompted  a  decision 
by  the  Official  I.  R.  A.  to  resist  and  defend  the  area.  It  was  the 
. 
heart  of  the  only  Official  stronghold  in  Belfast  at  the  time  and  its 
penetration  would  have  involved  a  disastrous  loss  of  men  and  mater- 
ials.  There  were  hundreds  of  Volunteers  in  the  area.  Perhaps 
because  of  this  only  one  unit  of  seven  Fianna  officers  was  issued  with 
weapons.  The  task  given  them,  to  cover  Cullingtree  Road  and  McDonnell 
Street,  proved  beyond  their  fire  power  and  two  of  the  boys  had  near 
misses  through  being  dangerously  exposed.  Others  deeper  inside  the 
district  carried  ammunition  and  organised  the  preparation  of  nail  and 
blast  bombs.  The  action  exemplifies  the  generally  auxiliary  role 
that  Fianna  were  given  in  joint  operations,  particularly  those  in  which 
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detailed  pre-planning  was  not  possible. 
The  main  tasks  of  the  boys  on  these  occasions  were  reconnaissance, 321 
look-out  duties,  and  retrieving  and  removing  materials  and  equipment, 
for  which  their  youth  made  them  well  suited.  Several  met  their 
deaths  undertaking  such  tasks.  One  such  was  Gerard  Gibson,  on  look- 
out  duty  near  his  home  in  Lenadoon  when  killed  by  a  British  or 
Loyality  sniper68.  Another  was  Patricia  McKay,  an  I.  R.  A.  officer  and 
slua  o/c,  shot  dead  while  attempting  to  remove  a  rifle  from  an  ex- 
posed  dump  in  an  area  ringed  by  the  British  Army69.  Girl  fiannai 
indeed  were  even  better  equipped  than  the  boys  for  duties  as  runners 
and  carriers  -  the  latter  a  traditional  duty  for  girls  in  Republican 
Belfast  -  and  as  messengers  for  Volunteers  on  the  run70 
The  two  best  known  Fianna  deaths  however,  those  of  Gerald  McAuley 
and  David  McCafferty,  were  in  fact  civilian  casualties.  Fifteen  year 
old  McAuley  was  a  member  of  Slua  Joe  McKelvey  from  the  Kashmir  Road 
area  which  abuts  the  southern  end  of  the  Loyalist  streets  that  run 
from  the  Shankhill  Road.  On  the  afternoon  of  15  August  1969  rioting 
had  broken  out  between  the  rival  communities  during  which  an  Orange 
mob  burned  Bombay  Street  to  the  ground.  Gerald  McAuley  was  in  the 
street  with  teenage  friends  helping  to  extinguish  fires  and  save 
property  when  he  was  shot  dead71.  In  the  evening  chaos  witnesses 
were  uncertain  of  the  source  of  fire  -  it  might  have  been  a  Loyalist 
gunman  or  one  of  the  R.  U.  C.,  who  -  it  is  accepted  -  abetted  the  attack 
that  day  and  "used  firearms  with  such  freedom  as  to  disqualify  them 
from  being  called  a  police  force"72. 
David  McCafferty,  o/c  of  Slua  Pädraic  Pearse,  Ballymurphy,  was 
killed  on  9  July  1972,  the  day  the  Provisional  I.  R.  A.  called  off  its 
ceasefire.  During  a  day  marked  by  scattered  exchanges  between  the 
Provisionals  and  the  British  Army  six  civilians  were  shot  in  the 
Springhill-Ballymurphy  area,  including  one  for  whom  McCafferty  was 
sent  to  bring  the  priest.  When  Fr.  Fitzpatrick  ventured  into  the 322 
open  to  the  body  he  was  himself  fatally  wounded,  and  David  McCafferty 
was  then  shot  dead  attempting  to  drag  him  to  safety.  At  the  in- 
quests  it  was  admitted  that  British  soldiers  fired  the  shots.  The 
Ard  Choiste  later  presented  the  parents  of  McCafferty  with  the  high- 
est  Fianna  award 
73. 
In  addition  to  the  huge  increase  in  recruits  a  second  effect  of 
the  military  situation  was  to  increase  the  proportion  of  members  who 
graduated  to  the  adult  movement.  Because  of  the  strongly  local  and 
family-centred  composition  of  Republicanism  in  the  North,  the  propor- 
tion  of  graduates  from  Fianna  to  the  movement  was  traditionally  high74. 
After  1969  almost  all  of  those  who  remained  any  length  of  time  in  the 
youth  wing  later  joined  the  Republican  Clubs.  Graduation  to  the  Army, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  often  delayed  since  many  members  preferred  to 
remain  in  Fianna  as  seniors  or  officers  -  some  until  their  mid- 
twenties  -  because  of  its  standing  and  role  in  Belfast  and  its  in- 
itially  superior  training.  As  a  result  by  the  early  1970s  the  average 
age  of  membership  in  the  city  was  notably  higher  than  elsewhere75. 
A  third  effect  was  the  prevalence  of  a  particular  type  of  re- 
cruit.  In  analysing  motivation  for  enrolling  in  Fianna  at  this  time 
it  is  possible  to  distinguish  three  main  factors,  which  might  operate 
singly  or  together76.  The  first  was  a  Republican  family  upbringing, 
the  second,  political  awareness  of  the  relevance  of  the  aims  and 
tradition  of  Fianna;  the  third,  the  need  to  defend  one's  area  from 
attack.  In  1969  the  third  was  the  most  prevalent  factor,  and  the 
least  permanent.  It  affected  all  branches  of  the  movement,  but  - 
since  the  young  have  less  inhibitions  and  responsibilities  in  the 
face  of  risk  -  its  most  pronounced  effect  was  upon  Fianna. 
Mushroom  growth  also  brought  a  severe  strain  upon  discipline, 
for  which  reason  most  senior  officers  "went  full-time",  being  anyway 323 
unemployed  or  unable  to  reach  their  places  of  work77.  Fianna  was 
most  fortunate  in  the  calibre  of  its  leaders  at  this  time  and  their 
ability  to  control  any  tendencies  to  indiscipline  brought  about  by 
the  war  conditions  in  the  city.  In  the  New  Year  of  1972,  however, 
almost  the  entire  Belfast  Command  Staff  and  shadow  leadership  were 
arrested  and  interned.  For  several  months  the  youth  organisation 
appeared  in  danger  of  degenerating  into  gangsterism,  a  slide  only 
halted  by  the  intervention  of  local  Army  units  and  by  an  excellent 
replacement  for  the  post  of  Brigade  o/c78. 
Finally,  the  day-to-day  military  demands  seriously  dislocated 
educational-and  cultural  activities,  precisely  as  they  had  after  1919. 
Hikes  and  camps  were  now  an  impossibility  for  an  organisation  in 
which  members  on  the  run  were  counted  in  hundreds  and  almost  all  other 
seniors  were  under  surveillance 
79. 
Sluaite  nevertheless  made  cons- 
cious  attempts  to  tackle  the  task  of  politicisation  of  members  that 
had  barely  begun  before  the  split  and  for  which  the  way  was  now  clear80. 
THE  POLITICISATION  OF  FIANNA 
The  new  emphasis  became  evident  immediately  after  the  abandon- 
ment  of  neutrality:  within  a  month  the  Ard  Choiste  had  instructed  all 
slua  o/cs  to  "initiate  political  education  by  whatever  means  were 
available  locally"81  and  later  in  the  year  organised  an  education  con- 
ference  which  included  lectures  on  the  role  of  youth,  culture  and 
language  in  revolution$2.  The  organisation  printed  two  political 
newsletters  regularly,  while  senior  members  were  recommended  to  study 
the  adult  movement's  occasional  theoretical  journal  Teoiric83.  In 
October  the  Ard  Fheis  passed  a  resolution  to  increase  Fianna's  in- 
volvement  in  the  anti-E.  E.  C.  campaign84.  Indeed  the  growing  political 
emphasis  is  clearly  illustrated  by  Ard  Fheis  resolutions  about  this 
time  -  whereas  in  1970  only  two  could  be  considered  even  marginally 324 
political,  three  years  later  eight  were  directly  so85. 
It  is  not  clear  to  what  extent  the  new  awareness  reached  the 
level  of  the  ordinary  membership.  One  interviewee  has  suggested 
that  in  Dublin  at  least  the  boys  were  largely  untouched  by  it 
86, 
and 
this  was  probably  the  case  wherever  the  members  were  predominantly 
pre-adolescent. 
It  was  certainly  not  so  in  Belfast,  and  it  was  in  this  city  that 
Fianna  first  and  most  thoroughly  developed  a  political  role.  This 
was  an  effect  of  the  age  of  members,  and  in  particular  of  the  military 
situation  which,  though  it  disrupted  Fianna's  own  political  programme, 
nevertheless  threw  up  day-to-day  issues  which  were  politically  educa- 
tive.  Notes  of  the  Belfast  Command  Staff  from  this  date  show  that 
every  opportunity  was  taken  to  use  local  issues  that  impinged  directly 
on  the  daily  lives  of  members  to  involve  them  in  what  the  leadership 
termed  "action-for-education" 
87. 
The  youth  organisation  in  fact  led 
the  movement  at  this  time  as  regards  political  development.  Its 
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progress  was  epitomised  by  the  'Scenas'  -  entertainments  on  a  class 
theme,  performed  at  the  clubs  and  based  on  drill,  song  and  recitation 
-  for  which  Fianna  in  Belfast  was  noted  at  the  time89. 
After  the  Officials'  cease-fire  in  May  1972  Fianna  devoted  it- 
self  increasingly  to  social  and  political  action,  particularly  in 
education,  and  within  two  years  its  members  had  won  leading  positions 
in  city  youth  clubs,  school  councils  and  students'  unions90. 
Of  all  Fianna's  actions  in  this  field  that  attracting  widest 
controversy  was  the  occupation  of  the  Christian  Brothers'  School  in 
Glen  Road  in  November  1974.  The  incident  throws  light  on  a  number  of 
aspects  of  Fianna's  development  in  Belfast  at  that  date.  Perhaps  150 
fiannai  were  involved  in  all.  The  particular  school  was  chosen  be- 
cause  its  staff  had  opposed  previous  Fianna  attempts  to  organise  a 325 
school  council,  and  also  because  it  was  militarily  suitable  being  on 
a  main  road  but  fairly  isolated  from  housing91  ,  Members  burst  into 
the  classrooms,  announced  the  take-over  and  escorted  teachers  to  the 
staffroom.  Pupils  then  gathered  in  the  hall  for  what  was  termed  a 
"teach-in".  The  main  demands  were  for  integrated  education  and  a 
reform  of  the  authority  structure.  Two  pupil  representatives  were 
elected  from  each  class  to  form  a  school  council92,  and  a  discussion 
was  led  by  four  speakers.  Since  Fianna  was  illegal  it  had  been 
decided  that  the  four  should  be  masked,  and  thus  they  appeared  in  the 
press  and  on  T.  V.  The  enterprise  succeeded  well  from  the  'military' 
point  of  view,  but  tactically  it  was  soon  seen  to  have  been  a  mistake. 
It  provoked  a  protest  meeting  by  some  1,000  Belfast  teachers 
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an 
inevitable  condemnation  from  public  figures.  It  also  prompted  a 
bitter  dispute  with  the  adult  movement  and  would  later  be  used  as 
prime  evidence  when  the  question  of  Fianna's  future  would  be  de- 
bated94.  The  use  of  hoods  and  the  failure  to  include  the  teachers  at 
the  meeting  were  seen  as  specific  errors,  the  first  as  being  elitist 
and  adventurist,  the  latter  in  that  it  contradicted  the  Republican 
position  on  education.  But  such  failings  arose  from  the  context  of 
Fianna's  relationship  with  the  movement,  according  to  the  leader  of 
the  occupation95.  For  two  years  it  had  received  scant  support  for 
its  education  campaign,  even  Republican  teachers  ignoring  it.  Glen 
Road  was  therefore  planned  as  a  publicity  coup,  to  be  followed  by 
further  actions  that  would  "make  a  statement"  precisely  by  being  non- 
military.  (In  the  event  the  I.  R.  A.  decreed  that  there  would  be  no 
follow-up.  )  The  occupation  was  thus  among  other  things  a  cri  de 
coeur  to  the  movement. 
In  effect,  Fianna's  attempt  to  analyse  society  was  bringing  it 
to  an  analysis  of  itself.  From  recognising  the  working  class  as  an 326 
isolated  class  it  arrived  at  the  realisation  that  working  youth  is 
itself  an  isolated  class,  and  that  its  own  organisation  had  been 
allowed  to  become  isolated  from  the  movement96.  And  in  seeking 
support  from  other  sections  of  the  movement  it  was  obliged  to  explore 
the  question  of  its  proper  role  and  relationship  within  the  movement. 
In  sum,  Fianna's  politicisation  confronted  its  members  with  these  un- 
avoidable  questions;  and  in  particular  it  forced  them  to  consider 
the  organisation's  position  vis-a-vis  the  I.  R.  A. 
FIANNA,  THE  I.  R.  A.,  AND  THE  ADULT  LEADERSHIP 
Although  political  authority  within  the  Official  Republican 
movement  had  already  passed  to  the  party  Fianna  remained  at  local 
level  under  the  effective  control  of  the  military  wing  in  1971. 
Dual  membership  generally  operated  from  slua  o/c  upwards  in  the 
South97  despite  occasional  local  Army  attempts  to  forbid  it98.  In 
Belfast  it  applied  in  eight  of  the  ten  girls'  sluaite  as  well  as  the 
entire  Command  Staff99.  In  Newry  the  Fianna  and  I.  R.  A.  o/cs  were 
the  same  man100.  Nationally  also  the  Army  continued  to  influence 
Fianna's  leadership  through  the  crucial  appointment  of  the  Chief 
Scout,  not  as  in  the  past  by  direct  nomination  but  through  its  tacit 
prior  approval  of  the  organisation's  own  candidates.  In  effect, 
"if  you  were  opposed  by  the  Army  you  did  not  become  Chief  Scout"101. 
But  if  the  Army  Council  and  the  party  Ard  Chomhairle  had  the 
power  they  lacked  the  interest  to  control  and  support  Fianna.  Their 
almost  total  neglect  of  the  youth  wing  is  attested  by  both  sides102. 
Good-will  certainly  existed  and  aid  was  given  "willingly  and  with  no 
strings  attached"  whenever  the  movement  could  afford  it103.  But 
with  few  exceptions  the  adult  leadership  appeared  unaware  of  Fianna's 
potential  and  uninterested  in  developing  it  beyond  its  traditional 
role.  The  attitude  prevailed  as  it  had  for  decades  that  a  youth 327 
wing  was  desirable,  to  be  "brought  out"  when  opportune  and'"always 
there"  when  called104.  Itself  hard  pressed,  the  movement  preferred 
to  remain  in  ignorance  of  the  boys'  activities  except  when  these 
brought  it  bad  publicity105. 
In  the  autumn  of  1968  the  I.  R.  A.  had  debated  its  relationship 
to  Fianna  at  an  officers'  meeting  held  in  North  Tipperary,  at  which 
proposals  for  change  had  ranged  between  complete  separation  and  the 
integration  of  senior  fiannai  into  the  Army 
106. 
The  majority 
decision,  to  retain  Fianna  as  part  of  the  movement  with  increased 
autonomy,  had  in  fact  merely  avoided  the  problem  since  it  failed  to 
answer  the  related  question  of  Fianna's  role  in  the  movement  or  the 
questions  of  support  and  control.  As  a  result  the  I.  R.  A.  had  re- 
mained  into  the  1970s  morally  and  publicly  responsible  for  an  organi- 
sation  that  now  enjoyed  greater  freedom  to  be  an  embarrassment  to  it. 
The  ambiguous  relationship  was  interpreted  differently  by  the  two 
sides. 
Fianna  for  its  part  sought  greater  support,  particularly  as 
regards  recognition  and  a  readiness  to  explore  its  potential  role  as 
a  revolutionary  youth  organisation107,  while  on  the  question  of  con- 
trol  it  stood  by  its  constitutional  independence.  In  1971  its 
Training  Course  warned  slua  o/cs  - 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  only  people  empowered  to 
issue  instructions  or  orders  to  a  Fianna  officer  regarding 
Na  Fianna  are  that  officer's  superiors  within  Na  Fianna. 
Representatives  of  other  Movement  organisations  do  not 
have  the  authority  to  order  Fianna  officers  with  dual 
membership  to  take  a  certain  line  with  Na  Fianna.  This 
is  of  course  a  delicate  point,  not  conceded  by  the  other 
Movement  bodies"108. 
The  Army's  interpretation  was  different.  Before  1970  and  during 
neutrality  it  had  for  tactical  reasons  avoided  pressing  too  hard  to 
change  Fianna's  role.  Subsequently,  as  Cathal  Goulding  stated  to 
the  author,  "once  they  were  with  us  the  question  was  now  what  to  do 328 
with  them"109,  Whereas  the  adult  leadership  envisaged  a  youth  wing 
as  an  organ  for  explicit  socialist  Republican  political  education, 
it  observed  the  reality  to  be  otherwise110. 
In  the  South  it  saw  a  scouting  organisation  composed  largely  of 
children  and  sometimes  barely  distinguishable  from  the  C.  B.  S.  I. 
except  in  having  a  mild  Republican  flavour  and  being  poorer 
III 
. 
In 
the  North  it  saw  an  organisation  numerous,  adolescent  and  militarily 
active,  and  -  because  of  the  autonomy  it  had  enjoyed  during  the 
year  of  neutrality  -  largely  outwith  Army  control.  In  1970  there 
had  in  fact  been  three  military  groups  in  Republican  Belfast  -  the 
Official  I.  R.  A.,  the  Provisionals,  and  Fianna  which  was  actually 
known  at  the  time  as  'the  Third  Force'112.  Now,  a  year  after  Fianna 
had  given  allegiance  to  the  Official  Republican  movement,  its  North- 
ern  units  were  still  operating  under  their  own  military  authority. 
Such  a  situation  was  intolerable  to  the  Dublin  adult  leadership 
who  therefore  used  the  opportunity  of  internment  and  the  consequent 
dislocation  of  Fianna's  Belfast  Command  Staff  to  convene  a  meeting 
with  the  youth  wing113.  It  was  held  in  Dundalk  late  in  1971  and 
included  Northern  and  G.  H.  Q.  representatives  from  Fianna.  From  it 
instructions  were  issued  that  all  slua  o/cs  in  Belfast  were  to  hand 
over  arms  to  the  local  Army  units,  and  that  no  operations  should  be 
undertaken  except  in  conjunction  with  the  I.  R.  A.  Although  not 
obeyed  in  toto  the  directives  largely  succeeded  in  their  purpose  and 
"spelled  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  Third  Force".  Liaison  was 
further  strengthened  by  the  newly  introduced  policy  of  permitting 
Belfast  Fianna  officers  from  the  rank  of  Battalion  Quartermaster  to 
participate  in  I.  R.  A.  Brigade  Staff  meetings114.  A  potentially 
dangerous  situation  remained  nonetheless.  In  the  ghettos  the 
youngsters  were  clamouring  for  weapons,  and  raids  by  the  authorities 329 
made  it  at  once  easy  for  fiannai  to  acquire  them  'for  safekeeping' 
and  impossible  for  the  I.  R.  A.  to  account  for  them115. 
While  the  I.  R.  A.  in  Belfast  tolerated  the  position,  recognising 
the  potential  of  the  youth  wing  and  indeed  depending  on  it  for  very 
survival  after  internment116,  the  Dublin  adult  leadership  saw  Fianna 
as  an  embarrassment.  Accounts  of  'gangsterism'  filtered  through  to 
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them  periodically,  and  its  leaders  appeared  able  and  willing  to 
countermand  adult  directives118.  Furthermore  the  Northern  organisa- 
tion  appeared  incorrigibly  military.  At  the  1973  Ard  Fheis,  more 
than  a  year  after  the  I.  R.  A.  's  ceasefire,  four  resolutions  from 
Belfast  sluaite  demanded  more  'specialist'  training  while  a  fifth 
urged  the  organisation  to  set  up  a  Catholic  Defence  Association119. 
In  sum  the  relationship  of  the  adult  movement  to  Fianna  in  the 
early  1970s  was  a  matter  of  dispute.  The  youth  wing  saw  it  as  con- 
trol  without  responsibility,  the  movement  as  responsibility  without 
control.  The  fact  of  neglect  was  agreed  by  all.  It  was  in  part  a 
perpetuation  of  the  movement's  traditional  sentimental  attachment 
without  practical  involvement.  But  it  also  reflected  the  recent 
political  development  of  Official  Republicanism  and  its  changing 
role  expectation  for  its  youth.  The  movement  now  generally  con- 
sidered  Fianna  irrelevant  in  the  South  and  dysfunctional  in  the 
North120r  and  viewed  its  drills  and  uniforms  at  best  as  relics  of 
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the  past  and  at  worst  as  insignia  reminiscent  of  Blueshirtism. 
Believing  it  outmoded  and  incapable  of  developing  a  revolutionary 
role  the  adult  leadership's  reaction  was  to  ignore  it  and  postpone 
the  question  of  its  future,  though  "always  aware  that  sooner  or 
later  they  would  have  to  get  down  to  it"122.  In  the  meantime  Fianna 
had  been  getting  down  to  the  question  for  itself. 330 
SELF  ANALYSIS 
The  divided  loyalties  of  1970  had  forced  it  to  look  hard  at 
its  position.  It  had  concluded  that 
to  arrive  at  a  definite  policy  it  is  first  necessary 
to  analyse  our  organisation,  and  recognise  and  under- 
stand  the  differing  groups  and  various  events  which 
have  had,  and  continue  to  have,  influences  on  Na 
Fianna.  By  recognising  and  understanding  the  various 
forces  it  is  easier  to  accept  that  the  position  in 
which  our  organisation  now  finds  itself  is  the  logical 
conclusion  of  the  policies,  or  lack  of  policies,  of 
recent  years123. 
The  statement  revealed  a  willingness  for  self-analysis  and  a  readi- 
ness  to  place  the  organisation  in  a  context  of  social  constraints 
rather  than,  as  hitherto,  to  seek  solutions  in  'Republican'  terms 
alone. 
By  1971  Fianna's  position  made  such  analysis  a  matter  of  urgent 
need.  The  traditionally  disparate  character  of  the  organisation, 
an  effect  of  its  local  strength  and  central  weakness,  had  become 
more  marked  since  the  Troubles  of  1969,  with  a  broad  North-South 
polarisation.  It  had  now  given  allegiance  to  the  Official  move- 
ment,  yet  it  remained  in  fact  a  congeries  of  local  groups  whose 
unity  was  more  emotional  than  organisational.  In  the  words  of  a 
contemporary  Chief  Scout,  "it  could  mean  anything  to  anyone"124 
Within  it  young  children  and  adolescents,  and  scouting,  military 
and  political  activities  co-existed  uneasily.  As  Headquarters 
pointed  out,  the  movement's  neglect  only  made  the  question  of  role- 
definition  more  imperative  -  "The  problem  of  youth  as  a  whole  is 
one  the  movement  seems  to  be  totally  neglecting,  and  so  it  appears 
that  until  that  role  is  examined  and  defined  we  in  Fianna  will  have 
to  find  our  own  place"125. 
G.  H.  Q.  therefore  set  out  to  encourage  policy  making  at  slua 
126 
level,  as  befitted  a  socialist  organisation,  and  during  1972  used 331 
its  national  newsletter  Nuacht  as  a  forum  for  debate  on  Fianna's 
future  role.  At  the  same  time  it  established  a  Structure  Committee 
to  consider  the  question,  and  invited  contributions  from  local  com- 
mand  staffs  which  it  distributed  to  branches  as  a  Discussion  Docu- 
ment  later  in  the  year. 
It  was  apparent  from  the  proposals  received  that  all  sections 
of  the  organisation  recognised  the  need  for  change  to  meet  the  dev- 
eloping  requirements  of  the  Republican  movement.  The  Committee's 
own  Pro  op  sals127,  and  the  Suggestions  for  Reorganisation  submitted 
by  the  Cork  city  Command  Staff128,  recommended  a  division  of  the 
existing  body  into  age-group  sections  with  graded  political  educa- 
tion,  greater  decision  making  by  members  and  representation  on  the 
party  Ard  Chomhairle,  but  retaining  the  structure,  activities  and 
uniform  essentially  unchanged. 
On  the  other  hand  two  further  contributions  published  in  the 
Discussion  Document 
129 
and  a  third  produced  at  the  same  date  by 
G.  H.  Q.  itself130  advocated  fundamental  reorganisation.  They  argued 
that  Republican  youth  should  be  organised  in  two  completely  separate 
bodies.  The  first  for  children  from  six  to  fourteen  years  should 
retain  the  name  'Fianna  Eireann',  the  scouting  form  and  the  uni- 
form.  The  second  should  be  a  "Young  Revolutionary  Movement",  quite 
distinct  in  name,  role  and  structure,  a  solely  political  organisa- 
tion,  excluding  all  military  training  which  should  in  future  be 
strictly  confined  to  the  I.  R.  A. 
131. 
The  three  documents  represen- 
ted  a  radical  departure  in  that  they  proposed  the  formation  of  an 
autonomous  youth  movement,  on  the  pattern  of  political  youth  move- 
ments  elsewhere  and  quite  unlike  Fianna  whose  prototype  was  scout- 
ing  within  the  adult-led  boys'  club  tradition. 
The  debate  initiated  in  1972  reflected  Fianna's  own  current 332 
ideological  development.  But  in  the  meantime  the  urgent  practical 
problems  which  had  first  occasioned  it  had  escalated  to  a  point 
that  demanded  that  debate  give  way  to  decision. 
THE  POSITION  IN  1973 
There  is  no  documentary  evidence  available  for  Fianna  member- 
ship  in  the  South  for  the  year  1973,  which  is  itself  a  significant 
pointer  to  the  situation.  Files  are  far  from  complete  for  1971-2, 
but  from  them  and  from  references  in  the  monthly  newsletter  it  is 
possible  to  compile  a  picture  of  the  strength  of  the  organisation 
that  is  probably  fairly  accurate.  There  were  at  least  thirteen 
sluaite  for  boys  in  1972,  six  of  them  in  greater  Dublin132,  and  if 
the  monthly  returns  extant  are  representative  the  total  membership 
may  have  been  220-30.  Six  sluaite  were  registered  with  the  Depart- 
ment  of  Girl  Scouts,  one  each  in  Limerick  and  Cork  and  the  rest  in 
the  capital,  but  of  the  latter  only  Slua  Anne  Devlin  had  a  full 
membership.  It  appears  there  were  some  sixty  girl  fiannai  in  Dub- 
lin,  and  perhaps  100  in  the  country  altogether133,  Analysis  of 
monthly  returns  from  those  sluaite  which  maintained  regular  contact 
with  Headquarters  is  equally  revealing.  It  shows  the  typical  boys' 
slua  as  having  a  membership  of  only  seventeen  (a  full  complement 
was  29),  of  whom  only  three-quarters  attended  parade,  and  a  high 
turnover  of  members  reflected  in  month-to-month  fluctuation  of  al- 
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most  one-in-five.  Girls'  sluaite  recruited  and  held  their  mem- 
bers  with  more  success135,  but  the  overall  impression  is  of  an 
organisation  of  mediocre  discipline  and  declining  attraction.  If 
attendance  may  be  taken  as  an  index  of  morale  then  morale  was  low, 
particularly  in  that  the  figures  are  based  on  the  fourteen  most 
efficient  branches  and  no  doubt  flatter  the  organisation  as  a  whole. 333 
The  Boys'  Battalion  in  Belfast  had  declined  in  strength  in 
1971-2,  years  which  mark  the  nadir  of  the  Official  Republican  move- 
ment  in  the  city  and  the  greatest  expansion  of  the  Provisionals. 
In  Fianna's  case  however  decline  was  not  the  result  of  loss  through 
defection  and  disenchantment  -  such  loss  had  taken  place  in  the 
winter  of  1970-1,  after  which  the  sluaite  held  their  members,  now 
reduced  to  a  stable  and  committed  core 
136. 
Decline  in  numbers  con- 
tinued  through  1971-2  because  the  organisation  was  unable  to  make 
good  the  normal  turnover  of  members  graduating  to  the  senior  move- 
went, 
It  was  not  until  1973  that  the  trend  was  reversed.  Growth 
that  year  in  general  reflected  new  momentum  within  the  Official 
movement,  for  whom  the  tide  was  also  beginning  to  turn.  More  par- 
ticularly  it  was  a  result  of  recruiting  campaigns  in  the  old  strong- 
holds,  in  areas  where  the  Officials  had  regained  a  foot-hold,  and  in 
the  new  housing  areas  on  the  edge  of  the  city137.  Probably  twenty 
branches  existed  in  all138  and  though  total  membership  never  matched 
the  figure  of  summer  1970139  the  Battalion  was  certainly  as  strong 
in  terms  of  active  members  as  at  any  time  since  the  beginning  of 
the  Troubles140, 
The  development  of  the  girls'  sluaite  had  followed  a  rather 
different  pattern,  more  gradual  and  without  the  severe  decline  of 
1971-2141.  Growth  had  remained  steady  and  turn-over  low  between 
1969  and  1973  during  which  time  a  Brigade  had  been  established  with 
a  Battalion  in  West  Belfast  and  a  second  covering  the  north  and 
east  of  the  city 
142. 
Thus  while  1973  marked  a  critical  deterioration  in  the  Republic 
it  was  a  year  of  new  strength,  stability  and  effectiveness  in  Bel- 
fast.  In  reality  the  traditional  differences  between  North  and 
South  were  now  so  extreme  that  two  organisations  existed  totally 334 
different  in  all  but  their  name143.  And  while  Ard  Fheis  resolu- 
tions  called  for  closer  relations  between  them144  the  two  went  their 
own  ways.  Belfast  largely  ignored  G.  H.  Q.  directives,  and  the 
occasional  visits  of  Headquarters  staff  on  matters  of  military  pro- 
cedure  were  received  naturally  enough  with  amused  tolerance 
145. 
The  setting  up  of  an  autonomous  Northern  Command  in  autumn  1973  in 
no  way  altered  the  existing  position  but  merely  gave  it  decency146, 
and  in  the  same  year  the  attempt  was  even  made  to  give  the  North 
its  own  separate  A.  G.  M.  s147 
It  was  not  only  in  Belfast  that  Headquarters  directives  were 
ignored;  the  same  applied  almost  everywhere,  and  in  particular  in 
Cork  where  Fianna  had  traditionally  worked  more  closely  with  the 
local  I.  R.  A.  than  with  its  own  G.  H.  Q.  In  the  words  of  Mice/  1 
Bairead,  elected  Chief  Scout  during  the  year,  central  control  "was 
almost  nil  and  applied  in  theory  only"  in  1971-2,  and  the  organisa- 
tion  "operated  under  licence  of  the  local  chiefs"148.  Headquarters 
had  no  effective  authority  -  they  "could  dish  out  what  they  liked" 
from  central  office;  they  could  visit  local  sluaite,  in  the  know- 
ledge  that  the  situation  would  revert  to  normal  on  their  departure. 
The  minuteness  and  fragility  of  the  organisation  in  the  South  and 
its  size  and  stability  in  the  North,  ironically  had  the  same 
effect  -  Headquarters  could  not  afford  to  attempt  to  change  that 
which  was.  Even  had  this  not  been  so,  they  lacked  the  necessary 
local  knowledge.  Communication  was  inconsistent  and  usually  ver- 
bal;  in  some  cases  it  was  second-hand,  in  others  it  lapsed  entirely 
to  be  picked  up  again  once  a  year  at  Bodenstown.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances  it  was  impossible  to  control  the  conditions  or  know  the 
facts  of  membership,  and  without  knowledge  or  control  G.  H.  Q.  was 
very  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  local  o/cs. 335 
By  1973  moreover  the  Headquarters  staff  was  itself  riven  by 
disputes.  Since  the  late  1960s  at  least  "there  had  always  been 
intrigue"  within  the  small  circle  of  Dublin  officers149.  By  1973 
the  situation  in  the  capital  was  one  of  total  disarray,  and  execu- 
tive  meetings  "just  one  continuous  row"150. 
Fianna  was  therefore  now  a  doubly  divided  house,  the  local 
areas  set  against  a  Dublin  leadership  which  was  itself  fragmented, 
and  the  divisions  had  all  but  destroyed  morale  and  purpose.  It  was 
a  matter  of  urgency  that  the  November  Ard  Fheis  should  tackle  the 
question  of  its  role  and  structure. 
DECISION  FOR  CHANGE 
The  Ard  Fheis  debate  was  conducted  on  the  basis  of  the  documents 
produced  earlier  in  the  year.  It  was  expected  to  reflect  the  posi- 
tions  of  Belfast  and  the  Dublin  leadership,  which  appeared  diametric- 
ally  opposed. 
In  the  eyes  of  G.  H.  Q.  -  and  the  view  was  shared  by  most  of  the 
Sinn  F6in  Ard  Chomhairle  -  Fianna  in  the  North  posed  problems  of 
militarism,  adventurism  and  indiscipline  which  could  only  be  solved 
by  radical  change,  while  the  organisation  in  the  South  was  "dead  in 
its  present  state,  only  coming  alive  at  commemorations"151  and  not 
to  be  revived  by  mere  reform.  North  and  South  it  had  been  left  be- 
hind  by  a  movement  whose  changes  "had  undermined  the  old  without 
9 
creating  a  new"152.  It  was  now  clearly  necessary  to  create  a  new. 
The  Belfast  leadership  on  the  contrary  considered  themselves 
neither  dead  nor  undermined,  and  saw  a  political  and  military  future 
for  Fianna153,  But  because  they  believed  that  the  changes  advo- 
cated  by  Dublin  were  precisely  what  was  already  being  practised  in 
the  North,  they  made  common  cause  with  G.  H.  Q.  on  the  day.  Thus  it 
was  ironically  Belfast  resolutions  for  change  that  were  carried  at 336 
the  Ard  Fheis,  against  counter  proposals  that  Fianna  be  reconstructed 
on  the  reformist  lines  recommended  by  the  Structure  Committee.  Over- 
whelming  support  was  given  to  their  motions  that  the  organisation  be 
divided  into  two  sections  each  with  a  separate  command,  that  Group  X 
retain  the  aims  and  objects  of  the  Fianna  Handbook  and  Group  Y  be 
developed  as  "an  effective  revolutionary  youth  movement  with  a  defi- 
nite  role  to  play  in  the  national  liberation  struggle"154" 
A  further  resolution  moved  by  the  Belfast  Command  Staff  and 
passed  unanimously,  would  later  prove  crucial.  It  provided  that, 
on  condition  that  the  youth  wing  had  representation  at  senior  level, 
it  would  "be  prepared  to  accept  all  the  policies  and  decisions  taken" 
by  the  party155.  In  the  name  of  party  discipline  Fianna  in  effect 
by  this  resolution  relinquished  its  historic  constitutional  inde- 
pendence. 
Belfast  left  the  Ard  Fheis  looking  for  change  to  be  accomplished 
within  Fianna;  most  of  the  Dublin  Headquarters  Staff  envisaged  a  com- 
pletely  new  organisation.  It  would  be  two  years  yet  before  the 
question  would  be  resolved.  But  since  its  resolution  had  now  been 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  adult  movement,  the  views  of  whose  leader- 
ship  were  known,  there  could  be  only  one  outcome. 
The  Ard  Fheis  had  broken  up  in  disorder  and  after  1973  there 
would  be  no  further  Ard  Fheiseanna,  no  executive  meetings,  and  no 
156 
further  written  records"  Deterioration  in  the  South  was  now 
such  that  all  pretence  of  organisational  process  was  abandoned.  It 
was  clear  that  the  question  now  was  not  whether  or  not  Fianna  had  a 
future,  but  when,  where  and  how  it  would  be  necessary  to  kill  it 
off. 337 
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Chapter  11.  THE  END  OF  FIANNA 
DEVELOPING  THE  CONCEPT  OF  A  REVOLUTIONARY  YOUTH  MOVEMENT 
The  decision  of  the  1973  Ard  Fheis  had  been  for  the  establish- 
ment  of  two  separate  organisations,  the  one  for  under-fourteens  and 
in  the  tradition  of  Fianna,  the  other  a  revolutionary  youth  move- 
ment.  Though  the  role  of  the  latter  was  not  specified  it  was  recog- 
nised  that  it  should  be  "definite",  avoiding  the  role  ambiguity  of 
Fianna,  and  that  it  should  be  defined  prior  to  inauguration.  The 
type  of  organisation  had  indeed  already  been  broadly  determined  by 
the  1973  documents,  which  -  though  formally  for  discussion  only  - 
expressed  the  consensus  view  of  G.  H.  Q.  and  the  Belfast  Command 
Staff  and  as  such  were  likely  to  become  policy.  In  effect  Fianna 
and  the  Republican  movement  by  this  date  accepted  that  the  revolu- 
tionary  youth  organisation  would  be  a  solely  political  body,  under 
a  new  name,  without  uniform,  and  run  democratically  by  the  members 
1 
In  order  to  develop  and  fill  out  this  general  concept  Dublin  dis- 
seminated  two  further  documents  the  following  year. 
The  first,  entitled  Some  Ideas  on  the  Formation  of  a  Revolu- 
tionary  Youth  Movement2,  repeated  the  recommendation  to  adopt  a  new 
name  and  thus  project  a  public  image  quite  different  from  that  tradi- 
tionally  inseparable  from  Fianna3.  It  reiterated  that  the  age 
range  of  members  should  be  between  fourteen  and  twenty  years,  but 
proposed  a  ceiling  age  of  25-30  years  for  full-time  workers  to  en- 
sure  continuity  of  experienced  leadership.  It  envisaged  the  mem- 
bers  being  recruited  from  the  younger  elements  in  Sinn  F6in  "in 
association  with  the  most  advanced  members  of  Fianna".  It  insisted 
that  though  the  youth  movement  would  "in  all  probability  be  working 
side  by  side  with  the  Party"  it  should  not  be  merely  an  auxiliary  at 346 
the  call  of  Sinn  F6in  cumainn.  Its  central  work  should  be  in 
youth  issues,  particularly  those  of  education  and  employment,  and 
to  this  end  members  should  participate  in  the  Trade  Unions,  univer- 
sity,  college  and  school  organisations  as  well  as  local,  national 
and  international  youth  organisations.  That  its  activities  should 
be  outgoing  represented  a  fundamental  departure  from  the  practice 
of  Fianna,  which  had  always  been  a  self-contained  and  inward-looking 
body. 
The  document  recommended  that  "the  youth  movement  should  be 
structurally  independent  of  the  Party,  but  should  declare  its  unity 
of  objective  with  the  Party  in  its  constitution.  If  it  (and  the 
Party)  wished  it  could  have  observers  at  Comhairle  Ceanntair  meet- 
ings.  It  should  remain  under  the  guidance  of  the  Party,  and 
regional  and.  national  officers  should  be  Party  members"4.  It  also 
saw  the  youth  organisation's  own  structure  in  terms  of  a  political 
party,  "similar  to  Sinn  Fein  at  present"  and  founded  on  democratic 
centralism. 
The  document  argued  against  attempting  to  fashion  the  new  body 
out  of  the  old:  though  it  recognised  the  willingness  of  some  Fianna 
members  to  develop  their  organisation  into  a  revolutionary  movement, 
it  considered  that  -  schooled  as  they  were  in  the  existing  slua 
practice  and  structure  -  they  lacked  the  necessary  political  aware- 
ness  and  experience. 
The  second  document 
5 
reiterated  the  concept  of  a  youth  movement 
adopting  a  structure  corresponding  to  that  of  the  parent  party,  and 
thus  serving  as  a  "practice  ground"  for  party  membership.  It  re- 
emphasised  the  importance  of  control  and  the  screening  of  recruits 
for  political  orthodoxy.  But  it  went  beyond  previous  publications 
in  specifically  advocating  a  relationship  with  the  party  modelled 347 
on  that  of  the  Connolly  Youth  Movement  with  the  Communist  Party  of 
Ireland. 
Several  observations  may  be  made  concerning  the  two  documents, 
and  the  stage  of  development  of  the  youth  movement  concept  within 
Republicanism  which  they  represent.  In  the  first  place,  they  are 
couched  in  a  new  language,  one  in  which  the  terms  of  Marxism- 
Leninism  have  replaced  the  traditional  idiom  of  Republicanism  and 
of  scouting,  in  which  'training  for  the  day'  has  been  superceded  by 
'educate,  agitate,  organise',  and  the  idealism  of  Gaelic  by  the 
realism  of  English.  This  is  not  at  all  -  as  were  the  earlier  docu- 
ments  -  Fianna  with  a  new  face.  The  concepts  of  control,  youth 
issues  and  education  are  directly  from  the  Young  Communist  Leagues 
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Corresponding  to  the  development  of  the  adult  sector  from  movement 
into  Marxist-Leninist  party,  the  prototype  now  proposed  for  youth 
is  the  Komsomol. 
Secondly,  the  documents  represent  the  first  statements  on  the 
future  of  organised  Republican  youth  not  actually  made  by  the  youth 
wing  itself.  The  author  of  the  first  was  a  party  member  and  a  mem- 
ber  of  the  Irish  Union  of  School  Students,  but  not  of  Fianna7.  His 
position  is  significant:  his  party  membership  indicates  Sinn  Fein's 
growing  interest  in  its  youth  and  implies  the  possibility  of  party 
intervention  on  the  question  of  the  future  of  Fianna;  his  student 
background  suggests  that  this  growing  interest  stemmed  less  from 
experience  of  Fianna  itself  than  from  encountering  student  organi- 
sations  in  general.  This  was  indeed  the  case:  Sinn  Fein  was  at 
this  time  establishing  a  growing  number  of  contacts  with  socialist 
parties  abroad  through  its  International  Affairs  Bureau,  and  came 
to  recognise  the  political  potential  of  organised  youth  through 
s 
meeting  young  party  members  in  student  action. 348 
Thirdly,  the  documents  were  primarily  concerned  with  exactly 
those  areas  of  youth  organisation  which  in  Fianna  had  proved  least 
amenable  to  solution  -  structure,  activities  and  control. 
Lastly,  it  may  be  observed  in  retrospect:  that  they  contained 
the  basis  of  all  subsequent  developments  in  the  field  of  organised 
Republican  youth  to  date.  Thus  by  the  autumn  of  1974  the  direction 
was  already  clear.  It  awaited  only  the  stamp  of  approval  by  party, 
Army  and  Fianna  itself,  which  would  be  given  the  following  year. 
INVESTIGATION  AND  DECISION 
In  spring  1975  the  Sinn  Fein  Ard  Chomhairle  appointed  a  commit- 
tee,  chaired  by  the  party's  joint  General  Secretary  Tony  Heffernan, 
to  consider  the  future  pattern  of  youth  organisation  and  within  that 
context  the  future  of  Fianna.  Its  main  brief  was  to  hold  explora- 
tory  meetings  in  those  areas  of  the  country  where  Fianna  still  opera- 
ted.  Meetings  were  arranged  at  seven  venues  and  it  was  largely  on 
the  evidence  gathered  at  them  that  the  committee  produced  its  Report 
later  in  the  year9,  The  present  account  is  based  upon  the  Report, 
amplified  by  the  committee's  working  notes  and  additional  interview 
material  supplied  by  Heffernan. 
The  meetings  revealed  that  Fianna  was  now  reduced  to  some  400 
senior  members  throughout  the  country,  of  whom  250  were  in  Belfast, 
perhaps  110  elsewhere  in  the  Six  Counties,  and  only  about  forty 
10 
south  of  the  Border  Outwith  Belfast  and  Dublin  sluaite  remained 
only  in  Dundalk,  Lurgan  and  Derry.  The  meeting  at  Cork  was  atten- 
ded  by  individual  fiannai  from  the  city  whose  slua  had  recently 
collapsed  through  lack  of  support  from  the  adult  movement.  Members 
gathered  at  Omagh  from  throughout  County  Tyrone;  there  was  no  slua 
in  the  area  and  most  of  them  maintained  contact  through  the  Repub- 
lican  Clubsll.  Under  such  circumstances  the  central  leadership 
were  inevitably  unaware  of  most  Fianna  activity  and  the  committee 349 
made  several  unexpected  discoveries.  Their  report  that  fiannai  in 
Tyrone  were  "apparently  involved  in  some  'specialist'  activities" 
exemplifies  their  extraordinary  lack  of  previous  knowledge  in 
potentially  damaging  matters. 
They  also  encountered  a  complete  lack  of  uniformity  from  area 
to  area,  which  they  attributed  both  to  the  differences  between  North 
and  South  and  the  party's  failure  to  define  a  role  for  its  youth 
wing.  "A  combination  of  these  factors,  "  they  reported,  "has  led 
to  the  present  situation  where  groups  of  Fianna  exist  in  various 
areas  of  the  country  operating  in  isolation  from  one  another,  with 
different  local  rules  and  varied  degrees  of  involvement  with  the 
rest  of  the  movement"12.  They  gave  as  examples  the  ceiling  age  of 
sixteen  years  in  North  Armagh  as  against  twenty-five  in  Belfast, 
and  the  Cork-practice  of  attending  Sinn  F6in  Comhairle  Ceanntair 
meetings  compared  with  that  in  Dublin  where  formal  contact  with  the 
adult  movement  was  non-existent. 
The  committee  similarly  found  no  uniformity  of  role  concept 
among  the  branches,  unless  it  was  in  their  uniformly  low  level  of 
political  awareness.  Among  the  Lurgan  members,  for  instance,  "when 
some  areas  of  political  activity  for  a  youth  group  were  suggested, 
their  reaction  was  that  if  they  'agreed'  to  engage  in  political 
activity,  then  they  should  be  allowed  more  specialist  training  'in 
return',  as  a  sort  of  reward"13.  Predictably,  therefore,  the 
branches  responded  variously  to  the  proposal  to  create  a  radically 
new  youth  organisation.  Derry  and  Cork  broadly  supported  change 
though  not  necessarily  in  the  same  terms  as  proposed;  Tyrone  favoured 
a  political  movement  to  supplement  but  not  replace  a  traditional 
Fianna;  Lurgan  saw  no  necessity  for  change  except  in  the  direction 
of  greater  local  autonomy  and  military  training.  But  an  equally 350 
significant  finding  in  the  committee's  view  was  the  generally  low 
salience  of  the  opinions  expressed.  It  appeared  that  Fianna  sim- 
ply  did  not  command  passionate  loyalty  in  1975,  and  that  whatever 
decisions  the  movement  might  make  as  to  its  future  would  meet  with 
little  resistance14. 
Only  in  Belfast  was  the  position  different.  The  general 
meeting  there  was  turned  into  "a  fiasco",  being  boycotted  by  Fianna 
members  on  the  informal  instruction  of  the  Battalion  Command  Staffs 
who  apparently  feared  that  it  would  be  used  to  disband  the  organisa- 
tion 
organisa- 
r  15 
A  second  meeting  was  called,  restricted  to  Fianna  and  the 
Republican-Clubs  Comhairle  Ceanntair,  and  on  this  occasion  450 
seniors  and  juniors  attended  in  a  tactical  demonstration  of  strength. 
The  audience  voted  "pretty  well  overwhelmingly"  against  disbanding 
Fianna16  and  the  visitors  noted  from  their  experience  of  the  two 
meetings  that  "great  caution  would  be  necessary  in  tackling  the 
17 
question  in  the  city". 
The  committee  prepared  their  Report  in  the  autumn.  Their 
overall  recommendation  was  for  a  "more  political"  youth  organisa- 
tion,  whose  role  should  be  to  educate  young  persons  in  the  prin- 
ciples  of  socialist  Republicanism  through  a  revolutionary  action 
approach  to  youth  problems,  and  thereby  to  recruit  members  for  the 
adult  movement18.  They  concluded  that  Fianna  could  not  be  devel- 
oped  to  fulfil  such  a  role,  in  that  its  public  image  of  paramilitary 
and  illegal  activity  and  its  military  discipline,  uniform  and  drill 
were  unlikely  to  attract  a  suitable  type  of  young  person  to  the 
movement.  Fianna  was  in  fact  now  judged  to  be  not  merely  valueless 
to  Republicanism,  but  actually  dysfunctional  to  its  political  dev- 
elopment  and  credibility. 351 
The  committee  therefore  recommended  the  establishment  of  a 
completely  new  organisation.  It  would  not  be  uniformed:  the  Report 
acknowledged  the  view  widely  expressed  in  the  Northern  meetings  that 
uniform  meets  a  need  in  young  people  to  express  a  common  identity, 
but  considered  "that  any  sort  of  formal  uniform  has  para-military 
associations  and  this  is  an  image  we  are  obviously  trying  to  avoid". 
This  judgment  illustrates  the  committee's  overall  insistence  that 
the  new  movement  should  present  a  face  as  different  as  possible  from 
Fianna's.  To  the  same  end  they  recommended  that  it  "should  be  as 
public  as  possible  and  seek  to  get  as  much  publicity  as  possible", 
to  forestall  allegations  that  it  was  merely  perpetuating  Fianna's 
subversion  of  the  young. 
The  Report  believed  the  "key  problem"  to  be  that  of  giving  the 
youth  movement  maximum  freedom  "while  at  the  same  time  assuring  that 
it  is  closely  tied  to  the  movement,  committed  to  its  policies,  and 
not  likely  at  any  stage  in  the  future  to  prove  an  embarrassment  by 
publicly  going  against  movement  decisions  or  policies"19.  It 
suggested  that  control  should  be  established  through  a  declaration 
of  allegiance  in  the  Constitution,  and  selection  of  personnel  in 
which  the  "vast  majority"  would  initially  be  party  or  Fianna  mem- 
bers;  it  should  be  maintained  by  granting  the  party  limited  powers 
of  veto  and  building  two-way  liaison  between  party  and  youth  move- 
ment20.  To  further  liaison  it  recommended  that  Sinn  Fein  appoint 
a  full-time  Director  of  Youth  Activities  and  provide  the  junior 
body  with  a  room  at  Headquarters.  These  initiatives,  with  in 
addition  the  provision  of  "some  sort  of  permanent  financial  arrange- 
ment"  which  it  left  unspecified,  would  be  seen  as  an  indica- 
tion  of  the  movement's  serious  intentions  towards  its  youth. 
It  is  doubtful  whether  the  views  gathered  round  the  country 352 
from  fiannai,  diverse  and  often  contradictory  as  they  were,  could 
of  themselves  have  prompted  the  committee's  conclusions.  Rather 
they  appear  to  have  provided  evidence  to  support  conclusions  that 
had  already  been  reached.  The  committee  had  after  all  been  appoin- 
ted  by  the  Sinn  Fein  Ard  Chomhairle  and  their  recommendations 
accorded  exactly  with  current  party  thinking,  following  quite  closely 
the  arguments  of  previous  documents  but  ranging  well  beyond  the  sub- 
ject  matter  of  the  meetings.  Thus  though  the  spring  tour  was  cer- 
tainly  undertaken  with  all  sincerity,  as  a  democratic  exercise  it 
was  perhaps  rather  more  apparent  than  real. 
The  appointment  of  the  committee,  and  the  conclusions  they 
reached,  should  be  viewed  in  the  context  of  events  taking  place 
within  the  Official  Republican  movement  at  the  time.  From  the 
summer  of  1974  the  movement  had  been  faced  with  a  threat  of  further 
defections  -  this  time  of  the  extreme  left  -  associated  with  Ard 
Chomhairle  member  Seamus  Costello.  Following  his  dismissal  by  the 
Ard  Fheis  in  January  1975  he  gathered  round  himself  and  Bernadette 
McAliskey  a  new  party,  the  Irish  Republican  Socialist  Party,  com- 
posed  substantially  of  disaffected  Officials  and  some  ex-Provis- 
ionals21.  Within  three  months  of  its  foundation  military  elements 
connected  with  the  new  party  were  responsible  for  the  death  of 
three  Official  Republicans  including  the  I.  R.  A.  's  commander  in  Bel- 
fast,  and  the  serious  wounding  of  other  prominent  members 
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.  it 
was  the  belief  of  the  Gardiner  Place  leadership  that  former  fiannai 
had  played  a  leading  part  in  the  I.  R.  S.  P.  defection,  and  that  some 
of  those  who  shot  their  members  in  Belfast  had  learned  their  use  of 
arms  in  Fianna23.  In  fact,  the  author  has  ascertained  from  those 
closer  to  the  situation  in  the  North  that  apart  from  one  explosives 
expert  very  few  of  the  I.  R.  S.  P.  's  military  personnel  were  ex- 
Fianna24.  However,  the  reality  is  less  relevant  than  what  was  be- 353 
lieved  in  the  capital.  Dublin's  view  was  that  Fianna  had  provided 
military  training  but  failed  to  give  political  education,  and  that 
its  incorrigible  militarism  had  this  time  damaged  more  than  just 
the  movement's  name.  Moreover,  during  the  spring  exchanges  -  and 
again  during  the  briefer  feud  with  the  Provisional  I.  R.  A.  in  the 
late  autumn25  -  they  were  forced  to  mobilise  the  youth  wing  and  it 
was  their  fear  that  an  armed,  mobilised  Fianna  was  at  any  time  able 
and  perhaps  likely  to  set  itself  up  as  an  autonomous  breakaway 
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group  It  would  therefore  be  correct  to  say  that  the  military 
events  of  1975  gave  an  urgency  to  the  work  of  the  youth  committee 
in  the  spring,  and  had  some  influence  upon  their  conclusions  in  the 
autumn. 
In  the  light  of  the  committee's  Report  the  Ard  Chomhairle  of 
Sinn  Fein  were  at  once  requested  to  offer  a  definitive  clarification 
of  the  question  of  arms  in  the  youth  movement27.  Their  decision 
was  that  there  could  be  no  place  for  an  armed  youth  wing,  and  that 
young  members  desiring  military  activity  should  undertake  it  only 
in  the  Army,  from  the  age  of  sixteen  and  under  mature  leadership 
28. 
In  effect  it  confirmed  the  committee's  conclusions.  The  Ard  Chom- 
hairle  now  sought  ratification  of  their  position  by  the  movement  as 
a  whole.  At  the  party's  Annual  General  Meeting  in  the  New  Year 
they  introduced  the  following  resolution: 
Recognising  that  the  need  exists  in  Ireland  for  a  political 
youth  movement,  and  recognising  that  none  of  the  youth 
organisations  that  exist  at  present  can  fulfil  this  need, 
this  Ard  Fheis  of  Sinn  Fein  instructs  the  incoming  Ard 
Chomhairle  to  take  steps  to  establish  a  political  youth 
movement  that  would  be:  - 
1.  Committed  through  its  constitution  to  supporting  and 
advancing  among  young  people  the  policies  and  objec- 
tives  of  Sinn  Fein,  subject  to  the  overall  control  and 
direction  of  the  Sinn  Fein  Ard  Chomhairle. 354 
2.  Aimed  at  recruiting  young  workers  and  students  in 
the  14-20  age  group  with  a  view  to  giving  them  an 
understanding  of  the  basic  principles  of  Republican 
Socialism,  and  involving  them  in  the  building  of 
the  revolutionary  movement  in  this  country. 
3.  Committed  to  fulfilling  the  need  that  exists  for  a 
young  people's  organisation  that  will  provide  a 
revolutionary  approach  to  the  many  social  and 
economic  problems  facing  young  workers  and  students. 
4.  Committed  to  working  with  other  progressive  youth 
movements  to  highlight  and  alleviate  these  problems. 
The  Ard  Fheis  further  instructs  the  incoming  Ard  Chomhairle 
to  appoint  a  committee,  representative  of  young  people  from 
throughout  the  Movement,  to  draft  a  constitution  and  mani- 
festo  and  to  make  the  other  necessary  arrangements  for  the 
public  launching  of  a  political  youth  movement  within  a 
period  of  four  months. 
The  Ard  Fheis  believes  that  Fianna  should  continue  as  a 
scouting  organisation  aimed  primarily  at  those  under  four- 
teen29. 
The  resolution  was  not  unopposed  on  the  day.  Nine  counter  motions 
had  been  forwarded  by  Republican  Clubs  in  Belfast,  one  of  them  seek- 
ing  to  delay  the  establishment  of  any  new  organisation  for  one  year 
and  a  second  urging  that  Fianna  should  spearhead  the  proposed  revolu- 
tionary  youth  movement30.  The  Belfast  boys'  o/c  spoke  as  a  guest 
against  the  resolution,  but  at  the  voting  little  serious  opposition 
was  encountered  even  from  the  Northern  delegates.  All  counter 
motions  were  taken  together  as  a  single  amendment  to  the  main  resolu- 
tion  and  were  defeated  by  a  substantial  majority31.  This  decision, 
reached  democratically  by  the  highest  authority  in  the  movement, 
appeared  to  signal  the  end  of  Fianna  in  its  traditionally  recognised 
form,  relegating  it  to  a  solely  scouting  organisation  for  pre- 
adolescents. 
GROUNDS  FOR  RESISTANCE 
The  Belfast  Fianna,  which  had  openly  opposed  the  conclusions  of 
the  committee's  autumn  Report,  now  challenged  the  Ard  Fheis  decision 
itself.  Their  grounds  for  resistance  were  threefold  -  faith  in 
their  own  organisation,  doubts  about  the  proposed  replacement,  and 355 
criticism  of  the  movement's  handling  of  the  question. 
They  had  good  reason  to  consider  themselves  an  effective 
organisation,  in  terms  of  size,  activity  and  political  development. 
Moreover,  the  old  Fianna  conviction  of  being  part  of  a  tradition 
of  special  excellence  survived  in  the  city,  as  a  general  concept 
with  particular  local  meaning.  Belfast  fiannai  were  taught  that 
their  members  had  always  been  the  most  quickly  promoted  in  the 
I.  R.  A.,  that  they  comprised  the  bulk  of  the  adult  leadership,  and 
that  'the  best  of  those  who  went  forward  and  gave  their  all'  over 
the  years  -  Seamus  'Ratty'  Burns,  Tom  Williams,  Terence  Perry,  Joe 
McKelvey  -.  had  all  been  ex-Fianna  officers32.  Indeed,  so  the  argu- 
ment  went,  whenever  Fianna  had  lapsed  in  Belfast,  the  whole  move- 
ment  there  had  lapsed33;  if  an  Army  unit  was  wiped  out,  Fianna  per- 
sonnel  replenished  it;  if  the  very  movement  itself  was  in  danger  of 
extinction  -  as  in  the  first  months  of  internment  in  1971  -  was  it 
not  Fianna  who  sustained  it?  If  such  things  were  made  a  myth,  they 
were  none  the  less  fact.  Similarly  with  the  scouting  ethic:  if  the 
skills  and  virtues  of  scouting  were  by  now  considered  out-dated 
elsewhere,  for  Belfast  youngsters  harrassed  by  police  and  living 
with  sectarianism  the  out-of-town  camps  and  the  'citizenship'  still 
had  undoubted  value,  while  the  fitness  and  rough  living  were  not 
meaningless  to  those  with  a  future  in  prison  or  on  the  run. 
Thus  of  their  faith  in  past  and  present.  As  to  the  future, 
their  conviction  was  that  Fianna  unquestionably  had  the  potential 
to  become  a  genuine  revolutionary  youth  movement34.  It  was  pre- 
cisely  such  a  development  that  Belfast,  virtually  alone,  had  been 
urging  upon  the  national  organisation  for  some  years;  and  it  was 
exactly  those  virtues  planned  for  the  new  movement  -  control, 
communication  and  political  rigour  -  that  the  city  Battalion  had 356 
campaigned  for  in  197335.  Had  their  Ard  Fheis  resolutions  been 
implemented,  they  believed,  Fianna  would  already  have  become  the 
revolutionary  movement36.  Because  they  had  not  been,  and  in  parti- 
cular  because  the  Dublin  Fianna  had  become  moribund,  now  ironically 
the  senior  movement  in  the  capital  was  intervening  to  disband  the 
organisation  nationally. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  proposed  replacement  was  seen  as  likely 
to  be  too  intellectual  and  student-like,  too  small,  and  lacking  the 
hard  experience  of  working-class  issues  that  had  latterly  given 
Fianna  such  conviction37.  Why,  it  was  asked,  abandon  an  organisa- 
tion  that  worked  for  one  untried?  Why  slavishly  imitate  the 
Connolly  Youth  movement,  which  cut  no  ice  in  the  ghettos?  The  new 
movement  would  surely  not  appeal  to  the  mass  of  fourteen-year-olds, 
few  of  whom  join  organisations  for  'political'  motives,  unlike  its 
predecessor  which  recruited  on  young  people's  terms  and  offered  a 
political  education  afterwards.  In  a  word,  it  would  not  suit  the 
reality  of  teenage  Belfast,  and  the  city's  Fianna  leaders  hotly 
resented  its  imposition  by  "textbook  revolutionaries"  from  Dublin38. 
The  Northern  Fianna  leadership  were  in  fact  critical  of  the 
senior  movement's  handling  of  the  question  in  general,  both  before 
and  after  the  Ard  Fheis.  They  considered  that  they  had  been 
"isolated  and  kept  in  the  dark"  in  the  early  stages  when  irreversible 
decisions  had  been  taken,  and  rebuffed  later  when,  following  their 
own  extraordinary  general  convention  in  the  spring,  they  approached 
the  Republican  Clubs  for  help  in  developing  along  the  lines  speci- 
fied  by  the  party39.  The  movement's  response  was  to  insist  that 
they  disband  and  fiannai  as  individuals  re-apply  for  membership  of 
the  new  organisation,  a  demand  that  became  a  sticking  point  for  many 
who  felt  that  they  should  have  been  educated  into  a  new  role  but 357 
instead  had  received  an  ultimatum40.  It  was  a  bitter  pill  to  those 
who  had  proved  their  loyalty  through  the  crises  of  the  1970s;  in  the 
words  of  their  o/c,  "We  were  bitter  to  know  that  we  were  not  trusted 
now.  We  looked  upon  ourselves  as  part  of  the  movement,  but  they 
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did  not  look  upon  us  in  this  way.  We  were  loyal,  they  were  not". 
What  most  strikes  the  observer  in  this  episode  is  a  mutual 
lack  of  sympathy,  and  consequently  the  adopting  of  entrenched  posi- 
tions.  Mutual  suspicion,  however,  applied  in  several  conflicting 
directions.  In  one  sense,  it  was  the  extreme  and  logical  conclu- 
sion  of  the  North-South  polarity  ever  present  in  Fianna  and  the 
Republican-movement  since  Partition  -  in  this  sense  Belfast  Fianna 
was  at  odds  not  only  with  the  senior  movement  in  the  South  but  with 
its  own  Dublin  organisation.  In  another  sense  it  was  a  difference 
between  those  with  a  'career'  commitment  to  the  Scouts,  and  those 
with  little  or  no  Fianna  background.  Thus  the  tenacity  of  the 
Belfast  leaders  was  seen  by  themselves  as  loyalty  to  the  past  and 
present  generations  of  youth,  but  by  some  others  even  in  their  city 
as  a  tenacious  clinging  to  power42.  In  a  third  sense  it  implied  a 
basic  difference  of  attitude  as  to  the  proper  role  and  status  of 
the  youth  wing,  between  the  adult  movement  which  considered  that  it 
had  acted  with  due  tact  and  consultation 
43, 
and  the  Fianna  member- 
ship  who  saw  themselves  treated  not  as  an  integral  part  of  the  move- 
ment,  with  a  voice. 
LAYING  NEW  FOUNDATIONS 
Following  the  Ard  Fheis  a  'national  organising  committee'  was 
established,  again  under  the  chairmanship  of  Tony  Heffernan,  to  lay 
the  foundations  of  the  new  movement44.  Heffernan's  role  in  the 
replacement  of  Fianna  was  thus  twofold  -  earlier  in  guiding  the 
party  towards  a  decision,  and  now  in  preparing  the  way  for  its 358 
implementation.  That  Sinn  Fein's  national  secretary  was  detailed 
for  the  task  is  a  measure  of  the  movement's  new  seriousness  with 
regard  to  organised  youth,  and  also  of  its  determination  to  maintain 
party  control  over  it45. 
In  May  Heffernan  arranged  a  country-wide  series  of  meetings  in 
order  to  establish  local  organising  committees46,  at  which  also  a 
name  was  agreed  for  the  new  movement:  the  'Irish  Democratic  Youth 
Movement'  was  accepted  "by  a  process  of  elimination,  not  because 
there  was  any  great  enthusiasm  for  it  but  because  it  seemed  to  raise 
less  objections  and  problems  than  any  other"47.  Local  committees 
were  set  up  in  Dublin,  Cork,  South  Down,  North  Armagh,  Derry  and 
Belfast48,  for  each  of  which  a  liaison  officer  was  to  be  appointed 
by  the  regional  Comhairle  Ceanntair  of  Sinn  F4in49. 
The  main  duty  of  the  local  committees  was  to  recruit  a  core  of 
members  for  the  new  organisation  prior  to  its  scheduled  inauguration 
in  the  autumn,  following  the  Youth  Committee's  recommendation  that 
there  should  be  no  public  launching  until  a  strong  enough  membership 
had  been  built  to  assure  survival.  Since  this  in  effect  involved 
the  establishing  of  pilot  branches  without  any  formal  national 
organisation,  it  was  necessary  to  conceal  them  behind  front  names, 
such  as  the  'Belfast  Youth  Action  Association' 
50. 
At  the  Bodens- 
town  Commemoration  in  June,  the  embryo  movement's  first  chance  for 
publicity,  groups  marched  as  'Dublin  Youth',  'Cork  Youth',  etc., 
agitating  for  specific  issues51. 
Although  an  image  of  autonomy  was  fostered  now  and  later,  care 
was  taken  to  ensure  that  the  organisation  would  be  closely  bound  to 
the  party.  The  aim  was  achieved  largely  by  selective  recruitment. 
Membership  was  at  first  almost  wholly  restricted  to  young  party  mem- 
bers  and  senior  fiannai,  in  the  latter  case  following  careful 
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screening  especially  in  Belfast  where  loyalty  and  support  for  the 
new  organisation  were  in  doubt.  Whereas  recruitment  to  Fianna  in 
Belfast  had  been  on  the  initiative  of  the  would-be  members,  in  the 
case  of  the  I.  D.  Y.  M.  it  was  the  branch  which  approached  the  young 
person,  local  press  advertisements  'inviting'  membership  being  in 
fact  issued  to  gain  publicity  not  recruits53.  In  Dublin  recruiting 
was  undertaken  through  the  local  Sinn  Fein  cumainn  and  was  explicitly 
restricted  to  party  members  or  "suitable  outsiders"  recommended  by 
party  members54.  Although  in  some  other  areas  the  procedure  was 
more  open,  arrangements  were  such  as  to  ensure  that  the  core  and 
dominant  membership  were  committed  and  politically  reliable55. 
The  party  also  screened  the  nomination  of  local  candidates  for 
the  forthcoming  national  executive,  through  the  unobtrusive  in- 
fluence  of  the  National  Organising  Committee.  The  latter  reported 
to  the  area  committees,  recommending  names  from  among  those  pro- 
posed  locally  and  later  advising  as  to  the  general  composition  of 
the  executive 
56. 
When  the  time  came  the  entire  body  of  ten  com- 
prised  party  members57. 
Recruiting  for  the  local  branches  was  hampered,  as  might  have 
been  expected,  by  opposition  in  Belfast  -  where  loyalty  to  the 
existing  organisation  was  intense  -  and  elsewhere,  where  loyalties 
were  weaker,  by  apathy.  The  Belfast  liaison  officer  met  with  a 
resistance  from  young  Republicans  which  he  attributes  to  the  obstruc- 
tive  response  of  the  Fianna  leadership  in  the  city58.  He  states 
that  the  girls'  Battalion  o/c  explicitly  ordered  her  members  not 
to  join  the  I.  D.  Y.  M.,  that  the  boys'  o/c  insisted  on  members  seeking 
his  personal  permission,  and  that  both  deliberately  withheld  informa- 
tion.  On  the  other  hand,  discussion  meetings  were  arranged  for 
sluaite,  to  which  representatives  of  the  adult  movement  were  invited. 360 
And  it  is  surely  the  case  that  if  opposition  had  been  merely  drummed 
up  by  the  leaders  and  not  the  spontaneous  response  of  branch  members, 
there  would  have  been  large  scale  transfer  to  the  new  movement  once 
Fianna  was  disbanded. 
In  fact,  transfer  was  minimal.  At  first,  only  about  one  boy 
in  ten  enrolled59  while  a  high  proportion  of  girls  were  lost  espec- 
ially  in  the  housing  schemes60.  Although  ten  branches  were  estab- 
lished,  corresponding  quite  closely  with  existing  slua  catchment 
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areas,  probably  no  more  than  forty  members  enrolled  in  alll.  Of 
the  potential  members  lost,  it  appears  that  none  joined  the  Provis- 
ional  Fianna  at  this  time.  A  small  number  defected  to  the  I.  R.  S.  P. 
A  much  larger  group  -  most  of  the  over-sixteens  in  fact  -  elected 
to  join  the  Republican  Clubs  despite  party  discouragement,  a  move 
particularly  demoralising  to  the  younger  members  since  the  group 
included  almost  all  the  Belfast  Fianna  leadership.  As  a  result, 
the  greatest  group  merely  drifted  out  of  active  Republicanism 
62. 
This  appeared  to  confirm  the  claim  that  in  the  ghettos  it  was  Fianna, 
and  not  a  new  'political'  movement,  that  the  grass-roots  members 
wanted. 
That  apathy  would  be  the  greatest  problem  in  establishing 
branches  in  some  other  areas  of  the  country  was  indicated  from  an 
early  date  by  the  reluctance  of  younger  party  members  to  serve  on 
the  local  organising  committees63.  The  weak  state  or  demise  of 
Fianna  in  these  centres  set  a  ceiling  on  membership  of  the  new  move- 
ment.  Cork  could  at  first  only  muster  seven  members.  In  Dublin 
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almost  all  of  the  small  faithful  remnant  were  held  and  by  the  autumn 
over  forty  members  were  organised  in  three  branches65.  And  at 
least  half  that  number  enrolled  in  North  Armagh  where  again  the  new 
branch  was  largely  composed  of  ex-fiannai  from  the  Lurgan  slua66. 361 
The  pilot  period  before  inauguration  also  allowed  time  and 
privacy  to  tackle  two  vital  practical  questions  concerning  the  new 
movement.  The  first  was  that  of  confining  it  to  a  purely  political 
role.  It  was  one  thing  for  the  leadership  to  ordain  the  exclusion 
of  all  military  activity  and  training.  It  was  quite  another  for 
rank-and-file  members  especially  in  the  North  to  accept  it,  given 
Fianna's  traditions.  The  problem  arose  almost  at  once,  during  the 
first  public  appearance  of  any  branch  in  Ireland,  when  the  local 
leader  paraded  his  members  in  military  formation  and  enquired  of 
Belfast  visitors  if  they  could  help  supply  him  with  weapons 
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it 
emerged  again  in  Newry,  where  the  branch  was  composed  of  former 
senior  fiannai  who  had  operated  not  with  the  Newry  Fianna  slua  it- 
self  but  directly  with  the  Army.  It  soon  became  apparent  that  they 
were  not  prepared  to  accept  a  solely  political  role  or  undertake 
mundane  day-to-day  political  work.  Shortly  before  the  inaugural 
convention  the  local  Republican  Club  in  liaison  with  the  I.  D.  Y.  M. 
National  Organising  Committee  stepped  in  and  disbanded  the  branch68. 
The  second  question  concerned  the  I.  D.  Y.  M.  's  precise  relation- 
ship  with  the  Republican  movement,  within  the  confines  established 
by  the  Ard  Fheis.  There  the  delegates  had  agreed  that  the  youth 
organisation  should  be  "committed  through  its  constitution  to 
supporting  ...  the  policies  and  objectives  of  Sinn  Fein,  subject 
to  the  overall  control  and  direction  of  the  Sinn  Fein  Ard  Chomhairle". 
But  they  had  not  specified  whether  its  support  of  the  party  should 
be  exclusive,  nor  what  should  be  the  form  of  party  control.  There 
still  appeared  to  be  room  for  debate,  therefore,  as  to  whether  the 
I.  D.  Y.  M.  should  be  an  integral  part  of  the  Republican  movement,  or 
an  independent  organisation  of  the  broad  left  under  the.  movement's 
effective  control.  The  party  leadership  favoured  the  first  arrange- 362 
ment.  The  second  had  been  recommended  by  the  most  influential  of 
Fianna's  leaders  in  Dublin  (on  the  grounds  that  Republicanism  was 
aiming  to  develop  as  a  mass  movement69),  and  was  now  advocated  by 
some  branch  members.  The  Derry  branch  among  others  proposed  a 
broad  left  management  for  tactical  reasons,  seeing  it  as  an  oppor- 
tunity  to  absorb  the  Connolly  Youth  Movement  and  create  a  stronger 
case  for  international  recognition70;  it  recommended  eight  outside 
bodies  "which  should  be  involved  in  setting  up  and  running  the 
I.  D.  Y.  M.  "71. 
The  draft  constitution  prepared  for  the  inaugural  convention 
affirmed  a'commitment  to  support  of  Sinn  Fein  as  demanded  by  the  Ard 
Fheis.  Its  wording  in  effect  upheld  the  first  arrangement,  in  that 
it  provided  for  a  close  association.  between  youth  movement  and  party, 
and  while  not  formally  specifying  integration  implied  it  through  the 
exclusion  of  alternatives 
72. 
Because  the  adult  movement  had  prepared  the  ground  through  the 
National  and  Local  Organising  Committees  and  the  youth  cadres,  the 
I.  D.  Y.  M.  emerged  at  its  inaugural  convention  in  October  in  effect  a 
ready  fashioned  organisation.  This  fact  was  clear  on  convention 
day  itself.  The  resolutions  submitted  by  branches  followed  closely 
in  scope,  theme  and  spirit  the  draft  Manifesto  which  had  been  pre- 
pared  in  liaison  with  the  party  and  circulated  several  weeks  pre- 
viously73.  The  draft  Constitution  was  accepted  almost  in  toto  by 
delegates.  Of  seven  amendments  put  forward  against  it  six  were 
defeated.  The  defeat  of  a  Belfast  amendment  to  include  a  "Fianna 
Eireann  organiser"  on  area  committees  was  particularly  significant, 
in  that  it  provided  further  evidence  of  the  I.  D.  Y.  M.  's  determination 
to  be  actually  and  publicly  dissociated  from  Fianna.  The  only 
amendment  passed  was  for  the  minor  addition  of  branch  organiser  to 363 
the  list  of  local  officers74.  Only  one  resolution  from  the  whole 
agenda  failed  to  win  a  majority,  and  that  a  proposal  that  branches 
adopt  the  names  of  Republican  heroes  after  the  practice  of  Fianna 
sluaite  and  Sinn  F4in  cumainn75.  Since  it  ran  counter  to  the 
I.  D.  Y.  M.  's  image  of  independence  from  the  party  and  distinctness 
from  its  predecessor,  its  defeat  was  itself  a  victory  for  orthodoxy. 
Every  other  resolution  was  orthodox,  predictable,  and  duly  passed. 
In  all  the  business  of  the  meeting  was  strikingly  routine  and 
predetermined.  It  was  possible  to  get  the  foundations  exactly 
right  within  the  democratic  process.  Indeed,  it  might  with  some 
justice  be  suggested  that  the  prime  function  of  the  inaugural  meet- 
ing  was  the  visible  and  public  operation  of  the  democratic  process. 
In  this  sense  October  1976  marked  the  formal  foundation  of  the 
I.  D.  Y.  M.  and  its  first  shop  window,  but  May  marked  its  real  founda- 
tion. 
TERMINATION  AND  SURVIVAL 
The  Ard  Fheis  resolution  had  not  specified  at  what  point  Fianna 
should  become  an  organisation  for  the  under-fourteens.  It  was 
tacitly  assumed  that  it  should  retain  its  existing  form  until  the 
replacement  had  been  established,  and  that  the  period  between  May 
and  October  would  be  a  time  of  running  down.  The  latter  date  would 
mark  the  termination  of  Fianna  in  its  traditional  form. 
In  most  of  the  areas  where  it  still  functioned  the  dissolution 
of  branches  was  effected  willingly  enough.  The  Dublin  sluaite  were 
disbanded  in  the  spring76;  Derry  had  already  accepted  re- 
organisation77;  the  branch  in  Cork  had  collapsed  the  previous  year 
and  had  not  been  re-established,  though  younger  boys  still  met 
regularly  of  their  own  accord  at  the  Thomas  Ashe  Hall78;  the  recently 
founded  slua  at  Warrenpoint  was  closed  during  the  summer,  though 364 
arrests  rather  than  the  party  directive  were  the  cause  of  its  de- 
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mise 
Voluntary  dissolution  of  the  Belfast  branches  could  hardly  be 
counted  on,  in  view  of  their  vitality  and  the  opposition  of  their 
leaders  to  any  successor.  The  senior  movement  itself  therefore 
took  "decisive  action"  to  disband  the  city  Battalions  immediately 
after  the  meetings  in  May.  In  the  words  of  those  principally 
detailed  to  undertake  the  task,  "the  heavy  hand  was  used"80  .  The 
Brigade  was  informed  that  henceforth  it  ceased  to  exist  as  such,  and 
that  if  sluaite  elected  to  continue  operating  they  should  do  so  under 
a  name  other  than  that  of  Fianna.  The  city  Battalions  convened  a 
meeting  at  the  Cyprus  Street  headquarters  in  June  to  consider  their 
position.  At  the  meeting  the  delegates,  representing  the  command 
staffs  and  every  slua  in  the  city,  accepted  the  party  instruction 
and  dissolved  their  organisation81. 
Nonetheless,  Fianna  for  the  over-fourteens  did  not  disappear 
entirely.  The  long-established  Newry  slua  continued  to  meet  with 
a  ceiling  age  of  twenty  years  and  was  permitted  to  do  so  because 
military  training  and  activities  were  strictly  excluded82.  The 
more  recent  branch  at  Downpatrick  also  survived,  and  there  may  have 
been  several  other  more  or  less  formal  groups  in  existence  by  the 
end  of  the  year.  In  addition,  younger  members  of  several  Belfast 
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sluaite  remained  together  as  they  grew  older,  so  that  by  1978  per- 
haps  half  a  dozen  branches  had  a  membership  age  range  of  13-16  years. 
The  Lower  Falls  group  had  some  thirty  members,  boys  and  girls84. 
Several  of  them  had  sampled  the  I.  D.  Y.  M.  but  found  its  meetings 
boring  and  incomprehensible.  As  they  saw  it,  Fianna  was  "a  part 
of  history"  but  the  new  organisation  was  "doing  away  with  history". 
It  was  their  hope  to  have  Fianna  officially  reinstated  and  a  command 365 
structure  established  for  the  city.  To  date  the  local  party 
cumainn,  aware  of  the  existence  of  these  sluaite,  had  allocated  a 
senior  party  member,  B.  McK.,  as  their  overall  supervisor  and  local 
members  to  provide-informal  supervision,  advice  and  political  work. 
In  all,  therefore,  a  number  of  areas  survived  or  re-formed 
spontaneously,  and  each  in  its  own  way  exemplified  the  response  of 
young  people  to  the  Republican  ideal,  a  response  loyal  to  the  move- 
ment  but  defiant  of  its  policy  on  organised  youth.  They  exempli- 
fied  also  the  continuity  that  sentiment  has  often  lent  to  Fianna  at 
times  when  formal  structure  has  been  lacking,  providing  a  momentum 
to  bridge  gaps  in  formal  organisation,  to  outlive  its  temporary 
abandonment  or  to  emerge  spontaneously  in  its  absence.  Such 
momentum  and  continuity  'of  the  heart'  are  to  be  seen  as  both  a  cause 
and  an  effect.  of  the  phenomenon  of  'the  unbroken  trädition'  so  deep 
rooted  in  Republicanism. 
In  a  word,  boys,  girls  and  leaders  in  a  few  areas  did  not 
accept  the  end  of  Fianna  in  1976.  They  maintained  tenuous  continu- 
ities  then,  which  have  been  expanded  in  the  interim. 
The  question  therefore  inevitably  arises  as  to  their  standing. 
Can  they  properly  be  called  'Fianna  Eireann'?  It  is  true  that 
Fianna  agreed  in  1973  to  accept  all  policies  and  decisions  of  the 
party,  and  that  the  party  voted  for  its  discontinuance  in  1975. 
But  that  decision  in  fact  at  least  arguably  gave  it  a  loophole  to 
survive.  For  though  the  intention  of  the  1975.  resolution  was 
clear  enough  the  wording  could  hardly  have  been  less  decisive  - 
"The  Ard  Fheis  believes  that  Fianna  should  continue  as  a  scouting 
organisation  aimed  primarily  at  those  under  fourteen"  (present 
author's  emphasis).  The  distinction  between  spirit  and  letter, 
which  might  have  appeared  academic  at  the  time,  is  one  to  which  the 366 
survivors  can  appeal  in  arguing  their  validity. 
In  fact,  the  party  has  made  no  move  to  clarify  the  1975  deci- 
sion,  and  is  clearly  prepared  to  accept  the  position  as  it  stands. 
It  has  effective  control  over  both  the  I.  D.  Y.  M.  'and  the  remnant  of 
Fianna,  and  though  it  has  had  it  in  its  power  to  terminate  the 
latter  at  any  time  it  has  not  done  so.  In  this  it  has  been  prag- 
matic.  While  giving  priority  in  terms  of  finance  and  resources  to 
the  new  organisation85,  it  has  been  obliged  to  accept  the  genuine 
desires  of  some  young  Republicans,  despite  its  own  political  in- 
stincts.  If  it  does  not  believe  that  Fianna  is  meeting  their  needs 
it  recognises  that  in  the  meantime  it  is  meeting  their  wants.  And 
as  a  party  seeking  to  become  a  mass  movement  it  will  not  choose  to 
alienate  any  section  of  its  youth  while  it  can  control  them. 367 
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CONCLUSION 
Though  Countess  Markievicz  and  Bulmer  Hobson  shared  in  the 
foundation  of  Fianna  in  1909  they  certainly  did  not  share  the  same 
vision  of  its  future  role.  She  saw  it  as  providing  an  antidote  to 
the  loyalist  education  of  the  day,  and  that  of  the  Baden-Powell 
Scouts  in  particular,  imitating  the  English  organisation  for  the 
purpose  of  de-anglicisation.  He  recognised  its  potential  value  to 
the  I.  R.  B.  and  envisaged  using  it  to  further  the  Brotherhood's  aims. 
In  this  sense  its  co-founders  represent  the  two  very  different 
traditions  -  of  informal  youth  education  and  of  physical  force  - 
from  which  it  sprang.  (This  is  not  to  say,  of  course,  that  the 
Countess  was  averse  to  the  use  of  force  in  politics,  or  Hobson  un- 
aware  of  the  educative  role  of  youth  organisations.  ) 
A  hybrid  in  its  conception,  Fianna  revealed  its  latent  duality 
almost  at  once,  for  while  its  Constitution  specified  a  programme  of 
physical  and  cultural  education1  and  its  Code  and  Motto  set  before 
boys  a  moral  ideal,  within  two  years  weapon  training  had  been  intro- 
duced  and  the  organisation  was  being  used  to  train  officers  for  an 
adult  army.  The  use  of  arms  was  restricted  as  far  as  possible  to 
senior  members  who  thus  became  in  effect  a  separate,  identifiable 
section  within  Fianna,  giving  it  an  organisational  duality  corres- 
ponding  to  its  duality  of  purpose.  The  two  roles  -  the  one  ideal- 
istic  and  concerned  with  the  development  of  the  boy,  the  other 
pragmatic  and  concerned  with  the  training  of  an  army  -  remained 
throughout  its  history  in  uneasy  co-existence. 
Fianna  was  founded  as  an  independent  body  within  the  separatist 
movement,  there  being  at  the  time  no  dominant  party  or  existing  army 
with  which  it  could  be  associated.  Its  Constitution  in  fact  stated 374 
that  it  should  remain  independent  of  all  parties,  its  members 
pledging  allegiance  only  to  Ireland  and  their  own  superior  officers. 
But  this  original  vision  of  an  autonomous  'Boys'  Republic'  evapora- 
ted  as  it  fell  under  the  control  of  the  I.  R.  B.  from  1912  and  estab- 
lished-an  informal  partnership  with  the  Volunteers  the  following 
year.  Again  the  Countess  and  Hobson  may  be  said  to  represent  the 
impulses  towards  independence  and  external  control  respectively, 
though  ironically  it  was  Hobson  who  first  warned  of  the  dangers  of 
outside  interference,  after  he  had  himself  fallen  foul  of  the 
machinations  of  the  Brotherhood. 
After.  the  Civil  War  Fianna  again  declared  itself  independent 
of  the  I.  R.  A.  and  all  political  parties  in  the  hope  of  regaining 
its  old  autonomy  while  yet  remaining  under  the  umbrella  of  Republi- 
canism2.  But  if  it  thought  to  enjoy  the  twin  benefits  of  associa- 
tion  and  independence  it  in  fact  enjoyed  neither,  for  like  all  other 
sections  of  the  movement  at  this  time  it  fell  under  the  control  of 
the  Army  Council,  maintained  in  its  case  by  the  practice  of  dual 
membership  and  by  direct  or  tacit  selection  of  its  leaders. 
It  was  thus  Fianna's  fortune  to  be  taken  over  by  a  movement 
which  it  had  itself  helped  to  create.  Not  having  been  originally 
designed  as  the  youth  wing  of  any  adult  organisation  had  left  it 
particularly  vulnerable  since  its  relationship  with  the  movement 
had  developed  ad  hoc.  It  had  also  made  the  question  of  relation- 
ship  a  matter  of  recurrent  dispute,  for  there  were  always  those  in 
Fianna  who  regretted  and  feared  control  by  forces  outside  it  which 
could  dictate  and  alter  its  role.  They  considered  its  constitution- 
al  independence  and  its  role  of  educating  boys  in  an  ideal  to  be 
crucial,  and  resisted  any  development  that  threatened  to  diminish 
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These  fears  were  the  basis  of  almost  all  Fianna's  disputes  with 
the  movement  over  the  years.  They  were  behind  Hobson's  warning  at 
the  1915  Ard  Fheis,  the  reluctance  of  some  officers  to  be  absorbed 
within  the  'pragmatic'  I.  R.  A.  in  1920-1,  the  restoration  of  inde- 
pendence  and  a  'citizenship'  emphasis  in  the  Constitution  of  1925, 
the  claims  in  the  1930s  that  Fianna's  needs  were  not  understood  by 
the  I.  R.  A.,  Bell's  attempts  to  re-assert  constitutional  independence 
in  1949,  and  Kelly's  confrontation  with  the  Army  in  the  1950s. 
For  its  part  the  senior  movement  appeared  to  view  the  question 
of  relationship  as  a  matter  of  control  only  -  and  that  often  nega- 
tively,  in  terms  of  its  own  public  image  -  and  failed  to  recognise 
that  it  was  intimately  bound  to  the  question  of  role.  It  there- 
fore  rarely  gave  serious  consideration  to  Fianna's  potential  as  a 
youth  movement;  it  controlled  but  it  did  not  foster;  from  the  first, 
in  short,  its  attitude  was  one  of  neglect3. 
The  problem  was  never  adequately  solved,  and  was  probably  not 
amenable  to  solution  short  of  the  complete  integration  of  Fianna 
within  the  I.  R.  A.  (as  obtained  in  1920-1),  its  complete  independence 
from  it,  or  the  subordination  of  both  to  party  political  authority, 
steps  that  the  movement  was  not  prepared  to  take. 
Fianna  is  thus  to  be  seen  and  judged  as  an  organisation  within 
a  larger  movement.  During  successive  periods  of  its  history  not 
only  was  it  controlled  and  its  role  dictated  by  decisions  taken 
within  the  senior  movement,  it  also  took  from  it  the  most  significant 
facets  of  its  character. 
In  the  first  place,  it  took  from  it  its  lasting  military  mental- 
ity.  The  "heresy  of  the  cult  of  armed  men"4  that  had  developed 
during  the  Anglo-Irish  War  and  the  Truce  -  in  part  a  conceptual 
heritage  of  Pearse,  in  part  a  residue  of  I.  R.  B.  elitism,  and  in  part 376 
a  deep  suspicion  of  politics  in  the  minds  of  fighting  men5  -  re- 
mained  and  hardened  after  1923.  The  I.  R.  A.  dissociated  itself 
from  Sinn  Fein  and  for  forty  years  remained  a  non-political,  indeed 
an  anti-political  organisation,  and  under  its  dominance  all  sections 
of  the  movement  took  a  similar  position.  So  Fianna  taught  boys  the 
argument  of  force  alone  and  the  military  but  rarely  the  political  or 
social  milestones  of  Ireland's  struggle  for  independence.  Between 
the  short-lived  Young  Republican  Party  established  by  Fianna  members 
and  others  in  Belfast  in  1913  and  the  developments  of  the  1970s  it 
showed  no  interest  in  open  political  or  social  activity.  Its  mili- 
tary  emphasis  and  its  reputation  as  the  cadet  force  of  the  I.  R.  A. 
remained,  so  long  as  the  semi-secret  military  wing  remained  supreme 
within  the  Republican  movement. 
Again,  as  a  part  of  that  movement  and  serving  the  same  working- 
class  families  Fianna  inevitably  also  shared  its  poverty.  It  en- 
joyed  neither  the  patronage  nor  the  facilities  from  which  its 
Baden-Powell  and  Catholic  rivals  benefited  and  had  a  constant 
struggle  to  survive.  While  it  most  obviously  lacked  material  re- 
sources  perhaps  even  more  damaging  was  its  inability  to  afford  an 
adequate  organisational  infrastructure,  particularly  after  the  dis- 
continuation  of  its  national  secretariat  in  19406.  Pride  in 
poverty,  on  the  argument  that  "the  rich  are  ever  on  the  side  of 
empire",  had  a  limited  attraction,  and  as  rivals  thrived  in  an 
Ireland  of  rising  expectations?  Fianna  became  second-rate  and  in- 
creasingly  unable  to  compete  in  the  eyes  of  many  young  people. 
It  was  its  association  with  the  I.  R.  A.,  also,  that  made  it  a 
suspect  organisation,  outlawed  in  Northern  Ireland  and  twice  pro- 
scribed  in  the  Free  State.  But  whereas  its  illegal  status  in  the 
Six  Counties  turned  it  into  a  secret  body  closely  tied  to  its  own 377 
local  communities  and  the  Army,  its  status  in  the  Twenty-six  - 
legal  but  under  threat  -  prompted  its  progressive  emasculation  to 
the  point  of  its  sometimes  being  barely  distinguishable  from  any 
other  scouting  organisation. 
Being  part  of  the  movement  in  fact  fragmented  Fianna  as  a 
national  body.  For  in  addition  to  the  North-South  division  the 
widespread  practice  of  dual  membership  set  slua  officers  problems 
of  allegiance  as  between  their  own  Headquarters  and  the  local  I.  R.  A., 
creating  an  organisation  of  local  strength  and  central  weakness 
whose  organs  of  national  authority  were  often  more  a  formula  than  a 
reality,  ignored,  bypassed  or  challenged  by  the  more  powerful  area 
commandss. 
On  the  other  hand  it  took  from  the  movement  the  more  funda- 
mental  unity  of  the  Republican  'family'.  It  was  a  family  bonded 
in  many  cases  by  actual  blood  ties  and  by  a  generational  cycle  of 
membership  in  which  local  Republican  dynasties  were  perpetuated 
through  the  ranks  of  the  Scouts;  one  which  gave  members  a  powerful 
sense  of  one-ness,  reinforced  by  an  awareness  of  their  unique 
mission  and  of  external  hostility9;  one  whose  solidarity  was  great- 
est  during  Fianna's  earliest  and  latter  years  when  the  movement  was 
a  struggling  minority. 
Finally,  Fianna's  dependence  upon  the  movement  was  self- 
perpetuating  in  that  external  control  and  the  recurrent  loss  of  its 
best  officers  to  the  adult  section  acted  as  disincentives  to  initia- 
tive.  One  must  conclude  therefore  that  on  balance  the  effects  of 
its  association  with  the.  movement  were  stultifying  and  restrictive. 
Its  membership  of  the  Republican  family  prompted  a  certain  intro- 
spection  and  insularity  that  inhibited  outward  development;  its 
military  emphasis  at  the  expense  of  open  political  activity  also 
minimised  its  expansion  beyond  its  own  circle  (just  as  it  led  to  a 378 
gradual  loss  of  popular  support  in  the  case  of  the  I.  R.  A.  );  and  its 
poverty,  fragmentation  and  legal  position  all  limited  its  scope  for 
independent  growth. 
The  overall  pattern  of  Republicanism  in  the  first  six  decades 
of  this  century  reveals  that  it  flourished  most  during  military  cam- 
paigns  and  suggests  that,  lacking  either  a  clear  role  or  mass  sup- 
port  in  times  of  peace,  it  sought  to  create  the  one  and  generate 
the  other  by  initiating  states  of  war  in  Ireland.  Its  campaigns 
were  certainly  undertaken  with  these  two  aims  in  view,  and  each  one 
10 
gave  it  a  new  impetus  and  its  volunteers  a  new  raison  d'etre. 
But  of  them  all  only  the  War  for  Independence  could  be  considered 
successful  in  itself,  and  it  is  significant  that  in  this  one  case 
the  Irish  people's  support  for  the  movement,  though  generated  by  the 
war  itself,  was  largely  built  upon  Sinn  Fein's  successful  political 
preparation  that  preceded  it.  After  the  War  for  Independence  none 
of  the  campaigns  (lacking  as  they  did  political  preparation  and 
relevance)  succeeded  in  winning  more  than  lukewarm  and  transient 
public  approval;  none,  though  they  rocked  governments,  brought  the 
movement's  own  aims  any  closer  to  realisation;  each  indeed  left  it 
weaker  than  before.  This  was  in  essence  the  problem  confronting 
Republicans  in  the  post-Civil  War  era. 
Fianna  had  played  an  integral  part  in  the  movement's  struggle 
between  1913-23,  and  like  many  twentieth  century  youth  movements 
whose  appeal  to  the  young  has  been  greatest  in  times  of  crisis,  it 
had  enjoyed  a  dramatic  rise  in  membership  during  this  period  of  its 
'emergency  role'11.  But  the  defeat  of  1923  marked  the  end  of  its 
military  participation  and  its  return  to  the  preparatory,  educa- 
tional  role  asserted  in  its  Constitution,  teaching  Republican  ideals 
as  well  as  scouting  and  citizenship  in  the  manner  of  Baden-Powell. 379 
Henceforth,  in  the  South  at  least,  the  average  member  lived  on  the 
promise  of  future  not  present  participation  and  was  'found  jobs  to 
do  for  the  I.  R.  A.  '  meantime  to  justify  his  existence.  In  time,  and 
particularly  after  the  campaigns  of  1939  and  1956  in  which  Fianna 
did  not  take  part,  the  credibility  of  its  genuine  involvement  in  the 
business  of  Republicanism  inevitably  wore  thin.  More  rarely  was  it 
able  to  hold  the  interest  of  its  members  through  adolescence;  in 
many  areas  membership  came  to  be  thought  of  as  a  natural  phase  for 
small  boys  and  recruitment  was  reduced  to  those  whose  family  back- 
ground  made  them  automatic  recruits. 
In  parts  of  the  North  the  grievances  of  the  nationalist 
minority,  Fianna's  own  illegal  status,  and  the  recurrent  need  for 
community  defence  perpetuated  something  akin  to  its  earlier  emer- 
gency  role  and  with  it  a  correspondingly  high  appeal  and  sense  of 
purpose.  This  became  more  noticeably  the  case  from  1969  in  areas 
of  Belfast,  Derry  and  elsewhere  when  the  involvement  of  whole 
communities  in  resistance  required  and  justified  Fianna's  wholesale 
commitment. 
In  the  Official-Provisional  split  that  arose  directly  from  the 
events  of  1969  the  two  sides  represented  the  re-emergence  and  crys- 
tallisation  of  two  distinct  emphases  within  Republicanism.  They 
represented  also  two  contrary  'solutions'  to  the  problem  of  the 
movement's  ineffectiveness  in  the  post-1923  era.  The  Provisionals' 
solution,  based  on  the  premise  that  previous  failure  had  been  mili- 
tary  failure,  has  been  to  mount  a  militarily  successful  campaign. 
That  of  the  Officials,  on  the  premise  that  failure  hitherto  had  been 
political,  has  been  to  build  a  popular  political  movement  viable  in 
peace  or  war,  one  that  would  continue  to  have  a  purpose  "should  the 
North  come  in  with  the  Republic  tomorrow"12;  they  have  done  so  by 3  80 
abandoning  the  military  campaign  and  developing  as  a  radical  party 
concerned  with  political  and  social  issues. 
As  a  result,  Provisional  Fianna  has  to  date  continued  to  play 
the  military  'emergency  role'  of  1971,  particularly  in  the  North, 
and  as  such  has  flourished  within  its  limits.  It  will  presumably 
continue  to  thrive  and  attract  recruits,  as  will  the  Provisionals 
as  a  whole,  so  long  as  they  can  maintain  the  momentum  of  war.  By 
their  ceasefire  of  1972,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Officials  in  effect 
shut  the  door  on  Fianna,  which  -  because  of  its  traditionally  mili- 
tary  emphasis,  authority  structure  and  image  and  its  illegal  status 
in  the  North  -  they  had  decided  could  never  be  made  a  suitable  youth 
wing  for  the  developing  party.  A  political  youth  movement  of  the 
I.  D.  Y.  M.  type  was  the  logical  extension  of  their  strategy  into  the 
youth  sector. 
It  remains  to  be  asked,  how  effective  was  Fianna  as  an  organi- 
sation  for  Republican  youth?  For  the  years  1909-16  the  fact  of  the 
Rising  stands  as  sufficient  answer  to  the  question.  In  the  period 
1916-21  it  developed  into  a  highly  successful  fighting  force  (though 
a  less  effective  recruiting  ground  for  the  Volunteers),  but  in  the 
eyes  of  its  own  leadership  culpably  failed  in  its  educational  role. 
In  the  post-1923  era  it  continued  to  provide  a  general  and  specific 
training  for  the  senior  movement,  giving  members  experience  of 
discipline  and  officers  a  grounding  in  command  and  weaponry.  But 
much  of  its  programme,  in  particular  the  camping  lore  and  drill,  was 
in  fact  now  more  or  less  irrelevant  to  the  I.  R.  A.,  who  preferred  to 
train  their  own  recruits  from  scratch13,  Its  lack  of  any  genuine 
participatory  role  in  the  movement  at  this  time  also  lessened  its 
effectiveness  in  preparing  boys  for  the  adult  section  since  it  gave 
them  little  opportunity  to  practise,  think  through  and  make  mature 381 
decisions  concerning  their  Republicanism.  Its  success  in  re- 
cruiting  boys  to  the  adult  ranks  varied  greatly:  transfer  was 
remarkably  low  in  Dublin  from  the  1930s  onwards,  though  higher  in 
Cork,  Belfast  and  other  centres  where  closer  ties  were  maintained 
with  the  Army.  But  it  would  perhaps  not  have  been  significantly 
less  in  the  absence  of  an  organised  youth  wing. 
Because  Fianna's  role  was  never  defined  and  therefore  to  some 
extent  open  to  local  interpretation,  because  it  in  fact  played  a 
diversity  of  roles,  and  because  much  of  what  it  achieved  was  not 
measurable  against  any  objective  standard,  the  task  of  assessing  its 
effectiveness  is  not  an  easy  one.  The  researcher  is  thrown  back 
upon  general  impressions,  of  standards  and  morale  within  the  organi- 
sation  and  of  its  likely  influence  upon  boys,  as  being  perhaps  as 
valid  a  touchstone  of  effectiveness  as  any  more  measurable  criteria. 
Those  who  remembered  its  early,  pioneering  years  have  remarked 
upon  its  strict  standards  and  atmosphere  of  serious  purpose,  and 
claimed  that  in  this  lay  its  appeal  and  influence  on  boys14.  And 
the  available  evidence  suggests  that  in  different  circumstances  and 
perhaps  for  different  reasons  standards  remained  high  through  the 
war  years  and  the  first  decade  of  the  Free  State.  But  from  the 
mid  1930s  a  distinct  decline  was  recorded,  coinciding  with  the 
decline  in  membership,  and  despite  a  brief  recovery  in  the  late 
1940s  the  organisation  never  regained  its  earlier  excellence.  In 
the  following  twenty  years  sluaite  in  the  South  encountered  growing 
difficulty  in  enforcing  and  sustaining  the  old  standards,  as  is 
indicated  perhaps  by  the  increased  frequency  of  courts  martial  at 
this  time.  With  recruiting  slack  local  officers  could  not  afford 
to  be  as  selective  or  demanding  as  before,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
tenuous  survival  of  some  branches  prevented  Headquarters  from  en- 382 
forcing  the  standards  it  would  have  wished.  Fianna  remained  a 
powerful  Republican  experience  for  some  members,  no  doubt,  but  for 
many  it  was  now  "more  like  a  youth  club" 
15 
that  made  few  demands 
upon  them  and  perhaps  exerted  little  deep  influence  upon  them. 
Standards  were  certainly  maintained  more  successfully  in  the  North- 
ern  sluaite,  and  particularly  in  Belfast.  The  young  people  there 
relished  the  semi-military  conditions  and  the  local  status  of 
membership,  gaining  from  it  an  altogether  more  potent  and  dynamic 
experience  and  evincing  a  high  degree  of  loyalty  in  return16. 
The  overall  impression,  nevertheless,  is  that  the  organisation 
was  latterly  unable  to  sustain  its  earlier  effectiveness.  It  had 
diminished  in  size  and  influence  certainly,  and  probably  in  qual- 
ity17,  before  finally  being  caught  stranded  by  the  changing  tide  of 
the  movement.  One  is  tempted  to  suggest  that  in  some  areas  it 
might  have  been  disbanded  a  quarter  of  a  century  before  it  was  with- 
out  appreciable  loss. 
Why  then  did  it  last  so  long?  -  for  until  the  1970s  apparently 
no-one  ever  questioned  that  there  should  be  a  Fianna.  The  answer 
lies  partly  perhaps  in  the  fact  that  since  its  role  in  the  movement 
was  undefined  its  effectiveness  was  not  readily  open  to  disproof; 
partly  also  in  the  excellent  work  still  being  done  in  individual 
sluaite.  But,  more  important,  it  lies  in  Fianna's  symbolic  value 
to  Republicans18.  By  organising  and  training  the  young  the  move- 
ment  fulfilled  its  pledge  'to  keep  faith  with  the  past  and  hand  on 
the  torch',  and  as  its  own  fortunes  declined  its  need  became  the 
greater  to  prove  its  continued  appeal  to  the  coming  generation19 
Fianna  parading  on  the  streets  helped  Republicans  to  believe  in 
themselves;  and  therefore  -  faute  de  mieux  -  its  existence  was  con- 
sidered  justified.  The  attitude  appears  to  explain  the  peculiar 
combination  of  attachment  and  neglect  in  which  it  was  held  by  the 383 
adult  section  over  the  years. 
Recognition  of  Fianna's  symbolic  value  must  modify  any  rig- 
orous  conclusions  as  to  its  effectiveness.  Its  survival  beyond 
1976  is  after  all  evidence  of  its  undoubted  significance  to  some 
boys,  and  of  depths  of  loyalty  to  its  ideal  that  should  not  lightly 
be  ignored. 
Perhaps  the  most  that  can  finally  be  said  is  that  because  it 
was  so  closely  tied  to  Republicanism  from  an  early  date  and  took 
from  the  association  so  much  of  its  character,  Fianna  was  in- 
evitably  what  it  was  :  for  most  of  its  history  it  was  about  as 
buoyant,  attractive,  influential  and  effective  as  the  movement  of 
which  it  was  a  part. 384 
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military  structure  in  1915,  re-established  in  1925.  It  went 
into  abeyance  during  the  collapse  of  Fianna  in  1940  and  was 
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interview. 
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originating  in  the  conditions  of  the  Anglo-Irish  War.  Organi- 
sational  authority  was  also  something  of  a  formula  in  many 
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The  I.  R.  A.  (London,  1970),  pp.  42  f. 
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pp.  175  ff.,  and  329  ff. 
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ments  in  times  of  national  crisis.  One  close  to  home  would 
be  the  cadet  forces  of  Britain  which  enjoyed  a  dramatic  rise 
in  membership  during  the  second  World  War  because  their  role 
made  members  "publicly  wanted"  and  gave  them  "a  real  initia- 
tion  into  adult  life"  -  Barnes,  L.  J.  Youth  Service  in  an 
English  County  (London,  1945),  pp.  70  ff.  Other  more  cele- 
brated  examples,  from  contrary  ideologies,  are  the  Hitler 
Jugend  before  and  during  the  war,  and  the  Soviet  Komsomol  after 
the  Revolution.  The  enormous  appeal  of  the  former,  the 
extreme  demands  made  upon  members  and  their  astonishing  courage 
in  the  late  stages  of  the  war,  were  all  based  upon  the  boys' 
genuine  participation  in  the  aims  of  the  Third  Reich  - 
Koch,  H.  W.  The  Hitler  Youth  (London,  1975),  espec.  pp.  95  and 
240  If.,,  and  Stachura,  P.  D.  Nazi  Youth  in  the  Weimar  Republic 
(Santa  Barbara,  1975),  passim.  The  ranks  of  the  Young  Com- 
munist  League  swelled  greatly  during  the  war  that  followed 
the  Revolution,  only  to  fall  sharply  when  peace  brought  a 
crisis  of  morale,  and  even  suicide,  to  some  members;  member- 
ship  figures  rose  again  in  the  late  1920s  when  the  urgent 
national  construction  projects  gave  the  organisation  a  new 
'emergency  role'  -  see  Josephson,  E.  Political  Youth  Organisa- 
tions  in  Europe  1900-1950,  unpubl.  Ph.  D.  thesis,  University 
of  California,  1959,  p.  261  f.;  also  Volkov,  Y.  E.  et  al. 
Soviet  Youth  and  Socialism,  transl.  Vechor-Scherbovich,  S. 
(Moscow,  1974),  pp.  217  ff.  Volkov  states  that  the  demands 
made  upon  the  young  in  crisis  satisfied  their  "yearning  for 
daring  feats". 
12.  Tony  Heffernan  interview. 
13.  Cathal  Goulding  interview. 
14.  Cf.,  eg.,  An  Phoblacht,  31/12/1926:  "There  was  an  atmosphere 
of  serious  purpose  and  sincerity  about  the  early  organisation 
which  was  attractive  to  boyhood  ...  every  parade  night  there 
was  strict  inspection  for  cleanliness  and  neatness;  no  slack- 
ness  of  morals  was  tolerated  ...  etc.  " 
15.  Seoirse  Dearle  interview.  Liam  Mac  an  Ultaigh  (interview) 
stated  that  leaders  in  the  1960s  "couldn't  be  choosey  about 
the  boys  we  got  and  were  in  no  position  to  stretch  them". 386 
16.  Cf.,  for  different  periods  between  1930  and  1976,  L.  F.  inter- 
view,  Joe  Atkinson  interview,  A.  McM.  interview,  D.  R.  inter- 
view. 
17.  The  same  point  was  made  to  the  author  concerning  the  I.  R.  A. 
and  the  movement  as  a  whole  by  Robert  Russell  (interview). 
Well  qualified  through  personal  and  family  involvement  to 
make  a  longitudinal  judgement,  Russell  remarked  upon  the 
high  calibre  of  the  earlier  movement  and  -  for  instance  - 
the  number  of  men  of  literary  talent  in  its  ranks,  and  pointed 
to  a  general  decline  in  the  overall  quality  of  membership  over 
the  years. 
18.  The  I.  R.  A.  also,  of  course,  has  had  symbolic  as  well  as  actual 
significance  in  Irish  political  events  -  cf.,  Williams,  T.  D. 
'De  Valera  in  Power',  in  McManus,  F.  (ed.  )  The  Years  of  the 
Great  Test  (Cork,  1967),  p.  37:  "The  I.  R.  A.  merits  separate 
treatment,  not  as  a  powerful  political  movement  but  as  a  sym- 
bol  of  forces,  emotions  and  ideals  associated  with  the  whole 
history  of  Ireland  since  the  Fenians  ...  ". 
19.  The  need  is  not  only  felt  by  struggling  minority  movements. 
The  notion  that  a  youth  wing  is  necessary  as  evidence  of  the 
vitality  of  the  party  is  commonplace.  Cf.,  in  the  British 
context  Layton-Henry,  Z.  Political  Youth  Organisations  in 
Britain.  A  comparative  study  of  the  Young  Conservatives 
and  the  Labour  Party  Young  Socialists,  Unpubl.  Ph.  D.  thesis, 
Birmingham  University,  1973,  p.  264.  Layton-Henry  argues  that 
because  the  party  youth  wing  plays  this  role  its  continued 
existence  is  vital  irrespective  of  its  tangible  success  or 
failure.  It  is  assured  of  continued  if  negative  support, 
because  "parties  dare  not  publicly  dissociate  themselves  from 
youth"  -  Layton-Henry,  Z.  'Labour's  Lost  Youth",  J.  Contemp. 
Hist.,  11,1976,  pp.  275-308. 387 
Appendix  I.  FIANNA  OUTWITH  IRELAND 
Sporadic  references  to  Fianna  outwith  Ireland  occur  in  press 
and  other  sources  of  the  Republican  movement,  from  the  first  year 
of  the  organisation's  existence  to  the  present  day.  In  almost  every 
case  expatriate  sluaite  have  been  established  in  urban  areas  with 
large  Irish  emigrant  communities. 
The  first  such  was  formed  in  Glasgow  in  the  spring  of  1910  by 
Joseph  Robinson,  a  former  member  of  Hobson's  Belfast  Fianna  of  19021. 
Within  four  years  it  had  grown  to  150  members  and  been  divided  into 
two  troops, 
_of 
which  the  larger  was  Slua  Willie  Nelson.  Both  were 
represented  at  the  1914  Ard  Fheis  in  Dublin2.  Between  1913  and  the 
Rising  senior  members  were  involved  in  raiding  for  explosives  and 
their  transportation  to  Dublin,  for  which  several  were  arrested  in 
1916  and  Robinson  himself  received  a  ten  year  prison  sentence  at 
the  High  Court  in  Edinburgh  the  following  year3.  The  branches  prob- 
ably  ceased  meeting  about  the  time  of  his  arrest. 
In  spring  1914  Fianna  founder-member  and  former  assistant 
national  secretary  Michael  Lonergan  emigrated  to  the  U.  S.  A.,  where 
the  following  year  he  established  an  honorary  support  organisation 
for  the  separatist  movement  under  the  title  Fianna  League  of 
America 
4. 
It  was  perhaps  from  this  adult  body  that  he  later  devel- 
oped  the  Republican  Boys'  Brigade  that  formed  a  guard  of  honour  for 
Countess  Markievicz  at  Madison  Square  Garden  during  her  propaganda 
tour  in  May  19225 
Fianna  was  re-established  in  Glasgow  after  the  Civil  War  by 
Seamus  Reader,  a  member  of  the  pre-Rising  slua.  Reader  attended 
the  1927  Ard  Fheis  as  branch  delegate,  where  he  was  co-opted  onto 
the  national  Ard  Choiste6.  A  second  overseas  representative  co-opted 
at  the  same  meeting  was  the  o/c  of  the  recently  founded  slua  in 388 
Liverpool7.  This  was  a  time  of  resurgence  of  Republicanism  after 
the  defeat  of  1923  and  the  national  secretary's  Ard  Pheis  report 
referred  to  the  possibility  of  further  development  in  Britain.  One 
other  branch  was  in  fact  established  in  1930,  in  Peckham,  London, 
where  it  was  "confidently  expected"  that  a  Division  would  be  in 
existence  before  the  end  of  the  year8.  In  the  event  there  was  no 
such  expansion  in  London  or  anywhere  else,  nor  any  further  reference 
to  the  Peckham  slua  itself.  The  Liverpool  branch  survived  for  a 
decade,  a  small  but  thriving  troop  which  paraded  at  the  Gaelic  League 
Hall  in  Wood  Street  and  sent  representatives  to  several  Ard  Fheis- 
9  10 
eanna.  But  it  remained  the  only  one  in  England. 
With  the  decline  of  the  Republican  movement  in  Ireland  in  the 
later  1930s,  its  virtual  extinction  during  the  following  decade,  and 
its  gradual  recovery  in  the  1950s,  no  record  exists  of  Fianna  acti- 
vity  in  Britain  for  over  twenty  years  after  1936.  But  in  the  new 
political  climate  kindled  by  the  1956  Border  campaign  several  slua- 
ite  were  founded  by  young  emigrant  activists  with  Fianna  backgrounds 
i  in  Ireland.  The  first  of  them  was  organised  in  London  by  Sean  0 
Cionnaith  in  195911,  and  drilled  at  Southwark  Town  Hall  with  a 
membership  of  twelve.  After  parading  in  uniform  at  a  Sinn  F6in 
demonstration  in  contravention  of  English  law12  it  was  forced  by 
police  pressure  to  adopt  associate  membership  status  in  1961,  aband- 
oning  public  appearances  in  favour  of  fund-raising  for  the  home 
organisation.  The  slua  lapsed  briefly  with 
Ö  Cionnaith's  recall 
to  Ireland  as  national  organiser  in  autumn  196213,  and  despite  an 
attempt  at  revival  the  following  spring14  appears  to  have  ceased  to 
exist  altogether  early  in  196415 
Other  branches  were  organised  in  the  early  1960s  in  Man- 
chester16  and  Birmingham.  The  latter  was  established  as  a  senior 389 
section  in  November  1960  by  a  former  member  of  the  Mac  Curtain  slua 
in  Cork 
17. 
It  lapsed  after  his  departure  but  was  re-formed  by 
Pädraig  Yeates  in  1965 
18 
with  a  junior  membership  recruited  mainly 
from  the  local  Irish  dancing  class.  Again  the  branch  barely  out- 
lived  its  organiser,  ceasing  to  function  two  months  after  his 
imprisonment  in  January  196619, 
The  Republican  movement  also  formed  an  adult  support  group  in 
Britain  in  autumn  1963  under  the  name  Clann  na  hEireann.  Three  of 
those  responsible  for  establishing  Fianna  sluaite  were  elected  onto 
Clann's  central  executive,  one  becoming  its  first  national  organiser 
in  March  196520,  The  adult  and  youth  ventures  were  in  fact  the 
work  of  the  same  small  group,  products  of  the  same  Republican  acti- 
vist  circle  emerging  within  the  emigrant  communities  in  Britain  at 
this  date. 
Records  also  exist  of  branches  in  Australia  and  U.  S.  A.  in  the 
1960s.  The  former,  founded  as  a  family  slua  of  four  members  in 
1961,  enjoyed  a  steady  growth  for  five  years  and  even  introduced 
associate  membership  for  adults 
1. 
The  branch  established  in  New 
2 
York  in  1963  survived  a  violent  dispute  of  leadership  and  continued 
meeting  until  at  least  196722. 
Expatriate  branches  have  been  set  up  by  both  the  Officials 
and  Provisionals  since  the  split  of  1970.  One  such,  which  survived 
briefly  in  Leeds  during  1971-2  under  the  leadership  of  members  of 
Clann  na  hEireann,  the  support  group  of  Official  Sinn  Fein 
23, 
pro- 
vided  a  cultural  club  environment  for  pre-adolescents  with  a  special 
emphasis  on  dancing24,  More  recently,  the  Provisional  movement  has 
organised  a  slua  in  California25. 
Fianna's  existence  outside  Ireland  has  been  sporadic,  iso- 
lated,  and  minute  in  scale  and  significance.  It  is  nonetheless 390 
possible  to  discern  a  broad  overall  pattern  which  -  in  that  sluaite 
have  usually  been  established  during  or  immediately  following 
periods  of  buoyancy  within  the  Republican  movement  as  a  whole  - 
appears  to  bear  some  correspondence  with  political  events  in  Ire- 
land.  More  pertinently,  however,  their  existence  has  depended  on 
the  often  fortuitous  presence  of  individuals,  for  in  hardly  any  case 
have  expatriate  branches  thrived  after  the  departure  of  their 
founders.  In  this  they  have  manifested  in  extreme  form  a  tendency 
also  observable  in  the  history  of  Fianna  in  Ireland  and  which,  it 
26  is  said,  has  often  applied  to  the  Republican  movement  itself. 391 
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letter  to  the  author  16/2/1981,  was  unable  to  supply  further 
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Appendix  II.  THE  1902  FIANNA  EIREANN 
When  the  County  Antrim  Board  of  the  G.  A.  A.  rejected  Hobson's 
proposal  to  organise  the  boys'  hurling  clubs  of  West  Belfast  into  a 
league,  he  resigned  from  the  Board  and  decided  to  form  a  league  him- 
self1.  To  this  end  a  meeting  was  held  at  the  Catholic  Boys'  Hall, 
Falls  Road,  on  Sunday  22  June  19022,  attended  apparently  by  nearly 
300  boys3.  It  was  agreed  that  the  league  should  be  called  'Fianna 
Gurean'  and  be  open  to  boys  of  sixteen  years  and  under.  Eight 
teams  applied  to  enter,  their  names  taken  from  both  ancient  and 
modern  history  -  Michael  Dwyer, 
Eire  6g,  Brian  Boru,  Fianna 
Eireann,  Oisfn,  Red  Branch  and  Geraldines.  'Fianna  Eireann'  was 
thus  initially  only  the  name  of  one  participating  club. 
Officers  were  elected4  and  the  decision  was  taken  to  hold 
weekly  committee  meetings.  At  the  first  of  these  the  league  was 
renamed  'Fianna  na  Eireann'  (sic),  and  subsequently  'Fianna  Eireann'. 
By  now  further  teams  had  affiliated  and  several  others  had  changed 
their  names  so  that  most  now  carried  the  name  of  one  of  Fionn's 
warriors.  Five  teams  proved  viable,  and  to  these  was  added  a  foot- 
ball  league  of  eight  teams  in  the  August. 
Hobson  was  given  financial  help  by  friends,  one  of  whom  donated 
a  shield  of  beaten  copper,  and  the  clubs  took  turns  to  organise  a 
Sgoruidheacht  at  Bank  Street  School  to  aid  the  funds.  The  league 
also  staged  an  athletics  tournament  at  Celtic  Park  in  the  summer, 
with  running,  jumping  and  hurling  events,  making  a  profit  and  new 
friends.  It  nevertheless  remained  handicapped  by  lack  of  funds. 
Medals  were  costly,  and  on  losing  their  original  playing  field  the 
boys  had  decided  to  take  over  Old  Celtic  Park.  To  use  this  en- 
closed  field  at  a  rental  of  £10  per  half-year  would  have  been  beyond 
their  pockets  but  the  decision  was  taken  on  the  guarantee  of  a 394 
friend  of  Hobson's  paying  the  rents  Morale  was  high  when  the  park 
was  officially  opened  in  November  with  a  Gaelic  tournament,  but  the 
venture  proved  a  millstone  when  the  benefactor  ran  into  debt  and 
left  the  league  to  foot  the  bill. 
A  second  problem  was  the  boys'  inconsistent  attendance  at 
matches  and  committee  meetings.  Hobson  himself  set  an  example  in 
this  matter  and  despite  other  commitments  was  absent  from  the  chair 
only  once  that  year.  Moreover,  at  least  five  venues  were  used 
for  meetings  to  share  the  burden  of  travels.  Nonetheless  the 
decision  was  taken  in  December  to  expel  committee  members  for  ir- 
regular  attendance,  and  by  November  the  football  league  had  dwindled 
to  five  teams. 
Precise  evidence  is  not  available  concerning  the  fortunes  of 
the  organisation  after  1902.  Hobson  himself  wrote  later  that  "as 
other  work  piled  up  I  was  able  to  give  less  time  to  the  Fianna, 
and  it  became  rather  neglected".  As  a  democratically  constituted 
7 
organisation  it  afforded  its  members  experience  in  running  their 
own  affairs.  But  Hobson  was  a  man  of  outstanding  organising  abi- 
lity  and  inventiveness,  as  well  as  being  three  or  four  crucial  years 
older  than  the  other  members,  and  his  guiding  presence  was  essen- 
tial  to  its  wellbeing.  The  league  maintained  a  more  or  less  un- 
broken  existence  for  a  further  two  years  or  so,  though  on  a  more 
restricted  scale.  A  member  who  joined  in  1903  recalls  hurling 
8 
being  almost  the  only  activity  at  this  time. 
In  the  same  year  the  sixteen  year  old  Joseph  Robinson  became 
the  league's  voluntary  organiser.  The  conditions  of  his  employment 
gave  him  the  opportunity  to  tour  the  clubs  on  his  bicycle  and  main- 
tain  contacts 
9; 
He  has  stated  that  the  organisation  still  had  150- 
200  members  at  the  end  of  the  year,  but  that  it  became  defunct  about 
190410.  Nevertheless  some  of  the  teams  certainly  survived  and  no 395 
doubt  games  were  played  occasionally  on  a  friendly  basis.  It 
would  be  possible  to  justify  lapses  and  revivals  as  seasonal  mat- 
ters  and  to  re-establish  the  league  more  or  less  formally  from  time 
to  time.  Robinson  believes  that  remnants  of  the  1902  Fianna  prob- 
ably  survived  in  Belfast  when  Hobson  and  Countess  Markievicz  founded 
the  new  body  in  Dublin  seven  years  later,  and  that  in  the  meantime 
various  efforts  were  made  to  "infuse  new  life"  into  the  organisation. 
He  cites  evidence  from  1906-7  supporting  his  view 
11 
. 
The  most  radical  attempt  at  re-organisation  was  made  late  in 
1906.  The  1  December  issue  of  Sinn  Fein  reported  a  meeting  of 
"national  boys  of  Belfast"  staged  by  "Fianna  na  hEireann"  for  the 
purpose  of  forming  a  National  Boys'  Brigade.  Over  one  hundred  boys 
joined  the  new  body,  Hobson  being  elected  President.  Apparently 
the  development  had  been  contemplated  for  some  time.  It  represen- 
ted  a  notable  departure,  being  clearly  a  reaction  to  the  success  of 
William  Smith's  Boys'  Brigade  and  kindred  'British'  organisations; 
as  such  it  anticipated  the  1909  Fianna  whose  foundation  was  inspired 
by  the  establishment  of  the  Baden-Powell  Scouts  in  Ireland.  The 
Brigade  was  to  be  "Irish  in  all  things  and  teach  its  members  to 
become  good  citizens  of  the  Irish  nation".  Its  structure  would  be 
military  with  the  boys  in  divisions  of  ten,  but  unlike  the  Boys' 
Brigade  that  inspired  it  it  would  retain  a  democratic  process  of 
decision  making.  Its  programme  was  planned  to  include  a  pipe  band 
and  lectures  in  Ireland's  language,  history  and  resources.  The 
last  item  implied  a  further  development  beyond  the  original  concept 
of  1902.  It  revealed  the  growing  influence  in  separatist  circles 
and  upon  Hobson  of  Arthur  Griffith,  whose  Resurrection  of  Hungary 
had  been  published  two  years  before  and  whose  National  Council 
would  amalgamate  with  Hobson's  Dungannon  Clubs  to  form  Sinn  Fein 396 
in  1908.  Thus  onto  the  Gaelic  and  heroic  nationalism  of  1902  were 
grafted  military  and  economic  nationalism. 
However,  the  ambitious  impetus  was  apparently  not  maintained. 
During  the  first  half  of  1907  Hobson  was  engaged  in  producing  his 
Belfast  weekly  The  Republic12,  the  first  issue  of  which  appeared 
only  three  weeks  after  the  launching  of  the  Brigade.  Yet  this 
lively  little  paper,  which  missed  no  opportunity  to  publicise  any 
happening  that  might  further  the  separatist  cause,  made  no  mention 
whatever  of  Fianna  Eireann,  whether  as  a  hurling  league  or  Brigade. 
The  silence  is  hardly  compatible  with  a  flourishing  organisation. 
Albeit  negative  evidence,  it  lends  weight  to  the  view  of  Cathal 
O'Shannon  that  Fianna  had  ceased  to  function  by  190713.  If  still 
technically  alive  after  this  date  it  was  making  no  stir  even  in 
the  close  circle  of  separatist  Belfast. 397 
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Appendix  III.  THE  IRISH  CITIZEN  ARMY  SCOUTS 
The  Citizen  Army  formed  its  own  scout  corps  in  the  summer  of 
1914.  The  Transport  Union's  weekly  paper  Irish  Worker  carried  no 
account  of  the  event,  its  first  reference  -  in  the  issue  of  25  July 
-  being  to  a  "junior  section"  of  the  Army  already  in  existence. 
Fox  has  dated  the  corps  from  that  month',  but-according  to  one  who 
was  a  member  from  the  outset  the  inaugural  meeting  in  fact  took 
2 
place  in  June 
The  formation  of  a  scout  section  is  to  be  seen  in  the  context 
of  a  number  of  initiatives  taken  about  this  time  with  the  aim  of 
improving  the-effectiveness  of  the  adult  Army.  In  the  spring  of 
1914  morale  in  the  Labour  movement  had  ebbed  with  the  defeat  of  the 
Lock-out,  and  the  Citizen  Army  seemed  to  be  without  direction  at  a 
time  when  the  Irish  Volunteers  were  enjoying  sweeping  success,  num- 
bering  some  25,000  and  recruiting  a  thousand  new  members  a  week3. 
With  a  view  to  increasing  efficiency  an  Army  general  meeting  was 
held  towards  the  end  of  March  at  which  a  Constitution  was  drawn  up, 
an  Army  Council  elected,  uniform  standardised,  and  the  force  re- 
organised  into  three  battalions4.  At  the  same  time,  in  order  to 
broaden  its  appeal  steps  were  taken  to  provide  a  social  life  for 
members.  At  the  instigation  of  Larkin  the  union  had  already 
acquired  Croydon  Park  as  a  recreative  retreat  for  its  tenement  dwel- 
lers5.  In  May  Larkin  succeeded  Jack  White  as  Commandant  of  the 
Army,  and  every  weekend  thereafter  throughout  the  summer  Croydon 
Park  was  made  the  venue  for  social  activities  of  a  'family'  nature 
which  his  men  helped  to  organise.  Events  included  a  "monster  car- 
nival"  on  Whit  Monday,  children's  sports  and  several  mock  Western 
battles  which  combined  serious  training  with  family  entertainment. 
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The  logical  extension  was  to  involve  women  and  young  people  in 
the  Army  itself.  To  this  end  an  ambulance  class  was  organised  for 
women  and  girls  towards  the  end  of  the  year,  "under  the  control  of 
and  affiliated"  to  the  Army  This  group  was  later  developed  into 
7 
an  Ambulance  Corps  and  made  an  integral  part  of  the  Army  itself 
8 
In  the  meantime  the  Scouts  were  formed  to  serve  a  similar  purpose 
among  the  boys.  They  were  envisaged  as  a  source  of  trained  re- 
cruits  to  the  Army  and  as  an  extension  of  the  organised  Union  family. 
The  decision  to  establish  a  junior  section  was  certainly  in- 
fluenced  by  the  effective  function  that  Fianna  was  already  perform- 
ing  for  the  Volunteers.  The  Citizen  Army  had  several  obvious  con- 
tacts  with  the  Republican  Scouts.  It  regularly  used  their  drill 
hall  in  Lower  Camden  Street,  for  example9,  and  must  often  have  ob- 
served  An  Chead  Slua  training.  Larkin  was  very  friendly  with  the 
Fianna,  and  Slua  Emmet  who  used  a  small  room  adjacent  to  the  Trans- 
port  Workers'  room  in  Beresford  Place  were  often  lent  the  Union's 
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room  there.  In  1913  Larkin  had  given  the  boys  of  St.  Enda's  the 
use  of  Croydon  Park  for  their  Fianna  Aeridheachtll.  Connolly's 
three  oldest  children  belonged  to  the  Belfast  sluaite  whose  members 
had  collected  for  the  locked-out  Dublin  workers12.  Above  all, 
Countess  Markievicz  held  positions  of  leadership  in  both  organisa- 
tions.  Although  at  this  time  President  of  Fianna  she  had  by  her 
own  admission  been  less  active  in  it  for  a  year  past13:  she  may 
have  become  disenchanted  with  the  dominance  within  it  of  the  I.  R.  B.; 
she  had  certainly  become  a  convert  to  Labour  in  the  autumn  of  1913 
and  had  turned  her  energies  increasingly  to  the  Citizen  Army  on  whose 
Council  she  now  served  as  joint  treasurer.  Probably  the  suggestion 
of  a  scout  corps  was  hers;  she  at  any  rate  took  a  leading  part  in 
founding  it  and  in  its  subsequent  organisation. 400 
One  Sunday  in  June,  perhaps  one  of  the  sports  days  at  Croydon 
Park,  with  the  help  of  Michael  Mallin  and  Seamus  McGowan  she 
rounded  up  all  the  boys  who  had  gathered  on  the  field.  She  in- 
vited  them  to  join  a  scout  corps,  to  train  at  Liberty  Hall  and  be 
attached  to  the  Citizen  Army,  and  if  interested  to  attend  a  meeting 
on  the  following  evening.  Twenty  boys  duly  arrived  on  the  Monday 
and  were  enrolled14,  Walter  Carpenter,  who  was  already  about 
twenty  years  of  age,  was  made  o/c,  Charlie  D'Arcy  Lieutenant  and 
Paddy  Carroll  Sergeant. 
Drill  training  was  given  on  Tuesday  evenings,  at  Croydon  Park 
in  the  summer  months  and  from  October  onwards  in  the  'Large  Room' 
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at  Liberty  Hall.  First  Aid  classes  were  later  added  on  Thursdays 
under  Drs.  Kathleen  Lynn  and  French-Mullen16.  With  the  completion 
of  the  rifle.  range  at  Croydon  Park  in  the  autumn  there  was  the 
chance  of  target  practice  on  Saturday  afternoons17,  using  the  dozen 
.  22  air  rifles  that  the  scouts  possessed  and  occasionally,  after 
Howth,  Lee  Enfields  and  Brownings.  Instruction  in  the  use  and  care 
of  weapons  was  given  by  the  Countess,  who  also  measured  the  boys  for 
uniforms,  herself  cutting  the  grey-green  German  napsac  material  which 
was  then  sewn  by  women  members  of  the  Union.  The  boys  were  turned 
out  in  slouch  hats  with  a  Red  Hand  badge,  red  ties  and  two  rows  of 
buttons.  Their  equipment  usually  included  haversack,  belt  and 
jack-knife. 
The  corps  was  formally  administered  by  a  committee,  though  in 
fact  the  Countess  and  Seamus  McGowan  came  to  be  its  general  organi- 
sers.  It  had  in  fact  no  autonomy,  being  run  from  above  as  a  minor 
wing  of  the  Army,  while  its  internal  structure  was  neither  that  of 
a  scout  troop  nor  a  'boys'  republic'  but  a  military  hierarchy. 
There  were  no  A.  G.  M.  s,  members'  meetings  or  democratic  process. 401 
Furthermore,  though  it  called  itself  a  'scout  corps'  the  term  was 
intended  in  the  limited  and  specifically  military  sense  of  'partici- 
pating  cadets'  -  such  scouting  elements  as  woodcraft,  tests  and 
camping  had  no  part  in  its  programme.  In  both  these  respects, 
though  inspired  by  Na  Fianna  it  departed  radically  from  its  model. 
After  the  initial  enrolment  there  appears  to  have  been  little 
subsequent  expansion  and  few  new  recruits.  It  is  true  that  a  Com- 
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pany  was  reportedly  formed  in  Kingstown  in  the  autumn,  and  a  second 
city  Company  in  the  Church  Road  area  of  Dublin  a  year  later19.  But 
the  former  got  off  the  ground  only  after  concerted  missionary  effort 
by  the  Dublin  members  and  may  not  have  outlived  their  presence,  while 
the  latter  was  apparently  formed  as  a  measure  to  reduce  winter  travel 
and  implied  a  division  rather  than  an  expansion  of  numbers. 
On  the  other  hand  the  little  band  maintained  a  remarkably  con- 
sistent  membership,  hardly  losing  a  boy  in  its  twenty-one  months' 
existence.  Like  its  adult  counterpart  it  had  a  cohesiveness  born 
of  shared  adversity  and  cemented  in  many  cases  by  family  ties,  for 
the  boys  were  all  sons  of  I.  T.  G.  W.  U.  men  who  had  lived  through  the 
Lock-out  together,  and  some  had  parents,  brothers  or  sisters  in  the 
Army  or  the  Ambulance  Corps.  In  addition,  they  latterly  came  to 
be  accepted  very  much  as  a  part  of  the  adult  Army,  accompanying 
them  on  all  marches,  manoeuvres  and  parades  from  at  least  the  autumn 
of  191520,  and  by  now  on  first  name  terms  with  them.  They  con- 
sidered  themselves  soldiers,  and  were  treated  as  such,  not  being 
pressed  into  the  usual  'political'  tasks  of  a  youth  auxiliary,  such 
as  paper  selling.  These  facts  must  all  have  contributed  to  their 
loyalty.  Above  all,  there  was  the  personal  influence  of  Connolly, 
who  held  so  much  together  which  fell  apart  after  his  death.  The 
boys  addressed  him  as  'Commandant'  and  his  easy,  extraordinary  auth- 402 
ority  induced  in  them  an  awe,  so  that  to  brush  against  him  was  for 
them  "like  brushing  against  our  Lord". 
Their  loyalty  was  exemplified  in  the  person  of  Charlie  D'Arcy, 
who  "gave  up  his  home,  his  job  and  everything"  to  take  his  place  in 
the  round-the-clock  guard  on  Liberty  Hall  during  March  and  April 
1916.  "His  father  and  mother  came  to  the  hall  one  night  when  he 
had  been  missing  from  home  for  about  a  week.  After  a  long  argument 
his  father  told  him  he  would  have  to  choose  now  between  the  hall  and 
his  home.  He  chose  the  hall  without  any  hesitation  and  they  left 
him  there.  It  is  doubtful  if  they  ever  saw  him  again"21. 
For  all  of  them  it  was  a  loyalty  put  to  the  final  test  in  Easter 
Week.  On  Palm  Sunday  Connolly  warned  them  of  imminent  action. 
After  a  week  spent  gathering  arms  and  ammunition  in  their  hand-cart, 
he  called  them  together  on  Good  Friday  and  asked  their  ages.  Sev- 
eral  were  still  fifteen.  He  now  gave  them  details  of  Sunday's 
mobilisation,  adding  that  "if  you  can't  come  it's  all  right".  In 
fact,  all  but  two  were  out  on  Easter  Monday,  making  the  Scouts  per- 
haps  the  most  fully  represented  of  all  the  insurgent  forces.  At 
least  six  boys  were  in  the  G.  P.  O. 
22, 
and  eight  set  off  with  the 
first  Citizen  Army  party  under  Captain  Dick  McCormack,  some  eventu- 
ally  reaching  Stephen's  Green  in  the  evening  after  holding  Davey's 
Pub  and  Harcourt  Street  Station  and  barricading  Harcourt  Street  it- 
self  against  a  British  attack  upon  the  Green23. 
It  was  by  this  barricade  that  the  Scouts  met  with  one  of  their 
three  fatalities.  On  Easter  Tuesday  evening  some  members  of  the 
force  which  had  during  the  day  abandoned  the  Green  and  occupied  the 
College  of  Surgeons  were  sent  out  to  burn  two  houses  beside  the 
Russell  Hotel.  Among  them  was  Fred  Ryan,  seventeen  years  old  but 
looking  like  a  man  with  his  bandolier.  As  they  attempted  to  enter 403 
the  ground-floor  shop  he  was  shot  dead  in  the  same  burst  of  fire 
24 
that  wounded  Margaret  Skinnider  standing  at  his  side.  He  had 
been  a  member  of  Fianna  since  1911  and  had  actually  joined  the  Vol- 
unteers  shortly  before  the  foundation  of  the  Citizen  Army  Scouts  in 
191425.  For  this  reason  he  is  claimed  as  a  Fianna  hero  of  Easter 
Week26,  though  he  had  certainly  relinquished  membership  two  years 
before  the  Rising. 
Seamus  Fox  also  died  a  Citizen  Army  Scout,  despite  his  inclu- 
sion  among  the  Fianna  martyrs.  Aged  sixteen  and  a  native  of  Drum- 
ree  County  Meath,  he  had  arrived  from  Liverpool  only  that  weekend 
and  was  handed  over  to  the  Scouts  by  his  father  outside  Liberty  Hall 
on  the  Monday  morning27.  He  had  no  training  for  battle.  The 
following  morning,  holed  up  in  the  Green  beneath  the  windows  of  the 
Shelbourne  Hotel  now  occupied  by  British  troops,  he  panicked  at  the 
first  volley  and  ran  for  the  gate,  being  shot  dead  while  climbing  it. 
The  first  of  the  Scouts  to  die  was  Charlie  D'Arcy  who  was  a 
member  of  the  force  attacking  Dublin  Castle  under  Seen  Connolly. 
He  was  sent  to  snipe  from  the  roof  of  Henry  and  James's  in  Parlia- 
ment  Street,  where  he  was  mortally  wounded.  At  least  one  other 
Scout,  fifteen  year  old  Mattie  Connolly,  was  with  him  on  the  same 
roof28.  The  Castle  area  was  the  first  to  which  reinforcements  were 
sent  by  the  British  and  the  rebel  contingent  was  soon  outnumbered 
there  by  more  than  twelve  to  one29.  It  was  not  until  after  the 
fighting  was  over  that  D'Arcy's  body  could  be  brought  down;  he  was 
later  buried  in  a  pauper's  grave  in  Glasnevin. 
After  the  surrender  all  surviving  scouts  were  gathered  in  the 
juvenile  party  held  with  the  other  prisoners  in  Richmond  Barracks. 
They  were  later  led  out  in  groups  of  a  dozen  and  instead  of  being 
shot  as  threatened  were  given  a  lecture  -  they  were  told  that  they 404 
had  been  foolish  boys,  misguidedly  following  madmen,  and  were  to  go 
home.  They  formed  ranks  outside  and  marched  together  to  Sackville 
Street  where  seeing  the  situation  they  dispersed. 
That  was  the  end  of  the  Citizen  Army  Scouts.  When  the  adult 
Army  was  re-organised  in  the  summer 
30 
at  least  two-thirds  of  the 
boys  became  members  of  it.  A  number  later  played  a  part  in  the 
Independence  War  and  the  early  stages  of  the  Civil  War  in  Dublin. 
In  the  latter,  for  instance,  Walter  Carpenter  was  a  member  of  the 
Four  Courts  garrison,  Joe  Keeley  was  one  of  the  party  posted  at 
Griffith's  Boot  Shop  as  cover  for  the  retreat  of  the  garrison,  and 
Robert  Norgrove  served  at  several  posts  in  the  capital31,  But  the 
story  of  these  and  other  boys  after  Easter  1916  is  not  a  part  of 
the  history  of  the  Citizen  Army  Scouts. 405 
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Appendix  IV.  AN  OUTLINE  HISTORY  OF  PROVISIONAL  FIANNA 
Although  a  loose  alliance  of  sluaite  associated  with  the  Pro- 
visional  Republican  movement  had  developed  during  1970  under  acting 
Chief  Scout  Andy  Corbett,  the  inaugural  Ard  Fheis  held  at  the  Man- 
Sion  House,  Dublin,  in  January  1971  marks  the  beginning  of  Provi- 
sional  Fianna  as  a  constituted,  national  organisation'. 
The  convention  in  fact  took  place  in  an  atmosphere  of  "utter 
chaos",  due  largely  to  the  inexperience  of  the  delegates2.  Apart 
from  the  Cork  and  Port  Arlington  sluaite,  which  pre-dated  the  split 
in  the  movement,  every  branch  had  been  in  existence  for  less  than  a 
year.  In  that  time  the  priority  had  been  to  establish  sluaite 
quickly  in  order  to  stake  a  claim  to  the  name  'Fianna',  but  this 
had  been  achieved  at  the  expense  of  entry  standards.  Undesirable 
elements  had  been  admitted,  some  attracted  by  the  glamour  of  the 
Provisional  I.  R.  A.  's  military  campaign,  others  dismissed  from  Fianna 
for  disciplinary  reasons  before  or  during  the  period  of  neutrality3. 
In  some  cases  inexperienced  and  unsuitable  boys  had  won  instant  pro- 
motion,  and  now  represented  their  sluaite  at  the  Ard  Fheis. 
The  meeting  elected  a  Headquarters  staff,  comprising  Gerry 
Campbell  Chief  Scout,  Art  Sherwin  Adjutant  General,  and  Daithi  0 
Buitheach  Quartermasterd  A  Belfastman  and  known  to  few  of  the 
delegates,  Campbell  was  elected  more  on  his-native  city's  name  than 
his  own  and  proved  a  totally  inadequate  Chief  Scout.  Supposedly 
on  the  run,  he  lived  off  the  Dublin  organisation  for  the  next 
eighteen  months5. 
The  adult  Provisional  movement  continued  to  expand  during  the 
year.  The  assembly  at  its  Bodenstown  commemoration  in  June  was 
the  largest  seen  there  since  the  1930s6.  But  this  very  buoyancy 
exacerbated  the  problems  of  the  youth  wing.  Sudden  growth,  re- 408 
cruits  often  raw,  apolitical  and  unmanageable,  and  a  non-existent 
leadership,  together  produced  severe  problems  of  control  for  an 
organisation  seeking  to  establish  credibility.  Its  responsible 
7 
members  recognised  the  urgent  need  for  internal  reform,  and  for 
this  looked  inevitably  to  the  Cork  o/c  Donal  Varian  as  the  one  man 
with  national  leadership  experience  in  Fianna  before  and  during 
s 
neutrality.  Through  his  position  on  the  Ard  Choiste  and  his  in- 
fluence  within  the  senior  movement  Varian  was  able  to  effect  the 
gradual  replacement  of  local  and  national  leaders9. 
In  the  late  spring  of  1972  the  Provisional  Army  Council 
ordered  the  dismissal  of  Campbell  and  his  G.  H.  Q.  staff  from  office. 
A  temporary  replacement  staff  was  appointed  by  Fianna's  Ard  Choiste, 
with  Varian  Chief  Scout,  his  brother  Pädraig  Adjutant  and  Valerie 
Gaffney  Quartermaster's.  In  August  Varian  contacted  slua  o/cs, 
informing  them  of  Campbell's  demotion  and  convening  an  extraordinary 
Ard  Fheis  to  elect  a  nationally  recognised  leadership.  At  the 
subsequent  meeting  he  was  himself  ratified  as  Chief  Scout,  his 
. 
brother  elected  Quartermaster  and  Dermott  Murphy  Adjutant 
11 
Significantly,  all  three  were  Corkmen.  Provisional  Fianna  had 
not  succeeded  in  establishing  a  strong  base  in  Dublin,  where  the 
damage  done  by  the  previous  national  leadership  was  greatest  and 
where  the  Officials  were  well  entrenched  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river.  Its  Six  Counties'  sluaite,  with  their  own  highly  localised 
needs  and  problems,  maintained  closer  contact  with  local  Army  units 
than  Fianna  headquarters12.  Within  the  Republic  the  areas  of 
greatest  growth  were  in  the  South  and  South-West13  and  the  August 
appointments  reflected  this  fact.  But  they  created  an  unbalanced 
national  structure,  its  organisational  centre  in  the  extreme  south, 
its  centre  in  terms  of  numbers  and  military  significance  in  the 409 
North.  That  it  operated  satisfactorily  for  five  years  was  due  in 
14  large  part  to  the  standing,  ability  and  dedication  of  Varian_ 
It  took  the  new  leadership  perhaps  a  further  year  to  "clean 
15 
up  the  organisation".  The  Ard  Choiste  was  gradually  purged,  a 
process  simplified  by  the  high  turnover  of  its  members  during  in- 
ternment.  Democratic  processes  were  dispensed  with  -  no  A.  G.  M.  was 
held  in  1972-3,  for  instance16  -  because  Varian  saw  that  the  member- 
ship  was  not  yet  ready  for  them.  In  their  place  he  built  the 
organisation  around  individuals  and  at  the  same  time  sought  the  sup- 
port  of  the  senior  movement  at  local  level.  Without  the  tradition- 
al  ties  that  existed  locally  between  Fianna  and  the  Army,  which  he 
was  able  to  redevelop,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  hold  to- 
gether  the  disparate  elements  that  made  up  the  youth  wing. 
He  and  his  colleagues  were  nevertheless  determined  not  to  buy 
support  at  the  cost  of  independence.  Although  at  national  level 
Fianna's  constitutional  autonomy  was  respected  by  both  Provisional 
Sinn  Fein  and  the  Provisional  I.  R.  A.,  especially  during  Mac  Stiofän's 
term  as  Chief-of-Staff,  this  was  not  always  the  case  locally.  The 
youth  leadership  welcomed  regular  communication  with  the  senior 
movement  locally  and  nationally,  but  only  on  the  basis  of  independent 
negotiation.  The  question  appeared  likely  to  arise  chiefly  in  rela- 
tion  to  the  transfer  of  members.  But  in  fact  the  Army's  need  for 
recruits  en  masse  declined  as  it  became  established  and,  recognising 
the  urgency  for  developing  discipline  and  security  within  Fianna,  it 
actively  encouraged  officers  and  seniors  to  remain  in  the  youth 
organisation. 
Close  association  between  the  two  bodies  was  an  inevitable  con- 
sequence  of  the  Provisionals'  military  campaign.  It  was  not  the 
author's  purpose  to  enquire  into  the  military  role  of  Provisional 410 
Fianna  during  the  campaign.  He  was  nevertheless  informed  that  its 
contribution  has  included  support  work  in  the  form  of  financial  aid 
and  propaganda,  as  well  as  direct  participation  by  select  Active 
Service  Units  organised  in  both  the  North  and  the  Republic.  The 
scale  of  its  involvement  cannot  be  measured  from  thesiovement's 
publicity  statements  since  named  participants  have  normally  been 
designated  as  Army  men  in  order  to  protect  the  young  and  Fianna's 
public  image.  It  may  be  surmised,  however,  by  the  fact  that  at 
least  ten  of  its  members  were  killed  on  active  service  in  the  Belfast 
area  alone  during  1972,  and  a  further  five  between  1973  and  197717. 
Although  senior  members  in  the  South  received  military  training 
and  were  in  some  cases  selected  for  active  service,  the  routine  of 
the  slua  -  particularly  for  juniors  -  was  hardly  affected  by  the 
campaign.  This  was  not  so  in  the  Six  Counties.  The  traditional 
gulf  between  Fianna  North  and  South  therefore  widened  in  the  first 
half  of  the  decade,  during  which  time  the  two  sections  scarcely  met 
except  at  Ard  Fheiseanna18.  Ironically,  the  original  cause  of  the 
divergence  -  Fianna's  illegal  status  in  Northern  Ireland  -  now 
played  little  part  in  maintaining  it  because  of  the  extent  of  the 
movement  across  the  Border  and  increased  harrassment  of  the  sup- 
posedly  legal  organisation  in  the  Republic.  Role,  and  not  the 
Border  as  such,  thus  determined  the  Fianna  type,  and  sluaite  in 
areas  near  the  Six  Counties  such  as  Dundalk  and  Donegal  came  to  be 
more  closely  associated  with  the  Northern  than  the  Southern  organi- 
sation19 
Although  the  two  types  remained  distinct  they  moved  towards  a 
closer  organisational  unity  from  1975.  The  fact  that  the  Northern 
Division  that  year  for  the  first  time  sought  election  of  its  members 
onto  the  Ard  Choiste  commensurate  with  its  numerical  strength  was 411 
seen  as  an  indication  of  willingness  to  develop  closer  ties  with 
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the  national  organisation. 
The  same  year  saw  mixed  sluaite  introduced  experimentally  in 
Cork,  as  a  departure  from  the  national  practice  of  separate  boys' 
and  girls'  branches  under  a  mixed  central  leadership.  Following 
the  success  of  the  Cork  initiative  the  new  structure  became  stan- 
dard  from  197621.  In  its  aims  and  methods,  however,  the  organisa- 
tion  remained  otherwise  broadly  unchanged,  its  self-concept  firmly 
bedded  in  the  'pure'  traditions  to  which  it  had  returned  in  1971. 
The  series  of  Fianna  articles  written  for  the  spring  1975  issues  of 
An  Phoblacht,  for  example,  echoed  the  old  style  and  content22. 
Entirely  apolitical,  they  extolled  the  Gaelic  and  chivalrous  vir- 
tues,  borrowing  from  Casement's  essay  on  chivalry  that  had  been  the 
subject  of  dispute  between  Fianna  and  the  new  leadership  of  the 
2 
movement  in  19643. 
At  the  1977  Ard  Fheis  Varian  was  succeeded  as  Chief  Scout  by 
Belfast  Brigade  officer  T.,  though  he  continued  as  Munster  organi- 
ser24.  In  that  he  was  a  constitutionalist  and  traditionalist  the 
change  of  leadership  probably  hastened  change  in  the  organisation. 
Certainly  it  coincided  with  the  beginning  of  significant  departures 
within  Fianna  that  reflected  developments  in  the  senior  movement  at 
this  time.  Change  was  being  forced  upon  the  Provisional  movement 
by  new  elements  within  its  own  membership25,  as  well  as  by  external 
events.  In  particular,  the  development  of  British  intelligence 
during  and  after  the  truce  of  spring  1975  had  severely  damaged  its 
military  effectiveness  and  prompted  a  major  re-appraisal  of  its 
methods  over  the  next  two  years26.  At  the  end  of  this  period  the 
I.  R.  A.  leadership  issued  a  Staff  Report  which  recommended  "re- 
organisation  and  remotivation,  the  building  of  a  new  Irish  Republi- 
can  Army"27.  Specific  recommendations  included  greater  discipline 412 
and  secrecy,  and  to  this  end  a  cell  system  to  replace'the  existing 
Brigade  structure,  as  well  as  the  radicalisation  of  Sinn  Fein  with 
a  programme  to  include  "agitation  around  social  and  economic 
issues".  The  document  stipulated  that  the  disciplinary  and  struc- 
tural  changes  should  apply  also  to  Fianna,  which  "should  return  to 
being  an  underground  organisation  with  little  or  no  public  image; 
(its  members)  should  be  educated  and  organised  decisively  to  pass 
into  the  I.  R.  A.  cell  structure  when  of  age". 
28 
In  response  to  the  Report  Fianna  has  restricted  public  and 
military  parades  since  1977,  adjusted  its  authority  structure  to 
correspond-geographically  with  that  of  the  Provisional  I.  R.  A.,  and 
adopted  the  cell  system  in  the  North29.  But  in  addition,  the  new 
and  wider  role  of  the  party  has  brought  a  corresponding  broadening 
of  its  own  role.  Its  leaders,  like  those  of  the  parent  movement, 
"have  come  to  realise  that  they  must  have  political  machinery  ready 
when  Britain's  declaration  of  intent  to  withdraw  from  Ireland  is 
announced"30,  They  have  therefore  added  to  the  existing  programme 
of  scouting,  language  and  culture  educational  courses  in  Republican 
and  general  politics,  and  at  the  same  time  laid  greater  emphasis  on 
31 
political  activity 
The  latter  has  developed  principally  out  of  their  work  for 
Republican  prisoners.  Traditionally  this  support  took  the  form  of 
social  welfare  and  in  particular  fund-raising32.  But  as  intern- 
ment  and.  prisoners'  rights  became  political  issues,  particularly 
after  the  withdrawal  of  Special  Category  Status  in  March  197633, 
prisoners'  aid  in  turn  developed  from  simple  welfare  into  a  politi- 
cal  activity.  It  remains  the  main  thrust  of  Fianna's  political 
34 
work 
The  attempt  made  at  the  1978  Provisional  Sinn  Fain  Ard  Fheis  to 
establish  a  Young  Sinn  F4in  party  is  evidence  of  the  importance  the 413 
adult  movement  now  attaches  to  political  activity  on  the  part  of 
its  youth35,  And  the  fact  that  the  motion  was  withdrawn  in  favour 
of  an  amendment  "to  support  the  existing  youth  organisation"  indi- 
cates  the  movement's  faith  in  the  ability  of  Fianna  to  undertake 
such  activity. 
The  new  emphasis  given  by  Provisional  Fianna  to  education,  and 
political  education  specifically,  represents  a  change  of  attitude, 
a  new  openness  and  readiness  to  foster  thought  among  its  members, 
which  in  turn  has  implications  for  its  relationship  with  the  senior 
movement.  Where  before  it  was  viewed  primarily  as  a  cadet  force 
for  the  Army,  with  implicit  assumptions  of  automatic  transfer,  its 
leadership  now  see  it  as  "a  holding  ground  where  the  members  can 
sort  out  their  views  and  reach  their  own  decisions"  concerning 
graduation;  the  members  for  their  part,  who  previously  looked  to 
the  leadership  of  the  adult  organisation  as  "gods",  are  now  devel- 
oping  a  capacity  to  criticise  them  and  their  policies36, 
It  is  not  clear  whether  the  initiatives  of  the  last  four  years 
will  result  in  time  in  a  significantly  new  definition  of  the  role 
of  youth  within  the  Provisional  Republican  movement.  But  there  is 
already  evidence  that  they  have  resulted  in  the  recruitment  of  a 
more  mature  and  thinking  type  of  young  person,  an  effect  reinforced 
by  a  deliberate  policy  of  more  discriminate  selection  of  applicants 
since  1978.  If  this  has  in  turn  brought  a  greater  steadiness  to 
the  organisation,  other  factors  -  notably  harrassment  and  a  severe 
shortage  of  resources  and  premises  -  have  made  continued  high  wast- 
age  inevitable,  especially  in  the  winter  months37.  At  the  time  of 
the  author's  enquiry  in  summer  1979  the  leadership  considered  that 
Fianna  was  holding  its  own  generally,  and  making  some  small  advances 
particularly  in  larger  rural  towns.  Their  detailed  analysis  of 
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structure  and  estimate  of  membership  were  probably  as  accurate  as 
seasonal  fluctuation,  problems  of  communication  and  the  demands  of 
security  would  allow: 
Table  II.  Analysis  of  structure  and  membership, 
Provisional  Fianna,  Summer  1979 
Structure 
Ard  Fheis  -  meeting  biennially  (for  organisational 
and  financial  reasons); 
Ard  Choiste  -9  elected  members  plus  chairman  and 
secretary,  meeting  bimonthly; 
G.  H.  Q.  staff  -  meeting  regularly; 
Divisions  -  one  -  the  Northern; 
Brigades  -  only  Belfast  large  enough;  Brigade  struc- 
ture  made  obsolete  by  cell  system; 
Battalions  -  Dublin 
Areas  and  Membership 
The  Republic  Northern  Ireland  plus  Newry 
Dublin  60-70  Belfast  200-250 
Diheda  15-20  Derry  100 
Dundalk  30+  South  Armagh  40-80 
Monaghan  20  Tyrone  40 
Castleblaney  15-20  Newry  24 
Scotstown  10  Strabane  ? 
Wexford  15-20 
Sligo  12  Plus  rural  areas  in  contact 
Cork  city  40-50  with  larger  cent  res  -  eg., 
Tralee  12  South  County  Der  ry  with 
Limerick  city  10-15  Derry  city 
W.  Limerick  8 
Shannon  30 
Galway  city  8 
Ballybofey  10 
Cashel  10-12 
Navan  15-20 
Estimated 
Total  320+  Total  600? 
The  above  composed  of  Seniors  Modal  age  of  memb  ers  in 
(14+)  and  Juniors  (6-14)  in  Northern  Ireland  c.  16-17 
approximately  equa  l  numbers  years 
Estimated  membership  32  Counties  -  c.  900 415 
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Appendix  V.  A  SUMMARY  OF  PENSIONS  ACTS  APPLICABLE  TO 
FI  ANNA 
The  Military  Service  Pensions  Act  1924  provided  for  the  grant 
of  military  service  pensions  to  persons 
(a)  who  had  pre-truce  service  in  certain  prescribed  National 
organisations  (including  Fianna  Eireann),  and 
(b)  who  served  in  the  National  Army  at  any  time  between 
1  July  1922  and  1  October  1923. 
(As  there  were  no  women  members  in  the  National  Army  there  was  no 
provision  in  this  Act  for  the  grant  of  pensions  to  members  of  Cumann 
na  mBan.  ) 
The  Military  Service  Pensions  Act  1934  provided  for  the  grant 
of  military  service  pensions  to  persons 
(a)  who  had  pre-truce  service  in  certain  prescribed  National 
organisations  (including  Fianna  Eireann  and  Cumann  na 
mBan),  and 
(b)  who  served  post-truce  in  such  organisations. 
This  Act  also  provided  pensions  for  persons  who  had  not  post-truce 
service  but  who  served  in  one  of  the  named  organisations 
(i)  at  any  time  during  the  week  which  commenced  on  23  April 
1916,  or 
(ii)  continuously  during  the  period  which  commenced  on  1  April 
1921  and  ended  on  11  July  1921. 
The  Act  of  1924  provided  for  the  setting  up  of  a  Board  of 
Assessors,  consisting  of  three  members,  to  investigate  and  report 
on  all  claims  referred  to  them  by  the  Minister  for  Defence.  The 
members  of  the  Board  were  appointed  by  the  Minister  with  the  appro- 
val  of  the  Government  and  one  of  the  members  was  required  to  be  a 
Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court,  High  Court,  Circuit  Court  or  District 
Court  or  a  practising  barrister  of  not  less  than  ten  years  standing. 418 
The  findings  of  the  Board  of  Assessors  were  final  and  conclusive 
and  binding  upon  the  applicant.  The  onus  of  proof  rested  on  the 
applicant  and  he  was  at  liberty  to  offer  such  evidence  as  might  be 
necessary  to  enable  him  to  discharge  that  onus. 
The  Act  of  1934  provided  that  a  Referee,  assisted  by  an 
Advisory  Committee  of  four  should  investigate  and  report  on  all 
applications  referred  to  him  by  the  Minister  for  Defence.  The 
Referee  was  appointed  by  the  Government  and  was  required  to  be  a 
Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  High  Court,  or  the  Circuit  Court, 
or  a  Justice  of  the  District  Court  or  a  practising  barrister  of  at 
least  ten  years  standing.  The  Advisory  Committee  consisted  of  a 
representative  of  the  Minister  for  Finance,  a  representative  of  the 
Minister  for  Defence  and  two  members  of  the  I.  R.  A.  nominated  by  the 
Government  and  who  had  held  high  rank  before  11  July  1921.  The 
Committee  was  advisory  only  and  had  no  executive  function.  The 
findings  of  the  Referee  were  final  and  conclusive  and  binding  on 
all  persons  and  tribunals.  The  onus  of  proving  before  the  Referee 
any  matters  of  fact  alleged  in  an  application  rested  on  the  appli- 
cant  who  was  at  liberty  to  offer  such  evidence  as  he  considered 
necessary. 
Where  the  facts  in  the  application  form  showed  a  prima  facie 
case  the  applicant  was  usually  called  before  the  Board  of  Assessors 
or  the  Referee  or  the  Advisory  Committee  as  appropriate  and  invited 
to  give  sworn  testimony  in  support  of  his  statements.  Officers  of 
the  Battalion  or  Company  in  which  the  applicant  claimed  to  have  ser- 
ved  might  also  be  called  to  testify  on  oath. 
Active  Service  was  not  defined  in  the  Acts.  The  interpreta- 
tion  of  the  term  was  a  matter  solely  for  the  Board  or  the  Referee, 
who  did  not  make  any  specific  rules  defining  active  service  but 
decided  each  case  on  the  facts  bearing  in  mind  that  active  service 419 
must  be  continuous  during  either  of  the  qualifying  periods  (1  April- 
1920  to  31  March  1921  or  1  April  1921  to  11  July  1921)  or  at  any 
time  during  Easter  Week  1916.  It  is  understood  that,  in  practice, 
the  term  'Active  Service'  was  interpreted  liberally.  There  is  no 
reason  to  think  that  the  absence  of  a  legal  definition  placed 
applicants  at  any  disadvantage.  Indeed  such  a  definition  might 
well  rule  out  many  meritorious  cases  which  could  benefit  from  the 
discretion  vested  in  the  Referee. 
Basis  of  the  Awards 
The  award  of  pension  was  calculated  by  multiplying  the  yearly 
amount  appropriate  to  the  grade  or  rank  of  an  applicant  by  the  num- 
ber  of  years  pensionable  service  awarded  to  him.  The  determina- 
tion  of  the  rank  and  pensionable  service  were  matters  exclusively 
for,  the  Board  of  Assessors  or  the  Referee  whose  findings  were  final 
and  conclusive.  The  maximum  service  from  23  April  1916  to  30  Sept- 
ember  1923  counted  notionally  as  14  years  for  pension  purposes. 
Easter  Week  1916  rated  as  4  years  and  the  three  months  before 
11  July  1921  were  reckoned  as  1  year. 
Military  Service  Pensions  (Amendment)  Act  1949 
This  Act  gave  an  opportunity  to  persons  who  had  not  previously 
applied  under  the  1924  or  1934  Acts  to  apply  for  pensions  and  pro- 
vided  for  appeals  by  persons  whose  claims  for  pensions  had  been  re- 
fused  earlier.  All  applications  and  appeals  under  this  Act  were 
disposed  of  and  the  administration  of.  the  Military  Service  Pensions 
Acts  was  wound  up  finally  on  30  September  1958. 
Disablement  Pensions 
The  Army  Pensions  Act  1932  provided  for  the  grant  of  pensions 
to,  among  others,  members  of  Fianna  Eireann,  who  were  suffering  from 
a  wound  or  disease  attributable  to  military  service. 420 
Statistics 
Current  rate  of  Maximum  Military  Service  Pension  -  £3,490  per  annum 
Current  rate  of  Minimum  Military  Service  Pension  -  £155  per  annum 
Current  rate  of  Maximum  Disability  Service 
Pension  1932  Act  (100%) 
-  £1,814  per  annum 
Current  rate  of  Minimum  Disability  Service 
Pension  (20%)  -  £412  per  annum 
Benefits  available  in  the  case  of  Fianna  veterans 
1.  Free  travel  within  the  State,  subject  to  certain  conditions, 
for  themselves  and  spouses. 
2.  Free  electricity  allowance  and  television  (monochrome)  licence 
subject  to  certain  conditions  (e.  g.  registered  consumer,  living 
alone  or  with  certain  categories  of  persons). 
3.  Special  allowance.  payable  if  they  are  over  70  years  of  age  and 
their  means  (including  that  of  the  spouse)  is  within  a  certain 
limit.  In  calculating  their  means  Social  Welfare  benefits  e.  g. 
old  age  pension,  widow's  pension  etc.  are  largely  disregarded. 
Average  special  allowance  payable  is  £326  per  annum. 
4.  Funeral  grant  of  £100. 
5.  Free  telephone  rental  if  living  entirely  alone.  Estimated  at 
£50  per  annum. 
Medals 
1916  Medal 
Awarded  to 
(a)  persons  who  were  granted  pensions  under  the  Military 
Service  Pensions  Acts  entitling  them  to  pension  in 
respect  of  Easter  week  1916. 
(b)  non  pensioners  who  satisfy  the  Minister  for  Defence 
that  their  service  was  such  as  would  have  merited  the 
grant  of  one  if  they  had  applied  under  the  Acts. 421 
Service  (1917-1921)  Medal  with  Bar 
Issued  to  all 
(a)  military  service  pensioners  and  those  disablement 
pensioners  whose  disability  was  attributable  to 
pre-truce  military  service. 
(b)  non-pensioners  who  satisfy  the  Minister  for  Defence 
that  their  service  was  such  as  would  have  merited 
the  grant  of  a  pension  if  they  had  applied  under  the 
Acts. 
Service  (1917-1921)  Medal  without  Bar 
Awarded  to  non-pensioners  who  satisfy  the  Minister  for  Defence 
that  they  were  members  of  one  of  the  prescribed  National  organi- 
sations  (including  Citizen  Army,  Fianna  Eireann  and  Cumann  na 
mBan)  continuously  for  a  period  of  three  months  prior  to 
11  July  1921. 
(The  text  of  this  Appendix  is  based  on  information  supplied  to  the 
author  by  the  Secretary  An  Roinn  Cosanta,  Brainse  Airgeadais, 
Coläiste  Caoimhin  -  Department  of  Defence,  Finance  Branch,  Colaiste 
Caoimhin,  Dublin;  February  1979.  ) LIST  OF  SOURCES  REFERRED  TO  IN  THE  TEXT 
Sections  arranged  alphabetically  or  chronologically 
PRIMARY  SOURCES 
FIANNA  INTERNAL  DOCUMENTS 
Constitution,  printed  in  Irish  Freedom,  October  1911. 
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Breandän  6  Cearbhaill  Dublin  1915-20  Company  o/c 
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Sean  McNally  Belfast  1917-22  Company  o/c 
Frank  Driver  Ballymore  1917-22  Company  o/c 
John  Murray  Cork  1917-27  Battalion  o/c 434 
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Ned  Lennon  Dun 
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(Louise  Coghlan  O'Brien  Dublin  1922-27  Countess  Markievicz 
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Robert  Russell  Dublin  1941-42 
A.  McM.  Belfast  1944-57; 
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Dick  Bell  Dublin  1945-52  Chief  Scout 
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Ned  Kelly  Dublin  1948-55  Chief  Scout 
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Donnchadha  6  S6aghdha  Dublin  1954-75  Brigade  o/c,  G.  H. Q. 
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Sean  6  Cionnaith  Galway  1960-65  o/c  London  Slua, 
National  Organiser, 
Chief  Scout 
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M¬ceäl  Bairead  Dublin  1963-75  Chief  Scout 
P.  C.  Belfast  1966-72  Brigade  o/c 
K.  O'K.  Belfast  1967-76  Girls'  Brigade  o/c 
Art  Sherwin  Dublin  1968-70;  Adjutant  General  Pro- 
1978-  visional  Fianna 
D.  R.  Belfast  1969-76  Brigade  o/c 
B.  H.  Belfast  1970-76  Also  National  Executive 
I.  D.  Y.  M. 
Brian  Lynch  Cork  1970-75  Also  National  Secretary 
I.  D.  Y.  M. 
G.  McM.  Belfast  1971-73  Girls'  Battalion  Adju- 
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(G.  McD.  Belfast  1975-76  Republican  Clubs' 
Chief  Liaison  Officer 
for  Fianna) 
(Tony  Heffernan  Dublin  1975-76  Gen.  Secretary  Sinn 
Fein  W.  P.;  Chairman 
S.  F.  W.  P.  Youth  Commit- 
tee;  Chairman  National 
Organising  Committee 
for  I.  D.  Y.  M.  ) 
'Two  fiannai'  Belfast  1976-  Lower  Falls  slua 
(Patsy  C.  Belfast  1978-  Republican  Clubs'  Slua 
Liaison  Officer) 
Philip  Moran  Dublin  1976-  First  National  Chair- 
man  I.  D.  Y.  M. 
Sean  Mac  Cartaigh  Cork  1976-  National  Recreation 
Officer  I.  D.  Y.  M. 
Tommy  O'Driscoll  Cork  1976-  Branch  Education  Officer 
I.  D.  Y.  M. 
Sein  Garland  Dublin  1962-  General  Secretary  Sinn 
Fein  W.  P. 
Tomas  Mac  Giolla  Dublin  1962-  President  Sinn  Fein 
W.  P. 
Paddy  Buttner  Dublin  1914-16  Irish  Citizen  Army 
Scouts 
Catherine  O'Connor  Dublin  1926-68  Commandant  Clann  na 
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May  Mac  Giolla  Dublin  1934-48  Clann  na  nGael 
1969-70  Dublin  o/c  Cumann  na 
gCailini 
Tommy  O'Flaherty  Dublin  National  Executive 
Connolly  Y.  M. 
Ken  Maloney  Dublin  National  Secretary 
Connolly  Y.  M. 
Stephen  Spain  Dublin  National  Secretary 
C.  B.  S.  I. 
Dennis  Meyer  Dublin  National  Commissioner 
for  Development  Scout 
Association  of  Ireland 
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